CN115883102A - Cross-domain identity authentication method and system based on identity credibility and electronic equipment - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a cross-domain identity authentication method, a system and electronic equipment based on identity credibility. The unique identity authorization module is used for converting the digital identity of the user into a publicly verifiable unique identity to realize the binding of the digital identity and the identity reliability; the privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero knowledge range certification is used for encrypting and verifying identity credibility records which are publicly stored in a federation chain account book, and the safety and the correctness of the public records are ensured; and the management and sharing module based on the identity credibility of the alliance chain is used for realizing dynamic maintenance and cross-domain identity authentication of the identity credibility. The invention provides a cross-domain unified management mode of identity credibility, and realizes the safe comparison of the identity credibility between the security domains on the premise of protecting the privacy of users.

Description

Cross-domain identity authentication method, system and electronic device based on identity credibility

technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of cross-domain identity authentication with privacy protection characteristics in applied cryptography, and relates to an identity authentication method, system and electronic equipment, in particular to a cross-domain identity authentication method, system and electronic device based on identity credibility. equipment.

Background technique

Identity authentication based on user name and password is a common authentication method for Web applications. The identity authentication service of each web application forms an independent security domain, and can only identify digital identities in this domain. Cross-domain authentication allows users to only have the identity of one security domain, but can be identified by other security domains. However, due to the lack of credible data sharing channels, each security domain can only passively accept identity credentials from outside the domain, making it difficult to assess its identity risk.

At present, the increasingly rich web application market has led to a rapid increase in the number of cross-domain requests, and both users and service providers have higher requirements for the function and security of cross-domain identity authentication services. On the one hand, there are multi-party credit joint credit scenarios in the credit system; similarly, in identity authentication, the identity of the same user in multiple domains can also be used as a credential source for cross-domain identity authentication; on the other hand, in order to reduce system Risks, to do a good job in the security protection of Web services, each enterprise and department will establish different identity credibility models according to system security policies and privacy requirements, and evaluate the credit status of user identities in the domain. The identity credibility model obtains the historical behavior records of users in this domain by analyzing the log files stored in the identity authentication server, so as to obtain the current credit level of the target identity according to specific calculation rules; and the system can analyze user behavior preferences to dynamically Monitor abnormal identity authentication behaviors in a timely manner. However, in a cross-domain scenario, the existing identity authentication framework is difficult to reliably meet the above requirements: First, whether it is a centralized authentication service or a third-party authentication service, they all belong to centralized service nodes, and there is a risk of single point failure . Secondly, due to data confidentiality requirements and user privacy considerations, each identity authentication service provider lacks channels for public maintenance and sharing of identity status and identity risk-related data, so they can only passively accept identity credentials from third parties. Finally, the traditional database-based log storage method cannot provide a reliable way of backtracking and auditing the entire data life cycle. Therefore, under the premise of protecting user privacy, how to reliably store, share and compare identity credibility to achieve cross-domain identity authentication is an urgent problem to be solved.

The authentication method based on the centralized strategy is too dependent on a single trust center. Even if the authentication service cluster composed of multiple service nodes is introduced, it can only solve the problem of single point failure caused by physical factors, and cannot logically disperse trust and realize decentralization. standardized identity authentication. Existing distributed identity authentication schemes are usually based on public blockchain technology, which publicly maintains identity authentication data and provides solutions for cross-domain identity authentication. However, due to the low throughput of public blockchains and the lack of access to data on the chain control mechanism, there are challenging issues in terms of storage efficiency and privacy protection.

Hyperledger Fabric alliance chain, as an open source enterprise-level access license distributed ledger technology, has made a special design for the above-mentioned needs of enterprise users. First of all, in terms of identity management, Fabric divides the blockchain network into alliances maintained by multiple organizations, and defines various types of participants in the organization, such as Peer nodes, sorting service nodes, and client applications of each organization Programs and alliance chain administrators of various organizations, etc. These identity information are strictly associated with the digital identities in the digital certificates distributed by the root CA and the intermediate CA; therefore, the digital identities defined in the digital certificates correspond to the responsibilities in the Fabric network and the access rights to specific resources. Secondly, in terms of transaction confirmation and consensus mechanism, Fabric uses a unified transparent governance model and strict access mechanism to realize the separation of transaction execution and sequencing by introducing sorting nodes and endorsement mechanisms; by supporting pluggable consensus protocols, A deterministic consensus algorithm is adopted under the trusted authority management mode to ensure that the blocks verified by Peer nodes are all final and correct, thereby avoiding forks in the public blockchain. Finally, Fabric also supports smart contract technology. The definition of smart contract is to transform the business model consisting of data, rules, concept definitions and business processes of the interaction between enterprise businesses into executable logic added to the fact records in the distributed ledger. In order to better manage the smart contracts physically stored on Peer nodes, Fabric packages the smart contracts of specific business processes into a dedicated technology container for contract installation and instantiation, which is called chain code.

