CN114866303A - Anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method - Google Patents
Anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method Download PDFInfo
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- CN114866303A CN114866303A CN202210448479.XA CN202210448479A CN114866303A CN 114866303 A CN114866303 A CN 114866303A CN 202210448479 A CN202210448479 A CN 202210448479A CN 114866303 A CN114866303 A CN 114866303A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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Abstract
本发明提供一种防劫持的探测信号鉴权方法，涉及远程探测技术领域，包括以下步骤：将鉴权密匙分为主动部分和被动部分；探测装置发出探测信息时，发出基础信号摘要和主动部分；获取装置对获取的主动部分进行解调；匹配自身存储的被动部分，合格则将主动部分和被动部分发回；探测装置按照完整的鉴权密匙对信息进行加密发出；获取装置将解调后的探测信息与基础信号摘要进行匹配，合格则探测目标信息为真；反之则探测目标信息为假。本发明简单合理，将鉴权密匙分为两部分，探测装置不知道被动部分，截获装置不知道主动部分，有效防止重要信号中的内容被截获或者劫持，传输安全性更高。
The invention provides an anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method, which relates to the technical field of remote detection and includes the following steps: dividing an authentication key into an active part and a passive part; The acquisition device demodulates the acquired active part; matches the passive part stored by itself, if it is qualified, the active part and the passive part are sent back; the detection device encrypts the information according to the complete authentication key and sends it out; The adjusted detection information is matched with the basic signal digest, and if it is qualified, the detection target information is true; otherwise, the detection target information is false. The invention is simple and reasonable, the authentication key is divided into two parts, the detection device does not know the passive part, and the interception device does not know the active part, which effectively prevents the content of important signals from being intercepted or hijacked, and has higher transmission security.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of remote detection,
in particular, the invention relates to an anti-hijack detection signal authentication method.
Background
With the continuous development of aerospace technologies, the requirements of various applications such as ground high-resolution remote sensing and space astronomical observation on the comprehensive performance of a spacecraft are higher and higher, and a detection platform with high pointing accuracy and high stability index needs to be explored urgently to meet the requirements of future spacecraft development.
The microsatellite or the high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle has the advantages of flexibility, low cost and short period, and the development of miniaturized remote sensing detection instruments is more and more at present, for example, Chinese patent invention patent CN110920934A provides a structure of a ground remote sensing satellite, which comprises a platform cabin, a load cabin, a star sensor, a ground remote sensing camera, a ground data transmission antenna, a firework unlocking device, a magnetic suspension actuator and a satellite and rocket separation device, wherein the magnetic suspension actuator is used for controlling the attitude of the load cabin after the load cabin is separated from the platform cabin; the remote ground sensing camera is used for carrying out high-resolution imaging observation on the ground; the ground data transmission antenna is used for transmitting the detection data of the ground remote sensing camera to the ground receiving station; the firer unlocking device is used for connecting the platform cabin and the load cabin when the satellite is launched, detonating after the satellite enters the orbit and removing the constraint on the load cabin; the satellite and rocket separation device is used for connecting the satellite and the carrier rocket during launching, and the separation of the satellite and the carrier rocket is realized after the satellite enters the orbit. The invention realizes the physical isolation of the load cabin and the platform cabin, avoids the interference of the platform cabin to the load cabin and can realize high-precision remote sensing observation to the ground.
However, the above remote sensing detection method still has the following disadvantages: the microsatellite or the high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle has small volume and small transmission bandwidth, so the protection capability is small, and the possibility of interference, interception and even hijacking is realized in the signal transmission process, so that the ground acquisition device cannot acquire real detection target information or is acquired by other parties to acquire the detection target information, and once important information content is involved, the loss is large.
