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CN115296792A - An Identity-Based Signcryption Method for Protecting Keys - Google Patents

An Identity-Based Signcryption Method for Protecting Keys Download PDF

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Publication number
CN115296792A
CN115296792A CN202210703552.3A CN202210703552A CN115296792A CN 115296792 A CN115296792 A CN 115296792A CN 202210703552 A CN202210703552 A CN 202210703552A CN 115296792 A CN115296792 A CN 115296792A
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private key
sender
receiver
bit
identity
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陈剑洪
肖绍章
张海艳
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Huaiyin Institute of Technology
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention discloses an identity-based signcryption method for protecting a secret key, which is characterized in that two credible assistors are arranged, the two assistors alternately help a sender and a receiver to generate an initial private key and a public key and update the private key at the starting point of each time period, the sender generates a signcryption ciphertext, and the receiver generates a plaintext by using a signcryption algorithm and performs signature verification. The invention sets two independent and physically safe credible assistors for the sender and the receiver respectively, and the two assistors help the sender and the receiver to generate the initial private key of the cryptosystem by using the secret value selected by the sender and the receiver, thereby avoiding the problem of identity revocation and realizing the function of resisting key leakage; the invention utilizes two assistors to alternately and respectively update the real-time private keys of the sender and the receiver in different time periods, thereby on one hand, allowing frequent real-time private key update, and on the other hand, reducing the secret key leakage probability of the assistors.

Description

一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法An Identity-Based Signcryption Method for Key Protection

技术领域technical field

本发明涉及信息安全,特别是一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。The invention relates to information security, in particular to an identity-based signcryption method for key protection.

背景技术Background technique

密码学是信息安全的底层支撑技术,也是认证和访问控制的核心。保密和认证是密码学中两个重要的安全目标。在公钥密码体制中,加密和解密方案是最基本的两个基本方案,分别用来提供消息的保密性和消息的认证性二个安全目标。在某些应用中,比如电子邮件、电子商务等,需要同时实现这二个安全目标。签密密码体制能在一个逻辑步骤内同时完成加密和签名二重功能,而计算量和数据量小于两者之和。发送者通过签密计算生成签密密文。接收者通过解签密计算生成明文并验证签名。Cryptography is the underlying supporting technology of information security and the core of authentication and access control. Secrecy and authentication are two important security goals in cryptography. In the public key cryptosystem, the encryption and decryption schemes are the two most basic schemes, which are used to provide two security goals of message confidentiality and message authentication respectively. In some applications, such as e-mail, e-commerce, etc., it is necessary to achieve these two security goals at the same time. The signcryption cryptosystem can simultaneously complete the dual functions of encryption and signature in one logical step, and the amount of computation and data is less than the sum of the two. The sender generates signcrypted ciphertext through signcrypt calculation. The receiver generates plaintext and verifies the signature by decrypting the signcryption calculation.

与本方法最接近的现有技术为文献《Identity-Based Key-InsulatedSigncryption.Informatica,23(1):27-45.》提出的基于身份的密钥隔离签密方法,该方法在标准模型下是可证明安全的。该方法适用于发送者和接收者的私钥需要保护的应用场景等。该方法的主要步骤是:第一,生成公共系统参数和系统主密钥;第二,生成发送者和接收者的初始私钥和一个协助器密钥;第三,生成发送者和接收者的实时私钥更新信息;第四,生成发送者和接收者的实时私钥;第五,发送者生成签密文;第六,接收者用解签密算法生成密文并验证签名。在该方法中,发送者和接收者的私钥在每个时间片段都进行更新,从而增强了系统防御私钥泄漏的能力。但该方法存在一些缺陷,该方法不能用于协助器密钥泄露的应用场景,从而不能解决该应用场景中的私钥保护问题。The closest existing technology to this method is the identity-based key isolation signcryption method proposed in the document "Identity-Based Key-InsulatedSigncryption.Informatica, 23(1):27-45.", which is provably safe. This method is suitable for application scenarios where the private keys of the sender and receiver need to be protected. The main steps of the method are: first, generate public system parameters and system master key; second, generate the initial private key of the sender and receiver and a facilitator key; third, generate the sender and receiver’s Real-time private key update information; Fourth, generate real-time private keys of the sender and receiver; Fifth, the sender generates a signed ciphertext; Sixth, the receiver generates a ciphertext and verifies the signature using the decryption signcryption algorithm. In this method, the private keys of the sender and the receiver are updated every time segment, thereby enhancing the system's ability to defend against private key leaks. However, there are some defects in this method. This method cannot be used in the application scenario where the facilitator key is leaked, so it cannot solve the problem of private key protection in this application scenario.

发明内容Contents of the invention

发明目的:本发明的目的是提供一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,从而解决在一个逻辑步骤内实现加密和签名的应用场景中的私钥保护问题。Purpose of the invention: The purpose of the invention is to provide an identity-based signcryption method for key protection, so as to solve the problem of private key protection in application scenarios where encryption and signature are implemented within one logical step.

