CN115296792A - An Identity-Based Signcryption Method for Protecting Keys - Google Patents
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Abstract
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明涉及信息安全,特别是一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。The invention relates to information security, in particular to an identity-based signcryption method for key protection.
背景技术Background technique
密码学是信息安全的底层支撑技术,也是认证和访问控制的核心。保密和认证是密码学中两个重要的安全目标。在公钥密码体制中,加密和解密方案是最基本的两个基本方案,分别用来提供消息的保密性和消息的认证性二个安全目标。在某些应用中,比如电子邮件、电子商务等,需要同时实现这二个安全目标。签密密码体制能在一个逻辑步骤内同时完成加密和签名二重功能,而计算量和数据量小于两者之和。发送者通过签密计算生成签密密文。接收者通过解签密计算生成明文并验证签名。Cryptography is the underlying supporting technology of information security and the core of authentication and access control. Secrecy and authentication are two important security goals in cryptography. In the public key cryptosystem, the encryption and decryption schemes are the two most basic schemes, which are used to provide two security goals of message confidentiality and message authentication respectively. In some applications, such as e-mail, e-commerce, etc., it is necessary to achieve these two security goals at the same time. The signcryption cryptosystem can simultaneously complete the dual functions of encryption and signature in one logical step, and the amount of computation and data is less than the sum of the two. The sender generates signcrypted ciphertext through signcrypt calculation. The receiver generates plaintext and verifies the signature by decrypting the signcryption calculation.
与本方法最接近的现有技术为文献《Identity-Based Key-InsulatedSigncryption.Informatica,23(1):27-45.》提出的基于身份的密钥隔离签密方法,该方法在标准模型下是可证明安全的。该方法适用于发送者和接收者的私钥需要保护的应用场景等。该方法的主要步骤是:第一,生成公共系统参数和系统主密钥;第二,生成发送者和接收者的初始私钥和一个协助器密钥;第三,生成发送者和接收者的实时私钥更新信息;第四,生成发送者和接收者的实时私钥;第五,发送者生成签密文;第六,接收者用解签密算法生成密文并验证签名。在该方法中,发送者和接收者的私钥在每个时间片段都进行更新,从而增强了系统防御私钥泄漏的能力。但该方法存在一些缺陷,该方法不能用于协助器密钥泄露的应用场景,从而不能解决该应用场景中的私钥保护问题。The closest existing technology to this method is the identity-based key isolation signcryption method proposed in the document "Identity-Based Key-InsulatedSigncryption.Informatica, 23(1):27-45.", which is provably safe. This method is suitable for application scenarios where the private keys of the sender and receiver need to be protected. The main steps of the method are: first, generate public system parameters and system master key; second, generate the initial private key of the sender and receiver and a facilitator key; third, generate the sender and receiver’s Real-time private key update information; Fourth, generate real-time private keys of the sender and receiver; Fifth, the sender generates a signed ciphertext; Sixth, the receiver generates a ciphertext and verifies the signature using the decryption signcryption algorithm. In this method, the private keys of the sender and the receiver are updated every time segment, thereby enhancing the system's ability to defend against private key leaks. However, there are some defects in this method. This method cannot be used in the application scenario where the facilitator key is leaked, so it cannot solve the problem of private key protection in this application scenario.
发明内容Contents of the invention
发明目的:本发明的目的是提供一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,从而解决在一个逻辑步骤内实现加密和签名的应用场景中的私钥保护问题。Purpose of the invention: The purpose of the invention is to provide an identity-based signcryption method for key protection, so as to solve the problem of private key protection in application scenarios where encryption and signature are implemented within one logical step.
