CN116405311B - A method for screening in-vehicle safety signals based on functional threat analysis - Google Patents
A method for screening in-vehicle safety signals based on functional threat analysisInfo
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- CN116405311B CN116405311B CN202310507815.8A CN202310507815A CN116405311B CN 116405311 B CN116405311 B CN 116405311B CN 202310507815 A CN202310507815 A CN 202310507815A CN 116405311 B CN116405311 B CN 116405311B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种基于功能威胁分析的车内安全信号筛选方法，首先根据智能网联车辆的实际情况，确定其车内信号所涉及的业务集合，确定各个业务的业务信息安全等级，然后确定业务功能安全等级，根据业务的信息安全等级和功能安全等级，采用业务筛选标识映射表确定业务的筛选标识，从而获取备选车内信号集合，对备选车内信号集合中的车内信号进行信号综合安全等级，最后根据信号综合安全等级从备选车内信号集合中筛选得到安全信号集合。本发明基于威胁分析与风险评估，对车内信号进行筛选，以便更高效地对车内信号进行安全加固。
The present invention discloses a method for screening in-vehicle safety signals based on functional threat analysis. First, based on the actual situation of an intelligent connected vehicle, the service set involved in its in-vehicle signals is determined, the service information security level of each service is determined, and then the service functional security level is determined. Based on the information security level and functional security level of the service, a service screening identifier mapping table is used to determine the service screening identifier, thereby obtaining a set of candidate in-vehicle signals. The in-vehicle signals in the candidate in-vehicle signal set are evaluated for a comprehensive signal security level. Finally, a safe signal set is screened from the candidate in-vehicle signal set based on the comprehensive signal security level. Based on threat analysis and risk assessment, the present invention screens in-vehicle signals to more efficiently reinforce the security of in-vehicle signals.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of intelligent network-connected automobile safety, and particularly relates to an in-car safety signal screening method based on functional threat analysis.
Background
The development of intelligent automobile networking makes the automobile network communication data and signals increasingly, and network safety protection becomes particularly important. The method is characterized in that the communication safety protection means are updated and iterated continuously, and the problems of massive consumption of system resources, increased communication bus load and signal delay of an automobile electronic control unit (Electronic Control Unit, ECU) are faced after a large number of data signals are reinforced safely all the time. Therefore, a scientific and effective analysis and evaluation method is urgently needed to determine the safety reinforcement range and reinforcement object so as to effectively reduce the adverse effect of safety measures on the ECU.
Threat analysis and risk assessment (THREAT ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT, TARA) is an analysis technique that identifies threats and evaluates the risk corresponding to the threat. The method is convenient for a developer to put resources and energy into network security activities corresponding to high-priority threats, and analyzes, evaluates and screens out signals with higher threat risk levels, so that the influence of security reinforcement measures on the resource consumption, network communication load and communication delay of an automobile ECU system is effectively reduced. FIG. 1 is a flow chart of intelligent car threat analysis and risk assessment. At present, the safety signal is analyzed through the flow shown in fig. 1 to determine whether the target safety signal is suitable for implementing the safety reinforcement measures. At present, the TARA technology of the whole vehicle and parts is mature, but when the risk level evaluation of the safety signal in the vehicle is carried out by the original TARA flow, the problem of huge workload and difficulty in implementation is always involved, and the reinforcement signal screening capability cannot be actually born.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provide an in-vehicle safety signal screening method based on functional threat analysis, which screens in-vehicle signals based on threat analysis and risk assessment so as to more efficiently carry out safety reinforcement on the in-vehicle signals.