技术方案:本发明所述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,原理为:设置二个协助器密钥,二个协助器在各时间段的起点生成实时私钥更新信息并对实时私钥进行更新,生成发送者和接收者的实时私钥,发送者使用签密算法生成密文,接收者使用解签密算法生成明文并验证签名。所述方法包括以下步骤:Technical solution: The identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys according to the present invention is based on the principle that two facilitator keys are set, and the two facilitators generate real-time private key update information at the starting point of each time period and update The real-time private key is updated to generate the real-time private key of the sender and receiver. The sender uses the signcryption algorithm to generate ciphertext, and the receiver uses the decryption signcryption algorithm to generate plaintext and verify the signature. The method comprises the steps of:

(1)建立系统参数:(1) Establish system parameters:

G1和G2都是阶为素数p的乘法群,g是G1的生成元;G2是一个阶为q的乘法循环群,且e:G1×G1→G2是一个双线性映射;Zp表示集合{0,1,2,...,p-1},用

Figure BDA0003705315260000021
表示Zp\{0};选取二个哈希函数Hu:{0,1}*→{0,1}nu,Hv:{0,1}nm→{0,1}nv,此处nu、 nm和nv均为安全参数;设身份为一个长度为nu的位串,设消息为一个长度为 nm的位串;定义一个双射V:Γ→G2,这里V-1表示它的逆映射,Γ为{0,1}nu+nm+nv的具有p个元素的子集;选取一个伪随机函数F:给定一个κ比特的输入参数x 和一个κ比特的种子,函数F将输出一个κ比特长的随机字符串Fs(x);随机选择整数α∈Zp,随机选择整数g2∈G1,设定g1=gα,设定Y=e(g1,g2);随机选择u′∈G1,当i=1,...,nu,随机选择ui∈G1,设定nu维向量
Figure BDA0003705315260000022
随机选择m′∈G1,当i= 1,...,nv,随机选择mi∈G1,设定nv维向量
Figure BDA0003705315260000023
设定主私钥
Figure BDA0003705315260000024
设定系统公开参数为
Figure BDA0003705315260000025
Both G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative groups whose order is a prime number p, and g is the generator of G 1 ; G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group whose order is q, and e:G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is a bilinear property mapping; Z p represents the set {0,1,2,...,p-1}, with
Figure BDA0003705315260000021
represents Z p \{0}; select two hash functions H u :{0,1} * →{0,1} nu , H v :{0,1} nm →{0,1} nv , where nu, nm and nv are security parameters; let identity be a bit string with length nu, let message be a bit string with length nm; define a bijection V:Γ→G 2 , where V -1 represents its Inverse mapping, Γ is a subset of {0,1} nu+nm+nv with p elements; choose a pseudorandom function F: Given a κ-bit input parameter x and a κ-bit seed, the function F will Output a random character string F s (x) of κ bit length; randomly select an integer α∈Z p , randomly select an integer g 2 ∈G 1 , set g 1 =g α , set Y=e(g 1 ,g 2 ); randomly select u′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nu, randomly select u i ∈G 1 , set nu-dimensional vector
Figure BDA0003705315260000022
Randomly select m′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nv, randomly select m i ∈G 1 , set nv-dimensional vector
Figure BDA0003705315260000023
Set the master private key
Figure BDA0003705315260000024
Set the system public parameters to
Figure BDA0003705315260000025

(2)私钥提取:(2) Private key extraction:

(2.1)设u为一个代表身份的长度为nu的位串;设u[i]为u的第i位;定义

Figure BDA0003705315260000026
为使得u[i]=1的下标i的集合;设wu,-1为Hu(u||-1)的输出,并设wu,-1[i]为wu,-1的第i位;设wu,0为Hu(u||0)的输出,并设wu,0[i]为wu,0的第i位;定义
Figure BDA0003705315260000027
为使得wu,-1[i]=1的下标i的集合;定义
Figure BDA0003705315260000028
为使得wu,0[i]=1的下标i的集合;随机选取二个协助器密钥HKu,1,HKu,0∈{0,1}κ并计算
Figure BDA0003705315260000029
随机选取
Figure BDA00037053152600000210
计算身份u的初始私钥
Figure BDA00037053152600000211
(2.1) Let u be a bit string representing an identity with a length of nu; let u[i] be the i-th bit of u; define
Figure BDA0003705315260000026
For the set of subscript i such that u[i]=1; let w u,-1 be the output of H u (u||-1), and let w u,-1 [i] be w u,-1 the i-th bit of ; let w u,0 be the output of H u (u||0), and let w u,0 [i] be the i-th bit of w u,0 ; define
Figure BDA0003705315260000027
be the set of subscript i such that w u,-1 [i]=1; define
Figure BDA0003705315260000028
To set w u,0 [i]=1 subscript i; randomly select two helper keys HK u,1 , HK u,0 ∈{0,1} κ and calculate
Figure BDA0003705315260000029
choose randomly
Figure BDA00037053152600000210
Compute the initial private key of identity u
Figure BDA00037053152600000211

