CN118107542A - Automobile line control braking system with safety redundancy framework and control method - Google Patents
Automobile line control braking system with safety redundancy framework and control method Download PDFInfo
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- CN118107542A CN118107542A CN202410265058.2A CN202410265058A CN118107542A CN 118107542 A CN118107542 A CN 118107542A CN 202410265058 A CN202410265058 A CN 202410265058A CN 118107542 A CN118107542 A CN 118107542A
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
- B60T13/00—Transmitting braking action from initiating means to ultimate brake actuator with power assistance or drive; Brake systems incorporating such transmitting means, e.g. air-pressure brake systems
- B60T13/74—Transmitting braking action from initiating means to ultimate brake actuator with power assistance or drive; Brake systems incorporating such transmitting means, e.g. air-pressure brake systems with electrical assistance or drive
- B60T13/741—Transmitting braking action from initiating means to ultimate brake actuator with power assistance or drive; Brake systems incorporating such transmitting means, e.g. air-pressure brake systems with electrical assistance or drive acting on an ultimate actuator
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R16/00—Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for; Arrangement of elements of electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for
- B60R16/02—Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for; Arrangement of elements of electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for electric constitutive elements
- B60R16/03—Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for; Arrangement of elements of electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for electric constitutive elements for supply of electrical power to vehicle subsystems or for
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
- B60T17/00—Component parts, details, or accessories of power brake systems not covered by groups B60T8/00, B60T13/00 or B60T15/00, or presenting other characteristic features
- B60T17/18—Safety devices; Monitoring
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
- B60T17/00—Component parts, details, or accessories of power brake systems not covered by groups B60T8/00, B60T13/00 or B60T15/00, or presenting other characteristic features
- B60T17/18—Safety devices; Monitoring
- B60T17/22—Devices for monitoring or checking brake systems; Signal devices
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Transportation (AREA)
- Regulating Braking Force (AREA)
- Valves And Accessory Devices For Braking Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to an automobile line control system with a safety redundancy framework and a control method thereof, wherein an electromechanical brake and a hub motor are not connected to the same group of power supply for the same wheel end actuator; the same executor on the same side is connected to different power supplies, the ECU continuously sends a controller normal instruction to the emergency dynamic braking switching module after being started, when the ECU sends an abnormal instruction or does not send an instruction within a required time range, the emergency dynamic braking switching generates an action, and the motor is directly connected to the dynamic braking unit to realize passive braking.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of automobiles, in particular to an automobile brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy framework.
Background
Braking systems (commonly known as brakes) are one of the important components of a vehicle system. The braking system plays an important role in the safety of the vehicle. The majority of accidents caused by failure of the vehicle itself are due to errors or failures of the braking system.
Hydraulic braking systems are used in traditional automobiles, but the hydraulic systems are slow in response, poor in controllability, large in size, and low in compatibility with mainstream technical routes such as electric automobiles and automatic driving, and therefore in recent years, an Electronic Mechanical Brake (EMB) is emerging. The pedal and EMB actuator are completely separated compared to conventional brake systems, and thus the vehicle is vulnerable to a malfunction of the electrical system. But at the same time, compared with a hydraulic system, the EMB has stronger independence, and in addition, with the development of electric automobiles, motor driving modes such as wheel side motors, hub motors and the like are widely applied. The vehicle driving motor can use modes of regenerative braking, reverse braking, energy consumption braking and the like to realize vehicle braking. The redundancy schemes of existing brakes are mostly aimed at conventional automobiles, or redundancy architecture only for a certain part.
The Chinese patent with the application number of CN201820855828.9 provides a redundant electronic parking brake system for a passenger car, which comprises a brake caliper, a power mechanism assembly, an electronic parking brake switch, an electronic parking brake controller, an electronic stability controller, a CAN FD communication line and an information acquisition module; the electronic parking brake switch is respectively and electrically connected with the electronic parking brake controller and the electronic stability controller; the electronic parking brake controller is connected with the electronic stabilizer through a CAN FD communication line; the electronic parking brake controller and the electronic stabilizer are respectively connected with the brake caliper and the power mechanism assembly in a control mode; the electronic parking brake controller and the electronic stability controller can independently control the brake calipers and the power mechanism assembly, so that the redundancy effect is achieved. The defects of insufficient redundancy, insufficient dynamic braking effect and insufficient stability of the existing electronic parking brake system are overcome.
