CN115310136B - Data security guarantee method based on SATA bridging chip - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a data security guarantee method based on a SATA bridge chip, and belongs to the technical field of information security storage. This method connects the HY0168 SATA bridge chip between the host/server and the SATA storage device, and the SATA bridge chip acts as a bridge for data transmission between the host/server and the SATA storage device, and encrypts and forwards SATA commands and user data At the same time, there are security policies stored in the SATA bridge chip to control SATA commands and data to prevent illegal intrusion and backdoor monitoring; security policies include whitelist system, data filtering, three-party authentication and partition protection, respectively from commands, data, and the overall system , Partition dimension for data security protection.

Description

Data Security Guarantee Method Based on SATA Bridge Chip

technical field

The invention relates to the field of information security storage, in particular to a data security guarantee method based on a SATA bridge chip.

Background technique

With the vigorous development of artificial intelligence, deep learning, knowledge graph, big data and other fields, data scale and data security are important foundations to support the development of the above fields. The new economy represented by the digital economy has become a new engine of economic growth, and data is the core. Factors of production have become the basic strategic resources.

Devices for mass storage are mainly divided into SATA interface and PCIe interface hard disk devices. As the current main technology development direction, PCIe solid state drives occupy more and more markets. However, mechanical hard disk (hereinafter referred to as HDD) and solid-state hard disk (hereinafter referred to as SSD) with SATA interface, especially HDD, due to the recoverability of its magnetic storage medium, high DSATA Retention (data storage time) performance, and low cost, are widely used in the market. Scenarios that pay more attention to stability and price sensitivity, such as small-scale data centers, university databases, security video servers, etc., often play an irreplaceable role.

The current security SSD adopts the method of using standard international (AES)/domestic (SM4) ciphers to encrypt data and store ciphertext. For the hard disk (also referring to the SSD/HDD of the SATA interface), a certain authentication mechanism (such as the OPAL instruction set) is adopted to protect the legitimacy of the user through passwords, hard disk serial numbers and other means. This method has a certain security effect on unapproved SSDs, but after passing the certification, third-party implicit attacks, such as updating the hard disk firmware through the SATA standard instruction set, tampering with the partition table, and forging the hard disk serial number, etc. Insufficient protection. Through the direct binding between the host and the hard disk, because both parties store security information, and considering the compatibility and versatility of the product, data snooping and brute force cracking are often more tolerant, such as on the host side. Or the hard disk stores the key locally, and guesses the key by reading the memory or monitoring the specific location of the hard disk. In addition, the destruction of the partition table can serve the purpose of damaging the entire data hard disk.

Contents of the invention

Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the present invention provides a data security guarantee method based on a SATA bridge chip, which comprehensively protects the SSD in the running state, effectively prevents command backdoors, firmware tampering, boot sector attacks, and contact attacks, and Endow general-purpose hard drives with permission classification and device binding functions to achieve the purpose of special applications for general-purpose storage products.

In order to solve the technical problem, the technical solution adopted in the present invention is: a data security guarantee method based on a SATA bridge chip, this method connects the HY0168 SATA bridge chip between the host/server and the SATA storage device, and the SATA bridge chip is used as the host/server The data transmission bridge between the server and the SATA storage device plays the role of encrypting and forwarding the SATA commands and user data. At the same time, the SATA bridge chip stores security policies to control the SATA commands and data to prevent illegal intrusion and backdoor monitoring. ;Security policies include whitelist system, data filtering, three-party authentication and partition protection, which respectively protect data from the dimensions of instructions, data, overall system and partitions.

In the present invention, the SATA bridge chip adopts the SATA bridge chip HY0168 of Shandong Huayi Semiconductor Co., Ltd.