技术方案:本发明所述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,原理为:设置二个协助器密钥,二个协助器在各时间段的起点生成实时私钥更新信息并对实时私钥进行更新,生成发送者和接收者的实时私钥,发送者使用签密算法生成密文,接收者使用解签密算法生成明文并验证签名。所述方法包括以下步骤:Technical solution: The identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys according to the present invention is based on the principle that two facilitator keys are set, and the two facilitators generate real-time private key update information at the starting point of each time period and update The real-time private key is updated to generate the real-time private key of the sender and receiver. The sender uses the signcryption algorithm to generate ciphertext, and the receiver uses the decryption signcryption algorithm to generate plaintext and verify the signature. The method comprises the steps of:
(1)建立系统参数:(1) Establish system parameters:
G1和G2都是阶为素数p的乘法群,g是G1的生成元;G2是一个阶为q的乘法循环群,且e:G1×G1→G2是一个双线性映射;Zp表示集合{0,1,2,...,p-1},用表示Zp\{0};选取二个哈希函数Hu:{0,1}*→{0,1}nu,Hv:{0,1}nm→{0,1}nv,此处nu、 nm和nv均为安全参数;设身份为一个长度为nu的位串,设消息为一个长度为 nm的位串;定义一个双射V:Γ→G2,这里V-1表示它的逆映射,Γ为{0,1}nu+nm+nv的具有p个元素的子集;选取一个伪随机函数F:给定一个κ比特的输入参数x 和一个κ比特的种子,函数F将输出一个κ比特长的随机字符串Fs(x);随机选择整数α∈Zp,随机选择整数g2∈G1,设定g1=gα,设定Y=e(g1,g2);随机选择u′∈G1,当i=1,...,nu,随机选择ui∈G1,设定nu维向量随机选择m′∈G1,当i= 1,...,nv,随机选择mi∈G1,设定nv维向量设定主私钥设定系统公开参数为 Both G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative groups whose order is a prime number p, and g is the generator of G 1 ; G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group whose order is q, and e:G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is a bilinear property mapping; Z p represents the set {0,1,2,...,p-1}, with represents Z p \{0}; select two hash functions H u :{0,1} * →{0,1} nu , H v :{0,1} nm →{0,1} nv , where nu, nm and nv are security parameters; let identity be a bit string with length nu, let message be a bit string with length nm; define a bijection V:Γ→G 2 , where V -1 represents its Inverse mapping, Γ is a subset of {0,1} nu+nm+nv with p elements; choose a pseudorandom function F: Given a κ-bit input parameter x and a κ-bit seed, the function F will Output a random character string F s (x) of κ bit length; randomly select an integer α∈Z p , randomly select an integer g 2 ∈G 1 , set g 1 =g α , set Y=e(g 1 ,g 2 ); randomly select u′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nu, randomly select u i ∈G 1 , set nu-dimensional vector Randomly select m′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nv, randomly select m i ∈G 1 , set nv-dimensional vector Set the master private key Set the system public parameters to
(2)私钥提取:(2) Private key extraction:
(2.1)设u为一个代表身份的长度为nu的位串;设u[i]为u的第i位;定义为使得u[i]=1的下标i的集合;设wu,-1为Hu(u||-1)的输出,并设wu,-1[i]为wu,-1的第i位;设wu,0为Hu(u||0)的输出,并设wu,0[i]为wu,0的第i位;定义为使得wu,-1[i]=1的下标i的集合;定义为使得wu,0[i]=1的下标i的集合;随机选取二个协助器密钥HKu,1,HKu,0∈{0,1}κ并计算随机选取计算身份u的初始私钥 (2.1) Let u be a bit string representing an identity with a length of nu; let u[i] be the i-th bit of u; define For the set of subscript i such that u[i]=1; let w u,-1 be the output of H u (u||-1), and let w u,-1 [i] be w u,-1 the i-th bit of ; let w u,0 be the output of H u (u||0), and let w u,0 [i] be the i-th bit of w u,0 ; define be the set of subscript i such that w u,-1 [i]=1; define To set w u,0 [i]=1 subscript i; randomly select two helper keys HK u,1 , HK u,0 ∈{0,1} κ and calculate choose randomly Compute the initial private key of identity u
(2.2)发送者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别为HKa,1,HKa,0和(2.2) The sender's facilitator key and initial private key are HK a,1 , HK a,0 and