The chinese patent with application No. cn202211086496.X provides a redundancy control method and a redundancy control system for a multi-brake system: the electronic parking auxiliary system comprises an electronic stability control system, an electronic parking auxiliary system and an electronic power-assisted brake system, wherein the electronic stability control system, the electronic parking auxiliary system and the electronic power-assisted brake system are normal, and the systems can be mutually independent without influencing functions among the systems. After the failure of the electronic parking auxiliary system and the electronic power-assisted braking system is detected, redundancy can be provided for the electronic power-assisted braking system and the electronic parking auxiliary system through the electronic stability control system, the electronic stability control system can replace the functions of the electronic power-assisted braking system and the electronic parking auxiliary system, and apply required braking force to the front wheels and the rear wheels, so that the vehicle brakes are decelerated, the vehicle speed is prevented from being out of control, deceleration and parking can be completed, timely parking braking can be realized, and safety accidents are avoided due to the failure of a plurality of braking functions.
The defects still exist in the practical use: the system is complex, the integration difficulty is high, and the manufacturing cost is high.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above-mentioned shortcomings in the prior art, the present invention provides a multiple redundant electrical architecture for improving the safety of vehicle braking.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
an automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture,
Comprising the following steps: the system comprises an electronic control unit ECU, a power supply management module and a drive-by-wire execution unit;
the drive-by-wire execution unit comprises an electromechanical brake assembly and a hub motor assembly;
The electromechanical brake assembly includes an actuator and a controller,
The actuator comprises an EMB motor and a clamping force sensor;
the controller comprises an EMB motor driver and a clamping force control algorithm module;
The hub motor assembly comprises a hub motor, an emergency dynamic braking switching module and a hub motor controller;
The in-wheel motor includes: a left front hub motor, a right front hub motor, a left rear hub motor, and a right rear hub motor;
the electromechanical brake assembly includes: left and right front electromechanical brake assemblies, left and right rear electromechanical brake assemblies;
The power supply includes: a power supply A and a power supply B;
The power supply A is connected with the left rear wheel hub motor and the right front wheel hub motor;
The power supply B is connected with the left front wheel hub motor and the right rear wheel hub motor;
the power supply A is connected with the left front electromechanical brake and the right rear electromechanical brake;
the power supply B is connected to the left rear electromechanical brake and the right front electromechanical brake.
Preferably, for the same wheel end effector, the electromechanical brake and the in-wheel motor are not connected to the same set of power sources;
the same actuators on the same side are connected to different power supplies.
Preferably, the power source A and the power source B are connected through the power source management module, and the mutual charge balance electric quantity is carried out when the capacity difference of the two groups of power sources exceeds 10% of the standard capacity of a single battery.
Preferably, the power management module cuts off the connection between the power a and the power B when any one of the power a and the power B fails.
Preferably, the electromechanical brake assembly operates in accordance with a clamping force control target value given by the ECU;
The in-wheel motor controller comprises an in-wheel motor driver and an in-wheel motor control algorithm module, and receives and executes instructions sent by the ECU.
Preferably, the ECU continuously sends a controller normal instruction to the emergency dynamic braking switching module after being started, and the hub motor controller are normally connected;
And when the ECU sends an abnormal instruction or does not send an instruction within a required time range, the emergency dynamic braking is switched to act, and the motor is directly connected to the dynamic braking unit to realize passive braking.
When the ECU transmits an abnormal instruction or does not transmit an instruction within a required time range, it includes:
1. and after the ECU is electrified, a normal working instruction is periodically sent to the emergency dynamic braking module, and when the ECU fails or is powered off, the emergency dynamic braking module does not receive the normal working instruction of the ECU within a required time range, and then the emergency dynamic braking module generates a switching action.
2. The ECU works normally and needs the emergency energy consumption braking module to work, and the emergency energy consumption braking module directly sends a report switching instruction to the seventh module to generate switching action.
Preferably, the electromechanical brake ECU is connected to the EMB controller via an EMB communication bus;
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the hub motor through a hub motor bus;
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the clamping force detection unit;
The electromechanical brake ECU is connected with an emergency dynamic braking control unit.