Set up a whitelist system for malicious command attacks, such as illegal firmware upgrades, overriding administrator passwords, and other attacks against the SATA command set. The white list system is that the SATA bridge chip screens the SATA instruction set, and divides the instruction set into three states: activation, prohibition, and management. In the active state, the SATA bridge chip forwards the host instruction to the SATA storage device as a data communication bridge. SATA command data forwarding, the SATA storage device responds to the command as the final receptor of the SATA command and feeds back to the host through the SATA bridge chip; in the prohibited state, the SATA bridge chip directly responds to the host command, and responds to the SATA command through a dominant failure or a recessive failure. The SATA bridge chip acts as the final SATA command acceptor and does not forward it. The SATA storage device cannot obtain all commands in the forbidden state; in the management state, the SATA bridge chip participates in command judgment, and decides to enter the active state or prohibit it according to the current operating state of the SATA bridge chip. state.

Specifically, the SATA bridge chip screens the SATA instruction set through the SATA instruction set filter, the activation state and the prohibition state are directly processed by the SATA instruction set filter, and the management state is first judged by the SATA instruction set filter, and then passed to the SATA bridge chip , the SATA bridge chip performs command and status judgment.

Data filtering is set for malicious damage attacks on the partition table. Data filtering is to protect the MBR partition table and prevent master boot partition attacks. The specific method is that the modification of the MBR partition table depends on custom tools and cannot be modified by third-party tools. When the bridge chip detects that the MBR data is modified, it judges whether the current operation is a legal user behavior. If yes, it continues. If not, the feedback modification fails, and then the SATA bridge chip randomly generates an LBA address S outside the actual capacity of the hard disk. The third-party tool obtains the address S to generate new partition table information, and writes it through the S address. The SATA bridge chip analyzes the partition table information and judges whether the parsed S is consistent with the original generated S. If they are consistent, the partition table information is written Inside the SATA bridge chip, modify the information and location of the partition table of the SATA storage device according to the partition table, reset the SATA bridge chip, and return that the partition table has been modified successfully.

In order to ensure safety, S has a certain keep-alive time, and the SATA bridge chip counts through a timer. After the keep-alive time is exceeded, S becomes invalid. Every time the MBR partition table is modified, S is regenerated. After using S every time, the SATA bridge chip will discard S and no longer use it.

Under normal circumstances, the system can read the MBR address (LBA0) / GPT (LBA2) to obtain partition information, but when LBA0/LBA2 suffers from illegal write attacks, the HY0168 firmware will reject the write operation, and special tools must be used to repartition or format Modify it to ensure the legality of the partition table and partition assignment. After the partition is successful, store the partition table in the internal storage area of HY0168 instead of the external hard disk. When HY0168 is separated from the hard disk, because the partition table stored in the hard disk is wrong, in the case of detaching from the corresponding HY0168, the hard disk connected alone will appear in an uninitialized state. For GPT partitions, partition table protection can also be completed by storing LBA2 (the key data of the GPT partition table is stored in LBA2).

Aiming at the anti-attack situation and tampering serial number of general equipment, HY0168 proposes a set of three-party authentication methods using HY0168 as the intermediate medium. The three-party authentication is based on the SATA bridge chip to authenticate the host and the SATA storage device based on the domestic commercial secret algorithm, and perform three-party binding on the host, SATA bridge chip, and SATA storage device. The host side requires the BIOS or TPM module to support the SM2 encryption and decryption algorithm, and has Non-volatile storage function; the three-party certification process is:

After power-on, BIOS/TPM obtains the SM2 key pair (Pub_a, Pri_a) generated by SATA bridge chip HY0168. Pub_a represents the public key in the key pair, and Pri_a represents the private key in the key pair. BIOS/TPM obtains the public key pair. Key Pub_a, BIOS/TPM generates a set of SM2 key pairs (Pub_b, Pri_b), Pub_b represents the public key in the key pair, Pri_b represents the private key in the key pair, and reads the key stored in BIOS/TPM Component R1 generates a set of random numbers R11, R11 and R1 have the same length, connect R1, R11 and Pub_b to generate C, that is, C= R1‖R11‖Pub_b, use Pub_a to encrypt C, and the encrypted result is C1, then C1= SM2Pub_a(C), send C1 to SATA bridge chip HY0168, SATA bridge chip HY0168 uses Pri_a to decrypt C1 to get C, then read R2 stored in HY0168 SATA bridge chip, calculate R ^' , R ^' = R1 XORR2, calculate SM3 (R ^' ) and compare whether the SM3 (R) stored in the HY0168 SATA bridge chip is consistent. If it is consistent, the certification is passed. Calculate R22, R22 = R XOR R11, R is the calculation parameter set in the SATA bridge chip, R= R1 XOR R2, and R is stored as a hash value in the SATA bridge chip, use Pub_b to encrypt R11, that is, C2=SM2Pub_b (R11), send C2 to BIOS/TPM, and use the SM2 private key Pri_b generated by the BIOS/TPM module Decrypt C2 to get ^R'11 , compare whether ^R'11 is consistent with R11, if they are consistent, update R1 to R11, and HY0168 SATA bridge chip to update R2 to R22;

Read the serial number S1 of the SATA storage device and the key information S2 of the hidden space to enter the SATA bridge chip and the storage device for mutual recognition. After the authentication is consistent, the three-party devices trust each other. The real partition table information is sent to the host, and the host begins to recognize the hard disk.

A partition protection mechanism is set up to solve the problem that a single key is not strong enough to protect data on the entire disk. Partition protection refers to the integration of LBA analyzer and partition key expansion module in the SATA bridge chip. The partition key expansion module corresponds to the partition and is used to store the range, key and mode of each partition, and the partition key expansion module Carry out key expansion and complete the key assembly of each partition; during data transmission, the LBA analyzer analyzes the corresponding relationship between LBA and partition according to the address and length of each written data, and calls the key of the corresponding partition key expansion module Information for data encryption and decryption operations.

Partition key sources include automatic generation and external import, and the HY0168 firmware mass production stage determines the key generation mode.

Automatic generation: After the mass production of HY0168 firmware is completed, the mass production tool generates key information, the key is stored in the internal non-volatile storage area of HY0168, and the external import and key generation functions are locked.

External import: After the mass production of HY0168 firmware is completed, the mass production tool does not generate key information, and the key is imported from the outside through a safe method, and the key is stored in the internal non-volatile storage area of HY0168, and the key generation function is locked.

From the perspective of data recovery, externally imported keys are more user-friendly. Since the external import is completed by the user, and the key is kept and maintained by the user, after the HY0168 is damaged or enters rapid destruction, the key can be imported to China by re-importing the key to ensure that the hard disk data is still available.

From the perspective of data security, automatic key generation is more secure. The automatically generated key cannot be exported to the outside, and once generated, the external import and key generation functions will be locked. After the HY0168 is damaged or enters rapid destruction, the HY0168 will automatically regenerate a new key to replace the old key, and the key will be permanently lost. , the data on the hard disk cannot be recovered.

Beneficial effects of the present invention: the present invention defines the SATA bridge chip as the role of "guard" between the host/server and the SATA storage device, and through mechanisms such as white list system, data filtering, partition key, and tripartite authentication, in the running state Carry out comprehensive protection for SSD, and by adding HY0168 on the main board, the general hard disk storage device can be transformed into a special storage device with high security level. The invention can solve the problems of storage data security and stability, and is beneficial to rapid market promotion, especially in industries concerned with storage security, and has very broad industrialization prospects.

Description of drawings

Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of SATA bridge chip storage data control;

Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of the SATA instruction screening state;

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of modifying MBR (LBA0)/GPT (LBA2) using third-party tools;

Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the three-party authentication process of BIOS, HY0168, and hard disk;

Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of partition protection.