Although the Fabric blockchain provides channel architecture and private data to realize confidential transactions between individual organizations, the data used for transactions still needs to be disclosed between organizations participating in confidential transactions. Therefore, for the confidentiality maintenance of numerical information on the alliance chain ledger, the homomorphic encryption cryptosystem can be used to ensure the computability of the ciphertext, and the range proof in the zero-knowledge proof can be used to ensure that the ciphertext is in a legal range.

The Paillier homomorphic encryption system is an additive homomorphic encryption scheme based on discrete logarithm and DCRA assumptions. The security assumption of this scheme can be reduced to the computational difficulty of the composite residual class decomposition problem. In order to reduce the time complexity of the decryption operation, the Paillier homomorphic encryption system can be transformed into an improved scheme based on the partial discrete logarithm problem: by selecting a subgroup with a smaller order generator g, the size of the ciphertext space is limited. The components of the improved Paillier algorithm are key generation step, encryption step and decryption step.

The goal of range proof based on Pederson vector commitment is to prove that for a given number v, prove that v∈[0,2 ⁿ ), that is to say, if the number v satisfies the interval requirement, then the length of its binary representation must be n, and the binary The string corresponding to the notation consists only of 0 and 1. Under the random oracle model, the Fiat-Shamir transformation can transform an interactive protocol requiring log(n) steps into a secure and completely zero-knowledge non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. In addition, by concatenating the binary representation strings of m values in the same range, an aggregated range proof that can prove n m bits at a time can be generated with only 2 log ₂ (m) proof elements added .

Contents of the invention

In view of the disadvantages of the above-mentioned centralized strategy-based authentication method relying too much on a single trust center, and the public blockchain’s need for efficiency and privacy protection under the requirement of storing identity authentication-related data, the present invention is based on having access permission The alliance chain account book provides an identity credibility management model, which realizes the unified management of identity credibility under the premise of protecting user privacy, and realizes a cross-domain identity authentication method and system based on security comparison of identity credibility and electronic equipment.

The technical solution adopted by the method of the present invention is: a cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility, comprising the following steps:

Step 1: Convert the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity to realize the binding of digital identity and identity credibility;

The authoritative identity source agency verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate to the user to generate the application; the user uses the identity dynamic identification certificate to register the digital identity, Provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials;

Step 2: Encrypt and verify the identity credibility records publicly stored in the alliance chain ledger;

After the user registers a digital identity by using a unique identity, the identity authentication service will distribute a homomorphic encryption key for each digital identity; when generating the identity credibility record corresponding to the digital identity, the identity authentication service will generate the corresponding homomorphic encryption Ciphertext and zero-knowledge range proofs are used as verification information for data legitimacy;

Step 3: Identity credibility configuration information management, dynamic maintenance on the identity credibility chain and verifiable comparison of identity credibility;

The consortium chain is used as a public verifiable storage medium and a credible consortium chain chain code execution environment to ensure that the identity credibility related information in the public ledger has not been tampered with and can honestly execute the functions defined by the chain code.

The technical solution adopted by the system of the present invention is: a cross-domain identity authentication system based on identity credibility, including a unique identity identification authorization module, a privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof, and an alliance chain-based Identity credibility management and sharing modules;

The unique identity authorization module is used to convert the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity, so as to realize the binding of digital identity and identity credibility;

The authoritative identity source agency verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate to the user to generate the application; the user uses the identity dynamic identification certificate to register the digital identity, Provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials;

The privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof is used to encrypt and verify the identity credibility records publicly stored in the alliance chain ledger;

After the user registers a digital identity by using a unique identity, the identity authentication service will distribute a homomorphic encryption key for each digital identity; when generating the identity credibility record corresponding to the digital identity, the identity authentication service will generate the corresponding homomorphic encryption Ciphertext and zero-knowledge range proofs are used as verification information for data legitimacy;

The management and sharing module of identity credibility based on the alliance chain is used for identity credibility configuration information management, dynamic maintenance of identity credibility on the chain, and verifiable comparison of identity credibility;

The consortium chain is used as a public verifiable storage medium and a credible consortium chain chain code execution environment to ensure that the identity credibility related information in the public ledger has not been tampered with and can honestly execute the functions defined by the chain code.