(2.2)发送者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别为HKa,1,HKa,0(2.2) The sender's facilitator key and initial private key are HK a,1 , HK a,0 and

Figure BDA00037053152600000212
Figure BDA00037053152600000212

(2.3)接收者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别HKb,1,HKb,0(2.3) The recipient’s facilitator key and initial private key are HK b,1 , HK b,0 and

Figure BDA00037053152600000213
Figure BDA00037053152600000213

(3)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时协助器更新信息:(3) Generate the real-time assistant update information of the sender and receiver at time slice t:

(3.1)设wu,t为Hu(u||t)的输出,并设wu,t[i]为wu,t的第i位,定义

Figure BDA0003705315260000031
Figure BDA0003705315260000032
为使得wu,t[i]=1的下标i的集合;同样设wu,t-2为Hu(u||t-2)的输出,并设wu,t-2[i] 为wu,t-2的第i位,定义
Figure BDA0003705315260000033
为使得wu,t-2[i]=1的下标i的集合;计算
Figure BDA0003705315260000034
Figure BDA0003705315260000035
为了构建将用户u的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息UIu,t,计算:(3.1) Let w u,t be the output of H u (u||t), and let w u,t [i] be the i-th bit of w u,t , define
Figure BDA0003705315260000031
Figure BDA0003705315260000032
In order to make w u,t [i]=1 set of subscript i; also set w u,t-2 as the output of H u (u||t-2), and set w u,t-2 [i ] is the i-th bit of w u,t-2 , define
Figure BDA0003705315260000033
For the set of subscript i such that w u,t-2 [i]=1; calculate
Figure BDA0003705315260000034
and
Figure BDA0003705315260000035
In order to construct the update information UI u,t of the temporary private key of user u for time segment t, calculate:

Figure BDA0003705315260000036
Figure BDA0003705315260000036

(3.2)同样发送者和接收者的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分别为:(3.2) The temporary private key update information for the time segment t of the sender and the receiver are respectively:

Figure BDA0003705315260000037
Figure BDA0003705315260000037

Figure BDA0003705315260000038
Figure BDA0003705315260000038

(4)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时私钥:(4) Generate the real-time private keys of the sender and receiver in time slice t:

将用户u在时间片段t-1的临时私钥分解为

Figure BDA0003705315260000039
将时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分解为
Figure BDA00037053152600000310
为了构建用户u在时间片段t的临时私钥du,t,用户u计算:Decompose the temporary private key of user u at time segment t-1 as
Figure BDA0003705315260000039
Decompose the temporary private key update information of time segment t into
Figure BDA00037053152600000310
To construct the temporary private key d u,t of user u at time segment t, user u computes:

Figure BDA00037053152600000311
Figure BDA00037053152600000311

对于任意身份u和任意时间片段t,临时私钥du,t具有如下形式:For any identity u and any time segment t, the temporary private key d u,t has the following form:

Figure BDA00037053152600000312
Figure BDA00037053152600000312

同样发送者和接收者在时间片段t的临时私钥分别为:Similarly, the temporary private keys of the sender and receiver at time segment t are:

Figure BDA00037053152600000313
Figure BDA00037053152600000313

Figure BDA00037053152600000314
Figure BDA00037053152600000314

(5)签密:(5) Sign encryption:

对于消息m,发送者A按如下方式进行签密:For message m, sender A performs signcryption as follows:

发送者A将他的临时私钥分解成

Figure BDA00037053152600000315
Sender A decomposes his ephemeral private key into
Figure BDA00037053152600000315

随机选取rm,r′t-1,

Figure BDA00037053152600000316
随机选取r∈{0,1}nv使得a||m||r∈ΓRandomly select r m , r′ t-1 ,
Figure BDA00037053152600000316
Randomly select r∈{0,1} nv such that a||m||r∈Γ

Figure BDA0003705315260000041
为使得从Hv(m)的第j位不同于r的第j位的下标j的集合,即
Figure BDA0003705315260000042
make
Figure BDA0003705315260000041
In order to make the j-th bit of H v (m) different from the set of subscript j of the j-th bit of r, that is
Figure BDA0003705315260000042

计算:calculate:

Figure BDA0003705315260000043
Figure BDA0003705315260000043

Figure BDA0003705315260000044
Figure BDA0003705315260000044

Figure BDA0003705315260000045
Figure BDA0003705315260000045

Figure BDA0003705315260000046
Figure BDA0003705315260000046

Figure BDA0003705315260000047
Figure BDA0003705315260000047

Figure BDA0003705315260000048
Figure BDA0003705315260000048

Figure BDA0003705315260000049
Figure BDA0003705315260000049

Figure BDA00037053152600000410
Figure BDA00037053152600000410

Figure BDA00037053152600000411
Figure BDA00037053152600000411

令rt-1=r′t-1+ka,t-1,rt=r′t+ka,tLet r t-1 =r′ t-1 +k a,t-1 , r t =r′ t +k a,t ,

Figure BDA00037053152600000412
Figure BDA00037053152600000412

Figure BDA00037053152600000413
Figure BDA00037053152600000413

Figure BDA00037053152600000414
Figure BDA00037053152600000414

发送者A输出一个密文:Sender A outputs a ciphertext:

Figure BDA00037053152600000415
Figure BDA00037053152600000415

Figure BDA0003705315260000051
Figure BDA0003705315260000051

并将它发送给接收者B;and send it to receiver B;

(6)解签密:(6) Sign decryption:

接收者B将收到的密文(t,σ)分解为(t,(σ<1><2><3><4><5><6><7><8><9>));接收者B将他的临时私钥分解成

Figure BDA0003705315260000052
Receiver B decomposes the received ciphertext (t,σ) into (t,(σ <1><2><3><4><5><6> , σ <7><8><9> )); receiver B decomposes his temporary private key into
Figure BDA0003705315260000052

计算

Figure BDA0003705315260000053
calculate
Figure BDA0003705315260000053

生成

Figure BDA0003705315260000054
generate
Figure BDA0003705315260000054

如果以下等式成立,则输出消息m,否则输出“解签密失败”;If the following equation is true, then output the message m, otherwise output "signcryption decryption failed";

Figure BDA0003705315260000055
Figure BDA0003705315260000055

一种计算机存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现上述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。A computer storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys is implemented.

一种计算机设备,包括储存器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序,所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现上述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。A computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and operable on the processor, when the processor executes the computer program, the above-mentioned identity-based signature for protecting a key is realized. encryption method.

有益效果:与现有技术相比,本发明具有如下优点:Beneficial effect: compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

1、为发送者和接收者设置分别二个独立且物理安全的可信协助器,并由这二个协助器帮助发送者和接收者在利用自己选取的秘密值时生成密码系统的初始私钥,避免了撤销身份问题并实现了抗密钥泄露功能;1. Set up two independent and physically secure trusted facilitators for the sender and the receiver, and these two facilitators help the sender and the receiver generate the initial private key of the cryptographic system when using the secret value they choose , which avoids the problem of revocation of identity and realizes the function of anti-key disclosure;

2、密码系统利用二个协助器在不同时间周期内交替分别对发送者和接收者的实时私钥进行更新,一方面允许频繁的实时私钥更新,另一方面又能降低的协助器密钥泄漏几率;2. The cryptographic system uses two facilitators to update the real-time private keys of the sender and the receiver alternately in different time periods. On the one hand, it allows frequent real-time private key updates, and on the other hand, it can reduce the facilitator key. Leakage probability;

3、发送者在一个逻辑步骤内实现加密和签名,这就降低了对消息进行加密与签名的总计算量与通信成本。3. The sender implements encryption and signature in one logical step, which reduces the total calculation and communication costs for encrypting and signing messages.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1为本发明的步骤流程图。Fig. 1 is a flow chart of steps of the present invention.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

下面结合附图对本发明的技术方案作进一步说明。The technical solution of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

如图1所示,一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,包括以下步骤:As shown in Figure 1, an identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys includes the following steps:

(1)建立系统参数:(1) Establish system parameters:

G1和G2都是阶为素数p的乘法群,g是G1的生成元;G2是一个阶为q的乘法循环群,且e:G1×G1→G2是一个双线性映射;Zp表示集合{0,1,2,...,p-1},用

Figure BDA00037053152600000612
表示Zp\{0};选取二个哈希函数Hu:{0,1}*→{0,1}nu,Hv:{0,1}nm→{0,1}nv,此处nu、 nm和nv均为安全参数;设身份为一个长度为nu的位串,设消息为一个长度为 nm的位串;定义一个双射V:Γ→G2,这里V-1表示它的逆映射,Γ为{0,1}nu+nm+nv的具有p个元素的子集;选取一个伪随机函数F:给定一个κ比特的输入参数x 和一个κ比特的种子,函数F将输出一个κ比特长的随机字符串Fs(x);随机选择整数α∈Zp,随机选择整数g2∈G1,设定g1=gα,设定Y=e(g1,g2);随机选择u′∈G1,当i=1,...,nu,随机选择ui∈G1,设定nu维向量
Figure BDA0003705315260000061
随机选择m′∈G1,当i=1,...,nv,随机选择mi∈G1,设定nv维向量
Figure BDA0003705315260000062
设定主私钥
Figure BDA0003705315260000063
设定系统公开参数为
Figure BDA0003705315260000064
Both G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative groups whose order is a prime number p, and g is the generator of G 1 ; G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group whose order is q, and e:G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is a bilinear property mapping; Z p represents the set {0,1,2,...,p-1}, with
Figure BDA00037053152600000612
represents Z p \{0}; select two hash functions H u :{0,1} * →{0,1} nu , H v :{0,1} nm →{0,1} nv , where nu, nm and nv are security parameters; let identity be a bit string with length nu, let message be a bit string with length nm; define a bijection V:Γ→G 2 , where V -1 represents its Inverse mapping, Γ is a subset of {0,1} nu+nm+nv with p elements; choose a pseudorandom function F: Given a κ-bit input parameter x and a κ-bit seed, the function F will Output a random character string F s (x) of κ bit length; randomly select an integer α∈Z p , randomly select an integer g 2 ∈G 1 , set g 1 =g α , set Y=e(g 1 ,g 2 ); randomly select u′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nu, randomly select u i ∈G 1 , set nu-dimensional vector
Figure BDA0003705315260000061
Randomly select m′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nv, randomly select m i ∈G 1 , set nv-dimensional vector
Figure BDA0003705315260000062
Set the master private key
Figure BDA0003705315260000063
Set the system public parameters to
Figure BDA0003705315260000064