In order to achieve the above object, the method for screening the safety signal in the vehicle based on the function threat analysis comprises the following steps:
s1, firstly, determining a service set related to signals in an intelligent network-connected vehicle according to the actual condition of the intelligent network-connected vehicle, and determining the service information security level of each service, wherein the specific method comprises the following steps:
If a certain business is controlled by a computer and affects driving control and safety protection, setting the safety threat level of the business as 'danger';
if a certain business is communicated with external access, or the business can cause execution change of the business with the security threat level of 'danger', or the business relates to property, setting the security threat level of the business to 'high';
if a certain business relates to vehicle body control or sensitive information preset by a user, setting the security threat level of the business as 'medium';
if a certain business does not meet the requirements of the security threat level of ' danger ', ' high ', ' medium ', setting the security threat level of the business to ' low ', ';
S2, setting the service function security level of each service of the service set according to the service function of each service, wherein the service function security level is 'not affected', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D' from low to high;
s3, according to the information security level and the function security level of the service, determining the service screening identification of the service, wherein the specific method comprises the following steps:
When the service function security level of the service is 'no influence' or 'A' or 'B', if the service information security level is 'no influence' or 'low', the service screening mark is 'non-selection', if the service information security level is 'medium', the service screening mark is 'optional', and if the service information security level is 'high' or 'dangerous', the service screening mark is 'necessary selection';
when the service function security level of the service is C or D, if the service information security level is not affected or low or medium, the service screening mark is optional, and if the service information security level is high or dangerous, the service screening mark is necessary;
Dividing the service into a mandatory service set B 1, an optional service set B 2 and an unselected service set B 3 according to the screening identification of the service, then acquiring an in-vehicle signal set S 1 related to the service in the mandatory service set B 1 and an in-vehicle signal set S 2 related to the optional service set B 2, and taking the two in-vehicle signal sets as alternative in-vehicle signal sets;
S4, for each in-vehicle signal set S 1 and in-vehicle signal set S 2, determining the signal information security level according to the key degree of the related information, wherein the signal information security level is 'not affected', 'low', 'medium', 'high', 'serious' from low to high respectively:
When the information security level of the signal is 'no influence', the comprehensive security level of the signal is 'no influence';
When the information security level of the signal is 'low', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'no influence', the signal comprehensive security level is 'no influence', otherwise, the signal comprehensive security level is 'low';
when the information security level of the signal is 'middle', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'no influence', the signal comprehensive security level is 'no influence', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low', the signal comprehensive security level is 'low', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'middle', or 'high', or 'danger', the signal comprehensive security level is 'middle';
When the information security level of the signal is 'high', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'not affected', the signal comprehensive security level is 'not affected', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low' or 'medium', the signal comprehensive security level is 'medium', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'high' or 'dangerous', the signal comprehensive security level is 'high';
When the information security level of the signal is serious, if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is not influenced, the signal comprehensive security level is not influenced, if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is low, medium or high, the signal comprehensive security level is high, and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is dangerous, the signal comprehensive security level is critical;
S5, regarding an in-vehicle signal set S 1, taking in-vehicle signals with the signal comprehensive safety level of high and key as safety signals, and regarding an in-vehicle signal set S 2, taking in-vehicle signals with the signal comprehensive safety level of key as safety signals, so as to form a safety signal set.
The invention relates to an in-vehicle safety signal screening method based on function threat analysis, which comprises the steps of firstly determining a service set related to in-vehicle signals of an intelligent network vehicle according to the actual condition of the intelligent network vehicle, determining the service information safety level of each service, then determining the service function safety level, determining the screening identification of the service according to the information safety level and the function safety level of the service by adopting a service screening identification mapping table, thereby obtaining an alternative in-vehicle signal set, carrying out signal comprehensive safety level on in-vehicle signals in the alternative in-vehicle signal set, and finally screening from the alternative in-vehicle signal set according to the signal comprehensive safety level to obtain a safety signal set.
The invention screens the in-vehicle signals based on threat analysis and risk assessment so as to more efficiently secure the in-vehicle signals.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of intelligent car threat analysis and risk assessment;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the in-vehicle security signal screening method based on functional threat analysis of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the invention is presented in conjunction with the accompanying drawings to provide a better understanding of the invention to those skilled in the art. It is to be expressly noted that in the description below, detailed descriptions of known functions and designs are omitted here as perhaps obscuring the present invention.