A control method of an automobile line control braking system with a safety redundancy framework comprises the following control steps:
step s100, starting;
step s101, detecting an EMB abnormality;
Step s102, judging whether the clamping force sensor is in fault, if so, jumping to step s103, otherwise jumping to step s104;
the clamping force sensor feeds back signals to the ECU, meanwhile, the ECU can acquire signals such as EMB motor current and rotation angle, and whether the clamping force sensor fails or not can be analyzed according to a program in the ECU.
Step s103, starting a control algorithm without a clamping force sensor, and jumping to step s108;
The ECU calculates the braking requirement of the whole vehicle, calculates the clamping force required to be generated by each wheel end EMB through a certain upper layer distribution control algorithm, sends a clamping force requirement instruction to the EMB controller, and executes the requirement in the clamping force controller.
And the EMB controller controls the motor to drive the actuating mechanism to enable the friction plate and the brake disc to be tightly attached after receiving the instruction, and the generated friction force enables the vehicle to stop.
Step S104, judging the EMB state in fault through the clamping force data;
The EMB has faults, can not act, and has various conditions. Such as complete absence of clamping force, clamping force of EMB to a certain fixed magnitude, and possibly uncontrolled variations.
When the EMB loses braking capability, other redundant backup braking measures such as regenerative braking and reverse braking need to be started to compensate for the functions of the EMB. In addition, the EMB fault of the single-side wheel can cause instability risk caused by instability of the dynamics of the whole vehicle, so that adjustment is needed to be made on the level of a whole vehicle distribution control program.
Step s105, judging whether the failure is the failure of the hub motor controller, and jumping to step s106 if the failure is the failure of the hub motor controller, otherwise jumping to step s107;
Step s106, the motor is switched to emergency energy consumption braking, and step s108 is skipped;
Step s107, wheel hub motor electric brake compensation;
The electromechanical brake compensation of the hub is to use regenerative braking and reverse braking for braking. Both regenerative braking and reverse braking are forms of braking achieved by the in-wheel motor, and emergency dynamic braking differs from the former in that the latter requires an in-wheel motor controller and the latter does not.
Step S108, adjusting a whole vehicle braking control strategy;
Step s109, ends.
Normally the EMB motor current and the resulting clamping force magnitude are positively correlated, and a normal corresponding range can be defined in the ECU by a fault detection procedure, beyond which the abnormality can be determined.
Whether the sensor is abnormal or not can be judged through a feedback signal sequence, if yes, whether the range is exceeded, whether mutation occurs or not, and the like.
The EMB actuator fault is typically determined in the EMB controller, and may be determined by the current of each phase of the motor, position sensor signals, etc.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework reduces risks caused by local faults in a multiple redundancy mode, and is designed from EMB and motor braking redundancy, power supply redundancy, control communication redundancy and processing logic among all the partial redundancy frameworks respectively, so that faults of the brake system are reduced, and the safety of braking of a power automobile is improved.
The automobile line control motor system with the safety redundancy framework reduces the risk of simultaneous failure in a dual-power supply mode of the EMB and the hub motor.
According to the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework, the EMB bus is separated from the hub motor bus, and when the EMB fails, the hub motor compensates the EMB braking function in a mode of regenerative braking, reverse braking and the like functionally.
According to the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework, the stroke independent module of the clamping force monitoring unit bypasses the EMB controller and is directly connected with the clamping force sensor and the ECU in the EMB, so that the EMB state can be monitored under the condition of failure or communication interruption of the EMB controller.
The automobile line control motor system with the safety redundancy framework switches a control algorithm to a control algorithm without clamping force when the clamping force sensor fails.
The invention relates to an automobile brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy framework, wherein an emergency energy consumption braking switching device is arranged between a hub motor and a hub motor controller, and under the condition that an EMB and the hub motor controller are invalid, an ECU is realized through an emergency energy consumption braking control unit, and the energy consumption braking of the hub motor is performed for a time, so that a vehicle is stopped rapidly.
According to the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework, when a braking system fails, the function is degraded under the necessary working condition through dynamic regulation and control on the whole automobile level, so that the risk of the braking system in failure is reduced.
The dynamic regulation mode is that the braking function of the EMB is compensated by the hub motor after the EMB on one side fails, but the braking force is not as good as that of the EMB, so that the braking force balance on the left side and the right side of the vehicle is ensured, and the braking clamping force target on the opposite side is correspondingly reduced when the braking force is distributed.