Detailed ways

The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

Example 1

This embodiment discloses a data security guarantee method based on a SATA bridge chip. As shown in FIG. The white list system, data filtering, partition key, and three-party authentication mechanism provide data security protection for SATA storage devices from the dimensions of command, data, partition, and overall system, effectively preventing command backdoor, firmware tampering, and boot sector attacks , contact attacks, and can give general hard disks the functions of permission classification and device binding, so as to achieve the purpose of special applications for general storage products.

In this embodiment, the SATA bridge chip adopts the SATA bridge chip HY0168 developed and produced by Shandong Huayi Semiconductor Co., Ltd., hereinafter referred to as HY0168, and the SATA storage device is an SSD hard disk, hereinafter referred to as hard disk.

As shown in Figure 2, attacks against malicious instructions, such as illegal firmware upgrades, overwriting administrator passwords, and other attacks on the SATA instruction set. HY0168 uses the SATA instruction set filter to divide the instruction set into three states: active (Active), forbidden (Forbidden), and management (Manage). After HY0168 is mass-produced, the active state and forbidden state are determined, and the management state is determined by the HY0168 firmware according to the usage scenario. Flexible control.

In the activated state, HY0168 forwards host commands to the hard disk, and acts as a data communication bridge to forward SATA command data. The hard disk acts as the final receptor of SATA commands to respond to commands, and feeds back to the host through HY0168. Specifically, when the command is active (Active), HY0168 forwards the command from the SATA storage device to the SATA host under the control of the firmware (the SATA host forwards to the SATA storage device), and the actual command recipient is the hard disk device. According to the hard disk command response result and The content transmits data to the host side, such as IDENTIFY DEVICE (0xEC).

In the disabled state, HY0168 directly responds to host commands, and responds to SATA commands through dominant failure and recessive failure. HY0168 acts as the final SATA command acceptor and does not forward. The hard disk cannot obtain all commands in the prohibited state. Specifically, when the command is in the forbidden (Forbidden) state, the specific content of the command is processed by the filter module. When it is a read command, the data of the read length is automatically filled, and the data content is meaningless; when it is a write command, the data is automatically filled. Discard and return the host-side command success, the command function has no practical meaning, such as DOWNLOAD MICROCODE, the command has no actual effect, but the command processing result obtained from the SATA command initiator is success.

In the management state, the HY0168 firmware participates in command judgment, and further analyzes and processes according to the current operating state of the HY0168 to decide whether to enter the active state or the forbidden state.

Specifically, when the command is in the management (Manage) state, HY0168 will analyze the command by the firmware, and according to the current security status of HY0168, it will be determined whether HY0168 or the hard disk will respond. In this embodiment, state control is realized through SATA private instructions. For the method of private instructions, refer to the patent CN107729777B A method for securely encrypted solid-state storage.

For example, when performing SECURITY DISABLE PASSWORD (0xF6h), HY0168 confirms that the identity is illegal according to the SATA private command, and the firmware directly rejects the command behavior, explicitly notifying the host of command failure or implicitly notifying the host of command success but not actually forwarding to the hard disk.

Or when performing SECURITY DISABLE PASSWORD (0xF6h), HY0168 confirms that the identity is legal according to SATA private instructions, and forwards the instructions and data to the hard disk device to start the function.

In this embodiment, the activation state and the prohibition state are directly processed by the SATA instruction set filter hardware, and the HY0168 firmware does not perform identification and judgment. The management state is first judged by the SATA instruction set filter hardware, and then passed to the HY0168 firmware. The HY0168 firmware judges the command and state, and performs subsequent processing according to the current state.

As shown in Figure 3, data filtering is set up for malicious damage attacks on the partition table. Data filtering is to protect the MBR partition table and prevent master boot partition attacks. tool to modify, when the SATA bridge chip detects the modification of MBR data, it will judge whether the current operation is a legal user behavior, if yes, continue, if not, feedback modification failure, and then the SATA bridge chip randomly generates a hard disk within the actual capacity range The external LBA address S, the third-party tool generates new partition table information after obtaining the address S, and writes through the S address, the SATA bridge chip analyzes the partition table information and judges whether the parsed S is consistent with the original generated S, if they are consistent, then Write the partition table information into the SATA bridge chip, and modify the information and location of the partition table of the SATA storage device according to the partition table, reset the SATA bridge chip, and return the partition table modification success.

