CN116781280A - A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method and system - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method and system. The method includes: data saving, user registration, user login, device activation authentication in the local area network state, device activation authentication in the Internet state, and device activation authentication in the non-network state. , password changes and new sensor device node connections. The invention belongs to the field of platform authentication technology, and specifically refers to a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method and system. This solution uses a hash function to calculate the private key, which increases the security of the data, and the session disconnection and failure mechanism protects the user. Information security and system stability; avoid excessive delays and data expiration issues by comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay; introduce an identity authentication mechanism, and add a failed retry mechanism, dual mechanisms to increase the security of authentication and process stability.

Description

A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method and system

Technical field

The invention belongs to the field of platform authentication technology, and specifically refers to a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method and system.

Background technique

With the rapid development of information technology, information security and user identity authentication have become important tasks for nurse station platform management. However, the existing nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method has problems such as information leakage due to weak data security, credibility and anti-tampering capabilities, and reduced communication security, which in turn leads to a reduction in the overall security and stability of the system. ;There are problems such as data inconsistency among nodes due to incomplete authentication process, and then attackers tampering with transmitted data and impersonating identities, reducing the security and reliability of data, and data expiration due to improper transmission delay settings; there are problems such as unauthorized The device is activated during the device activation authentication process, the system security is weak, and authentication fails due to network problems and other errors.

Contents of the invention

In view of the above situation, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method and system, which is aimed at information leakage due to weak data security, credibility and tamper-proof ability, and communication problems. The security is reduced, which in turn leads to the reduction of the overall security and stability of the system. This solution uses a hash function to calculate the private key, which increases the security of the data. The key library is stored in the blockchain center, ensuring the reliability of the data. Reliability and anti-tampering capabilities, encryption to generate activation sequence files ensures the security of sensitive information and prevents information leakage, storage of smart cards and identity hash values increase the reliability of authentication, and session disconnection and failure mechanisms protect users Information security and system stability; In case of data inconsistency among nodes due to incomplete authentication process, attackers may tamper with transmitted data and impersonate identities, reducing the security and reliability of data. Improper transmission delay settings may cause data to expire. This solution ensures the integrity and security of device activation authentication. Each step has specific calculations and verifications to ensure the correctness and consistency of each node and data. Hash values and XOR operations are used to process data. , ensure the integrity of data, prevent attackers from impersonating identities and tampering with transmitted data, avoid excessive delays and data expiration issues by comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay, and use multiple verification mechanisms to improve security and reliability , thereby reducing potential security risks and attacks; in view of the problems that unauthorized devices are activated during the device activation authentication process, system security is weak, and authentication fails due to network problems and other errors, this solution is used during the authentication process. Introduce an identity verification mechanism to ensure that activation requests come from legitimate devices and prevent malicious activation requests, and add a failed retry mechanism to ensure the correct transmission and storage of data. The dual mechanism increases the security of authentication and the stability of the process, making authentication safe. Improved security, enhanced fault tolerance, clear certification process, reducing errors and confusion.

The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: the present invention provides a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method, which method includes the following steps:

Step S1: Data saving, using the hash function to calculate the private key and shared key, saving the information to the key library, and encrypting it to generate the activation sequence file;

Step S2: User registration, the user selects a unique ID and password, calculates the hash value of the user password and the identity hash value, and saves them to the smart card;

Step S3: User logs in. The user inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. The calculation of hash value and random number, session disconnection and failure mechanism are introduced. The smart card sends a login request to the gateway node through the public channel;

Step S4: Device activation authentication in LAN state, using a complete authentication process, using hash value and XOR operation to encrypt, verify and prevent tampering of data, and avoid excessive delays and occurrences by comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay To solve the problem of data expiration, multiple verification mechanisms are used at the same time;

Step S5: Device activation authentication in the Internet state, introducing an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process to ensure that the activation request comes from a legitimate device, prevent malicious activation requests, and add a failed retry mechanism;

Step S6: Activate the device for authentication when there is no network. The authentication device scans and pairs through Bluetooth, uses private key encryption to send the BLE protocol that activates device authentication, and introduces an identity verification mechanism for authentication;

Step S7: Password change. The user inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. The smart card calculates the relevant random values and hash values and performs identity verification. If the verification is passed, the user enters the new password and modifies the relevant information in the smart card. , otherwise, the session is interrupted;

Step S8: The new sensor device node is connected. The blockchain center selects the new sensor device node, calculates the new shared key, saves the relevant information and sends it to the gateway node. The gateway node stores and updates the information in the key database. .

Further, in step S1, the data saving specifically includes the following steps:

Step S11: Calculate the private key of the gateway node. The formula used is as follows:

S _g =h(ID _g ||S _BC );

In the formula, S _g is the private key of the gateway node, h () is the hash function, ID _g is the identifier of the gateway node, S _BC is the private key of the blockchain center BC, || is the splicing operation;

Step S12: Calculate the shared key, the formula used is as follows:

S _sn =h(ID _sn ||S _BC );

In the formula, S _sn is the shared key between the gateway node and the sensor device node, and ID _sn is the identifier of the sensor device node;

Step S13: The key database is saved, {ID _sn , S _sn } is saved in the sensor device node SN _k by the blockchain center BC;

Step S14: The blockchain center saves and sends it to the gateway node. The blockchain center BC saves {ID _g , S _g , ID _sn , S _sn } and sends it to the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S15: Information is stored in the database. All nurse station hosts need to record batch and equipment hardware information into the equipment library when leaving the factory, and record key information such as the motherboard serial number and store it in the database;

Step S16: Encrypt and generate an activation sequence file, which contains hardware information, platform module module configuration content, account number and other encrypted content.

Further, in step S2, the user registration specifically includes the following steps:

Step S21: Calculate the hash value of the user's password, the user selects a unique ID and password, and generates a random number r ₁ , calculates the hash value of the password, and sends {ID _i , HPW _i } to the gateway node GW _j , using The formula is as follows:

HPW _i =h(r ₁ ||PW _i );

In the formula, HPW _i is the hash value of user i’s password, ID _i is the ID of user i, and PW _i is the password of user i;

Step S22: Calculate the hash value. After receiving {ID _i , HPW _i }, the gateway node GW _j uses a pseudo-random number generator to generate a random number r ₂ and calculates R ₁ , R ₂ and R ₃ at the timestamp T ₁ , the formula used is as follows:

R ₁ =h(HPW _i ||T ₁ );

R ₂ =h(HPW _i ||ID _g );

R ₃ =h(R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )⊕h(HPW _i ||T ₁ );

In the formula, || is a string concatenation operation, ⊕ is an XOR operation, R ₁ is the combination of the hash value of user i’s password and the timestamp T ₁ and uses a hash function to calculate the hash value, R ₂ is the hash value of user i’s password The hash value is combined with the identifier ID _g of the gateway node and the hash value is calculated. R ₃ is the hash value calculated after the XOR operation;

Step S23: Smart card saving, gateway node GW _j saves {r ₂ , T ₁ , ID _g , h (), R ₁ , R ₂ , R ₃ } in the smart card SC that stores user identification information, and sends it to useri;

Step S24: Calculate the identity hash value. After user i receives {r ₂ , T ₁ , ID _g , h (), R ₁ , R ₂ , R ₃ }, the identity hash value is calculated and written into For smart card SC, the formula used is as follows:

HID _i =h(PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₁ ;

In the formula, HID _i is the identity hash value of user i.

Further, in step S3, the user login specifically includes the following steps:

Step S31: Smart card insertion, user i inserts the smart card SC into the reader and enters ID _i and PW _i ;

Step S32: Obtain data. User i selects the nearest gateway node, establishes a communication link with the sensor device node, and obtains the data required by the user;

Step S33: The first calculation of the smart card, the formula used is as follows:

r ₁ ^* =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i );

HPW _i ^* =h (r ₁ ^* ||PW _i );

R ₂ ^* =h (HPW _i ^* ||ID _g );

In the formula, r ₁ ^* is the random value calculated by the smart card SC, HPW _i ^* is the hash value of user i's password calculated by the smart card SC, and R ₂ ^* is the random number generated by the gateway node;

Step S34: Verification, the smart card SC checks whether R ₂ and R ₂ ^* are equal. If R ₂ =R ₂ ^* , then verify the ID _i and PW _i of the user i, otherwise, the session is interrupted;

Step S35: The smart card calculates for the second time. The smart card SC generates a random number r ₃ and calculates F ₁ , F ₂ and F ₃ at timestamp T _2. The formula used is as follows:

F ₁ =R ₃ ⊕h (HPW _i ||T ₁ );

F ₂ =h(T ₂ ||r ₃ ||F ₁ ||ID _g );

F ₃ =h(r ₃ ||T ₂ )⊕F ₁ ;

In the formula, F ₁ is the value obtained by the XOR operation, F ₂ is the hash value calculated by the smart card SC, and F ₃ is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S36: Send a login request. The smart card SC sends the login request {ID _sn , F ₂ , F ₃ } to the gateway node GW _j through the public channel.