Therefore, in order to solve the above problems, it is necessary to design a reasonable anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a simple and reasonable anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method which divides an authentication key into two parts, wherein a detection device does not know a passive part, and an interception device does not know an active part, so that the content in important signals is effectively prevented from being intercepted or hijacked, and the transmission security is higher.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention is realized by adopting the following technical scheme:
an anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method comprises the following steps:
s1: dividing the authentication key into an active part and a passive part;
s2: when the detection device sends out the information of the detection target, a basic signal abstract is generated and sent, and the active part of the authentication key is also sent;
s3: the acquisition device acquires a signal and then performs preset demodulation on an active part of the authentication key;
s4: the acquisition device judges whether the matching degree of the active part of the demodulated authentication key and the passive part of the authentication key stored by the acquisition device is higher than a first threshold value or not, and if so, the active part and the passive part of the authentication key are sent back to the detection device; otherwise, returning to the step S2;
s5: the detection device acquires the combination of the active part and the passive part of the authentication key to obtain a complete authentication key, and completely encrypts detection target information according to the complete authentication key and then sends the detection target information;
s6: the acquisition device demodulates the acquired completely encrypted detection target information, judges whether the matching degree of the demodulated signal and the basic signal abstract is higher than a second threshold value or not, and if so, the detection target information is true; otherwise, the detection target information is false.
Preferably, in step S1, the active part and the passive part of the authentication key are independent authentication keys.
Preferably, in step S2, the basic signal summary is a symmetric digital signal.
Preferably, in step S3, the demodulating the active part of the authentication key includes forward demodulation and backward demodulation.
Preferably, when step S4 is executed, the obtaining device sequentially obtains the passive part of each stored authentication key, and compares the passive part with the active part of the demodulated authentication key, and only if the matching degree of forward demodulation and backward demodulation of the passive part of one authentication key and the active part of the authentication key is higher than the first threshold, the passive part of the authentication key and the obtained active part of the authentication key are sent back to the detecting device.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when step S2 is executed, the detecting means deletes the active part of the original authentication key and accepts the active part of the new authentication key at predetermined intervals.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, in step S5, after the detecting device obtains the complete authentication key from the combination of the active part and the passive part of the authentication key, the detecting device does not accept the active part of the new authentication key before completely encrypting the signal of the detecting object according to the complete authentication key and then sending out the encrypted signal.
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when the detection target information is false, the detection device is marked and the active part of the new authentication key is no longer sent to the detection device in step S6.
The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method has the beneficial effects that: the method is simple and reasonable, the authentication key is divided into two parts, the detection device does not know the passive part, the interception device does not know the active part, the content in the important signal is effectively prevented from being intercepted or hijacked, and the transmission safety is higher.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart illustrating an anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following are specific examples of the present invention and further describe the technical solutions of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited to these examples.
Various exemplary embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that: the relative arrangement of the modules and structures set forth in these embodiments does not limit the scope of the invention unless specifically stated otherwise.
The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely illustrative in nature and is in no way intended to limit the invention, its application, or uses.
Techniques, methods, and systems known to those of ordinary skill in the relevant art may not be discussed in detail, but are intended to be part of the specification where appropriate.
Example (b): as shown in fig. 1, which is only one embodiment of the present invention, an anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method includes the following steps:
s1: dividing the authentication key into an active part and a passive part;
s2: when the detection device sends out the information of the detection target, a basic signal abstract is generated and sent, and the active part of the authentication key is also sent;
s3: the acquisition device acquires a signal and then performs preset demodulation on an active part of the authentication key;
s4: the acquisition device judges whether the matching degree of the active part of the demodulated authentication key and the passive part of the authentication key stored by the acquisition device is higher than a first threshold value or not, and if so, the active part and the passive part of the authentication key are sent back to the detection device; otherwise, returning to the step S2;
s5: the detection device acquires the combination of the active part and the passive part of the authentication key to obtain a complete authentication key, and completely encrypts and then sends detection target information according to the complete authentication key;
s6: the acquisition device demodulates the acquired completely encrypted detection target information, judges whether the matching degree of the demodulated signal and the basic signal abstract is higher than a second threshold value or not, and if so, the detection target information is true; otherwise, the detection target information is false.