In this embodiment, S is an address outside the visible partition of the system, which is similar to a hidden partition. For example, the actual capacity of the hard disk is 1024G, and the visible area presented to the user by the firmware control is 1000G, and the remaining 24G is controlled by the firmware and cannot be accessed by the system or tools. Select an address within the 24G range as S to back up the partition table. This is to protect the partition table. The default system partition table is at LBA0. Violently modifying the MBR may cause other partitions to be displayed.

S will be regenerated every time MBR(LBA0) /GPT(LBA2) is modified, and after each use of S, HY0168 will discard S and no longer use it. HY0168 provides a time-limited modification function. After each use of S, HY0168 starts a timer to count. If S is not returned within the specified time, HY0168 will discard S and no longer use it.

When an illegal user/virus operates the partition table through the partitioning tool or formatting tool that comes with the system, the HY0168 firmware returns that the operation is successful but does not forward the command to prevent the system from triggering a retry or freezing for a long time.

Under normal circumstances, the system can read the MBR address (LBA0) / GPT (LBA2) to obtain partition information, but when LBA0/LBA2 suffers from illegal write attacks, the HY0168 firmware will reject the write operation, and special tools must be used to repartition or format Modify it to ensure the legality of the partition table and partition allocation. After the partition is successful, store the partition table in the internal storage area of HY0168 instead of the external hard disk. When HY0168 is separated from the hard disk, because the partition table stored in the hard disk is wrong, in the case of detaching from the corresponding HY0168, the hard disk connected alone will appear in an uninitialized state.

For GPT partitions, partition table protection can also be completed by storing LBA2 (the key data of the GPT partition table is stored in LBA2).

Aiming at the anti-attack situation and tampering serial number of general equipment, HY0168 proposes a set of three-party authentication methods using HY0168 as the intermediate medium. The three-party authentication uses the SATA bridge chip to authenticate the host and the hard disk based on the domestic commercial secret algorithm, and performs three-party binding on the host, SATA bridge chip, and hard disk. The host side requires the BIOS or TPM module to support the SM2 encryption and decryption algorithm, and has non-volatile storage. Function.

As shown in Figure 4, the three-party authentication process is as follows:

After power-on, BIOS/TPM obtains the SM2 key pair (Pub_a, Pri_a) generated by SATA bridge chip HY0168. Pub_a represents the public key in the key pair, and Pri_a represents the private key in the key pair. BIOS/TPM obtains the public key pair. Key Pub_a, BIOS/TPM generates a set of SM2 key pairs (Pub_b, Pri_b), Pub_b represents the public key in the key pair, Pri_b represents the private key in the key pair, and reads the key stored in BIOS/TPM Component R1 generates a set of random numbers R11, R11 and R1 have the same length, connect R1, R11 and Pub_b to generate C, that is, C= R1‖R11‖Pub_b, use Pub_a to encrypt C, and the encrypted result is C1, then C1= SM2Pub_a(C), send C1 to SATA bridge chip HY0168, SATA bridge chip HY0168 uses Pri_a to decrypt C1 to get C, then read R2 stored in HY0168 SATA bridge chip, calculate R ^' , R ^' = R1 XORR2, calculate SM3 (R ^' ) and compare whether the SM3 (R) stored in the HY0168 SATA bridge chip is consistent. If it is consistent, the authentication is passed and R22 is calculated, R22 = R XOR R11, R is the calculation parameter set in the SATA bridge chip, R= R1 XOR R2, and R is stored as a hash value in the SATA bridge chip, use Pub_b to encrypt R11, that is, C2=SM2Pub_b (R11), send C2 to BIOS/TPM, and use the SM2 private key Pri_b generated by the BIOS/TPM module Decrypt C2 to get ^R'11 , compare whether ^R'11 is consistent with R11, if they are consistent, update R1 to R11, and HY0168 SATA bridge chip to update R2 to R22;