Further, in step S4, the device activation authentication in the local area network state specifically includes the following steps:

Step S41: The gateway node calculates for the first time. When the gateway node GW _j receives the login request {ID _sn , F ₂ , F ₃ }, it calculates F ₁ ^* and F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ at timestamp T _3. The formula used is as follows:

r ₃ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₃ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i )

T ₂ ^* =h(T ₂ );

F ₁ ^* =h (R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g );

F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ =h (r ₃ ^* ||T ₂ ^* ); in the formula, F ₁ ^* is the value calculated by gateway node GW _j , F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ is the value calculated by gateway node GW _j Hash value, r ₃ ^* is the value obtained by XOR operation, T ₂ ^* is the hash value obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₂ ;

Step S42: For the first check, the gateway node GW _j checks whether (T ₃ -T ₂ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₃ -T ₂ ) < ΔT, proceed to the next step. , otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S43: For the first verification, gateway node GW _j calculates F ₂ ^* and verifies whether F ₂ ^* is equal to F ₂ . If F ₂ ^* =F ₂ , authenticate user i. Otherwise, the session is interrupted. The formula used is as follows:

F ₂ ^* =h (T ₂ ^* ||r ₃ ^* ||F ₁ ^* ||ID _g );

In the formula, F ₂ ^* is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S44: The gateway node calculates for the second time. The gateway node GW _j generates a random number r4 and calculates R ₄ , R ₅ and R ₆ . The formula used is as follows:

R ₄ =h(ID _sn ||R ₁ ||S _sn ||r ₄ ||T ₃ );

R ₅ = (r ₃ ^* ||T ₃ ||r ₄ )⊕S _sn ;

R ₆ =R ₁ ⊕h(ID _sn ||h(r ₄ )||r ₃ ^* );

In the formula, R ₄ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , R ₅ is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and R ₆ is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S45: The gateway node sends a request for the first time, and the gateway node GW _j sends {ID _sn , R ₄ , R ₅ , R ₆ } to the sensor device node SN _k ;

Step S46: The sensor device node calculates for the first time. After the sensor device node SN _k receives {ID _sn , R ₄ , R ₅ , R ₆ }, it calculates h (r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* | at timestamp T ₄ |T ₃ ^* ), the formula used is as follows:

r ₃ ^** =h（PW _i ^* ||ID _i )⊕r ₃ ⊕h（PW _i ^* ||ID _i )

r ₄ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₄ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i )

T ₃ ^* =h(T ₃ );

h(r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* )=R ₅ ⊕S _sn ;

In the formula, h (r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* ) is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₃ ^** is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₄ ^* is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation , T ₃ ^* is the hash value obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₃ ;

Step S47: For the second check, the sensor device node SN _k checks whether (T ₄ -T ₃ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the transmitter and receiver. If (T ₄ -T ₃ ) <ΔT, proceed to the next step. Step, otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S48: The sensor device node is calculated for the second time. The formula used is as follows:

R ₁ ^* =R ₆ ⊕h (ID _sn ||h (r ₄ ^* ) ||r ₃ ^** );

R ₄ ^* =h (ID _sn ||R ₁ ^* ||S _sn ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* );

In the formula, R ₁ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and R ₄ ^* is the hash value calculated by the sensor device node SN _k ;

Step S49: For the third check, the sensor device node SN _k checks whether R ₄ ^* is equal to R ₄ . If R ₄ ^* =R ₄ , proceed to the next step. Otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S410: The sensor device node calculates for the third time. The sensor device node SN _k generates a random number r5 and calculates SK _i , B ₁ and B ₂ . The formula used is as follows:

SK _i =h(R ₁ ^* ||r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||r ₅ );

B ₁ =h (T ₄ ||r ₅ ||S _sn ||ID _sn ||T ₃ ||SK _i );

B ₂ =h(r ₅ ||T ₄ )⊕r ₄ ^* ;

In the formula, SK _i is the key of the sensor device node SN _k , B ₁ is the hash value used to verify and identify the identity, and B ₂ is the hash value used to verify data integrity;

Step S411: The sensor device node sends a message, and the sensor device node SN _k sends {B ₁ , B ₂ } to the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S412: The gateway node calculates for the third time. After the gateway node GW _j receives {B ₁ , B ₂ }, it calculates h (r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* ) at the timestamp T ₅ . The formula used is as follows:

r ₅ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₅ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i )

T ₄ ^* =h(T ₄ );

h(r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* )=B ₂ ⊕r ₄ ;

In the formula, h (r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* ) is the value obtained by the XOR operation, r ₅ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and T ₄ ^* is the hash obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₄ value;

Step S413: For the fourth check, the gateway node GW _j checks whether (T ₅ -T ₄ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₅ -T ₄ ) <ΔT, proceed to the next step. , otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S414: For the second verification, the gateway node GW _j calculates B ₁ ^* and verifies whether B ₁ ^* is equal to B ₁ . If B ₁ ^* =B ₁ , then verify the sensor device node SN _k . Otherwise, terminate the session. The formula used is as follows:

B ₁ ^* =h (T ₄ ^* ||r ₅ ^* ||S _sn ||ID _sn ||T ₃ ^* ||SK _i );

In the formula, B ₁ ^* is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S415: The gateway node calculates for the fourth time. The formula used is as follows:

R ₇ =h (SK _i ||R ₁ ||r ₄ ||T ₅ ||R ₄ );

R ₈ =h(r ₅ ^* ||r ₄ ||T ₅ )⊕r ₃ ^* ;

In the formula, R ₇ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , and R ₈ is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S416: The gateway node sends a request for the second time, and the gateway node GW _j sends {R ₄ , R ₇ , R ₈ } to user i;

Step S417: The smart card calculates for the third time. After user i receives {R ₄ , R ₇ , R ₈ }, it calculates h (r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ) at timestamp T ₆ , using the formula as follows:

r ₅ ^** =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i );

T ₅ ^* =h (T ₅ );

h(r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* )=R ₈ ⊕r ₃ ;

In the formula, h (r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ) is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₅ ^** is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, and T ₅ ^* is performed on the timestamp T ₅ The hash value obtained by the hash operation;

Step S418: The fifth check, the smart card SC checks whether (T ₆ -T ₅ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₆ -T ₅ ) < ΔT, proceed to the next step, otherwise , terminate the session;

Step S419: For the third verification, the smart card SC calculates R ₇ ^* and verifies whether R ₇ ^* is equal to R ₇ . If R ₇ ^* =R ₇ , the authentication is successful and the device is activated. Otherwise, the session is interrupted. The formula used is as follows:

R ₇ ^* =h (SK _i ||h (HPW _i ||T ₁ ) ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ||R ₄ );

In the formula, R ₇ ^* is the hash value calculated by the smart card SC.

Further, in step S5, the device activation authentication in the Internet state specifically includes the following steps:

Step S51: Turn on the platform device and ensure that the main program works normally;

Step S52: In a normal networking state, the main program generates a device information dynamic code through an encryption algorithm based on the public key content saved in the device;

Step S53: The server inputs the dynamic code, decrypts the private key file to obtain the hardware device information and IP address gateway, etc., and sends the activation invitation agreement ① to the platform device through the UDP communication protocol;

Step S54: The platform device receives the activation invitation protocol ①, responds and provides device information to the nurse station server to authenticate the activation UDP protocol ②, and introduces an identity verification mechanism;

Step S55: After receiving the authentication activation UDP protocol ②, the nurse station server records and sends the authentication sequence content TCP protocol ③ to the designated device;

Step S56: After the platform device receives the authentication sequence content TCP protocol ③, it saves the sequence file content to the internal storage shared directory, and sets the file to read-only mode. After successfully saving the file, it sends the confirmation authentication activation protocol ④, and adds the failed retry. test mechanism;

Step S57: After confirming receipt of the confirmation authentication activation protocol ④, the nurse station server records the current device information and sequence file information to the database to complete the authentication;

Step S58: After the authentication device is restarted, the system main program will check the authentication sequence file stored in step S56, use the contents of the sequence file to complete the platform system function initialization, and request the server to complete token content registration and activation, complete authentication, and read The platform system function configuration starts to run the platform multi-application system; if the file reading fails or the file is invalid, re-enter step S53 and wait.

Further, in step S6, the device activation authentication in the non-network state specifically includes the following steps:

Step S61: Turn on the platform device and ensure that the main program works normally;

Step S62: Ensure that the Bluetooth module is normal and not damaged, and record the authentication device public key file and authentication sequence list file in the system storage location through the transmission tool;

Step S63: The authentication device is paired through Bluetooth scanning, the private key is encrypted and sent to activate the device authentication BLE protocol ①, and an identity verification mechanism is introduced;

Step S64: The platform device continues to save the device authentication BLE protocol ①. When encountering the specified ending content, it stops content parsing and reception, and introduces an error handling mechanism;

Step S65: The platform device uses the public key file to parse the protocol content and intercept the specified byte content;

Step S66: If the platform device has completed authentication activation, save the sending device information of the specified byte parsing in the device authentication BLE protocol ①, add the authentication sequence list file, and splice the device information feedback to confirm the activation of the BLE protocol ②, and then disconnect Bluetooth Link, after a fixed interval, return to step S63;

Step S67: If the platform device has not been authenticated and activated, the splicing device information feedback confirms the activation of the BLE protocol ②;

Step S68: The authentication device key box receives the BLE protocol ②, parses and intercepts the specified byte content according to its own private key file, and if it corresponds to the device information saved in step S66, records the authentication device, adds the authentication sequence list file, and directly The stop step disconnects Bluetooth, and after a fixed interval, returns to step S63; if it corresponds to the device authentication sequence generated in step S67, go to step S69; if the BLE protocol ② is not received within the specified time, in the authentication sequence list The file removes the device, disconnects Bluetooth, and returns to step S63 after a fixed interval, adding an identity authentication mechanism in the process;

Step S69: The authentication device splices the content of the private key file and the content of the device authentication sequence, and encrypts and sends the authentication to activate the BLE protocol ③;

Step S610: The platform device saves the BLE protocol ③. When encountering the specified ending content, it stops content parsing and reception, uses the public key content to parse the protocol content, completes the storage of the authentication sequence content and public key content, and records that the current sending end authentication device has joined the authentication sequence. List file, disconnect the Bluetooth link, and use an error handling mechanism in the process;

Step S611: All platform devices that have completed authentication turn on the infection activation blockchain algorithm, proceed to step S63 instead of the authentication device key box, and perform BLE protocol communication on all nearby devices in step S62;

Step S612: The above operation can be consolidated from step S63 to step S610 through the Bluetooth base station, which is only used as data transfer and does not affect the actual authentication result;

Step S613: When the device is in the LAN or Internet state, randomly import the authentication sequence list file of any authentication device to the information exchange server to directly complete the registration, initialization and use of all devices;

Step S614: Add logging and monitoring functions to regularly check the operating status of the system.