(2)私钥提取:(2) Private key extraction:

(2.1)设u为一个代表身份的长度为nu的位串;设u[i]为u的第i位;定义

Figure BDA0003705315260000065
为使得u[i]=1的下标i的集合;设wu,-1为Hu(u||-1)的输出,并设wu,-1[i]为wu,-1的第i位;设wu,0为Hu(u||0)的输出,并设wu,0[i]为wu,0的第i位;定义
Figure BDA0003705315260000066
为使得wu,-1[i]=1的下标i的集合;定义
Figure BDA0003705315260000067
为使得wu,0[i]=1的下标i的集合;随机选取二个协助器密钥HKu,1,HKu,0∈{0,1}κ并计算
Figure BDA0003705315260000068
随机选取
Figure BDA0003705315260000069
计算身份u的初始私钥
Figure BDA00037053152600000610
(2.1) Let u be a bit string representing an identity with a length of nu; let u[i] be the i-th bit of u; define
Figure BDA0003705315260000065
For the set of subscript i such that u[i]=1; let w u,-1 be the output of H u (u||-1), and let w u,-1 [i] be w u,-1 the i-th bit of ; let w u,0 be the output of H u (u||0), and let w u,0 [i] be the i-th bit of w u,0 ; define
Figure BDA0003705315260000066
be the set of subscript i such that w u,-1 [i]=1; define
Figure BDA0003705315260000067
To set w u,0 [i]=1 subscript i; randomly select two helper keys HK u,1 , HK u,0 ∈{0,1} κ and calculate
Figure BDA0003705315260000068
choose randomly
Figure BDA0003705315260000069
Compute the initial private key of identity u
Figure BDA00037053152600000610

(2.2)发送者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别为HKa,1,HKa,0(2.2) The sender's facilitator key and initial private key are HK a,1 , HK a,0 and

Figure BDA00037053152600000611
Figure BDA00037053152600000611

(2.3)接收者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别HKb,1,HKb,0(2.3) The recipient’s facilitator key and initial private key are HK b,1 , HK b,0 and

Figure BDA0003705315260000071
Figure BDA0003705315260000071

(3)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时协助器更新信息:(3) Generate the real-time assistant update information of the sender and receiver at time slice t:

(3.1)设wu,t为Hu(u||t)的输出,并设wu,t[i]为wu,t的第i位,定义

Figure BDA0003705315260000072
Figure BDA0003705315260000073
为使得wu,t[i]=1的下标i的集合;同样设wu,t-2为Hu(u||t-2)的输出,并设wu,t-2[i] 为wu,t-2的第i位,定义
Figure BDA0003705315260000074
为使得wu,t-2[i]=1的下标i的集合;计算
Figure BDA0003705315260000075
Figure BDA0003705315260000076
为了构建将用户u的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息UIu,t,计算:(3.1) Let w u,t be the output of H u (u||t), and let w u,t [i] be the i-th bit of w u,t , define
Figure BDA0003705315260000072
Figure BDA0003705315260000073
In order to make w u,t [i]=1 set of subscript i; also set w u,t-2 as the output of H u (u||t-2), and set w u,t-2 [i ] is the i-th bit of w u,t-2 , define
Figure BDA0003705315260000074
For the set of subscript i such that w u,t-2 [i]=1; calculate
Figure BDA0003705315260000075
and
Figure BDA0003705315260000076
In order to construct the update information UI u,t of the temporary private key of user u for time segment t, calculate:

Figure BDA0003705315260000077
Figure BDA0003705315260000077

(3.2)同样发送者和接收者的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分别为:(3.2) The temporary private key update information for the time segment t of the sender and the receiver are respectively:

Figure BDA0003705315260000078
Figure BDA0003705315260000078

Figure BDA0003705315260000079
Figure BDA0003705315260000079

(4)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时私钥:(4) Generate the real-time private keys of the sender and receiver in time slice t:

将用户u在时间片段t-1的临时私钥分解为

Figure BDA00037053152600000710
将时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分解为
Figure BDA00037053152600000711
为了构建用户u在时间片段t的临时私钥du,t,用户u计算:Decompose the temporary private key of user u at time segment t-1 as
Figure BDA00037053152600000710
Decompose the temporary private key update information of time segment t into
Figure BDA00037053152600000711
To construct the temporary private key d u,t of user u at time segment t, user u computes:

Figure BDA00037053152600000712
Figure BDA00037053152600000712

对于任意身份u和任意时间片段t,临时私钥du,t具有如下形式:For any identity u and any time segment t, the temporary private key d u,t has the following form:

Figure BDA00037053152600000713
Figure BDA00037053152600000713

同样发送者和接收者在时间片段t的临时私钥分别为:Similarly, the temporary private keys of the sender and receiver at time segment t are:

Figure BDA00037053152600000714
Figure BDA00037053152600000714

Figure BDA00037053152600000715
Figure BDA00037053152600000715

(5)签密:(5) Sign encryption:

对于消息m,发送者A按如下方式进行签密:For message m, sender A performs signcryption as follows:

发送者A将他的临时私钥分解成

Figure BDA00037053152600000716
Sender A decomposes his ephemeral private key into
Figure BDA00037053152600000716

随机选取rm,r′t-1,

Figure BDA00037053152600000717
随机选取r∈{0,1}nv使得a||m||r∈ΓRandomly select r m , r′ t-1 ,
Figure BDA00037053152600000717
Randomly select r∈{0,1} nv such that a||m||r∈Γ

Figure BDA0003705315260000081
为使得从Hv(m)的第j位不同于r的第j位的下标j的集合,即
Figure BDA0003705315260000082
make
Figure BDA0003705315260000081
In order to make the j-th bit of H v (m) different from the set of subscript j of the j-th bit of r, that is
Figure BDA0003705315260000082

计算:calculate:

Figure BDA0003705315260000083
Figure BDA0003705315260000083

Figure BDA0003705315260000084
Figure BDA0003705315260000084

Figure BDA0003705315260000085
Figure BDA0003705315260000085

Figure BDA0003705315260000086
Figure BDA0003705315260000086

Figure BDA0003705315260000087
Figure BDA0003705315260000087

Figure BDA0003705315260000088
Figure BDA0003705315260000088

Figure BDA0003705315260000089
Figure BDA0003705315260000089

Figure BDA00037053152600000810
Figure BDA00037053152600000810

Figure BDA00037053152600000811
Figure BDA00037053152600000811

令rt-1=r′t-1+ka,t-1,rt=r′t+ka,tLet r t-1 =r′ t-1 +k a,t-1 , r t =r′ t +k a,t ,

Figure BDA00037053152600000812
Figure BDA00037053152600000812

Figure BDA00037053152600000813
Figure BDA00037053152600000813

Figure BDA00037053152600000814
Figure BDA00037053152600000814

发送者A输出一个密文:Sender A outputs a ciphertext:

Figure BDA00037053152600000815
Figure BDA00037053152600000815

Figure BDA0003705315260000091
Figure BDA0003705315260000091

并将它发送给接收者B;and send it to receiver B;

(6)解签密:(6) Sign decryption:

接收者B将收到的密文(t,σ)分解为(t,(σ<1><2><3><4><5><6><7><8><9>));接收者B将他的临时私钥分解成

Figure BDA0003705315260000092
Receiver B decomposes the received ciphertext (t,σ) into (t,(σ <1><2><3><4><5><6> , σ <7><8><9> )); receiver B decomposes his temporary private key into
Figure BDA0003705315260000092

计算

Figure BDA0003705315260000093
calculate
Figure BDA0003705315260000093

生成

Figure BDA0003705315260000094
generate
Figure BDA0003705315260000094

如果以下等式成立,则输出消息m,否则输出“解签密失败”;If the following equation is true, then output the message m, otherwise output "signcryption decryption failed";

Figure BDA0003705315260000095
Figure BDA0003705315260000095

Claims (3)