Read the serial number S1 of the SATA storage device and the key information S2 of the hidden space to enter the SATA bridge chip and the storage device for mutual recognition, specifically: after the SATA bridge chip obtains the information S1 and S2, set M=SM3 (SM3(S1)XOR S2) , compare whether M is consistent with M1 stored in the SATA bridge chip. If they are consistent, the authentication will pass the mutual trust of the three-party devices, and the SATA storage device will release the data path, and send the real partition table information stored in the SATA storage device to the host. The host starts Identify the hard disk.

The BIOS/TPM and SATA bridge chip authentication process adopts a one-time pad mechanism: that is, R is unchanged (R=R1XORR2). After each authentication is completed, use the R11 generated by the BIOS/TPM to calculate R22, R22 = R XOR R11, Then replace R1 and R2. In order to ensure the security of the transmission process, two sets of keys are introduced to encrypt and protect R11 and R22 during the communication process. And HY1068 does not store the plaintext of R2 and R22, and uses SM3(R2)/SM3(R22) to identify whether the authenticated data is correct. And HY0168 does not store the plaintext of R, but stores SM3(R), and identifies whether the authentication is correct by calculating whether SM3(R`) is consistent with SM3(R).

After mass production, HY0168 is in the initial installation state. In the initial installation state, HY0168 does not store any device authentication information. Before binding the device and the host, HY0168 can be connected to any hard disk host.

After HY0168 binds the storage device, HY0168 uses the serial number S1 of the hard disk device as the calculation factor, and writes a piece of random data S2 into the hidden area of the hard disk, uses S1 and S2 as the authentication information of the hard disk, and generates it through multiple hash algorithms M1, stored in HY0168.

The BIOS/host TPM module needs to have storage capability and SM2 password computing capability. If not available, HY0168 controls the slave disk device, and realizes the three-party authentication through the software encryption algorithm in the Windows or Linux system. This method is less secure than BIOS or TPM to directly store and calculate key data.

The BIOS/TPM module obtains the key component R1, and encrypts the factor C generated by the connection through the SM2 key generated by HY0168 power-on.

HY0168 decrypts the authentication data, then obtains R2 for calculation, and compares whether it is consistent to verify whether the BIOS/TPM matches the HY0168 bridge chip.

After the BIOS/TPM and HY0168 bridge chip are successfully matched, HY0168 regenerates the authentication data, and encrypts and transmits the updated authentication data R11 through Pub_b. The purpose of this is to pass R11 to the BIOS/TPM, and the BIOS/TPM will judge whether the process is successful. In the next step, the BIOS/TPM updates the authentication data after calculation, and updates R1 to R11 and R2 to R22, so as to achieve the purpose of dynamic update of authentication information and improve security strength.

After the HY0168 authenticates the host, it obtains the device serial numbers S1 and S2, and performs calculations to determine the validity of the HDD/SSD, and performs binary operations by reading the information stored in the hidden space by the HY0168, which prevents tampering with the identify command. serial number for hard drive cloning.

When M and M1 are consistent, it is considered that HY0168 is bound to the hard disk, and the real partition table information stored in HY0168 is loaded, and the MBR/LBA2 is replaced and fed back to the host. The replacement of MBR/LBA2 here is not to overwrite the hard disk, but when the firmware detects that the MBR/LBA0 address is read, it will directly return the data from the HY0168 to the host, and no longer obtain the information in the hard disk.

After completing the above certification, HY0168 releases the access from the host to the hard disk, so that all data is forwarded under the supervision of HY0168, and commands are filtered under the supervision of HY0168.