Further, in step S7, the password change specifically includes the following steps:

Step S71: Smart card insertion, user i inserts smart card SC into the reader and enters ID _i and PW _i ;

Step S72: The first calculation of the smart card, the formula used is as follows:

r ₁ ^* =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i );

HPW _i ^* =h (r ₁ ^* ||PW _i );

R ₂ ^* =h (HPW _i ^* ||ID _g );

h(R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )=R ₃ ⊕h(HPW _i ||T ₁ );

In the formula, r ₁ ^* is the random value calculated by the smart card SC, HPW _i ^* is the hash value of user i's password calculated by the smart card SC, R ₂ ^* is the random number generated by the gateway node, h (R ₁ ||r ₂ | |S _g ) is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S73: Verification, the smart card SC checks whether R ₂ and R ₂ ^* are equal. If R ₂ =R ₂ ^* , then verify the ID _i and PW _i of the user i, otherwise, the session is interrupted;

Step S74: Enter a new password, user i enters a new password PW _i ^new ;

Step S75: The smart card calculates for the second time. The smart card SC uses a pseudo-random number generator to generate a new random number r ₁ ^new , and the formula used is as follows:

HID _i ^new =r ₁ ^new ⊕h (PW _i ^new ||ID _i );

HPW _i ^new =h(r ₁ ^* ||PW _i ^new );

R ₂ ^new =h(HPW _i ^new ||ID _g );

R ₃ ^new =h（R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )⊕h（PW _i ^new ||T ₁ );

In the formula, HID _i ^new is the new identity hash value of user i, HPW _i ^new is the new hash value of user i password calculated by smart card SC, R ₂ ^new is the new random number, R ₃ ^new is XOR The value obtained by the operation;

Step S76: Replacement, the smart card SC replaces R ₂ , R ₃ and HID with the corresponding new values R ₂ ^new , R ₃ ^new and HID _i ^new , and the password is changed successfully.

Further, in step S8, the new sensor device node connection specifically includes the following steps:

Step S81: Calculate the shared key and save it. The blockchain center BC selects the new sensor device node SN _k , calculates the new shared key, and stores {SN _k , S _sn }. The formula used is as follows:

S _sn =h(ID _sn ||S _BC );

In the formula, S _sn is the shared key between the gateway node and the new sensor device node, and ID _sn is the identifier of the new sensor device node;

Step S82: The blockchain center sends to the gateway node, and the blockchain center BC sends {SN _k , S _sn } to the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S83: The gateway node stores and updates the key database, and the gateway node GW _j stores {SN _k , S _sn } and updates the information in the key database.

The invention provides a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management system, which includes a data storage module, a user registration module, a user login module, a device activation authentication module in a local area network state, a device activation authentication module in an Internet state, and a device activation authentication module in a non-network state. Authentication module, password change module and new sensor device node connection module;

The data storage module uses a hash function to calculate the private key and shared key, saves the information to the key library, encrypts and generates the activation sequence file, and sends the activation sequence file to the user registration module;

The user registration module receives the activation sequence file sent by the data storage module, the user selects a unique ID and password, calculates the hash value and identity hash value of the user password, and saves it to the smart card;

The user login module inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. It provides the reliability of security authentication through the calculation of hash value and random number, session disconnection and failure mechanism, and sends the login request to the LAN. The device activation authentication module in the state, the device activation authentication module in the Internet state and the device activation authentication module in the non-network state;

The device activation authentication module in the LAN state receives the login request sent by the user login module, adopts a complete authentication process, uses hash values and XOR operations to encrypt, verify and prevent tampering of data, and compares timestamps and sets the maximum allowable Transmission delay avoids excessive delays and data expiration issues, uses multiple verification mechanisms to improve security and reliability, and sends the verification results to the password change module;

The device activation authentication module in the Internet state receives the login request sent by the user login module, introduces an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process, ensures that the activation request comes from a legitimate device, and prevents malicious activation requests, and adds a failed retry mechanism to ensure data security. Correctly transmit and save, the dual mechanism increases the security of authentication and the stability of the process, and sends the authentication result to the password change module;

The device activation authentication module in the non-network state receives the login request sent by the user login module, uses the BLE protocol and identity verification mechanism for authentication, and sends the authentication result to the password change module;

The password change module receives the authentication results sent by the device activation authentication module in the LAN state, the device activation authentication module in the Internet state, and the device activation authentication module in the non-network state. The user inserts the smart card into the reader, enters the ID and password, and the smart card calculates Relevant random values and hash values, and perform identity verification. If the verification is passed, enter a new password and modify the relevant information in the smart card. Otherwise, the session will be interrupted;

The new sensor device node connection module selects a new sensor device node, calculates a new shared key, saves relevant information and sends it to the gateway node. The gateway node stores and updates the information in the key database to complete the new sensor Device node connection.

The beneficial effects achieved by the present invention by adopting the above scheme are as follows:

(1) In order to solve the problem of information leakage and reduced communication security due to weak data security, credibility and anti-tampering capabilities, which in turn leads to a reduction in the overall security and stability of the system, this solution uses a hash function to calculate the private data. The key increases the security of the data. The key library is stored in the blockchain center to ensure the credibility and anti-tampering ability of the data. The encryption and generation of activation sequence files ensures the security of sensitive information and prevents information leakage. The smart card Saving and identity hash values increase the reliability of authentication, and the session disconnection and failure mechanism protects the security of user information and system stability.

(2) In view of the problem that the data of each node is inconsistent due to the incomplete authentication process, and then attackers tamper with the transmitted data and impersonate the identity, reducing the security and reliability of the data, and the data expires due to improper transmission delay settings, this solution ensures The integrity and security of device activation authentication. Each step has specific calculations and verifications to ensure the correctness and consistency of each node and data. Hash values and XOR operations are used to process data to ensure data integrity. , to prevent attackers from impersonating identities and tampering with transmission data. By comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay, avoid excessive delays and data expiration issues, and use multiple verification mechanisms to improve security and reliability, thereby reducing potential security risks. Risks and Attacks.

(3) In view of the problems that unauthorized devices are activated during the device activation authentication process, system security is weak, and authentication fails due to network problems and other errors, this solution introduces an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process to ensure activation. The request comes from a legitimate device and prevents malicious activation requests. A failed retry mechanism is added to ensure the correct transmission and storage of data. The dual mechanism increases the security of authentication and the stability of the process, improving authentication security and fault tolerance. The certification process is clear and unambiguous, reducing errors and confusion.

Description of drawings

Figure 1 is a schematic flow chart of a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method provided by the present invention;

Figure 2 is a schematic flow chart of a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management system provided by the present invention;

Figure 3 is a schematic flow chart of step S1;

Figure 4 is a schematic flow chart of step S2;

Figure 5 is a schematic flow chart of step S3;

Figure 6 is a schematic flowchart of step S7.

The drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. They are used to explain the present invention together with the embodiments of the present invention and do not constitute a limitation of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them; based on The embodiments of the present invention and all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

In the description of the present invention, it should be understood that the terms "upper", "lower", "front", "back", "left", "right", "top", "bottom", "inner", " The orientation or positional relationship indicated by "outside" is based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings. It is only for the convenience of describing the present invention and simplifying the description. It does not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation or a specific location. orientation, construction and operation, and therefore should not be construed as limitations of the present invention.