1.一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法,其特征在于,包括以下步骤:1. An identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys, comprising the following steps: (1)建立系统参数:(1) Establish system parameters: G1和G2都是阶为素数p的乘法群,g是G1的生成元;G2是一个阶为q的乘法循环群,且e:G1×G1→G2是一个双线性映射;Zp表示集合{0,1,2,...,p-1},用
Figure FDA0003705315250000011
表示Zp\{0};选取二个哈希函数Hu:{0,1}*→{0,1}nu,Hv:{0,1}nm→{0,1}nv,此处nu、nm和nv均为安全参数;设身份为一个长度为nu的位串,设消息为一个长度为nm的位串;定义一个双射V:Γ→G2,这里V-1表示它的逆映射,Γ为{0,1}nu+nm+nv的具有p个元素的子集;选取一个伪随机函数F:给定一个κ比特的输入参数x和一个κ比特的种子,函数F将输出一个κ比特长的随机字符串Fs(x);随机选择整数α∈Zp,随机选择整数g2∈G1,设定g1=gα,设定Y=e(g1,g2);随机选择u′∈G1,当i=1,...,nu,随机选择ui∈G1,设定nu维向量
Figure FDA0003705315250000012
随机选择m′∈G1,当i=1,...,nv,随机选择mi∈G1,设定nv维向量
Figure FDA0003705315250000013
设定主私钥
Figure FDA0003705315250000014
设定系统公开参数为
Figure FDA0003705315250000015
Both G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative groups whose order is a prime number p, and g is the generator of G 1 ; G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group whose order is q, and e:G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is a bilinear property mapping; Z p represents the set {0,1,2,...,p-1}, with
Figure FDA0003705315250000011
represents Z p \{0}; select two hash functions H u :{0,1} * →{0,1} nu , H v :{0,1} nm →{0,1} nv , where nu, nm and nv are security parameters; let the identity be a bit string of length nu, let the message be a bit string of length nm; define a bijection V:Γ→G 2 , where V -1 represents its Inverse mapping, Γ is a subset of {0,1} nu+nm+nv with p elements; choose a pseudorandom function F: Given a κ-bit input parameter x and a κ-bit seed, the function F will Output a random character string F s (x) of κ bit length; randomly select an integer α∈Z p , randomly select an integer g 2 ∈G 1 , set g 1 =g α , set Y=e(g 1 ,g 2 ); randomly select u′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nu, randomly select u i ∈G 1 , set nu-dimensional vector
Figure FDA0003705315250000012
Randomly select m′∈G 1 , when i=1,...,nv, randomly select m i ∈G 1 , set nv-dimensional vector
Figure FDA0003705315250000013
Set the master private key
Figure FDA0003705315250000014
Set the system public parameters to
Figure FDA0003705315250000015
(2)私钥提取:(2) Private key extraction: (2.1)设u为一个代表身份的长度为nu的位串;设u[i]为u的第i位;定义
Figure FDA0003705315250000016
为使得u[i]=1的下标i的集合;设wu,-1为Hu(u||-1)的输出,并设wu,-1[i]为wu,-1的第i位;设wu,0为Hu(u||0)的输出,并设wu,0[i]为wu,0的第i位;定义
Figure FDA0003705315250000017
为使得wu,-1[i]=1的下标i的集合;定义
Figure FDA0003705315250000018
为使得wu,0[i]=1的下标i的集合;随机选取二个协助器密钥HKu,1,HKu,0∈{0,1}κ并计算
Figure FDA0003705315250000019
随机选取
Figure FDA00037053152500000110
计算身份u的初始私钥
Figure FDA00037053152500000111
(2.1) Let u be a bit string representing an identity with a length of nu; let u[i] be the i-th bit of u; define
Figure FDA0003705315250000016
For the set of subscript i such that u[i]=1; let w u,-1 be the output of H u (u||-1), and let w u,-1 [i] be w u,-1 the i-th bit of ; let w u,0 be the output of H u (u||0), and let w u,0 [i] be the i-th bit of w u,0 ; define
Figure FDA0003705315250000017
be the set of subscript i such that w u,-1 [i]=1; define
Figure FDA0003705315250000018
To set w u,0 [i]=1 subscript i; randomly select two helper keys HK u,1 , HK u,0 ∈{0,1} κ and calculate
Figure FDA0003705315250000019
choose randomly
Figure FDA00037053152500000110
Compute the initial private key of identity u
Figure FDA00037053152500000111
(2.2)发送者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别为HKa,1,HKa,0(2.2) The sender's facilitator key and initial private key are HK a,1 , HK a,0 and
Figure FDA00037053152500000112
Figure FDA00037053152500000112
(2.3)接收者的协助器密钥和初始私钥分别HKb,1,HKb,0(2.3) The recipient’s facilitator key and initial private key are HK b,1 , HK b,0 and
Figure FDA00037053152500000113
Figure FDA00037053152500000113
(3)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时协助器更新信息:(3) Generate the real-time assistant update information of the sender and receiver at time slice t: (3.1)设wu,t为Hu(u||t)的输出,并设wu,t[i]为wu,t的第i位,定义
Figure FDA0003705315250000021
Figure FDA0003705315250000022
为使得wu,t[i]=1的下标i的集合;同样设wu,t-2为Hu(u||t-2)的输出,并设wu,t-2[i]为wu,t-2的第i位,定义
Figure FDA0003705315250000023
为使得wu,t-2[i]=1的下标i的集合;计算
Figure FDA0003705315250000024
Figure FDA0003705315250000025
为了构建将用户u的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息UIu,t,计算:
(3.1) Let w u,t be the output of H u (u||t), and let w u,t [i] be the i-th bit of w u,t , define
Figure FDA0003705315250000021
Figure FDA0003705315250000022
In order to make w u,t [i]=1 set of subscript i; also set w u,t-2 as the output of H u (u||t-2), and set w u,t-2 [i ] is the i-th bit of w u,t-2 , define
Figure FDA0003705315250000023
For the set of subscript i such that w u,t-2 [i]=1; calculate
Figure FDA0003705315250000024
and
