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CN114726535A - Privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method based on block chain - Google Patents

Privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method based on block chain Download PDF

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CN114726535A
CN114726535A CN202210327691.0A CN202210327691A CN114726535A CN 114726535 A CN114726535 A CN 114726535A CN 202210327691 A CN202210327691 A CN 202210327691A CN 114726535 A CN114726535 A CN 114726535A
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information
ownership
product
automobile
automobile part
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CN114726535B (en
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祝烈煌
张璨
徐畅
李荣荣
丁瑶玲
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Beijing Institute of Technology BIT
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01Protocols
    • H04L67/10Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1097Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3255Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02PCLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING OF GOODS
    • Y02P90/00Enabling technologies with a potential contribution to greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions mitigation
    • Y02P90/30Computing systems specially adapted for manufacturing

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to a privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method based on a block chain, and belongs to the technical field of block chain privacy protection and intelligent car networking. The method utilizes the Hash chain and the group signature technology to protect the identity privacy problem of merchants participating in the supply chain, simultaneously uses the block chain technology to effectively deal with the unreliability of the traditional central server, realizes the public and verifiable product information, and achieves the aim of product anti-counterfeiting. Compared with the traditional anti-counterfeiting supply chain, the anti-counterfeiting supply chain for the automobile parts can store automobile part information and transaction information such as ownership certification and ownership transfer process by using the block chain technology, and can realize the anti-counterfeiting supply chain for the automobile parts without centralization and tampering. Compared with the traditional anti-counterfeiting supply chain based on the block chain, the anti-counterfeiting supply chain based on the block chain utilizes the cryptography technologies such as the hash chain and the group signature, protects the privacy information such as the business relationship among suppliers in the automobile supply chain, and the group signature technology can ensure that the anti-counterfeiting supply chain is traced by a trusted authority when any dispute occurs.

Description

一种基于区块链的隐私保护防伪汽车供应链方法A privacy protection and anti-counterfeiting automotive supply chain method based on blockchain

技术领域technical field

本发明涉及一种隐私保护防伪汽车供应链方法,具体涉及一种基于区块链的隐私保护防伪汽车供应链方法,属于区块链隐私保护及智能车联网技术领域。The invention relates to a privacy protection and anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method, in particular to a privacy protection and anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method based on blockchain, and belongs to the technical fields of blockchain privacy protection and intelligent vehicle networking.

背景技术Background technique

在当前全球化的背景下,越来越多的跨国企业建立了汽车零部件的供应链,以实现高效的汽车零部件供应。然而,汽车零部件的假货问题愈发严重。假冒的汽车零部件容易导致交通事故,严重威胁到车辆驾驶员和行人的生命财产安全。In the context of current globalization, more and more multinational companies have established supply chains for auto parts to achieve efficient auto parts supply. However, the problem of counterfeit auto parts is growing. Counterfeit auto parts can easily lead to traffic accidents and seriously threaten the safety of life and property of vehicle drivers and pedestrians.

近年来,射频识别技术(RFID,Radio Frequency Identification)多被用在防伪技术上,其使用一种被称为产品电子代码(EPC,Electronic Product Code)的 NFC(NearField Communication)标签来识别具有唯一标识符(Product Identifier) 的产品。在这类方案中,用户扫描产品的唯一标识符,再通过与数据库存储的该产品唯一标识符进行比对,如果一致则认为产品为真,否则为假。但是,该类方案存在一定的安全风险。首先,产品的标识符可能会被复制伪造。其次,传统的中心化服务器容易受到敌手攻击,存储的数据可能会被破坏或篡改。In recent years, radio frequency identification technology (RFID, Radio Frequency Identification) has been mostly used in anti-counterfeiting technology. Product Identifier. In this type of scheme, the user scans the unique identifier of the product, and then compares it with the unique identifier of the product stored in the database. If the product is consistent, the product is considered to be true, otherwise it is false. However, this type of scheme has certain security risks. First, the product's identifier may be copy-forged. Second, traditional centralized servers are vulnerable to adversary attacks, and stored data may be corrupted or tampered with.