The technical solution adopted by the electronic equipment of the present invention is: an electronic equipment, comprising:

one or more processors;

a storage device for storing one or more programs, when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, causing the one or more processors to implement the identity-based credibility The cross-domain authentication method.

Compared with the prior art, the present invention has advantages and positive effects mainly in the following aspects:

(1) The present invention proposes a standard storage mode of identity credibility based on homomorphic encryption and non-interactive zero-knowledge scope proof, and builds a secure sharing channel of identity credibility under the premise of ensuring data computability. Realized the unified management of the credibility of multiple heterogeneous identities;

(2) The present invention designs an efficient compact storage mode, and realizes efficient storage of multiple identity credibility state records by designing a compact storage structure combined with Merkle hash tree and aggregation range proof;

(3) The present invention proposes a cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility. When each security domain accepts identity credentials from outside the domain, under the supervision of the ciphertext authentication chain code as a trusted third party, it uses ciphertext certification, ciphertext records of identity credibility status and pre-disclosed identity credibility evaluation criteria , execute the identity credibility security comparison protocol, and obtain the comparison result between the user identity credibility and the minimum threshold requirement of the local identity credibility, so as to decide whether to accept the cross-domain identity authentication request. During this process, the protocol provided by this scheme can effectively protect the privacy of the security domain and users.

Description of drawings

Fig. 1 is the overall frame diagram of the system of the embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an authorization module based on unique identity identification in an embodiment of the present invention;

3 is a schematic diagram of a privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof in an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the standard structure of the security domain configuration information of the management and sharing module of the identity credibility based on the consortium chain in the embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 5 is a verifiable comparison schematic diagram of identity credibility management and sharing modules based on consortium chains in an embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed ways

In order to facilitate those skilled in the art to understand and implement the present invention, the present invention will be described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the implementation examples described here are only used to illustrate and explain the present invention, not for limit the invention.

A cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility provided by this embodiment includes the following steps:

Step 1: Convert the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity to realize the binding of digital identity and identity credibility;

The authoritative identity source agency verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate to the user to generate the application; the user uses the identity dynamic identification certificate to register the digital identity, Provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials;

Step 2: Encrypt and verify the identity credibility records publicly stored in the alliance chain ledger;

After the user registers a digital identity by using a unique identity, the identity authentication service will distribute a homomorphic encryption key for each digital identity; when generating the identity credibility record corresponding to the digital identity, the identity authentication service will generate the corresponding homomorphic encryption Ciphertext and zero-knowledge range proofs are used as verification information for data legitimacy;

Step 3: Identity credibility configuration information management, dynamic maintenance on the identity credibility chain and verifiable comparison of identity credibility;

The consortium chain is used as a public verifiable storage medium and a credible consortium chain chain code execution environment to ensure that the identity credibility related information in the public ledger has not been tampered with and can honestly execute the functions defined by the chain code.

The present invention provides a cross-domain identity authentication system based on identity credibility, which consists of a unique identity identification authorization module, a privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof, management and identity credibility based on alliance chains. Composition of shared modules, see Figure 1 for a complete system architecture diagram.

The unique identity authorization module of this embodiment is used to convert the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity, and realize the binding of digital identity and identity credibility;

The authoritative identity source agency verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate to the user to generate the application; the user uses the identity dynamic identification certificate to register the digital identity, Provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials;

The privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge scope proof in this embodiment is used to encrypt and verify identity credibility records publicly stored in the alliance chain account book;

After the user registers a digital identity by using a unique identity, the identity authentication service will distribute a homomorphic encryption key for each digital identity; when generating the identity credibility record corresponding to the digital identity, the identity authentication service will generate the corresponding homomorphic encryption Ciphertext and zero-knowledge range proofs are used as verification information for data legitimacy;

The identity credibility management and sharing module based on the consortium chain of this embodiment is used for identity credibility configuration information management, identity credibility chain dynamic maintenance and identity credibility verifiable comparison;

The consortium chain is used as a public verifiable storage medium and a credible consortium chain chain code execution environment to ensure that the identity credibility related information in the public ledger has not been tampered with and can honestly execute the functions defined by the chain code.