(2.3)接收者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别HKb,1,HKb,0和(2.3) The recipient’s facilitator key and initial private key are HK b,1 , HK b,0 and
(3)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时协助器更新信息:(3) Generate the real-time assistant update information of the sender and receiver at time slice t:
(3.1)设wu,t为Hu(u||t)的输出,并设wu,t[i]为wu,t的第i位,定义 为使得wu,t[i]=1的下标i的集合;同样设wu,t-2为Hu(u||t-2)的输出,并设wu,t-2[i] 为wu,t-2的第i位,定义为使得wu,t-2[i]=1的下标i的集合;计算和为了构建将用户u的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息UIu,t,计算:(3.1) Let w u,t be the output of H u (u||t), and let w u,t [i] be the i-th bit of w u,t , define In order to make w u,t [i]=1 set of subscript i; also set w u,t-2 as the output of H u (u||t-2), and set w u,t-2 [i ] is the i-th bit of w u,t-2 , define For the set of subscript i such that w u,t-2 [i]=1; calculate and In order to construct the update information UI u,t of the temporary private key of user u for time segment t, calculate:
(3.2)同样发送者和接收者的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分别为:(3.2) The temporary private key update information for the time segment t of the sender and the receiver are respectively:
(4)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时私钥:(4) Generate the real-time private keys of the sender and receiver in time slice t:
将用户u在时间片段t-1的临时私钥分解为将时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分解为为了构建用户u在时间片段t的临时私钥du,t,用户u计算:Decompose the temporary private key of user u at time segment t-1 as Decompose the temporary private key update information of time segment t into To construct the temporary private key d u,t of user u at time segment t, user u computes:
对于任意身份u和任意时间片段t,临时私钥du,t具有如下形式:For any identity u and any time segment t, the temporary private key d u,t has the following form:
同样发送者和接收者在时间片段t的临时私钥分别为:Similarly, the temporary private keys of the sender and receiver at time segment t are:
(5)签密:(5) Sign encryption:
对于消息m,发送者A按如下方式进行签密:For message m, sender A performs signcryption as follows:
发送者A将他的临时私钥分解成 Sender A decomposes his ephemeral private key into
随机选取rm,r′t-1,随机选取r∈{0,1}nv使得a||m||r∈ΓRandomly select r m , r′ t-1 , Randomly select r∈{0,1} nv such that a||m||r∈Γ
令为使得从Hv(m)的第j位不同于r的第j位的下标j的集合,即 make In order to make the j-th bit of H v (m) different from the set of subscript j of the j-th bit of r, that is
计算:calculate:
令rt-1=r′t-1+ka,t-1,rt=r′t+ka,t,Let r t-1 =r′ t-1 +k a,t-1 , r t =r′ t +k a,t ,
发送者A输出一个密文:Sender A outputs a ciphertext:
并将它发送给接收者B;and send it to receiver B;
(6)解签密:(6) Sign decryption:
接收者B将收到的密文(t,σ)分解为(t,(σ<1>,σ<2>,σ<3>,σ<4>,σ<5>,σ<6>,σ<7>,σ<8>,σ<9>));接收者B将他的临时私钥分解成 Receiver B decomposes the received ciphertext (t,σ) into (t,(σ <1> ,σ <2> ,σ <3> ,σ <4> ,σ <5> ,σ <6> , σ <7> ,σ <8> ,σ <9> )); receiver B decomposes his temporary private key into
计算 calculate
生成 generate
如果以下等式成立,则输出消息m,否则输出“解签密失败”;If the following equation is true, then output the message m, otherwise output "signcryption decryption failed";
一种计算机存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现上述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。A computer storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys is implemented.
一种计算机设备,包括储存器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序,所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现上述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。A computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and operable on the processor, when the processor executes the computer program, the above-mentioned identity-based signature for protecting a key is realized. encryption method.