区块链技术具有无中心化、不可篡改、数据公开透明等特性,任何人或机构无法通过控制一个或者几个节点的方式控制整个区块链网络,且数据一旦存储在区块链上,就无法被修改或删除。因此,将区块链技术应用在汽车供应链中,可以有效解决上述问题。现有的防伪汽车供应链实现方案中,汽车零部件信息(如汽车零部件制造商、生产日期、PID等)和汽车零部件交易信息(如物流信息、所有权转移信息等)均存储在区块链上。如果接收到的信息与区块链上存储的信息存在不一致,则买方可以将该汽车零部件视为假冒产品。Blockchain technology has the characteristics of decentralization, non-tampering, open and transparent data, etc. No one or organization can control the entire blockchain network by controlling one or several nodes, and once the data is stored on the blockchain, it is Cannot be modified or deleted. Therefore, the application of blockchain technology in the automotive supply chain can effectively solve the above problems. In the existing anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain implementation scheme, auto parts information (such as auto parts manufacturer, production date, PID, etc.) and auto parts transaction information (such as logistics information, ownership transfer information, etc.) are stored in the block. chain. If there is an inconsistency between the received information and the information stored on the blockchain, the buyer can treat the auto part as a counterfeit product.

然而,现有方案存在隐私信息泄露的问题。由于区块链的透明性,每个用户都可以获得区块链上的数据,从而导致敏感信息的泄露。某种产品的销量、利润、买方、卖方等均属于一些需要保密的商业机密,这些商业机密的泄露同样会对汽车供应链中的商家造成经济损失。However, the existing solutions have the problem of leakage of private information. Due to the transparency of the blockchain, every user can obtain the data on the blockchain, which leads to the leakage of sensitive information. The sales volume, profit, buyer, seller, etc. of a certain product are all trade secrets that need to be kept secret. The disclosure of these trade secrets will also cause economic losses to businesses in the automotive supply chain.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明的目的是针对现有技术存在不缺和缺陷,为了解决传统的基于区块链的防伪汽车供应链方法无法同时满足数据公开可验证和隐私保护的技术问题,创造性地提出一种基于区块链的隐私保护防伪汽车供应链方法。本方法利用哈希链和群签名技术来保护参与供应链的商家的身份隐私问题,同时使用区块链技术有效应对传统中心服务器的不可靠性,并实现产品信息的公开可验证,达到产品防伪的目的。The purpose of the present invention is to solve the technical problems that the traditional anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method based on block chain cannot satisfy the technical problem of data disclosure, verifiability and privacy protection at the same time, and creatively proposes a block chain-based A privacy-preserving anti-counterfeiting automotive supply chain approach to blockchain. This method uses hash chain and group signature technology to protect the identity and privacy issues of merchants participating in the supply chain, and at the same time uses blockchain technology to effectively deal with the unreliability of traditional central servers, and realizes the public and verifiable product information to achieve product anti-counterfeiting. the goal of.

首先,对本发明涉及的相关内容说明如下:First, the relevant content involved in the present invention is described as follows:

可信机构:其任务是身份登记和产品追踪。任何实体(包括汽车零部件制造商、汽车零部件代理商和汽车零部件零售商)都需要在可信机构使用真实的身份信息进行注册。一般情况下,可信机构处于离线状态,当汽车零部件出现问题时,可信机构可对其物流信息进行溯源追踪。Trusted Authority: Its tasks are identity registration and product tracking. Any entity (including auto parts manufacturers, auto parts dealers, and auto parts retailers) needs to register with a trusted agency with real identification information. In general, the trusted agency is offline, and when there is a problem with the auto parts, the trusted agency can trace its logistics information.

区块链网络:一种去中心化网络,具有公开透明、不可篡改等特点。区块链网络上的数据由大量区块链交易构成。在本发明中,生产的汽车零部件的产品信息作为不可篡改的证据存储在区块链上,同时所有汽车零部件制造商、汽车零部件代理商和汽车零部件零售商均可在区块链上发布交易信息,包括汽车零部件信息、所有权转让信息、所有权证明信息。同时,由于区块链上的数据是公开透明的,所有人都可调用智能合约查看相关信息。Blockchain network: A decentralized network with the characteristics of openness, transparency, and immutability. Data on a blockchain network consists of a large number of blockchain transactions. In the present invention, the product information of the produced auto parts is stored on the blockchain as a non-tamperable evidence, and all auto parts manufacturers, auto parts dealers and auto parts retailers can register on the blockchain Publish transaction information, including auto parts information, ownership transfer information, and ownership certification information. At the same time, since the data on the blockchain is open and transparent, everyone can call the smart contract to view the relevant information.