A partition protection mechanism is set up to solve the problem that a single key is not strong enough to protect data on the entire disk. As shown in Figure 5, partition protection refers to the integration of an LBA analyzer and a partition key expansion module in the SATA bridge chip. The partition key expansion module corresponds to the partition and is used to store the range, key and mode of each partition. And the partition key expansion module performs key expansion to complete the key assembly of each partition; during data transmission, the LBA analyzer analyzes the corresponding relationship between the LBA and the partition according to the address and length of each written data, and calls the corresponding partition key The key information of the key expansion module is used to perform data encryption and decryption operations.

Partition key sources include automatic generation and external import, and the HY0168 firmware mass production stage determines the key generation mode.

Automatic generation: After the mass production of HY0168 firmware is completed, the mass production tool generates key information, the key is stored in the internal non-volatile storage area of HY0168, and the external import and key generation functions are locked.

External import: After the mass production of HY0168 firmware is completed, the mass production tool does not generate key information, and the key is imported from the outside through a safe method, and the key is stored in the internal non-volatile storage area of HY0168, and the key generation function is locked.

From the perspective of data recovery, externally imported keys are more user-friendly. Since the external import is completed by the user, and the key is kept and maintained by the user, after the HY0168 is damaged or enters rapid destruction, the key can be imported to China by re-importing the key to ensure that the hard disk data is still available.

From the perspective of data security, automatic key generation is more secure. The automatically generated key cannot be exported to the outside, and once generated, the external import and key generation functions will be locked. After the HY0168 is damaged or enters rapid destruction, the HY0168 will automatically regenerate a new key to replace the old key, and the key will be permanently lost. , the data on the hard disk cannot be recovered.