Please see Fig. 2, this embodiment is based on the unique identity identification authorization module, and the specific working process includes the following steps:

Step A1: The generation process of the user's unique identity involves three entities: the user, the authoritative identity source organization and the alliance chain ledger;

The authoritative identity source institution provides the user with an authentication application including a unique identification code appid. The user uses the authentication application to generate the user key (PrivKey _User , PubKey _User ), calculates the hash value of the personal information and signs it, and applies for the unique identity identifier uuid _User from the authoritative identity source organization;

Step A1.1: The authoritative identity source agency distributes the authentication application program with the unique identification code appid to the user, and uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate the private key PrivKey _User and the public key PubKey _User ; then the user organizes the personal information UserInfo into a standard storage format , and calculate the summary value of personal information H=Hash(UserInfo), and use your own private key PrivKey _User to sign the summary of personal information, application identification code appid and identity generation timestamp Sig _User (H|appid|Timestamp). After the calculation is completed, the user transmits the public key PubKey _User , personal information UserInfo, personal information summary H, application identification code appid, and signature Sig _User to the authoritative identity source through the application program;

Among them, the asymmetric encryption algorithm in this embodiment is preferably an elliptic curve encryption algorithm based on the NIST P-256 curve, and the digital signature algorithm in this embodiment is preferably an ECDSA (FIPS 186-3) signature algorithm.

Step A1.2: After receiving the request from the user application, the authoritative identity source agency calculates the user's personal information digest H=Hash(UserInfo) according to the same rules, and uses the public key PubKey _User to verify the user signature Sig _User . After confirming the authenticity and completeness of the request, the authoritative identity source agency sends the personal information summary H, the application identification code appid, the identity generation timestamp Timestamp and the signature Sig _Authority (H|appid|Timestamp ) is submitted to the alliance chain account book, and the identity address addr _User is obtained, and then addr _User is returned to the authentication application as the user's unique identity uuid _User .

Step A2: The authentication process of the user's unique identity involves three entities: the user, the local security domain authentication server and the alliance chain ledger;

The user uses the authentication application to generate a dynamic identity dynamic identification credential composed of the unique identity uuid _User obtained from A1, the summary value of personal information H, the timestamp Timestamp generated by the dynamic identity identification credential, the security domain for applying for access, and the validity period. The identification credentials are sent to the target authentication server.

Step A2.1: The authentication application will generate the identity dynamic identification credential Cert=(appid, H, Timestamp, targetDomain, LifeTime), and use the private key PrivKey _User to sign it, where TargetDomain is the security domain to apply for access, and LifeTime is the validity period; then dynamically identify the identity certificate Cert, sign Sig _User , public key PubKey _User , The personal information summary value H and the unique identity uuid _User are combined into an identity authentication message and sent to the target authentication server;

During a cross-domain identity authentication process, the local security domain authentication server needs to verify the identity of the user who initiates the authentication request; and the target authentication server needs to verify the cross-domain identity authentication message provided by the local security domain server.

First of all, the local security domain can verify the user's identity credentials, and the adversary needs to have the user's private key to pass the identity authentication of the local security domain. Then, the local security domain needs to use the private key to construct a legal cross-domain authentication message, so it is difficult for the adversary to forge the cross-domain authentication request. Finally, the target authentication server can verify the authenticity of the authentication message through the public key of the authentication server in the local security domain and the authoritative record of the identification information summary.

Step A2.2: After the target authentication server obtains the identity authentication message, it will use the generated timestamp and validity period to judge the timeliness of the identity authentication message. Then use the user public key PubKey _User and the content of the identity authentication message to verify the identity dynamic identification credential Cert. After the identity dynamic identification credential is verified, the authoritative record of the identification information summary is obtained according to the unique identity uuid _User , and the personal information summary value H is verified. When all the information provided by the user side is consistent, the target authentication server can determine that the user's identity is legitimate. Finally, the target authentication server records the hash value of the identity dynamic identification credential and marks it as used.

Please see Fig. 3, this embodiment is based on the privacy protection module of homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof, and the specific working process includes the following steps:

Step B1: Homomorphic encryption key distribution;

The user uses the unique identity uuid _User obtained from A1 to pass the authentication of the local security domain Web application through step A2. Subsequently, the local security domain web application generates a pair of homomorphic encryption public-private key pair public key PK _User = (n, g) and private key SK _User = (p, q, α) for the user's digital identity, and secures the private key It is stored locally for the verification of identity credibility comparison results, and the public key is publicly sent to all participants in the system for the encryption of identity credibility. Among them, p and q are random large prime numbers, n is the product of p and q, g is a random number, and α is a factor of the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1;

Among them, the homomorphic encryption algorithm in this embodiment is preferably an improved Paillier algorithm based on a Partial Discrete Logarithm Problem (Partial Discrete Logarithm Problem).