Embodiment 1. Referring to Figure 1, the present invention provides a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method. The method includes the following steps:

Step S1: Data saving, using the hash function to calculate the private key and shared key, saving the information to the key library, and encrypting it to generate the activation sequence file;

Step S2: User registration, the user selects a unique ID and password, calculates the hash value of the user password and the identity hash value, and saves them to the smart card;

Step S3: User logs in. The user inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. The calculation of hash value and random number, session disconnection and failure mechanism are introduced. The smart card sends a login request to the gateway node through the public channel;

Step S4: Device activation authentication in LAN state, using a complete authentication process, using hash value and XOR operation to encrypt, verify and prevent tampering of data, and avoid excessive delays and occurrences by comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay To solve the problem of data expiration, multiple verification mechanisms are used at the same time;

Step S5: Device activation authentication in the Internet state, introducing an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process to ensure that the activation request comes from a legitimate device, prevent malicious activation requests, and add a failed retry mechanism;

Step S6: Activate the device for authentication when there is no network. The authentication device scans and pairs through Bluetooth, uses private key encryption to send the BLE protocol that activates device authentication, and introduces an identity verification mechanism for authentication;

Step S7: Password change. The user inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. The smart card calculates the relevant random values and hash values and performs identity verification. If the verification is passed, the user enters the new password and modifies the relevant information in the smart card. , otherwise, the session is interrupted;

Step S8: The new sensor device node is connected. The blockchain center selects the new sensor device node, calculates the new shared key, saves the relevant information and sends it to the gateway node. The gateway node stores and updates the information in the key database. .

Embodiment 2. Refer to Figures 1 and 3. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S1, data saving specifically includes the following steps:

Step S11: Calculate the private key of the gateway node. The formula used is as follows:

S _g =h(ID _g ||S _BC );

In the formula, S _g is the private key of the gateway node, h () is the hash function, ID _g is the identifier of the gateway node, S _BC is the private key of the blockchain center BC, || is the splicing operation;

Step S12: Calculate the shared key, the formula used is as follows:

S _sn =h(ID _sn ||S _BC );

In the formula, S _sn is the shared key between the gateway node and the sensor device node, and ID _sn is the identifier of the sensor device node;

Step S13: The key database is saved, {ID _sn , S _sn } is saved in the sensor device node SN _k by the blockchain center BC;

Step S14: The blockchain center saves and sends it to the gateway node. The blockchain center BC saves {ID _g , S _g , ID _sn , S _sn } and sends it to the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S15: Information is stored in the database. All nurse station hosts need to record batch and equipment hardware information into the equipment library when leaving the factory, and record key information such as the motherboard serial number and store it in the database;

Step S16: Encrypt and generate an activation sequence file, which contains hardware information, platform module module configuration content, account number and other encrypted content.

Embodiment 3. Refer to Figures 1 and 4. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S2, user registration specifically includes the following steps:

Step S21: Calculate the hash value of the user's password, the user selects a unique ID and password, and generates a random number r ₁ , calculates the hash value of the password, and sends {ID _i , HPW _i } to the gateway node GW _j , using The formula is as follows:

HPW _i =h(r ₁ ||PW _i );

In the formula, HPW _i is the hash value of user i’s password, ID _i is the ID of user i, and PW _i is the password of user i;

Step S22: Calculate the hash value. After receiving {ID _i , HPW _i }, the gateway node GW _j uses a pseudo-random number generator to generate a random number r ₂ and calculates R ₁ , R ₂ and R ₃ at the timestamp T ₁ , the formula used is as follows:

R ₁ =h(HPW _i ||T ₁ );

R ₂ =h(HPW _i ||ID _g );

R ₃ =h(R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )⊕h(HPW _i ||T ₁ );

In the formula, || is a string concatenation operation, ⊕ is an XOR operation, R ₁ is the combination of the hash value of user i’s password and the timestamp T ₁ and uses a hash function to calculate the hash value, R ₂ is the hash value of user i’s password The hash value is combined with the identifier ID _g of the gateway node and the hash value is calculated. R ₃ is the hash value calculated after the XOR operation;

Step S23: Smart card saving, gateway node GW _j saves {r ₂ , T ₁ , ID _g , h (), R ₁ , R ₂ , R ₃ } in the smart card SC that stores user identification information, and sends it to useri;

Step S24: Calculate the identity hash value. After user i receives {r ₂ , T ₁ , ID _g , h (), R ₁ , R ₂ , R ₃ }, the identity hash value is calculated and written into For smart card SC, the formula used is as follows:

HID _i =h(PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₁ ;

In the formula, HID _i is the identity hash value of user i.

Embodiment 4. Refer to Figures 1 and 5. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S3, user login specifically includes the following steps:

Step S31: Smart card insertion, user i inserts the smart card SC into the reader and enters ID _i and PW _i ;

Step S32: Obtain data. User i selects the nearest gateway node, establishes a communication link with the sensor device node, and obtains the data required by the user;

Step S33: The first calculation of the smart card, the formula used is as follows:

r ₁ ^* =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i );

HPW _i ^* =h (r ₁ ^* ||PW _i );

R ₂ ^* =h (HPW _i ^* ||ID _g );

In the formula, r ₁ ^* is the random value calculated by the smart card SC, HPW _i ^* is the hash value of user i's password calculated by the smart card SC, and R ₂ ^* is the random number generated by the gateway node;

Step S34: Verification, the smart card SC checks whether R ₂ and R ₂ ^* are equal. If R ₂ =R ₂ ^* , then verify the ID _i and PW _i of the user i, otherwise, the session is interrupted;

Step S35: The smart card calculates for the second time. The smart card SC generates a random number r ₃ and calculates F ₁ , F ₂ and F ₃ at timestamp T _2. The formula used is as follows:

F ₁ =R ₃ ⊕h (HPW _i ||T ₁ );

F ₂ =h(T ₂ ||r ₃ ||F ₁ ||ID _g );

F ₃ =h(r ₃ ||T ₂ )⊕F ₁ ;

In the formula, F ₁ is the value obtained by the XOR operation, F ₂ is the hash value calculated by the smart card SC, and F ₃ is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S36: Send a login request. The smart card SC sends the login request {ID _sn , F ₂ , F ₃ } to the gateway node GW _j through the public channel.

By performing the above operations, in order to solve the problem of information leakage and reduced communication security due to weak data security, credibility and tamper resistance, which in turn leads to a reduction in the overall security and stability of the system, this solution uses a hash function Calculating the private key increases the security of the data. The key library is stored in the blockchain center to ensure the credibility and anti-tampering ability of the data. The encryption and generation of activation sequence files ensures the security of sensitive information and prevents information leakage. The storage of smart cards and identity hash values increase the reliability of authentication, and the session disconnection and failure mechanism protects the security of user information and the stability of the system.

Embodiment 5. Refer to Figure 1. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S4, device activation authentication in the local area network state specifically includes the following steps:

Step S41: The gateway node calculates for the first time. When the gateway node GW _j receives the login request {ID _sn , F ₂ , F ₃ }, it calculates F ₁ ^* and F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ at timestamp T _3. The formula used is as follows:

r ₃ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₃ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i )

T ₂ ^* =h(T ₂ );

F ₁ ^* =h (R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g );

F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ =h (r ₃ ^* ||T ₂ ^* );

In the formula, F ₁ ^* is the value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , r ₃ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and T ₂ ^* is the value calculated by the XOR operation. The hash value obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₂ ;

Step S42: For the first check, the gateway node GW _j checks whether (T ₃ -T ₂ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₃ -T ₂ ) < ΔT, proceed to the next step. , otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S43: For the first verification, gateway node GW _j calculates F ₂ ^* and verifies whether F ₂ ^* is equal to F ₂ . If F ₂ ^* =F ₂ , authenticate user i. Otherwise, the session is interrupted. The formula used is as follows:

F ₂ ^* =h (T ₂ ^* ||r ₃ ^* ||F ₁ ^* ||ID _g );

In the formula, F ₂ ^* is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S44: The gateway node calculates for the second time. The gateway node GW _j generates a random number r4 and calculates R ₄ , R ₅ and R ₆ . The formula used is as follows:

R ₄ =h(ID _sn ||R ₁ ||S _sn ||r ₄ ||T ₃ );

R ₅ = (r ₃ ^* ||T ₃ ||r ₄ )⊕S _sn ;

R ₆ =R ₁ ⊕h(ID _sn ||h(r ₄ )||r ₃ ^* );

In the formula, R ₄ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , R ₅ is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and R ₆ is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S45: The gateway node sends a request for the first time, and the gateway node GW _j sends {ID _sn , R ₄ , R ₅ , R ₆ } to the sensor device node SN _k ;

Step S46: The sensor device node calculates for the first time. After the sensor device node SN _k receives {ID _sn , R ₄ , R ₅ , R ₆ }, it calculates h (r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* | at timestamp T ₄ |T ₃ ^* ), the formula used is as follows:

r ₃ ^** =h（PW _i ^* ||ID _i )⊕r ₃ ⊕h（PW _i ^* ||ID _i )

r ₄ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₄ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i )

T ₃ ^* =h(T ₃ );

h(r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* )=R ₅ ⊕S _sn ;

In the formula, h (r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* ) is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₃ ^** is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₄ ^* is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation , T ₃ ^* is the hash value obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₃ ;

Step S47: For the second check, the sensor device node SN _k checks whether (T ₄ -T ₃ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the transmitter and receiver. If (T ₄ -T ₃ ) <ΔT, proceed to the next step. Step, otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S48: The sensor device node is calculated for the second time. The formula used is as follows:

R ₁ ^* =R ₆ ⊕h (ID _sn ||h (r ₄ ^* ) ||r ₃ ^** );

R ₄ ^* =h (ID _sn ||R ₁ ^* ||S _sn ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* );

In the formula, R ₁ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and R ₄ ^* is the hash value calculated by the sensor device node SN _k ;