The above descriptions are only the basic principles and preferred embodiments of the present invention. Improvements and replacements made by those skilled in the art according to the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. The data security guarantee method based on the SATA bridge chip is characterized in that: the method connects the SATA bridge chip between the host/server and the SATA storage device, and the SATA bridge chip is used as the data transmission between the host/server and the SATA storage device Bridge, which encrypts and forwards SATA commands and user data, and stores security policies in the SATA bridge chip to control SATA commands and data to prevent illegal intrusion and backdoor monitoring; security policies include whitelist system, data filtering , Three-party authentication and partition protection, respectively protect data from the dimensions of instructions, data, overall system and partition; The white list system is that the SATA bridge chip screens the SATA instruction set, and divides the instruction set into three states: activation, prohibition, and management. In the active state, the SATA bridge chip forwards the host instruction to the SATA storage device as a data communication bridge. SATA command data forwarding, the SATA storage device responds to the command as the final receptor of the SATA command and feeds back to the host through the SATA bridge chip; in the prohibited state, the SATA bridge chip directly responds to the host command, and responds to the SATA command through a dominant failure or a recessive failure. The SATA bridge chip acts as the final SATA command acceptor and does not forward it. The SATA storage device cannot obtain all commands in the forbidden state; in the management state, the SATA bridge chip participates in command judgment, and decides to enter the active state or prohibit it according to the current operating state of the SATA bridge chip. state; Data filtering is to protect the MBR partition table to prevent master boot partition attacks. The specific method is that the modification of the MBR partition table depends on custom tools and cannot be modified by third-party tools. When the SATA bridge chip detects the modification of MBR data, it will judge the current operation Whether it is a legitimate user behavior, if yes, continue, if not, feedback modification failure, then the SATA bridge chip randomly generates an LBA address S outside the actual capacity of the hard disk, and the third-party tool generates new partition table information after obtaining the address S , and write through the S address, the SATA bridge chip analyzes the partition table information and judges whether the parsed S is consistent with the original generated S, and if it is consistent, writes the partition table information into the SATA bridge chip, and modifies the SATA storage according to the partition table The information and location of the device partition table, the SATA bridge chip is reset, and the partition table modification is successful; The three-party authentication is based on the SATA bridge chip to authenticate the host and the SATA storage device based on the domestic commercial secret algorithm, and perform three-party binding on the host, SATA bridge chip, and SATA storage device. The host side requires the BIOS or TPM module to support the SM2 encryption and decryption algorithm, and has Non-volatile storage function; the three-party certification process is: After power-on, BIOS/TPM obtains the SM2 key pair (Pub_a, Pri_a) generated by SATA bridge chip HY0168. Pub_a represents the public key in the key pair, and Pri_a represents the private key in the key pair. BIOS/TPM obtains the public key pair. Key Pub_a, BIOS/TPM generates a set of SM2 key pairs (Pub_b, Pri_b), Pub_b represents the public key in the key pair, Pri_b represents the private key in the key pair, and reads the key stored in BIOS/TPM Component R1, generate a set of random numbers R11, R11 and R1 have the same length, connect R1, R11 and Pub_b to generate C, that is, C= R1‖R11‖Pub_b, use Pub_a to encrypt C, the encrypted result is C1, and send C1 Give SATA bridge chip HY0168, SATA bridge chip HY0168 uses Pri_a to decrypt C1 to get C, then read R2 stored in HY0168 SATA bridge chip, calculate R ^' , R ^' = R1 XOR R2, calculate SM3 (R ^' ) and compare the stored Whether the SM3 (R) in the HY0168 SATA bridge chip is consistent, if it is consistent, the certification is passed, calculate R22, R22 = R XORR11, R is the calculation parameter set in the SATA bridge chip, R=R1 XOR R2, and R is in the SATA Store in the form of hash value in the bridge chip, use Pub_b to encrypt R11 to get C2, send C2 to BIOS/TPM, use SM2 private key Pri_b generated by BIOS/TPM module to decrypt C2 to get ^R'11 , compare ^R'11 with R11 Whether they are consistent, if they are consistent, update R1 to R11, and HY0168SATA bridge chip to update R2 to R22; Read the serial number S1 of the SATA storage device and the key information S2 of the hidden space to enter the SATA bridge chip and the storage device for mutual recognition. After the authentication is consistent, the three-party devices trust each other. The real partition table information is sent to the host, and the host begins to identify the hard disk; Partition protection refers to the integration of LBA analyzer and partition key expansion module in the SATA bridge chip. The partition key expansion module corresponds to the partition and is used to store the range, key and mode of each partition, and the partition key expansion module Carry out key expansion and complete the key assembly of each partition; during data transmission, the LBA analyzer analyzes the corresponding relationship between LBA and partition according to the address and length of each written data, and calls the key of the corresponding partition key expansion module Information for data encryption and decryption operations. 2. the data security guarantee method based on the SATA bridge chip according to claim 1, is characterized in that: the SATA bridge chip screens the SATA command set by the SATA command set filter, and the activated state and the forbidden state are controlled by the SATA command set filter Direct processing, the management state is first judged by the SATA instruction set filter, and then passed to the SATA bridge chip, and the SATA bridge chip performs command and status judgment. 3. The data security guarantee method based on the SATA bridge chip according to claim 1, characterized in that: S has a certain keep-alive time, and the SATA bridge chip is timed by a timer, and after exceeding the keep-alive time, S becomes invalid. 4. the data security method based on SATA bridge chip according to claim 1, is characterized in that: when revising MBR partition table at every turn, S regenerates, after using S at every turn, SATA bridge chip will discard S and no longer use . 5. the data security guarantee method based on SATA bridge chip according to claim 1, is characterized in that: according to information S1, the process of S2 storage device mutual recognition is: after SATA bridge chip obtains information S1, S2, make M= SM3 (SM3(S1) XORS2), compare whether M is consistent with M1 stored in the SATA bridge chip, and if they are consistent, the authentication is passed. 6. The data security guarantee method based on the SATA bridge chip according to claim 1, characterized in that: the source of the partition key includes automatic generation and external import.

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