汽车零部件制造商:生产轮胎、电池、发动机等汽车零部件,并且每个产品都有唯一的产品标识符PID,任何实体都可调用RFID阅读器来获取汽车零部件的标识符PID。同时,汽车零部件制造商在生产汽车零部件后,需要在区块链上发布汽车零部件信息。产品可以卖给汽车零部件代理商和汽车零部件零售商,在出售汽车零部件之后,需要将所有权转移信息发布至区块链上。Auto parts manufacturer: produces tires, batteries, engines and other auto parts, and each product has a unique product identifier PID, any entity can call the RFID reader to obtain the identifier PID of auto parts. At the same time, auto parts manufacturers need to publish auto parts information on the blockchain after producing auto parts. Products can be sold to auto parts dealers and auto parts retailers. After the auto parts are sold, the ownership transfer information needs to be published on the blockchain.

汽车零部件代理商:汽车零部件制造商将生成的汽车零部件卖给汽车零部件代理商,再由汽车零部件代理商将其卖给汽车零部件零售商。汽车零部件代理商在收到汽车零部件制造商出售的汽车零部件后,需要从区块链上查找该汽车零部件的所有权转让信息,并且验证汽车零部件的所有权证明是否正确,若验证通过,则接受该汽车零部件并生成新的所有权转让信息以及所有权证明,否则拒绝接受。Auto parts dealers: Auto parts manufacturers sell the generated auto parts to auto parts dealers, who in turn sell them to auto parts retailers. After the auto parts agent receives the auto parts sold by the auto parts manufacturer, it needs to find the ownership transfer information of the auto parts from the blockchain, and verify whether the ownership certificate of the auto parts is correct. , then accept the auto part and generate new ownership transfer information and ownership certificate, otherwise refuse to accept.

汽车零部件零售商:可以从汽车零部件代理商处购买汽车零部件,也可以将汽车零部件出售给需要购买的用户。当购买汽车零部件时,需要检测汽车零部件的所有权信息,防止出现假冒的汽车零部件。在出售汽车零部件时,需要提供零售商的产品所有权证明。Auto parts retailers: You can buy auto parts from auto parts dealers, or you can sell auto parts to users who need to buy. When purchasing auto parts, it is necessary to detect the ownership information of auto parts to prevent counterfeit auto parts. When selling auto parts, a retailer's proof of product ownership is required.

用户:用户通过汽车零部件零售商购买汽车零部件,当购买时需要验证该汽车零部件是否为假冒产品,如果产品没有问题,用户将支付购买汽车零部件,当用户购买后,汽车零部件的所有权状态将被更新为已购买。User: The user purchases auto parts through auto parts retailers. When purchasing, it is necessary to verify whether the auto part is a counterfeit product. If the product has no problem, the user will pay for the purchase of auto parts. Ownership status will be updated to Purchased.

本发明采用以下技术方案实现。The present invention is realized by the following technical solutions.

一种基于区块链的隐私保护防伪汽车供应链方法,包括以下步骤:A blockchain-based privacy protection and anti-counterfeiting automotive supply chain method, comprising the following steps:

步骤1:系统初始化。Step 1: System initialization.

可信机构对每个实体进行注册并生成公共参数,最后将它们通过安全信道发送给每个实体。可信机构通过标准的区块链部署工具,将整个方案需要的智能合约部分部署到区块链上。待系统初始化之后,可信机构将保持离线状态,除非发生纠纷。A trusted authority registers each entity and generates public parameters, which are finally sent to each entity through a secure channel. The trusted organization deploys the smart contract part required by the entire solution to the blockchain through standard blockchain deployment tools. After the system is initialized, the trusted authority will remain offline unless a dispute arises.