Step S49: For the third check, the sensor device node SN _k checks whether R ₄ ^* is equal to R ₄ . If R ₄ ^* =R ₄ , proceed to the next step. Otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S410: The sensor device node calculates for the third time. The sensor device node SN _k generates a random number r5 and calculates SK _i , B ₁ and B ₂ . The formula used is as follows:

SK _i =h(R ₁ ^* ||r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||r ₅ );

B ₁ =h (T ₄ ||r ₅ ||S _sn ||ID _sn ||T ₃ ||SK _i );

B ₂ =h(r ₅ ||T ₄ )⊕r ₄ ^* ;

In the formula, SK _i is the key of the sensor device node SN _k , B ₁ is the hash value used to verify and identify the identity, and B ₂ is the hash value used to verify data integrity;

Step S411: The sensor device node sends a message, and the sensor device node SN _k sends {B ₁ , B ₂ } to the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S412: The gateway node calculates for the third time. After the gateway node GW _j receives {B ₁ , B ₂ }, it calculates h (r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* ) at the timestamp T ₅ . The formula used is as follows:

r ₅ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₅ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i )

T ₄ ^* =h(T ₄ );

h(r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* )=B ₂ ⊕r ₄ ;

In the formula, h (r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* ) is the value obtained by the XOR operation, r ₅ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and T ₄ ^* is the hash obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₄ value;

Step S413: For the fourth check, the gateway node GW _j checks whether (T ₅ -T ₄ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₅ -T ₄ ) <ΔT, proceed to the next step. , otherwise, terminate the session;

Step S414: For the second verification, the gateway node GW _j calculates B ₁ ^* and verifies whether B ₁ ^* is equal to B ₁ . If B ₁ ^* =B ₁ , then verify the sensor device node SN _k . Otherwise, terminate the session. The formula used is as follows:

B ₁ ^* =h (T ₄ ^* ||r ₅ ^* ||S _sn ||ID _sn ||T ₃ ^* ||SK _i );

In the formula, B ₁ ^* is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S415: The gateway node calculates for the fourth time. The formula used is as follows:

R ₇ =h (SK _i ||R ₁ ||r ₄ ||T ₅ ||R ₄ );

R ₈ =h(r ₅ ^* ||r ₄ ||T ₅ )⊕r ₃ ^* ;

In the formula, R ₇ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , and R ₈ is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S416: The gateway node sends a request for the second time, and the gateway node GW _j sends {R ₄ , R ₇ , R ₈ } to user i;

Step S417: The smart card calculates for the third time. After user i receives {R ₄ , R ₇ , R ₈ }, it calculates h (r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ) at timestamp T ₆ , using the formula as follows:

r ₅ ^** =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i );

T ₅ ^* =h (T ₅ );

h(r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* )=R ₈ ⊕r ₃ ;

In the formula, h (r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ) is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₅ ^** is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, and T ₅ ^* is performed on the timestamp T ₅ The hash value obtained by the hash operation;

Step S418: The fifth check, the smart card SC checks whether (T ₆ -T ₅ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₆ -T ₅ ) < ΔT, proceed to the next step, otherwise , terminate the session;

Step S419: For the third verification, the smart card SC calculates R ₇ ^* and verifies whether R ₇ ^* is equal to R ₇ . If R ₇ ^* =R ₇ , the authentication is successful and the device is activated. Otherwise, the session is interrupted. The formula used is as follows:

R ₇ ^* =h (SK _i ||h (HPW _i ||T ₁ ) ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ||R ₄ );

In the formula, R ₇ ^* is the hash value calculated by the smart card SC.

By performing the above operations, in order to solve the problem of data inconsistency among nodes due to incomplete authentication process, attackers tampering with transmitted data and impersonating identities, reducing the security and reliability of data, and data expiration due to improper transmission delay settings, this paper The solution ensures the integrity and security of device activation authentication. Each step has specific calculations and verifications to ensure the correctness and consistency of each node and data. Hash values and XOR operations are used to process data to ensure the integrity of the data. Integrity prevents attackers from impersonating identities and tampering with transmitted data. By comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay, it avoids excessive delays and data expiration issues. It uses multiple verification mechanisms to improve security and reliability, thereby reducing potential security risks and attacks.

Embodiment 6. Refer to Figure 1. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S5, device activation authentication in the Internet state specifically includes the following steps:

Step S51: Turn on the platform device and ensure that the main program works normally;

Step S52: In a normal networking state, the main program generates a device information dynamic code through an encryption algorithm based on the public key content saved in the device;

Step S53: The server inputs the dynamic code, decrypts the private key file to obtain the hardware device information and IP address gateway, etc., and sends the activation invitation agreement ① to the platform device through the UDP communication protocol;

Step S54: The platform device receives the activation invitation protocol ①, responds and provides device information to the nurse station server to authenticate the activation UDP protocol ②, and introduces an identity verification mechanism;

Step S55: After receiving the authentication activation UDP protocol ②, the nurse station server records and sends the authentication sequence content TCP protocol ③ to the designated device;

Step S56: After the platform device receives the authentication sequence content TCP protocol ③, it saves the sequence file content to the internal storage shared directory, and sets the file to read-only mode. After successfully saving the file, it sends the confirmation authentication activation protocol ④, and adds the failed retry. test mechanism;

Step S57: After confirming receipt of the confirmation authentication activation protocol ④, the nurse station server records the current device information and sequence file information to the database to complete the authentication;

Step S58: After the authentication device is restarted, the system main program will check the authentication sequence file stored in step S56, use the contents of the sequence file to complete the platform system function initialization, and request the server to complete token content registration and activation, complete authentication, and read The platform system function configuration starts to run the platform multi-application system; if the file reading fails or the file is invalid, re-enter step S53 and wait.

By performing the above operations, in order to solve the problems of unauthorized device activation, weak system security, and authentication failure due to network problems and other errors during the device activation authentication process, this solution introduces an identity verification mechanism in the authentication process. Ensure that activation requests come from legitimate devices and prevent malicious activation requests, and add a failed retry mechanism to ensure the correct transmission and storage of data. The dual mechanism increases the security of authentication and the stability of the process, making authentication security more secure and fault-tolerant. Enhanced, clear certification process to reduce errors and confusion.

Embodiment 7. Refer to Figure 1. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S6, device activation authentication in a non-network state specifically includes the following steps:

Step S61: Turn on the platform device and ensure that the main program works normally;

Step S62: Ensure that the Bluetooth module is normal and not damaged, and record the authentication device public key file and authentication sequence list file in the system storage location through the transmission tool;

Step S63: The authentication device is paired through Bluetooth scanning, the private key is encrypted and sent to activate the device authentication BLE protocol ①, and an identity verification mechanism is introduced;

Step S64: The platform device continues to save the device authentication BLE protocol ①. When encountering the specified ending content, it stops content parsing and reception, and introduces an error handling mechanism;

Step S65: The platform device uses the public key file to parse the protocol content and intercept the specified byte content;

Step S66: If the platform device has completed authentication activation, save the sending device information of the specified byte parsing in the device authentication BLE protocol ①, add the authentication sequence list file, and splice the device information feedback to confirm the activation of the BLE protocol ②, and then disconnect Bluetooth Link, after a fixed interval, return to step S63;

Step S67: If the platform device has not been authenticated and activated, the splicing device information feedback confirms the activation of the BLE protocol ②;

Step S68: The authentication device key box receives the BLE protocol ②, parses and intercepts the specified byte content according to its own private key file, and if it corresponds to the device information saved in step S66, records the authentication device, adds the authentication sequence list file, and directly The stop step disconnects Bluetooth, and after a fixed interval, returns to step S63; if it corresponds to the device authentication sequence generated in step S67, go to step S69; if the BLE protocol ② is not received within the specified time, in the authentication sequence list The file removes the device, disconnects Bluetooth, and returns to step S63 after a fixed interval, adding an identity authentication mechanism in the process;

Step S69: The authentication device splices the content of the private key file and the content of the device authentication sequence, and encrypts and sends the authentication to activate the BLE protocol ③;

Step S610: The platform device saves the BLE protocol ③. When encountering the specified ending content, it stops content parsing and reception, uses the public key content to parse the protocol content, completes the storage of the authentication sequence content and public key content, and records that the current sending end authentication device has joined the authentication sequence. List file, disconnect the Bluetooth link, and use an error handling mechanism in the process;

Step S611: All platform devices that have completed authentication turn on the infection activation blockchain algorithm, proceed to step S63 instead of the authentication device key box, and perform BLE protocol communication on all nearby devices in step S62;

Step S612: The above operation can be consolidated from step S63 to step S610 through the Bluetooth base station, which is only used as data transfer and does not affect the actual authentication result;

Step S613: When the device is in the LAN or Internet state, randomly import the authentication sequence list file of any authentication device to the information exchange server to directly complete the registration, initialization and use of all devices;

Step S614: Add logging and monitoring functions to regularly check the operating status of the system.