In step S1, the active part and the passive part of the authentication key are both independent authentication keys.
In step S2, the basic signal is summarized as a symmetric digital signal.
In step S3, demodulating the active portion of the authentication key includes forward demodulation and reverse demodulation.
When step S4 is executed, the obtaining device sequentially obtains the passive part of each stored authentication key, and compares the passive part with the active part of the demodulated authentication key, and sends the passive part of the authentication key and the active part of the obtained authentication key back to the detecting device only when the forward demodulation and reverse demodulation matching degrees of the passive part of one authentication key and the active part of the authentication key are higher than the first threshold.
When step S2 is executed, the detecting device deletes the active part of the original authentication key and accepts the active part of the new authentication key at predetermined intervals.
When step S5 is executed, after the detecting device obtains the complete authentication key from the combination of the active part and the passive part of the authentication key, it does not accept the active part of the new authentication key until the signal of the detected object is completely encrypted according to the complete authentication key and then sent out.
When the detection target information is false, the detection device is marked and the active part of the new authentication key is not sent to the detection device any more when step S6 is executed.
The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method is simple and reasonable, the authentication key is divided into two parts, the detection device does not know the passive part, and the interception device does not know the active part, so that the content in the important signal is effectively prevented from being intercepted or hijacked, and the transmission safety is higher.
The present invention is not limited to the above-described specific embodiments, and various modifications and variations are possible. Any modifications, equivalents, improvements and the like made to the above embodiments in accordance with the technical spirit of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
s1: dividing the authentication key into an active part and a passive part;
s2: when the detection device sends out the information of the detection target, a basic signal abstract is generated and sent, and the active part of the authentication key is also sent;
s3: the acquisition device acquires a signal and then performs preset demodulation on an active part of the authentication key;
s4: the acquisition device judges whether the matching degree of the active part of the demodulated authentication key and the passive part of the authentication key stored by the acquisition device is higher than a first threshold value or not, and if so, the active part and the passive part of the authentication key are sent back to the detection device; otherwise, returning to the step S2;
s5: the detection device acquires the combination of the active part and the passive part of the authentication key to obtain a complete authentication key, and completely encrypts and then sends detection target information according to the complete authentication key;
s6: the acquisition device demodulates the acquired completely encrypted detection target information, judges whether the matching degree of the demodulated signal and the basic signal abstract is higher than a second threshold value or not, and if so, the detection target information is true; otherwise, the detection target information is false.
2. The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 1, wherein:
in step S1, the active part and the passive part of the authentication key are both independent authentication keys.
3. The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 1, wherein:
in step S2, the basic signal is summarized as a symmetric digital signal.
4. An anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 3, characterized in that:
in step S3, demodulating the active portion of the authentication key includes forward demodulation and reverse demodulation.
5. The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 4, wherein:
when step S4 is executed, the obtaining device sequentially obtains the passive part of each stored authentication key, and compares the passive part with the active part of the demodulated authentication key, and sends the passive part of the authentication key and the active part of the obtained authentication key back to the detecting device only when the forward demodulation and reverse demodulation matching degrees of the passive part of one authentication key and the active part of the authentication key are higher than the first threshold.
6. The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 1, wherein:
when step S2 is executed, the detecting device deletes the active part of the original authentication key and accepts the active part of the new authentication key at predetermined intervals.
7. The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 6, wherein:
when step S5 is executed, after the detecting device obtains the complete authentication key from the combination of the active part and the passive part of the authentication key, it does not accept the active part of the new authentication key until the signal of the detected object is completely encrypted according to the complete authentication key and then sent out.
8. The anti-hijacking detection signal authentication method according to claim 7, wherein:
when the detection target information is false, the detection device is marked and the active part of the new authentication key is not sent to the detection device any more when step S6 is executed.
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