Examples
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the in-vehicle security signal screening method based on functional threat analysis of the present invention. As shown in fig. 2, the method for screening the safety signal in the vehicle based on the function threat analysis comprises the following specific steps:
S201, determining the security level of service information:
Based on the analysis, the invention firstly determines the service set related to the in-car signal according to the actual condition of the intelligent network-connected vehicle, and determines the service information security level of each service, and the specific method is as follows:
if a certain service is controlled by a computer and affects driving control and safety protection, setting the service information safety level of the service as 'danger';
If a certain service is communicated with external access, or the service can cause the execution change of the service with the service information security level of 'danger', or the service relates to property, setting the service information security level of the service to 'high';
if a certain service does not influence the running safety of the service or relates to property, but relates to vehicle body control or relates to sensitive information preset by a user, setting the service information safety level of the service as 'medium';
if a service involves an auxiliary function for information display, the security threat level of the service is set to "low". Such a service generally does not affect the running safety of itself nor involves control of the vehicle body and properties, and therefore the service information security level is set to "low".
If a certain service does not meet the requirements of the service information security level of 'danger', 'high', 'medium', 'low', the service information security level of the service is set to 'no influence'.
According to the service composition of the existing intelligent automobile, the service with the security threat level of 'danger' in the embodiment comprises a service related to longitudinal control right of vehicle movement, a service related to transverse control right of vehicle movement, a service related to vehicle movement stopping control right, a service related to anti-collision radar, a service related to Doppler radar, a service related to infrared radar, an active braking system service, a lane keeping system service, a lane changing early warning system service, a traction control system service, an electronic stabilizing device system service, a brake anti-locking system service and an electronic brake control system service.
The services with the high security threat level in the embodiment comprise a service communicated with Bluetooth, a service communicated with 4G and 5G, an infrared data service, a radar data service, a vehicle window control service, a vehicle door control service, a service related to financial payment, a power control battery service and a power battery temperature control service.
The services with the security threat level of 'medium' in the embodiment comprise services related to parking information, services related to driving tracks, wiper control services, car light control services and rearview mirror automatic control services.
The service with the low security threat level in the embodiment comprises a tire pressure feedback service, a temperature feedback service, an oil feedback service and a water quantity feedback service.
And screening out the message ID and ECU (sending/receiving) list which need to be reinforced by SecOC according to the service.
S202, determining the security level of the service function:
In terms of the impact level of business functions, in security (security), finance (financial), operation (operation), privacy (privacy), the impact level of operation and privacy is mainly dependent on security and finance, with a small impact weight. Whereas for business functions the financial level is mainly dependent on the level of security. Therefore, the invention is simplified to mainly consider the security elements of the business functions when considering the influence level of the business. Functional safety level (ASIL) is the result of hazard analysis and risk assessment of automotive electronics systems. The functional security levels are four levels, A, B, C, D each, where A is the lowest level and D is the highest level. The functional level is divided mainly by three criteria, severity (Severity), exposure rate (Exposure) and controllability (Controllability). The higher the level of functionality, the higher the security requirements, and the higher the cost 2 for implementing security. The functional security level may be broken down and assigned according to different uses and security objectives, and may be determined in advance by professional evaluation.
In the invention, for each service of the service set, the security level of the service function is set according to the service function, and the security level is 'not affected', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D' from low to high.
S203, screening a candidate in-vehicle signal set:
and determining the service screening identification of the service by adopting a service screening identification mapping table according to the information security level and the functional security level of the service. Table 1 is a service screening identity mapping table in the present invention.
TABLE 1
As can be seen from table 1, the method for determining the service screening identifier in the present invention is as follows:
When the service function security level of the service is 'no influence' or 'A' or 'B', if the service information security level is 'no influence' or 'low', the service screening mark is 'non-selection', if the service information security level is 'medium', the service screening mark is 'optional', and if the service information security level is 'high' or 'dangerous', the service screening mark is 'necessary selection';
When the service function security level of the service is ' C ' or ' D ', if the service information security level is ' no influence ' or ' low ' or ' medium ', the service screening identification is ' optional ', and if the service information security level is ' high ' or ' dangerous ', the service screening identification is ' necessary.