Step B2: Identity credibility ciphertext generation, after the web application in the local security domain evaluates the identity credibility corresponding to the user's digital identity, use the corresponding homomorphic encryption public key PK _User = (n, g) and random number r to generate Identity credibility ciphertext.

Step B3: Generation of identity credibility range proof, the web application in the local security domain selects the public parameter ParamsRP, and generates the range proof corresponding to the identity credibility level ciphertext record.

Among them, the Bulletproof algorithm is preferred in this embodiment of the zero-knowledge range proof algorithm;

Please see Figure 4 and Figure 5, this embodiment is based on the identity credibility management and sharing module of the alliance chain, and the specific working process includes the following steps:

Step C1: Identity credibility configuration information management. Each security domain stores the identity credibility configuration information in the alliance chain ledger in the form of a JSON standard storage structure in advance, including the security domain Domain, the homomorphic encryption public key PHEKey, and the identity can be Maximum reliability CreditMax, minimum identity credibility CreditMin, identity credibility evaluation standard TrustworthinessStandard, timestamp Timestamp, message hash value MessageHash, digital signature ConfigSig;

Wherein, digital signature algorithm preferred ECDSA (FIPS 186-3) signature algorithm in this embodiment;

Step C2: The identity credibility is dynamically maintained on the chain. After the user registers the digital identity in the security domain, the security domain generates the identity credibility status information of the digital identity through the identity credibility evaluation standard TrustworthinessStandard in C1, and adopts the standard storage mode Or the compact storage mode stores one or more identity credibility state records in the alliance chain ledger;

For the sake of clarity, it is assumed that the security domain dynamically maintains identity credibility in a standard storage mode;

Step C2.1: The security domain adopts the standard storage mode, and the generation contains the security domain Domain, the timestamp Timestamp, the previous identity credibility status record PreviousCreditAddress, the identity credibility ciphertext Credit, the identity credibility range certificate CreditRangeProof, configuration Records of the encrypted storage structure of information such as information address ConfigAddress, message hash value MessageHash, digital signature MessageSig, etc.;

Step C2.2: The alliance chain chain code verifies the digital signature and the range certificate, first checks the validity of the signature of the security domain web application, and then calculates VerifyRP (paramsRP, proofRP), where proofRP is the identity credibility range certificate; If the verification is passed, the ciphertext verification chain code will store the identity credibility state in the alliance chain account book, and obtain the transaction address addr corresponding to the record; otherwise, the identity credibility state will be discarded, and the alliance chain account book does not need to be updated;

Step C3: Verifiable comparison of identity credibility, users can use existing digital identities for cross-domain identity authentication. The security domain that accepts cross-domain identity credentials can select an appropriate minimum threshold of identity credibility t according to the identity credibility evaluation standard TrustworthinessStandard disclosed in advance by the security domain that provides the identity; Next, judge whether the identity credibility of the cross-domain identity certificate meets the minimum requirements of the domain, so as to decide whether to pass the cross-domain identity authentication request.

Step C3.1: The external security domain Ex selects the comparison parameter θ(θ>CreditMax _L ) according to the identity credibility configuration information of the local security domain L, and calculates the ciphertext Encrypt _Ex (θ,r _θ ) of the comparison parameter θ; where, CreditMax _L is the maximum value allowed by identity credibility, and r _θ is the random number used when encrypting θ;

PK_Ex，PK_CC；其中，C(Ex,v₁)为外部安全域Ex申请的密文v₁的鉴定证明，Certificate_Ex为外部安全域Ex的证书，PK_Ex为外部安全域Ex的公钥，PK_CC为密文鉴定链码CC的公钥；Step C3.2: Calculate v ₁ = θ-t in the external security domain Ex, and apply for a certificate C(Ex,v ₁ ) from the ciphertext authentication chain code, the content of the certificate includes Sig(Hash(Certificate _Ex )),

PK _Ex , PK _CC ; among them, C(Ex, v ₁ ) is the authentication certificate of the ciphertext v ₁ applied for by the external security domain Ex, Certificate _Ex is the certificate of the external security domain Ex, and PK _Ex is the public key of the external security domain Ex , PK _CC is the public key of the ciphertext authentication chain code CC;

Step C3.3: The external security domain sends Encrypt _Ex (θ,r _θ ) and C(Ex,v ₁ ) to the local security domain;