Because the braking capability of the whole vehicle is also reduced after the EMB fails, the function degradation of the driving system, such as limiting the maximum vehicle speed and the like, is required to be performed at the moment, and the risk is reduced, and meanwhile, the vehicle is ensured to have certain functions, such as driving to a repair shop at a low speed and the like.
The technical scheme of the invention is different from the comparison documents 1 and 2 in the background technology as follows:
Firstly, the two systems are electronic parking (EPB, electronic Parking Brake) systems, and the invention is an electronic mechanical brake (EMB, electronic Mechanical Brake) which is different in that the EPB is started after the vehicle is stopped, so as to prevent the problems of sliding and the like when the vehicle is stopped on a slope road and the like, and the EMB is a device for decelerating or stopping the vehicle during the running of the vehicle.
The specific differences are that: EPB requires much less force than EMB; the EPB action is very simple to perform and rough, and requires less time to perform, the actual amount of clamping force, etc., because the safety problem is less pronounced than for an EMB when the EPB action is already stopped.
The CN201820855828.9 patent uses a wheel speed sensor to determine whether the vehicle is running downhill, and proposes countermeasures of the secondary response as redundancy of the EPB function. The invention considers the redundancy scheme measures after the EMB power supply, the ECU, the communication or the actuator are failed, and the correlation degree of the EMB power supply, the ECU and the communication or the actuator is not high.
Patent cn202211086496.X uses EPB as a redundant service brake system for hydraulic pressure. The invention does not relate to the function of EPB, the EMB function is equivalent to the hydraulic braking system in this patent, but both use different principles, and the redundancy of the invention is that of using a hub/wheel motor to achieve redundancy and other monitoring.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a power redundancy architecture for an automotive brake-by-wire system having a safety redundancy architecture;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication redundancy architecture for an automotive brake-by-wire system having a safety redundancy architecture;
FIG. 3 is a junction control flow diagram of an automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in detail below with reference to the attached drawings and examples:
In fig. 2: FL represents the left front; RL represents the left rear; FR represents the right rear; RR stands for rear right.
There are various configurations of the distributed motor drive system, among which the four-wheel independent drive of the in-wheel motor/rim motor is the most flexible. The following analysis is made using the four wheel distributed drive in-wheel motor configuration as an example, and the four wheel rim motor drive or three motor/two motor drive is similar in architecture.
As shown in fig. 1 and 2, an automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture,
Comprising the following steps: the system comprises an electronic control unit ECU, a power supply management module and a drive-by-wire execution unit;
the drive-by-wire execution unit comprises an electromechanical brake assembly and a hub motor assembly;
The electromechanical brake assembly includes an actuator and a controller,
The actuator comprises an EMB motor and a clamping force sensor;
the controller comprises an EMB motor driver and a clamping force control algorithm module;
The hub motor assembly comprises a hub motor, an emergency dynamic braking switching module and a hub motor controller;
The in-wheel motor includes: a left front hub motor, a right front hub motor, a left rear hub motor, and a right rear hub motor;
the electromechanical brake assembly includes: left and right front electromechanical brake assemblies, left and right rear electromechanical brake assemblies;
The power supply includes: a power supply A and a power supply B;
The power supply A is connected with the left rear wheel hub motor and the right front wheel hub motor;
The power supply B is connected with the left front wheel hub motor and the right rear wheel hub motor;
the power supply A is connected with the left front electromechanical brake and the right rear electromechanical brake;
the power supply B is connected to the left rear electromechanical brake and the right front electromechanical brake.
Preferably, for the same wheel end effector, the electromechanical brake and the in-wheel motor are not connected to the same set of power sources; the same actuators on the same side are connected to different power supplies.
Preferably, the power supply A and the power supply B are connected through a power supply management module, the power supply management module comprises a control circuit and a group of relays, the control circuit outputs signals to the relays, the relays control whether the two groups of power supplies are connected or not, and when the capacity difference of the two groups of power supplies exceeds 10% of the standard capacity of a single battery, mutual charging balance electric quantity is carried out. The control circuit of the power management module can monitor the voltage of the power supply in real time, and the capacities of the two groups of batteries are calculated through an internal integrated algorithm.