有益效果:与现有技术相比,本发明具有如下优点:Beneficial effect: compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:
1、为发送者和接收者设置分别二个独立且物理安全的可信协助器,并由这二个协助器帮助发送者和接收者在利用自己选取的秘密值时生成密码系统的初始私钥,避免了撤销身份问题并实现了抗密钥泄露功能;1. Set up two independent and physically secure trusted facilitators for the sender and the receiver, and these two facilitators help the sender and the receiver generate the initial private key of the cryptographic system when using the secret value they choose , which avoids the problem of revocation of identity and realizes the function of anti-key disclosure;
2、密码系统利用二个协助器在不同时间周期内交替分别对发送者和接收者的实时私钥进行更新,一方面允许频繁的实时私钥更新,另一方面又能降低的协助器密钥泄漏几率;2. The cryptographic system uses two facilitators to update the real-time private keys of the sender and the receiver alternately in different time periods. On the one hand, it allows frequent real-time private key updates, and on the other hand, it can reduce the facilitator key. Leakage probability;
3、发送者在一个逻辑步骤内实现加密和签名,这就降低了对消息进行加密与签名的总计算量与通信成本。3. The sender implements encryption and signature in one logical step, which reduces the total calculation and communication costs for encrypting and signing messages.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1为本发明的步骤流程图。Fig. 1 is a flow chart of steps of the present invention.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
下面结合附图对本发明的技术方案作进一步说明。The technical solution of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
如图1所示,一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,包括以下步骤:As shown in Figure 1, an identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys includes the following steps:
(1)建立系统参数:(1) Establish system parameters:
G1和G2都是阶为素数p的乘法群,g是G1的生成元;G2是一个阶为q的乘法循环群,且e:G1×G1→G2是一个双线性映射;Zp表示集合{0,1,2,...,p-1},用表示Zp\{0};选取二个哈希函数Hu:{0,1}*→{0,1}nu,Hv:{0,1}nm→{0,1}nv,此处nu、 nm和nv均为安全参数;设身份为一个长度为nu的位串,设消息为一个长度为 nm的位串;定义一个双射V:Γ→G2,这里V-1表示它的逆映射,Γ为{0,1}nu+nm+nv的具有p个元素的子集;选取一个伪随机函数F:给定一个κ比特的输入参数x 和一个κ比特的种子,函数F将输出一个κ比特长的随机字符串Fs(x);随机选择整数α∈Zp,随机选择整数g2∈G1,设定g1=gα,设定Y=e(g1,g2);随机选择u′∈G1,当i=1,...,nu,随机选择ui∈G1,设定nu维向量随机选择m′∈G1,当i=1,...,nv,随机选择mi∈G1,设定nv维向量设定主私钥设定系统公开参数为 Both G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative groups whose order is a prime number p, and g is the generator of G 1 ; G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group whose order is q, and e:G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is a bilinear property mapping; Z p represents the set {0,1,2,...,p-1}, with represents Z p \{0}; select two hash functions H u :{0,1} * →{0,1} nu , H v :{0,1} nm →{0,1} nv , where nu, nm and nv are security parameters; let identity be a bit string with length nu, let message be a bit string with length nm; define a bijection V:Γ→G 2 , where V -1 represents its Inverse mapping, Γ is a subset of {0,1} nu+nm+nv with p elements; choose a pseudorandom function F: Given a κ-bit input parameter x and a κ-bit seed, the function F will Output a random character string F s (x) of κ bit length; randomly select an integer α∈Z p , randomly select an integer g 2 ∈G 1 , set g 1 =g α , set Y=e(g 1 ,g 2 ); randomly select u′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nu, randomly select u i ∈G 1 , set nu-dimensional vector Randomly select m′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nv, randomly select m i ∈G 1 , set nv-dimensional vector Set the master private key Set the system public parameters to
(2)私钥提取:(2) Private key extraction:
(2.1)设u为一个代表身份的长度为nu的位串;设u[i]为u的第i位;定义为使得u[i]=1的下标i的集合;设wu,-1为Hu(u||-1)的输出,并设wu,-1[i]为wu,-1的第i位;设wu,0为Hu(u||0)的输出,并设wu,0[i]为wu,0的第i位;定义为使得wu,-1[i]=1的下标i的集合;定义为使得wu,0[i]=1的下标i的集合;随机选取二个协助器密钥HKu,1,HKu,0∈{0,1}κ并计算随机选取计算身份u的初始私钥 (2.1) Let u be a bit string representing an identity with a length of nu; let u[i] be the i-th bit of u; define For the set of subscript i such that u[i]=1; let w u,-1 be the output of H u (u||-1), and let w u,-1 [i] be w u,-1 the i-th bit of ; let w u,0 be the output of H u (u||0), and let w u,0 [i] be the i-th bit of w u,0 ; define be the set of subscript i such that w u,-1 [i]=1; define To set w u,0 [i]=1 subscript i; randomly select two helper keys HK u,1 , HK u,0 ∈{0,1} κ and calculate choose randomly Compute the initial private key of identity u
(2.2)发送者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别为HKa,1,HKa,0和(2.2) The sender's facilitator key and initial private key are HK a,1 , HK a,0 and
(2.3)接收者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别HKb,1,HKb,0和(2.3) The recipient’s facilitator key and initial private key are HK b,1 , HK b,0 and
(3)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时协助器更新信息:(3) Generate the real-time assistant update information of the sender and receiver at time slice t:
(3.1)设wu,t为Hu(u||t)的输出,并设wu,t[i]为wu,t的第i位,定义 为使得wu,t[i]=1的下标i的集合;同样设wu,t-2为Hu(u||t-2)的输出,并设wu,t-2[i] 为wu,t-2的第i位,定义为使得wu,t-2[i]=1的下标i的集合;计算和为了构建将用户u的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息UIu,t,计算:(3.1) Let w u,t be the output of H u (u||t), and let w u,t [i] be the i-th bit of w u,t , define In order to make w u,t [i]=1 set of subscript i; also set w u,t-2 as the output of H u (u||t-2), and set w u,t-2 [i ] is the i-th bit of w u,t-2 , define For the set of subscript i such that w u,t-2 [i]=1; calculate and In order to construct the update information UI u,t of the temporary private key of user u for time segment t, calculate:
(3.2)同样发送者和接收者的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分别为:(3.2) The temporary private key update information for the time segment t of the sender and the receiver are respectively:
(4)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时私钥:(4) Generate the real-time private keys of the sender and receiver in time slice t:
将用户u在时间片段t-1的临时私钥分解为将时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分解为为了构建用户u在时间片段t的临时私钥du,t,用户u计算:Decompose the temporary private key of user u at time segment t-1 as Decompose the temporary private key update information of time segment t into To construct the temporary private key d u,t of user u at time segment t, user u computes:
对于任意身份u和任意时间片段t,临时私钥du,t具有如下形式:For any identity u and any time segment t, the temporary private key d u,t has the following form:
同样发送者和接收者在时间片段t的临时私钥分别为:Similarly, the temporary private keys of the sender and receiver at time segment t are:
(5)签密:(5) Sign encryption:
对于消息m,发送者A按如下方式进行签密:For message m, sender A performs signcryption as follows:
发送者A将他的临时私钥分解成 Sender A decomposes his ephemeral private key into
随机选取rm,r′t-1,随机选取r∈{0,1}nv使得a||m||r∈ΓRandomly select r m , r′ t-1 , Randomly select r∈{0,1} nv such that a||m||r∈Γ
令为使得从Hv(m)的第j位不同于r的第j位的下标j的集合,即 make In order to make the j-th bit of H v (m) different from the set of subscript j of the j-th bit of r, that is
计算:calculate:
令rt-1=r′t-1+ka,t-1,rt=r′t+ka,t,Let r t-1 =r′ t-1 +k a,t-1 , r t =r′ t +k a,t ,
发送者A输出一个密文:Sender A outputs a ciphertext:
并将它发送给接收者B;and send it to receiver B;
(6)解签密:(6) Sign decryption:
接收者B将收到的密文(t,σ)分解为(t,(σ<1>,σ<2>,σ<3>,σ<4>,σ<5>,σ<6>,σ<7>,σ<8>,σ<9>));接收者B将他的临时私钥分解成 Receiver B decomposes the received ciphertext (t,σ) into (t,(σ <1> ,σ <2> ,σ <3> ,σ <4> ,σ <5> ,σ <6> , σ <7> ,σ <8> ,σ <9> )); receiver B decomposes his temporary private key into
计算 calculate
生成 generate
如果以下等式成立,则输出消息m,否则输出“解签密失败”;If the following equation is true, then output the message m, otherwise output "signcryption decryption failed";
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