PK_L，PK_CC；其中，Certificate_L为本地安全域L的证书，r_k为加密k时的随机数，/>

为密文v₂在联盟链账本中的存储地址，PK_L为本地安全域L的公钥；Step C3.4: Assuming that the identity credibility of User _L is v ₂ , the local security domain L randomly selects linear transformation parameters k ₁ , k ₂ , and applies for a certificate C(L,k ₁ ·v ₂ from the ciphertext authentication chain code ), the proof content includes Sig(Hash(Certificate _L )), Encrypt _L (k ₁ ,r _k ),

PK _L , PK _CC ; Among them, Certificate _L is the certificate of the local security domain L, r _k is the random number when encrypting k, />

is the storage address of the ciphertext v ₂ in the ledger of the alliance chain, and PK _L is the public key of the local security domain L;

Step C3.5: After the local security domain L obtains the ciphertext proof, it will calculate the intermediate results m ₁ , m ₂ for comparison,

The local security domain L also needs to calculate intermediate results m ₃ , m ₄ , m ₅ for verification,

Step C3.6: After obtaining all the intermediate results, the local security domain L sends m ₁ , m ₂ , m ₃ , m ₄ , m ₅ , C(L,k ₁ ·v ₂ ) to the external security domain Ex;

是否与

对应的身份可信度状态记录一致，若不一致则立即终止协议。然后，外部安全域将验证证明C(L,k₁·v₂)中的数字签名，若数字签名验证不通过则立即终止协议。在确保密文的真实性之后，外部安全域Ex解密并比较d₁＝Decrypt_ex(m₁)和d₂＝Decrypt_Ex(m₂)，从而得到UserL在本地安全域中的数字身份对应的身份可信度和外部安全域的身份可信度最小阈值要求的比较结果。最后，外部安全域Ex解密d₃＝Decrypt_Ex(m₃)和d₄＝Decrypt_Ex(m₄)，得到验证信息，随后计算并验证下列等式Step C3.7: The external security domain Ex first checks the certificate in C(L,k ₁ ·v ₂ )

whether with

The corresponding identity credibility status records are consistent, and if they are inconsistent, the agreement will be terminated immediately. Then, the external security domain will verify the digital signature in the certificate C(L,k ₁ ·v ₂ ), and if the digital signature verification fails, the agreement will be terminated immediately. After ensuring the authenticity of the ciphertext, the external security domain Ex decrypts and compares d ₁ = Decrypt _ex (m ₁ ) and d ₂ = Decrypt _Ex (m ₂ ), thereby obtaining the identity corresponding to the digital identity of UserL in the local security domain The result of the comparison of trustworthiness and the minimum threshold requirement for identity trustworthiness of the external security domain. Finally, the external security domain Ex decrypts d ₃ =Decrypt _Ex (m ₃ ) and d ₄ =Decrypt _Ex (m ₄ ) to obtain verification information, and then calculates and verifies the following equation

If the equations are all true, it proves that the local security domain L has implemented the agreement honestly, and the external security domain Ex accepts the identity credibility comparison result; otherwise, it proves that the local security domain L has fraudulent behavior during the protocol execution.

Step C3.8: The external security domain Ex judges whether the cross-domain identity authentication request of the user is passed according to the comparison result.

Step C3.9: Finally, the external security domain Ex records the execution log of the identity credibility security comparison protocol in the alliance chain ledger.

The present invention can provide:

1. Binding of digital identity and identity credibility: This solution converts the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity, realizing the binding of digital identity and identity credibility. The authoritative identity source organization verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate generation application to the user. Users can then use the identity dynamic identification credentials to register digital identities and provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials;

2. Unified management of multiple heterogeneous identity credibility: This solution provides a standard storage structure for identity credibility configuration information, and based on this, an identity security system based on homomorphic encryption and non-interactive zero-knowledge scope proof is designed. The reliability standard storage mode and the efficient compact storage mode use the Fabric alliance chain ledger with access permission as the storage medium to realize the unified maintenance of identity credibility records under the premise of protecting user privacy.

3. A cross-domain identity authentication framework based on identity credibility: When each security domain accepts identity credentials from outside the domain, under the supervision of the alliance chain chain code as a trusted third party, the identities certified by ciphertext and publicly stored can be verified. The ciphertext record of the credibility state executes the identity credibility security comparison protocol, and obtains the comparison result of the user identity credibility and the minimum threshold requirement of the domain identity credibility, so as to decide whether to accept the cross-domain identity authentication request. By combining the existing identity credibility management mode with cross-domain identity authentication, this solution realizes a safe and reliable identity authentication mechanism in cross-domain scenarios.

It should be understood that the above-mentioned descriptions for the preferred embodiments are relatively detailed, and should not therefore be considered as limiting the scope of the patent protection of the present invention. Within the scope of protection, replacements or modifications can also be made, all of which fall within the protection scope of the present invention, and the scope of protection of the present invention should be based on the appended claims.