Preferably, the power management module cuts off the connection between the power a and the power B when any one of the power a and the power B fails. When the battery fails, the voltage, the temperature and the pressure (the temperature and the pressure are all provided with related sensors connected to the control circuit) of the battery are abnormal, and a fault detection algorithm in the control circuit can complete specific judgment. The disconnection is performed by isolating the two sets of power sources by the relay opening.
Preferably, the electromechanical brake assembly operates in accordance with a clamping force control target value given by the ECU; the in-wheel motor controller comprises an in-wheel motor driver and an in-wheel motor control algorithm module, and receives and executes instructions sent by the ECU. The in-wheel motor control algorithm controls an inverter in the motor controller to convert direct current into proper alternating current and send the proper alternating current to the in-wheel motor, or the in-wheel motor is used as a generator (namely regenerative braking) through reasonable on-off control.
Preferably, the ECU continuously sends a controller normal instruction to the emergency dynamic braking switching module after being started, and the hub motor controller are normally connected; and when the ECU sends an abnormal instruction or does not send an instruction within a required time range, the emergency dynamic braking is switched to act, and the motor is directly connected to the dynamic braking unit to realize passive braking.
When the ECU transmits an abnormal instruction or does not transmit an instruction within a required time range, it includes:
1. And after the ECU is electrified, a normal working instruction is periodically sent to the emergency dynamic braking module, and when the ECU fails or is powered off, the emergency dynamic braking module does not receive the normal working instruction of the ECU within a required time range, and then the emergency dynamic braking module generates a switching action. (how the emergency dynamic braking module determines that the command sent by the ECU is a normal operation command.) the normal operation command has a specific format and content, and the emergency dynamic braking module determines that the command is a normal operation command after receiving the post-inspection format and content.
2. The ECU works normally and needs the emergency energy consumption braking module to work, and directly sends a report switching instruction to the emergency energy consumption braking module to generate switching action.
Preferably, the electromechanical brake ECU is connected to the EMB controller via an EMB communication bus;
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the hub motor through a hub motor bus;
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the clamping force detection unit;
The electromechanical brake ECU is connected with an emergency dynamic braking control unit.
FIG. 3 is a control method of an automobile brake-by-wire system with a safety redundant architecture, comprising the following control steps:
step s100, starting;
step s101, detecting an EMB abnormality;
Step s102, judging whether the clamping force sensor is in fault, if so, jumping to step s103, otherwise jumping to step s104;
the clamping force sensor feeds back signals to the ECU, meanwhile, the ECU can acquire signals such as EMB motor current and rotation angle, and whether the clamping force sensor fails or not can be analyzed according to a program in the ECU.
Step s103, starting a control algorithm without a clamping force sensor, and jumping to step s108;
The ECU calculates the braking requirement of the whole vehicle, calculates the clamping force required to be generated by each wheel end EMB through a certain upper layer distribution control algorithm, sends a clamping force requirement instruction to an EMB controller,
The clamping force demand given by the ECU is performed in the EMB controller. (the algorithm in the EMB controller that is used to track the target clamping force demand is referred to as the clamping force controller, and specifically the control algorithm).
And the EMB controller controls the motor to drive the actuating mechanism to enable the friction plate and the brake disc to be tightly attached after receiving the instruction, and the generated friction force enables the vehicle to stop.
Step S104, judging the EMB state in fault through the clamping force data;
The EMB has faults, can not act, and has various conditions. Such as complete absence of clamping force, clamping force of EMB to a certain fixed magnitude, and possibly uncontrolled variations.
When the EMB loses braking capability, other redundant backup braking measures such as regenerative braking and reverse braking need to be started to compensate for the functions of the EMB. In addition, the EMB fault of the single-side wheel can cause instability risk caused by instability of the dynamics of the whole vehicle, so that adjustment is needed to be made on the level of a whole vehicle distribution control program.
Step s105, judging whether the failure is the failure of the hub motor controller, and jumping to step s106 if the failure is the failure of the hub motor controller, otherwise jumping to step s107;
Step s106, the motor is switched to emergency energy consumption braking, and step s108 is skipped;
Step s107, wheel hub motor electric brake compensation;
The electromechanical brake compensation of the hub is to use regenerative braking and reverse braking for braking. Both regenerative braking and reverse braking are forms of braking achieved by the in-wheel motor, and emergency dynamic braking differs from the former in that the latter requires an in-wheel motor controller and the latter does not.