Embodiment 8. Refer to Figures 1 and 6. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S7, the password change specifically includes the following steps:

Step S71: Smart card insertion, user i inserts smart card SC into the reader and enters ID _i and PW _i ;

Step S72: The first calculation of the smart card, the formula used is as follows:

r ₁ ^* =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i );

HPW _i ^* =h (r ₁ ^* ||PW _i );

R ₂ ^* =h (HPW _i ^* ||ID _g );

h(R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )=R ₃ ⊕h(HPW _i ||T ₁ );

In the formula, r ₁ ^* is the random value calculated by the smart card SC, HPW _i ^* is the hash value of user i's password calculated by the smart card SC, R ₂ ^* is the random number generated by the gateway node, h (R ₁ ||r ₂ | |S _g ) is the value obtained by the XOR operation;

Step S73: Verification, the smart card SC checks whether R ₂ and R ₂ ^* are equal. If R ₂ =R ₂ ^* , then verify the ID _i and PW _i of the user i, otherwise, the session is interrupted;

Step S74: Enter a new password, user i enters a new password PW _i ^new ;

Step S75: The smart card calculates for the second time. The smart card SC uses a pseudo-random number generator to generate a new random number r ₁ ^new , and the formula used is as follows:

HID _i ^new =r ₁ ^new ⊕h (PW _i ^new ||ID _i );

HPW _i ^new =h(r ₁ ^* ||PW _i ^new );

R ₂ ^new =h(HPW _i ^new ||ID _g );

R ₃ ^new =h（R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )⊕h（PW _i ^new ||T ₁ );

In the formula, HID _i ^new is the new identity hash value of user i, HPW _i ^new is the new hash value of user i password calculated by smart card SC, R ₂ ^new is the new random number, R ₃ ^new is XOR The value obtained by the operation;

Step S76: Replacement, the smart card SC replaces R ₂ , R ₃ and HID with the corresponding new values R ₂ ^new , R ₃ ^new and HID _i ^new , and the password is changed successfully.

Embodiment 9. Refer to Figure 1. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. In step S8, the new sensor device node connection specifically includes the following steps:

Step S81: Calculate the shared key and save it. The blockchain center BC selects the new sensor device node SN _k , calculates the new shared key, and stores {SN _k , S _sn }. The formula used is as follows:

S _sn =h(ID _sn ||S _BC );

In the formula, S _sn is the shared key between the gateway node and the new sensor device node, and ID _sn is the identifier of the new sensor device node;

Step S82: The blockchain center sends to the gateway node, and the blockchain center BC sends {SN _k , S _sn } to the gateway node GW _j ;

Step S83: The gateway node stores and updates the key database, and the gateway node GW _j stores {SN _k , S _sn } and updates the information in the key database.

Embodiment 10. Refer to Figure 2. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment. The present invention provides a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management system, including a data storage module, a user registration module, a user login module, and device activation authentication in a local area network state. module, device activation authentication module in the Internet state, device activation authentication module in the non-network state, password change module and new sensor device node connection module;

The data storage module uses a hash function to calculate the private key and shared key, saves the information to the key library, encrypts and generates the activation sequence file, and sends the activation sequence file to the user registration module;

The user registration module receives the activation sequence file sent by the data storage module, the user selects a unique ID and password, calculates the hash value and identity hash value of the user password, and saves it to the smart card;

The user login module inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. It provides the reliability of security authentication through the calculation of hash value and random number, session disconnection and failure mechanism, and sends the login request to the LAN. The device activation authentication module in the state, the device activation authentication module in the Internet state and the device activation authentication module in the non-network state;

The device activation authentication module in the LAN state receives the login request sent by the user login module, adopts a complete authentication process, uses hash values and XOR operations to encrypt, verify and prevent tampering of data, and compares timestamps and sets the maximum allowable Transmission delay avoids excessive delays and data expiration issues, uses multiple verification mechanisms to improve security and reliability, and sends the verification results to the password change module;

The device activation authentication module in the Internet state receives the login request sent by the user login module, introduces an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process, ensures that the activation request comes from a legitimate device, and prevents malicious activation requests, and adds a failed retry mechanism to ensure data security. Correctly transmit and save, the dual mechanism increases the security of authentication and the stability of the process, and sends the authentication result to the password change module;

The device activation authentication module in the non-network state receives the login request sent by the user login module, uses the BLE protocol and identity verification mechanism for authentication, and sends the authentication result to the password change module;

The password change module receives the authentication results sent by the device activation authentication module in the LAN state, the device activation authentication module in the Internet state, and the device activation authentication module in the non-network state. The user inserts the smart card into the reader, enters the ID and password, and the smart card calculates Relevant random values and hash values, and perform identity verification. If the verification is passed, enter a new password and modify the relevant information in the smart card. Otherwise, the session will be interrupted;

The new sensor device node connection module selects a new sensor device node, calculates a new shared key, saves relevant information and sends it to the gateway node. The gateway node stores and updates the information in the key database to complete the new sensor Device node connection.

It should be noted that in this article, relational terms such as first and second are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply that these entities or operations are mutually exclusive. any such actual relationship or sequence exists between them. Furthermore, the terms "comprises," "comprises," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that includes a list of elements includes not only those elements, but also those not expressly listed other elements, or elements inherent to the process, method, article or equipment.

Although the embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, those of ordinary skill in the art will understand that various changes, modifications, and substitutions can be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention. and modifications, the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

The present invention and its embodiments have been described above. This description is not limiting. What is shown in the drawings is only one embodiment of the present invention, and the actual structure is not limited thereto. In short, if a person of ordinary skill in the art is inspired by the invention and without departing from the spirit of the invention, can devise structural methods and embodiments similar to the technical solution without inventiveness, they shall all fall within the protection scope of the invention.

Claims (10)

1. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method, characterized in that: the method includes the following steps: Step S1: Data saving, using the hash function to calculate the private key and shared key, saving the information to the key library, and encrypting it to generate the activation sequence file; Step S2: User registration, the user selects a unique ID and password, calculates the hash value of the user password and the identity hash value, and saves them to the smart card; Step S3: User logs in. The user inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. The calculation of hash value and random number, session disconnection and failure mechanism are introduced. The smart card sends a login request to the gateway node through the public channel; Step S4: Device activation authentication in LAN state, using a complete authentication process, using hash value and XOR operation to encrypt, verify and prevent tampering of data, and avoid excessive delays and occurrences by comparing timestamps and setting the maximum allowable transmission delay To solve the problem of data expiration, multiple verification mechanisms are used at the same time; Step S5: Device activation authentication in the Internet state, introducing an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process to ensure that the activation request comes from a legitimate device, prevent malicious activation requests, and add a failed retry mechanism; Step S6: Activate the device for authentication when there is no network. The authentication device scans and pairs through Bluetooth, uses private key encryption to send the BLE protocol that activates device authentication, and introduces an identity verification mechanism for authentication; Step S7: Password change. The user inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. The smart card calculates the relevant random values and hash values and performs identity verification. If the verification is passed, the user enters the new password and modifies the relevant information in the smart card. , otherwise, the session is interrupted; Step S8: The new sensor device node is connected. The blockchain center selects the new sensor device node, calculates the new shared key, saves the relevant information and sends it to the gateway node. The gateway node stores and updates the information in the key database. . 2. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S4, the device activation authentication in the local area network state specifically includes the following steps: Step S41: The gateway node calculates for the first time. When the gateway node GW _j receives the login request {ID _sn , F ₂ , F ₃ }, it calculates F ₁ ^* and F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ at timestamp T _3. The formula used is as follows: r ₃ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₃ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i ); T ₂ ^* =h(T ₂ ); F ₁ ^* =h (R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g ); F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ =h (r ₃ ^* ||T ₂ ^* ); In the formula, F ₁ ^* is the value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , F ₁ ^* ⊕F ₃ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , r ₃ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and T ₂ ^* is the value calculated by the XOR operation. The hash value obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₂ ; Step S42: For the first check, the gateway node GW _j checks whether (T ₃ -T ₂ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₃ -T ₂ ) < ΔT, proceed to the next step. , otherwise, terminate the session; Step S43: For the first verification, gateway node GW _j calculates F ₂ ^* and verifies whether F ₂ ^* is equal to F ₂ . If F ₂ ^* =F ₂ , authenticate user i. Otherwise, the session is interrupted. The formula used is as follows: F ₂ ^* =h (T ₂ ^* ||r ₃ ^* ||F ₁ ^* ||ID _g ); In the formula, F ₂ ^* is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j ; Step S44: The gateway node calculates for the second time. The gateway node GW _j generates a random number r4 and calculates R ₄ , R ₅ and R ₆ . The formula used is as follows: R ₄ =h(ID _sn ||R ₁ ||S _sn ||r ₄ ||T ₃ ); R ₅ = (r ₃ ^* ||T ₃ ||r ₄ )⊕S _sn ; R ₆ =R ₁ ⊕h(ID _sn ||h(r ₄ )||r ₃ ^* ); In the formula, R ₄ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , R ₅ is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and R ₆ is the value obtained by the XOR operation; Step S45: The gateway node sends a request for the first time, and the gateway node GW _j sends {ID _sn , R ₄ , R ₅ , R ₆ } to the sensor device node SN _k ; Step S46: The sensor device node calculates for the first time. After the sensor device node SN _k receives {ID _sn , R ₄ , R ₅ , R ₆ }, it calculates h (r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* | at timestamp T ₄ |T ₃ ^* ), the formula used is as follows: r ₃ ^** =h（PW _i ^* ||ID _i )⊕r ₃ ⊕h（PW _i ^* ||ID _i ) r ₄ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₄ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i ) T ₃ ^* =h(T ₃ ); h(r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* )=R ₅ ⊕S _sn ; In the formula, h (r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* ) is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₃ ^** is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₄ ^* is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation , T ₃ ^* is the hash value obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₃ ; Step S47: For the second check, the sensor device node SN _k checks whether (T ₄ -T ₃ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the transmitter and receiver. If (T ₄ -T ₃ ) <ΔT, proceed to the next step. Step, otherwise, terminate the session; Step S48: The sensor device node is calculated for the second time. The formula used is as follows: R ₁ ^* =R ₆ ⊕h (ID _sn ||h (r ₄ ^* ) ||r ₃ ^** ); R ₄ ^* =h (ID _sn ||R ₁ ^* ||S _sn ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₃ ^* ); In the formula, R ₁ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and R ₄ ^* is the hash value calculated by the sensor device node SN _k ; Step S49: For the third check, the sensor device node SN _k checks whether R ₄ ^* is equal to R ₄ . If R ₄ ^* =R ₄ , proceed to the next step. Otherwise, terminate the session; Step S410: The sensor device node calculates for the third time. The sensor device node SN _k generates a random number r5 and calculates SK _i , B ₁ and B ₂ . The formula used is as follows: SK _i =h(R ₁ ^* ||r ₃ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||r ₅ ); B ₁ =h (T ₄ ||r ₅ ||S _sn ||ID _sn ||T ₃ ||SK _i ); B ₂ =h(r ₅ ||T ₄ )⊕r ₄ ^* ; In the formula, SK _i is the key of the sensor device node SN _k , B ₁ is the hash value used to verify and identify the identity, and B ₂ is the hash value used to verify data integrity; Step S411: The sensor device node sends a message, and the sensor device node SN _k sends {B ₁ , B ₂ } to the gateway node GW _j ; Step S412: The gateway node calculates for the third time. After the gateway node GW _j receives {B ₁ , B ₂ }, it calculates h (r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* ) at the timestamp T ₅ . The formula used is as follows: r ₅ ^* =h（PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₅ ⊕h（PW _i ||ID _i ) T ₄ ^* =h(T ₄ ); h(r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* )=B ₂ ⊕r ₄ ; In the formula, h (r ₅ ^* ||T ₄ ^* ) is the value obtained by the XOR operation, r ₅ ^* is the value obtained by the XOR operation, and T ₄ ^* is the hash obtained by hashing the timestamp T ₄ value; Step S413: For the fourth check, the gateway node GW _j checks whether (T ₅ -T ₄ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₅ -T ₄ ) <ΔT, proceed to the next step. , otherwise, terminate the session; Step S414: For the second verification, the gateway node GW _j calculates B ₁ ^* and verifies whether B ₁ ^* is equal to B ₁ . If B ₁ ^* =B ₁ , then verify the sensor device node SN _k . Otherwise, terminate the session. The formula used is as follows: B ₁ ^* =h (T ₄ ^* ||r ₅ ^* ||S _sn ||ID _sn ||T ₃ ^* ||SK _i ); In the formula, B ₁ ^* is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j ; Step S415: The gateway node calculates for the fourth time. The formula used is as follows: R ₇ =h (SK _i ||R ₁ ||r ₄ ||T ₅ ||R ₄ ); R ₈ =h(r ₅ ^* ||r ₄ ||T ₅ )⊕r ₃ ^* ; In the formula, R ₇ is the hash value calculated by the gateway node GW _j , and R ₈ is the value obtained by the XOR operation; Step S416: The gateway node sends a request for the second time, and the gateway node GW _j sends {R ₄ , R ₇ , R ₈ } to user i; Step S417: The smart card calculates for the third time. After user i receives {R ₄ , R ₇ , R ₈ }, it calculates h (r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ) at timestamp T ₆ , using the formula as follows: r ₅ ^** =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i ); T ₅ ^* =h (T ₅ ); h(r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* )=R ₈ ⊕r ₃ ; In the formula, h (r ₅ ^** ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ) is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, r ₅ ^** is the value obtained by the exclusive OR operation, and T ₅ ^* is performed on the timestamp T ₅ The hash value obtained by the hash operation; Step S418: The fifth check, the smart card SC checks whether (T ₆ -T ₅ ) is less than the maximum allowable transmission delay ΔT of the sender and receiver. If (T ₆ -T ₅ ) < ΔT, proceed to the next step, otherwise , terminate the session; Step S419: For the third verification, the smart card SC calculates R ₇ ^* and verifies whether R ₇ ^* is equal to R ₇ . If R ₇ ^* =R ₇ , the authentication is successful and the device is activated. Otherwise, the session is interrupted. The formula used is as follows: R ₇ ^* =h (SK _i ||h (HPW _i ||T ₁ ) ||r ₄ ^* ||T ₅ ^* ||R ₄ ); In the formula, R ₇ ^* is the hash value calculated by the smart card SC. 3. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S1, the data saving specifically includes the following steps: Step S11: Calculate the private key of the gateway node. The formula used is as follows: S _g =h(ID _g ||S _BC ); In the formula, S _g is the private key of the gateway node, h () is the hash function, ID _g is the identifier of the gateway node, S _BC is the private key of the blockchain center BC, || is the splicing operation; Step S12: Calculate the shared key, the formula used is as follows: S _sn =h(ID _sn ||S _BC ); In the formula, S _sn is the shared key between the gateway node and the sensor device node, and ID _sn is the identifier of the sensor device node; Step S13: The key database is saved, {ID _sn , S _sn } is saved in the sensor device node SN _k by the blockchain center BC; Step S14: The blockchain center saves and sends it to the gateway node. The blockchain center BC saves {ID _g , S _g , ID _sn , S _sn } and sends it to the gateway node GW _j ; Step S15: Information is stored in the database. All nurse station hosts need to record batch and equipment hardware information into the equipment library when leaving the factory, and record key information such as the motherboard serial number and store it in the database; Step S16: Encrypt and generate an activation sequence file, which contains hardware information, platform module module configuration content, account number and other encrypted content; In step S2, the user registration specifically includes the following steps: Step S21: Calculate the hash value of the user's password, the user selects a unique ID and password, and generates a random number r ₁ , calculates the hash value of the password, and sends {ID _i , HPW _i } to the gateway node GW _j , using The formula is as follows: HPW _i =h(r ₁ ||PW _i ); In the formula, HPW _i is the hash value of user i’s password, ID _i is the ID of user i, and PW _i is the password of user i; Step S22: Calculate the hash value. After receiving {ID _i , HPW _i }, the gateway node GW _j uses a pseudo-random number generator to generate a random number r ₂ and calculates R ₁ , R ₂ and R ₃ at the timestamp T ₁ , the formula used is as follows: R ₁ =h(HPW _i ||T ₁ ); R ₂ =h(HPW _i ||ID _g ); R ₃ =h(R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )⊕h(HPW _i ||T ₁ ); In the formula, || is a string concatenation operation, ⊕ is an XOR operation, R ₁ is the combination of the hash value of user i’s password and the timestamp T ₁ and uses a hash function to calculate the hash value, R ₂ is the hash value of user i’s password The hash value is combined with the identifier ID _g of the gateway node and the hash value is calculated. R ₃ is the hash value calculated after the XOR operation; Step S23: Smart card saving, gateway node GW _j saves {r ₂ , T ₁ , ID _g , h (), R ₁ , R ₂ , R ₃ } in the smart card SC that stores user identification information, and sends it to useri; Step S24: Calculate the identity hash value. After user i receives {r ₂ , T ₁ , ID _g , h (), R ₁ , R ₂ , R ₃ }, the identity hash value is calculated and written into For smart card SC, the formula used is as follows: HID _i =h(PW _i ||ID _i )⊕r ₁ ; In the formula, HID _i is the identity hash value of user i. 4. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S3, the user login specifically includes the following steps: Step S31: Smart card insertion, user i inserts the smart card SC into the reader and enters ID _i and PW _i ; Step S32: Obtain data. User i selects the nearest gateway node, establishes a communication link with the sensor device node, and obtains the data required by the user; Step S33: The first calculation of the smart card, the formula used is as follows: r ₁ ^* =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i ); HPW _i ^* =h (r ₁ ^* ||PW _i ); R ₂ ^* =h (HPW _i ^* ||ID _g ); In the formula, r ₁ ^* is the random value calculated by the smart card SC, HPW _i ^* is the hash value of user i's password calculated by the smart card SC, and R ₂ ^* is the random number generated by the gateway node; Step S34: Verification, the smart card SC checks whether R ₂ and R ₂ ^* are equal. If R ₂ =R ₂ ^* , then verify the ID _i and PW _i of the user i, otherwise, the session is interrupted; Step S35: The smart card calculates for the second time. The smart card SC generates a random number r ₃ and calculates F ₁ , F ₂ and F ₃ at timestamp T _2. The formula used is as follows: F ₁ =R ₃ ⊕h (HPW _i ||T ₁ ); F ₂ =h(T ₂ ||r ₃ ||F ₁ ||ID _g ); F ₃ =h(r ₃ ||T ₂ )⊕F ₁ ; In the formula, F ₁ is the value obtained by the XOR operation, F ₂ is the hash value calculated by the smart card SC, and F ₃ is the value obtained by the XOR operation; Step S36: Send a login request. The smart card SC sends the login request {ID _sn , F ₂ , F ₃ } to the gateway node GW _j through the public channel. 5. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S5, the device activation authentication in the Internet state specifically includes the following steps: Step S51: Turn on the platform device and ensure that the main program works normally; Step S52: In a normal networking state, the main program generates a device information dynamic code through an encryption algorithm based on the public key content saved in the device; Step S53: The server inputs the dynamic code, decrypts the private key file to obtain the hardware device information and IP address gateway, etc., and sends the activation invitation agreement ① to the platform device through the UDP communication protocol; Step S54: The platform device receives the activation invitation protocol ①, responds and provides device information to the nurse station server to authenticate the activation UDP protocol ②, and introduces an identity verification mechanism; Step S55: After receiving the authentication activation UDP protocol ②, the nurse station server records and sends the authentication sequence content TCP protocol ③ to the designated device; Step S56: After the platform device receives the authentication sequence content TCP protocol ③, it saves the sequence file content to the internal storage shared directory, and sets the file to read-only mode. After successfully saving the file, it sends the confirmation authentication activation protocol ④, and adds the failed retry. test mechanism; Step S57: After confirming receipt of the confirmation authentication activation protocol ④, the nurse station server records the current device information and sequence file information to the database to complete the authentication; Step S58: After the authentication device is restarted, the system main program will check the authentication sequence file stored in step S56, use the contents of the sequence file to complete the platform system function initialization, and request the server to complete token content registration and activation, complete authentication, and read The platform system function configuration starts to run the platform multi-application system; if the file reading fails or the file is invalid, re-enter step S53 and wait. 6. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S6, the device activation authentication in the non-network state specifically includes the following steps: Step S61: Turn on the platform device and ensure that the main program works normally; Step S62: Ensure that the Bluetooth module is normal and not damaged, and record the authentication device public key file and authentication sequence list file in the system storage location through the transmission tool; Step S63: The authentication device is paired through Bluetooth scanning, the private key is encrypted and sent to activate the device authentication BLE protocol ①, and an identity verification mechanism is introduced; Step S64: The platform device continues to save the device authentication BLE protocol ①. When encountering the specified ending content, it stops content parsing and reception, and introduces an error handling mechanism; Step S65: The platform device uses the public key file to parse the protocol content and intercept the specified byte content; Step S66: If the platform device has completed authentication activation, save the sending device information of the specified byte parsing in the device authentication BLE protocol ①, add the authentication sequence list file, and splice the device information feedback to confirm the activation of the BLE protocol ②, and then disconnect Bluetooth Link, after a fixed interval, return to step S63; Step S67: If the platform device has not been authenticated and activated, the splicing device information feedback confirms the activation of the BLE protocol ②; Step S68: The authentication device key box receives the BLE protocol ②, parses and intercepts the specified byte content according to its own private key file, and if it corresponds to the device information saved in step S66, records the authentication device, adds the authentication sequence list file, and directly The stop step disconnects Bluetooth, and after a fixed interval, returns to step S63; if it corresponds to the device authentication sequence generated in step S67, go to step S69; if the BLE protocol ② is not received within the specified time, in the authentication sequence list The file removes the device, disconnects Bluetooth, and returns to step S63 after a fixed interval, adding an identity authentication mechanism in the process; Step S69: The authentication device splices the content of the private key file and the content of the device authentication sequence, and encrypts and sends the authentication to activate the BLE protocol ③; Step S610: The platform device saves the BLE protocol ③. When encountering the specified ending content, it stops content parsing and reception, uses the public key content to parse the protocol content, completes the storage of the authentication sequence content and public key content, and records that the current sending end authentication device has joined the authentication sequence. List file, disconnect the Bluetooth link, and use an error handling mechanism in the process; Step S611: All platform devices that have completed authentication turn on the infection activation blockchain algorithm, proceed to step S63 instead of the authentication device key box, and perform BLE protocol communication on all nearby devices in step S62; Step S612: The above operation can be consolidated from step S63 to step S610 through the Bluetooth base station, which is only used as data transfer and does not affect the actual authentication result; Step S613: When the device is in the LAN or Internet state, randomly import the authentication sequence list file of any authentication device to the information exchange server to directly complete the registration, initialization and use of all devices; Step S614: Add logging and monitoring functions to regularly check the operating status of the system. 7. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S7, the password change specifically includes the following steps: Step S71: Smart card insertion, user i inserts the smart card SC into the reader, and inputs ID _i and PW _i ; Step S72: Smart card calculation for the first time, the formula used is as follows: r ₁ ^* =HID _i ⊕h (PW _i ||ID _i ); HPW _i ^* =h (r ₁ ^* ||PW _i ); R ₂ ^* =h (HPW _i ^* ||ID _g ); h(R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )=R ₃ ⊕h(HPW _i ||T ₁ ); In the formula, r ₁ ^* is the random value calculated by the smart card SC, HPW _i ^* is the hash value of user i's password calculated by the smart card SC, R ₂ ^* is the random number generated by the gateway node, h (R ₁ ||r ₂ | |S _g ) is the value obtained by the XOR operation; Step S73: Verification, the smart card SC checks whether R ₂ and R ₂ ^* are equal. If R ₂ =R ₂ ^* , then verify the ID _i and PW _i of the user i, otherwise, the session is interrupted; Step S74: Enter a new password, user i enters a new password PW _i ^new ; Step S75: The smart card calculates for the second time. The smart card SC uses a pseudo-random number generator to generate a new random number r ₁ ^new , and the formula used is as follows: HID _i ^new =r ₁ ^new ⊕h (PW _i ^new ||ID _i ); HPW _i ^new =h(r ₁ ^* ||PW _i ^new ); R ₂ ^new =h(HPW _i ^new ||ID _g ); R ₃ ^new =h（R ₁ ||r ₂ ||S _g )⊕h（PW _i ^new ||T ₁ ); In the formula, HID _i ^new is the new identity hash value of user i, HPW _i ^new is the new hash value of user i password calculated by smart card SC, R ₂ ^new is the new random number, R ₃ ^new is XOR The value obtained by the operation; Step S76: Replacement, the smart card SC replaces R ₂ , R ₃ and HID with the corresponding new values R ₂ ^new , R ₃ ^new and HID _i ^new , and the password is changed successfully. 8. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step S8, the new sensor device node connection specifically includes the following steps: Step S81: Calculate the shared key and save it. The blockchain center BC selects the new sensor device node SN _k , calculates the new shared key, and stores {SN _k , S _sn }. The formula used is as follows: S _sn =h(ID _sn ||S _BC ); In the formula, S _sn is the shared key between the gateway node and the new sensor device node, and ID _sn is the identifier of the new sensor device node; Step S82: The blockchain center sends to the gateway node, and the blockchain center BC sends {SN _k , S _sn } to the gateway node GW _j ; Step S83: The gateway node stores and updates the key database, and the gateway node GW _j stores {SN _k , S _sn } and updates the information in the key database. 9. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management system, used to implement a nurse station information interaction platform authentication management method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized by: including a data storage module, a user Registration module, user login module, device activation authentication module in LAN status, device activation authentication module in Internet status, device activation authentication module in non-network status, password change module and new sensor device node connection module. 10. A nurse station information interaction platform authentication management system according to claim 9, characterized in that: the data saving module uses a hash function to calculate the private key and the shared key, save the information to the key library, and encrypt and generate Activate the sequence file and send the activated sequence file to the user registration module; The user registration module receives the activation sequence file sent by the data storage module, the user selects a unique ID and password, calculates the hash value and identity hash value of the user password, and saves it to the smart card; The user login module inserts the smart card into the reader and enters the ID and password. It provides the reliability of security authentication through the calculation of hash value and random number, session disconnection and failure mechanism, and sends the login request to the LAN. The device activation authentication module in the state, the device activation authentication module in the Internet state and the device activation authentication module in the non-network state; The device activation authentication module in the LAN state receives the login request sent by the user login module, adopts a complete authentication process, uses hash values and XOR operations to encrypt, verify and prevent tampering of data, and compares timestamps and sets the maximum allowable Transmission delay avoids excessive delays and data expiration issues, uses multiple verification mechanisms to improve security and reliability, and sends the verification results to the password change module; The device activation authentication module in the Internet state receives the login request sent by the user login module, introduces an identity verification mechanism during the authentication process, ensures that the activation request comes from a legitimate device, and prevents malicious activation requests, and adds a failed retry mechanism to ensure data security. Correctly transmit and save, the dual mechanism increases the security of authentication and the stability of the process, and sends the authentication result to the password change module; The device activation authentication module in the non-network state receives the login request sent by the user login module, uses the BLE protocol and identity verification mechanism for authentication, and sends the authentication result to the password change module; The password change module receives the authentication results sent by the device activation authentication module in the LAN state, the device activation authentication module in the Internet state, and the device activation authentication module in the non-network state. The user inserts the smart card into the reader, enters the ID and password, and the smart card calculates Relevant random values and hash values, and perform identity verification. If the verification is passed, enter a new password and modify the relevant information in the smart card. Otherwise, the session will be interrupted; The new sensor device node connection module selects a new sensor device node, calculates a new shared key, saves relevant information and sends it to the gateway node. The gateway node stores and updates the information in the key database to complete the new sensor Device node connection.