The service is divided into a mandatory service set B 1, an optional service set B 2 and an unselected service set B 3 according to the screening identification of the service. Then, an in-vehicle signal set S 1 related to the service in the mandatory service set B 1 and an in-vehicle signal set S 2 related to the optional service set B 2 are acquired, and the two in-vehicle signal sets are used as alternative in-vehicle signal sets.
S204, determining the comprehensive security level of the signal:
For the existing intelligent network-connected automobile, the signal in the automobile is transmitted through a CAN bus. In terms of threat level, no matter what attack means is adopted for the bus signal in the vehicle, the influence signal finally needs to be attacked by a physical contact mode. Thus, all communication channels within the vehicle have substantially identical threat levels, and the security signal may be simply considered to have substantially identical threat levels. Therefore, the signal in the vehicle only considers the signal information security level of the signal in the vehicle.
For each in-vehicle signal set S 1 and in-vehicle signal set S 2, the signal information security level is determined according to the key degree of the related information, and the signals are respectively "unaffected", "low", "medium", "high" and "serious" from low to high. The information criticality can be assessed in advance by a professional. And then determining the signal comprehensive security level of the in-vehicle signal by adopting a signal comprehensive security mapping table according to the information security level of the in-vehicle signal and the information security level of the corresponding service of the in-vehicle signal. Table 2 is a signal comprehensive security mapping table in the present invention.
TABLE 2
As can be seen from table 2, the method for determining the comprehensive security level of the signal in the present invention is as follows:
When the information security level of the signal is 'no influence', the comprehensive security level of the signal is 'no influence';
When the information security level of the signal is 'low', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'no influence', the signal comprehensive security level is 'no influence', otherwise, the signal comprehensive security level is 'low';
when the information security level of the signal is 'middle', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'no influence', the signal comprehensive security level is 'no influence', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low', the signal comprehensive security level is 'low', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'middle', or 'high', or 'danger', the signal comprehensive security level is 'middle';
When the information security level of the signal is 'high', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'not affected', the signal comprehensive security level is 'not affected', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low' or 'medium', the signal comprehensive security level is 'medium', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'high' or 'dangerous', the signal comprehensive security level is 'high';
when the information security level of the signal is 'serious', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'not affected', the signal comprehensive security level is 'not affected', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low', or 'medium', or 'high', the signal comprehensive security level is 'high', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'dangerous', the signal comprehensive security level is 'critical'.
S205, screening to obtain a safety signal set:
for the in-vehicle signal set S 1, the in-vehicle signal in which the signal comprehensive security level is "high" and "critical" is used as a security signal, and for the in-vehicle signal set S 2, the in-vehicle signal in which the signal comprehensive security level is "critical" is used as a security signal, so as to constitute a security signal set.
And for the in-car signals in the safety signal set, the message ID and the sending/receiving ECU list of the in-car signals are obtained for SecOC reinforcement, so that the safety of the intelligent network-connected car can be effectively improved.
While the foregoing describes illustrative embodiments of the present invention to facilitate an understanding of the present invention by those skilled in the art, it should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the scope of the embodiments, but is to be construed as protected by the accompanying claims insofar as various changes are within the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined and defined by the appended claims.