Step S108, adjusting a whole vehicle braking control strategy;
Step s109, ends.
Normally the EMB motor current and the resulting clamping force magnitude are positively correlated, and a normal corresponding range can be defined in the ECU by a fault detection procedure, beyond which the abnormality can be determined.
Whether the sensor is abnormal or not can be judged through a feedback signal sequence, if yes, whether the range is exceeded, whether mutation occurs or not, and the like.
The EMB actuator fault is typically determined in the EMB controller, and may be determined by the current of each phase of the motor, position sensor signals, etc.
The automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework reduces risks caused by local faults in a multiple redundancy mode, and is designed from EMB and motor braking redundancy, power supply redundancy, control communication redundancy and processing logic among all the partial redundancy frameworks respectively, so that faults of the brake system are reduced, and the safety of braking of a power automobile is improved.
The automobile line control motor system with the safety redundancy framework reduces the risk of simultaneous failure in a dual-power supply mode of the EMB and the hub motor.
According to the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework, the EMB bus is separated from the hub motor bus, and when the EMB fails, the hub motor compensates the EMB braking function in a mode of regenerative braking, reverse braking and the like functionally.
According to the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework, the stroke independent module of the clamping force monitoring unit bypasses the EMB controller and is directly connected with the clamping force sensor and the ECU in the EMB, so that the EMB state can be monitored under the condition of failure or communication interruption of the EMB controller.
The automobile line control motor system with the safety redundancy framework switches a control algorithm to a control algorithm without clamping force when the clamping force sensor fails. A common EMB clamping force execution control algorithm requires feedback of the clamping force to work properly. Failure of a conventional control algorithm to function properly when the clamp force sensor fails can pose a hazard.
Switching to a control algorithm without a clamp force sensor does not require the acquisition of the clamp force by a sensor, but rather by a clamp force estimation algorithm, but the control accuracy is not as high as the clamp force sensor.
The invention relates to an automobile brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy framework, wherein an emergency energy consumption braking switching device is arranged between a hub motor and a hub motor controller, and under the condition that an EMB and the hub motor controller are invalid, an ECU is realized through an emergency energy consumption braking control unit, and the energy consumption braking of the hub motor is performed for a time, so that a vehicle is stopped rapidly.
According to the automobile brake-by-wire system with the safety redundancy framework, when a braking system fails, the function is degraded under the necessary working condition through dynamic regulation and control on the whole automobile level, so that the risk of the braking system in failure is reduced.
The dynamic regulation mode is that the braking function of the EMB is compensated by the hub motor after the EMB on one side fails, but the braking acting force of the hub motor is not as same as that of the EMB, so that the braking force balance on the left side and the right side of the vehicle is ensured, and the braking clamping force target on the opposite side is correspondingly reduced when the braking force is distributed. Because the braking force generated by the in-wheel motor is generally not as great as EMB. The target braking force of the EMB on the other side cannot be too large after the wheel hub motor is adopted for compensating the braking on one side. Otherwise the braking forces on both sides are not equal, the vehicle will generate yaw moment, thus causing a hazard.
Because the braking capability of the whole vehicle is also reduced after the EMB fails, the function degradation of the driving system, such as limiting the maximum vehicle speed and the like, is required to be performed at the moment, and the risk is reduced, and meanwhile, the vehicle is ensured to have certain functions, such as driving to a repair shop at a low speed and the like.
In particular, possible failure problems for braking systems incorporating EMBs and drive motors include: power failure, EMB controller failure, EMB clamp force sensor failure, ECU failure, and drive motor controller failure. When the vehicle loses some or all of its braking capability, if no necessary measures are applied, the risk of accident will increase considerably.
EMB (Electronic Mechanical Brake) an electromechanical brake refers to a device that uses a motor to directly drive an actuator to cause a friction member to clamp a rotating member to stop the wheel from rotating.