Figure FDA0003705315250000025
In order to construct the update information UI u,t of the temporary private key of user u for time segment t, calculate:
Figure FDA0003705315250000026
Figure FDA0003705315250000026
(3.2)同样发送者和接收者的时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分别为:(3.2) The temporary private key update information for the time segment t of the sender and the receiver are respectively:
Figure FDA0003705315250000027
Figure FDA0003705315250000027
Figure FDA0003705315250000028
Figure FDA0003705315250000028
(4)生成发送者和接收者在时间片t的实时私钥:(4) Generate the real-time private keys of the sender and receiver in time slice t: 将用户u在时间片段t-1的临时私钥分解为
Figure FDA0003705315250000029
将时间片段t的临时私钥更新信息分解为
Figure FDA00037053152500000210
为了构建用户u在时间片段t的临时私钥du,t,用户u计算:
Decompose the temporary private key of user u at time segment t-1 as
Figure FDA0003705315250000029
Decompose the temporary private key update information of time segment t into
Figure FDA00037053152500000210
To construct the temporary private key d u,t of user u at time segment t, user u computes:
Figure FDA00037053152500000211
Figure FDA00037053152500000211
对于任意身份u和任意时间片段t,临时私钥du,t具有如下形式:For any identity u and any time segment t, the temporary private key d u,t has the following form:
Figure FDA00037053152500000212
Figure FDA00037053152500000212
同样发送者和接收者在时间片段t的临时私钥分别为:Similarly, the temporary private keys of the sender and receiver at time segment t are:
Figure FDA00037053152500000213
Figure FDA00037053152500000213
Figure FDA00037053152500000214
Figure FDA00037053152500000214
(5)签密:(5) Sign encryption: 对于消息m,发送者A按如下方式进行签密:For message m, sender A performs signcryption as follows: 发送者A将他的临时私钥分解成
Figure FDA00037053152500000215
Sender A decomposes his ephemeral private key into
Figure FDA00037053152500000215
随机选取
Figure FDA00037053152500000216
随机选取r∈{0,1}nv使得a||m||r∈Γ
choose randomly
Figure FDA00037053152500000216
Randomly select r∈{0,1} nv such that a||m||r∈Γ
Figure FDA00037053152500000217
为使得从Hv(m)的第j位不同于r的第j位的下标j的集合,即
Figure FDA00037053152500000218
make
Figure FDA00037053152500000217
In order to make the j-th bit of H v (m) different from the set of subscript j of the j-th bit of r, that is
Figure FDA00037053152500000218
计算:calculate:
Figure FDA0003705315250000031
Figure FDA0003705315250000031
Figure FDA0003705315250000032
Figure FDA0003705315250000032
Figure FDA0003705315250000033
Figure FDA0003705315250000033
Figure FDA0003705315250000034
Figure FDA0003705315250000034
Figure FDA0003705315250000035
Figure FDA0003705315250000035
Figure FDA0003705315250000036
Figure FDA0003705315250000036
Figure FDA0003705315250000037
Figure FDA0003705315250000037
Figure FDA0003705315250000038
Figure FDA0003705315250000038
Figure FDA0003705315250000039
Figure FDA0003705315250000039
令rt-1=r′t-1+ka,t-1,rt=rt′+ka,tLet r t-1 =r′ t-1 +k a,t-1 , r t =r t ′+k a,t ,
Figure FDA00037053152500000310
Figure FDA00037053152500000310
Figure FDA00037053152500000311
Figure FDA00037053152500000311
Figure FDA00037053152500000312
Figure FDA00037053152500000312
发送者A输出一个密文:Sender A outputs a ciphertext:
Figure FDA00037053152500000313
Figure FDA00037053152500000313
并将它发送给接收者B;and send it to receiver B; (6)解签密:(6) Sign decryption: 接收者B将收到的密文(t,σ)分解为
Figure FDA0003705315250000041
接收者B将他的临时私钥分解成
Figure FDA0003705315250000042
Receiver B decomposes the received ciphertext (t, σ) into
Figure FDA0003705315250000041
Receiver B decomposes his ephemeral private key into
Figure FDA0003705315250000042
计算
Figure FDA0003705315250000043
calculate
Figure FDA0003705315250000043
生成
Figure FDA0003705315250000044
generate
Figure FDA0003705315250000044
如果以下等式成立,则输出消息m,否则输出“解签密失败”;If the following equation is true, then output the message m, otherwise output "signcryption decryption failed";
Figure FDA0003705315250000045
Figure FDA0003705315250000045
2.一种计算机存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,其特征在于,该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-5中任一项所述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。2. A computer storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, characterized in that, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the identity-based authentication of a protection key according to any one of claims 1-5 is realized. Signcryption method. 3.一种计算机设备,包括储存器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序,其特征在于,所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现如权利要求1-5中任一项所述的一种保护密钥的基于身份的签密方法。3. A computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and operable on the processor, characterized in that, when the processor executes the computer program, it realizes claims 1-5 An identity-based signcryption method for protecting keys according to any one of the above.
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