Claims (2)
1. An in-vehicle safety signal screening method based on functional threat analysis is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, firstly, determining a service set related to signals in an intelligent network-connected vehicle according to the actual condition of the intelligent network-connected vehicle, and determining the service information security level of each service, wherein the specific method comprises the following steps:
If a certain business is controlled by a computer and affects driving control and safety protection, setting the safety threat level of the business as 'danger';
if a certain business is communicated with external access, or the business can cause execution change of the business with the security threat level of 'danger', or the business relates to property, setting the security threat level of the business to 'high';
if a certain business relates to vehicle body control or sensitive information preset by a user, setting the security threat level of the business as 'medium';
if a certain business does not meet the requirements of the security threat level of ' danger ', ' high ', ' medium ', setting the security threat level of the business to ' low ', ';
S2, setting the service function security level of each service of the service set according to the service function of each service, wherein the service function security level is 'not affected', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D' from low to high;
s3, according to the information security level and the function security level of the service, determining the service screening identification of the service, wherein the specific method comprises the following steps:
When the service function security level of the service is 'no influence' or 'A' or 'B', if the service information security level is 'no influence' or 'low', the service screening mark is 'non-selection', if the service information security level is 'medium', the service screening mark is 'optional', and if the service information security level is 'high' or 'dangerous', the service screening mark is 'necessary selection';
when the service function security level of the service is C or D, if the service information security level is not affected or low or medium, the service screening mark is optional, and if the service information security level is high or dangerous, the service screening mark is necessary;
Dividing the service into a mandatory service set B 1, an optional service set B 2 and an unselected service set B 3 according to the screening identification of the service, then acquiring an in-vehicle signal set S 1 related to the service in the mandatory service set B 1 and an in-vehicle signal set S 2 related to the optional service set B 2, and taking the two in-vehicle signal sets as alternative in-vehicle signal sets;
S4, for each in-vehicle signal set S 1 and in-vehicle signal set S 2, determining the signal information security level according to the key degree of the related information, wherein the signal information security level is 'not affected', 'low', 'medium', 'high', 'serious' from low to high respectively:
When the information security level of the signal is 'no influence', the comprehensive security level of the signal is 'no influence';
When the information security level of the signal is 'low', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'no influence', the signal comprehensive security level is 'no influence', otherwise, the signal comprehensive security level is 'low';
when the information security level of the signal is 'middle', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'no influence', the signal comprehensive security level is 'no influence', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low', the signal comprehensive security level is 'low', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'middle', or 'high', or 'danger', the signal comprehensive security level is 'middle';
When the information security level of the signal is 'high', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'not affected', the signal comprehensive security level is 'not affected', if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'low' or 'medium', the signal comprehensive security level is 'medium', and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is 'high' or 'dangerous', the signal comprehensive security level is 'high';
When the information security level of the signal is serious, if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is not influenced, the signal comprehensive security level is not influenced, if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is low, medium or high, the signal comprehensive security level is high, and if the service information security level of the service corresponding to the signal is dangerous, the signal comprehensive security level is critical;
S5, regarding an in-vehicle signal set S 1, taking in-vehicle signals with the signal comprehensive safety level of high and key as safety signals, and regarding an in-vehicle signal set S 2, taking in-vehicle signals with the signal comprehensive safety level of key as safety signals, so as to form a safety signal set.
2. The method for screening the safety signal in the vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the traffic with the safety threat level of "danger" in the step S1 includes traffic related to longitudinal control right of vehicle movement, traffic related to transverse control right of vehicle movement, traffic related to stop control right of vehicle movement, traffic related to anti-collision radar, traffic related to doppler radar, traffic related to infrared radar, traffic of an active braking system, traffic of a lane keeping system, traffic of a lane changing early warning system, traffic of a traction control system, traffic of an electronic stabilizer system, traffic of a brake anti-lock system, traffic of an electronic brake control system;
the services with the security threat level of high comprise services communicated with Bluetooth, services communicated with 4G and 5G, infrared data services, radar data services, window control services and door control services;
the system comprises a financial payment service, a power control battery service, a power battery temperature control service, a power battery service and a power battery service;
The safety threat level is 'medium' business comprises business related to parking information, business related to driving tracks, wiper control business, car light control business, rearview mirror automatic control business;
the services with the low security threat level comprise a tire pressure feedback service, a temperature feedback service, an oil feedback service and a water quantity feedback service.
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| CN109885033A (en) * | 2019-03-18 | 2019-06-14 | 百度在线网络技术（北京）有限公司 | The method and device of safe processing of vehicle control instruction |
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