ECU (Electronic Control Unit) electronic control unit, i.e. vehicle-mounted computer, is composed of microcontroller and peripheral circuit, and can be used for running control algorithm of whole vehicle layer. As can be seen in figure 2 of the drawings,
The above description is only of the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the structure of the present invention in any way. Any simple modification, equivalent variation and modification of the above embodiments according to the technical substance of the present invention fall within the technical scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture,
Comprising the following steps: the system comprises an electronic control unit ECU, a power supply management module and a drive-by-wire execution unit;
the drive-by-wire execution unit comprises an electromechanical brake assembly and a hub motor assembly;
The electromechanical brake assembly includes an actuator and a controller,
The actuator comprises an EMB motor and a clamping force sensor;
the controller comprises an EMB motor driver and a clamping force control algorithm module;
The hub motor assembly comprises a hub motor, an emergency dynamic braking switching module and a hub motor controller;
The in-wheel motor includes: a left front hub motor, a right front hub motor, a left rear hub motor, and a right rear hub motor;
the electromechanical brake assembly includes: left and right front electromechanical brake assemblies, left and right rear electromechanical brake assemblies;
the power supply includes: a power supply A and a power supply B; the method is characterized in that:
The power supply A is connected with the left rear wheel hub motor and the right front wheel hub motor;
The power supply B is connected with the left front wheel hub motor and the right rear wheel hub motor;
the power supply A is connected with the left front electromechanical brake and the right rear electromechanical brake;
the power supply B is connected to the left rear electromechanical brake and the right front electromechanical brake.
2. The automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture of claim 1, wherein:
for the same wheel end actuator, the electromechanical brake and the hub motor are not connected to the same set of power supply;
the same actuators on the same side are connected to different power supplies.
3. The automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture of claim 1, wherein:
the power supply A and the power supply B are connected through the power supply management module, and the mutual charge balance electric quantity is carried out when the capacity difference of the two groups of power supplies exceeds 10% of the standard capacity of a single battery.
4. The automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture of claim 1, wherein:
when any one of the power supply a and the power supply B fails, the power management module cuts off the connection between the power supply a and the power supply B.
5. The automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture of claim 1, wherein:
the electronic mechanical brake assembly acts according to a clamping force control target value given by the ECU;
The in-wheel motor controller comprises an in-wheel motor driver and an in-wheel motor control algorithm module, and receives and executes instructions sent by the ECU.
6. The automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture of claim 1, wherein:
After the ECU is started, continuously sending a controller normal instruction to the emergency dynamic braking switching module, wherein the hub motor and the hub motor controller are normally connected;
And when the ECU sends an abnormal instruction or does not send an instruction within a required time range, the emergency dynamic braking is switched to act, and the motor is directly connected to the dynamic braking unit to realize passive braking.
7. The automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture of claim 1, wherein:
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the EMB controller through an EMB communication bus;
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the hub motor through a hub motor bus;
the electronic mechanical brake ECU is connected with the clamping force detection unit;
The electromechanical brake ECU is connected with an emergency dynamic braking control unit.
8. The control method of an automotive brake-by-wire system with a safety redundancy architecture according to claim 1, comprising the control steps of:
step s100, starting;
step s101, detecting an EMB abnormality;
Step s102, judging whether the clamping force sensor is in fault, if so, jumping to step s103, otherwise jumping to step s104;
The clamping force sensor feeds signals back to the ECU, meanwhile, the ECU can acquire signals such as EMB motor current and rotation angle, and whether the clamping force sensor fails or not can be analyzed according to a program in the ECU;
Step s103, starting a control algorithm without a clamping force sensor, and jumping to step s108;
step S104, judging the EMB state in fault through the clamping force data;
Step s105, judging whether the failure is the failure of the hub motor controller, and jumping to step s106 if the failure is the failure of the hub motor controller, otherwise jumping to step s107;
Step s106, the motor is switched to emergency energy consumption braking, and step s108 is skipped;
Step s107, wheel hub motor electric brake compensation;
Step S108, adjusting a whole vehicle braking control strategy;
Step s109, ends.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202410265058.2A CN118107542A (en) | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-08 | Automobile line control braking system with safety redundancy framework and control method |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN202410265058.2A CN118107542A (en) | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-08 | Automobile line control braking system with safety redundancy framework and control method |
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| CN202410265058.2A Pending CN118107542A (en) | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-08 | Automobile line control braking system with safety redundancy framework and control method |
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN119348595A (en) * | 2024-12-23 | 2025-01-24 | 苏州利氪科技有限公司 | Electromechanical brake system for automobile and automobile |
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN119348595A (en) * | 2024-12-23 | 2025-01-24 | 苏州利氪科技有限公司 | Electromechanical brake system for automobile and automobile |
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