Claims (9)

1. A cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility, characterized in that, comprising the following steps: Step 1: Convert the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity to realize the binding of digital identity and identity credibility; The authoritative identity source agency verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate to the user to generate the application; the user uses the identity dynamic identification certificate to register the digital identity, Provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials; Step 2: Encrypt and verify the identity credibility records publicly stored in the alliance chain ledger; After the user registers a digital identity by using a unique identity, the identity authentication service will distribute a homomorphic encryption key for each digital identity; when generating the identity credibility record corresponding to the digital identity, the identity authentication service will generate the corresponding homomorphic encryption Ciphertext and zero-knowledge range proofs are used as verification information for data legitimacy; Step 3: Identity credibility configuration information management, dynamic maintenance on the identity credibility chain and verifiable comparison of identity credibility; The consortium chain is used as a public verifiable storage medium and a credible consortium chain chain code execution environment to ensure that the identity credibility related information in the public ledger has not been tampered with and can honestly execute the functions defined by the chain code. 2. The cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step 1, the generation process of the user's unique identity involves three entities: the user, the authoritative identity source organization and the alliance Chain ledger; The process of generating the unique identity of a user specifically includes the following sub-steps: Step A1.1: The user uses the asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate a pair of public and private key pairs through the authentication application program provided by the authoritative identity source organization that contains the unique identification code; then the user organizes the personal information into a standard storage format and calculates the summary of the personal information value, and use their own private key to sign the personal information summary, application identification code and identity generation timestamp; the user transmits the public key, personal information, personal information summary, application identification code, and signature through the application through a secure channel To the authoritative identity source organization, apply for a unique identity identifier from the authoritative identity source organization; Step A1.2: After receiving the request from the user application, the authoritative identity source agency calculates the user's personal information summary according to the same rules, and verifies the user's signature; after confirming the authenticity and integrity of the request, the authoritative identity The source organization submits the summary of personal information, application identification code, identity generation time stamp and the signature of the authoritative organization on the chain information to the alliance chain account book, and obtains the transaction address; then returns the transaction address as the user's unique identity to the authentication application. 3. The cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility according to claim 1, characterized in that: in step 1, the authentication process of the user's unique identity involves three entities: the user, the local security domain authentication server and Consortium chain ledger; The authentication process of the unique identity of the user specifically includes the following sub-steps: Step A2.1: When the user performs identity authentication, the authentication application will generate an identity dynamic identification credential consisting of the application identification code, personal information summary value, generation time stamp of the identity dynamic identification credential, the security domain for which access is applied for and the validity period, and Use the private key to sign it; then combine the identity dynamic identification certificate, signature, public key, personal information digest value and unique identity into an identity authentication message, and send it to the target authentication server; Step A2.2: After the target authentication server obtains the identity authentication message, it will use the generated timestamp and validity period to judge the timeliness of the identity authentication message; then use the user's public key and the content of the identity authentication message to verify the identity dynamic identification certificate; After the verification of the identity dynamic identification certificate is passed, the authoritative record of the identification information summary is obtained according to the unique identity identifier, and the personal information summary value is verified; when all the information provided by the user side is consistent, the target authentication server determines that the user's identity is legal; Finally, the target authentication server records the hash value of the identity dynamic identification credential and marks it as used. 4. The cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility according to claim 1, wherein the specific realization of step 2 includes the following sub-steps: Step B1: Homomorphic encryption key distribution; The user provides the local security domain authentication server with personal identity information and the user name and password corresponding to the digital identity in the local security domain to create a digital identity, and uses the unique identity to pass the authentication of the local security domain authentication server; The digital identity generates a pair of homomorphic encryption public-private key pairs, and stores the private key safely locally for verification of identity credibility comparison results, and publicly sends the public key to all participants in the system for identity verification. Encryption of credibility; Step B2: Generation of identity credibility ciphertext; After the local security domain authentication server evaluates the identity credibility corresponding to the user's digital identity, it uses the corresponding homomorphic encryption public key to generate identity credibility ciphertext; Step B3: Generation of identity credibility range proof; The local security domain authentication server selects the public parameters and generates the range certificate corresponding to the identity credibility ciphertext record. 5. The cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility according to claim 1, characterized in that: the identity credibility configuration information management described in step 3, each security domain configures the identity credibility configuration information in advance The JSON standard storage structure is stored in the alliance chain ledger, and the configuration information is signed; The specific implementation includes the following sub-steps: Step C1.1: The security domain selects the identity credibility evaluation standard consisting of the user security behavior and the maximum identity credibility obtained from the corresponding behavior, the maximum and minimum identity credibility, and generates a pair of homomorphisms encryption key pair; Step C1.2: The security domain organizes the security domain name, homomorphic encryption public key, maximum and minimum identity credibility, identity credibility evaluation criteria, configuration generation timestamp, configuration message hash value, and digital signature. into a standard storage structure in JSON format; Step C1.3: The security domain submits the identity credibility configuration information to the alliance chain ledger and obtains its storage location. 6. The cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility according to claim 1, characterized in that: the identity credibility in step 3 is dynamically maintained on the chain, after the user registers a digital identity in the security domain, the security domain Generate identity credibility status information of digital identities through pre-disclosed identity credibility evaluation standards, and store one or more identity credibility status records in the alliance chain ledger in standard storage mode or compact storage mode; The specific implementation includes the following sub-steps: Step C2.1: The security domain generates the ciphertext of the user's identity credibility and the corresponding zero-knowledge scope proof record, forms an encrypted storage structure in the standard storage mode or a compact storage structure in the compact storage mode, and submits it to the alliance chain ledger ; Step C2.2: In the standard storage mode, the alliance chain ledger will verify the digital signature and range proof in the encrypted storage structure; in the compact storage mode, the alliance chain ledger will verify the Merkel hash in the compact storage structure Tree root and aggregated range proofs are verified. 7. The cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility according to claim 1, characterized in that: the verifiable comparison of the identity credibility described in step 3, the security domain that accepts the cross-domain identity credential according to the provided identity The identity credibility evaluation standard disclosed in advance in the security domain, select the appropriate minimum threshold requirement of identity credibility; under the supervision of the alliance chain chain code as a trusted third party, judge whether the identity credibility of the cross-domain identity certificate meets the requirements The minimum requirements of this domain, so as to decide whether to pass this cross-domain identity authentication request; The specific implementation includes the following sub-steps: Step C3.1: The user requests to use the digital identity in the existing local security domain to pass the identity authentication of the external security domain; Step C3.2: The external security domain selects an appropriate minimum threshold for identity credibility according to the identity credibility evaluation criteria disclosed in advance by the local security domain in the alliance chain ledger, and applies for the cipher text of the comparison parameters from the alliance chain chain code prove; Step C3.3: The local security domain applies to the alliance chain chain code for the ciphertext proof of the user identity credibility according to the alliance chain ledger record of the user identity credibility; Step C3.4: The external security domain provides the comparison parameters and corresponding ciphertext proofs to the local security domain; Step C3.5: The local security domain uses the comparison parameters provided by the external security domain and its own parameters to complete the calculation of intermediate results and verification information; Step C3.6: The external security domain obtains the identity credibility and threshold comparison results based on the intermediate results, and uses the verification information to judge the authenticity of the comparison results, and submits the comparison log to the alliance chain ledger. 8. A cross-domain identity authentication system based on identity credibility, characterized in that: it includes a unique identity authorization module, a privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof, and a consortium chain-based identity credibility Management and sharing module composition; The unique identity authorization module is used to convert the user's digital identity into a publicly verifiable unique identity, so as to realize the binding of digital identity and identity credibility; The authoritative identity source agency verifies the identity information provided by the user, submits the legal identity information summary to the alliance chain account book, and distributes the key and identity dynamic identification certificate to the user to generate the application; the user uses the identity dynamic identification certificate to register the digital identity, Provide verifiable dynamic identity credentials; The privacy protection module based on homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge range proof is used to encrypt and verify the identity credibility records publicly stored in the alliance chain ledger; After the user registers a digital identity by using a unique identity, the identity authentication service will distribute a homomorphic encryption key for each digital identity; when generating the identity credibility record corresponding to the digital identity, the identity authentication service will generate the corresponding homomorphic encryption Ciphertext and zero-knowledge range proofs are used as verification information for data legitimacy; The management and sharing module of identity credibility based on the alliance chain is used for identity credibility configuration information management, dynamic maintenance of identity credibility on the chain, and verifiable comparison of identity credibility; The consortium chain is used as a public verifiable storage medium and a credible consortium chain chain code execution environment to ensure that the identity credibility related information in the public ledger has not been tampered with and can honestly execute the functions defined by the chain code. 9. An electronic device, characterized in that it comprises: one or more processors; A storage device for storing one or more programs, when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors are configured to implement any one of claims 1 to 7 A cross-domain identity authentication method based on identity credibility.

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