具体地,步骤1包括以下步骤:Specifically, step 1 includes the following steps:

步骤1.1:向可信机构提供一个实体信息集合用于进行注册,其中包括实体的现实世界真实身份和实体属于汽车零部件制造商、汽车零部件代理商和汽车零部件零售商中的实体类型。可信机构初始化一个注册信息集合,用于存储生成的注册信息。Step 1.1: Provide the trusted authority with a set of entity information for registration, including the entity's real-world real identity and the entity type of the entity in auto parts manufacturers, auto parts dealers, and auto parts retailers. The trusted authority initializes a registration information set for storing the generated registration information.

步骤1.2:可信机构首先生成一个主密钥,然后利用群签名方案中的密钥生成算法,生成群签名需要的群公钥、主私钥以及集合内每个实体对应的私钥。Step 1.2: The trusted authority first generates a master key, and then uses the key generation algorithm in the group signature scheme to generate the group public key, the master private key and the private key corresponding to each entity in the set required for the group signature.

步骤1.3:对于用户信息集合内的每一个实体信息,可信机构生成对应的注册信息。Step 1.3: For each entity information in the user information set, the trusted authority generates corresponding registration information.

具体地,首先借助主密钥和实体信息生成一个对应的实体ID,然后生成一个新的密钥K。最后将生成的实体ID、新的密钥K、实体的身份信息以及群签名中实体对应的私钥四个信息组成实体的注册信息。将实体信息集合内的所有实体生成的注册信息保存在注册信息集合中。Specifically, a corresponding entity ID is first generated with the help of the master key and entity information, and then a new key K is generated. Finally, the registration information of the entity is composed of the generated entity ID, the new key K, the identity information of the entity and the private key corresponding to the entity in the group signature. The registration information generated by all entities in the entity information set is stored in the registration information set.

步骤1.4:可信机构将步骤1.2中生成的群公钥作为公共参数发布到区块链上,将步骤1.3中生成的注册信息集合与步骤1.2中生成的主私钥由可信机构自己保存,用于产品溯源。同时,汽车零部件制造商、汽车零部件代理商以及汽车零部件零售商,均需生成对应的区块链地址并将地址发送给可信机构。Step 1.4: The trusted institution publishes the group public key generated in step 1.2 as a public parameter on the blockchain, and the set of registration information generated in step 1.3 and the master private key generated in step 1.2 are kept by the trusted institution itself, For product traceability. At the same time, auto parts manufacturers, auto parts agents, and auto parts retailers all need to generate corresponding blockchain addresses and send them to trusted institutions.

步骤2:产品注册。Step 2: Product Registration.

汽车零部件制造商生产一批含有唯一标识符的汽车零部件后,调用智能合约对汽车零部件进行注册,并将汽车零部件的信息集合发布在区块链上。After the auto parts manufacturer produces a batch of auto parts with unique identifiers, it calls the smart contract to register the auto parts, and publishes the information collection of the auto parts on the blockchain.

具体地,步骤2包括以下步骤:Specifically, step 2 includes the following steps:

步骤2.1:将生产的该批汽车零部件的标识符存放在汽车零部件信息集合内,并初始化所有权证明集合与产品信息集合。Step 2.1: Store the identifiers of the produced batch of auto parts in the auto parts information set, and initialize the ownership certificate set and the product information set.

步骤2.2:对于汽车零部件信息集合内的每一个汽车零部件标识符,利用步骤1中该汽车零部件制造商注册时生成的密钥K以及实体ID,生成所有权证明,并计算其哈希值。Step 2.2: For each auto part identifier in the auto parts information set, use the key K and the entity ID generated when the auto parts manufacturer registered in step 1 to generate a proof of ownership and calculate its hash value .

步骤2.3:对于步骤2.2计算所得的所有权证明哈希值,利用步骤1中生成的群公钥以及该汽车零部件制造商的私钥,使用群签名方案中的签名算法对其进行签名。如图2所示。Step 2.3: For the hash value of the proof of ownership calculated in step 2.2, use the group public key generated in step 1 and the private key of the auto parts manufacturer to sign it using the signature algorithm in the group signature scheme. as shown in picture 2.

步骤2.4:将汽车零部件标识符、所有权证明的哈希值、该汽车零部件制造商的实体ID、表示该汽车零部件是否卖出的标志位和利用群签名技术生成的签名进行组合,并存放在产品信息集合内。最终,制造商将产品信息集合存储在区块链上。将汽车零部件标识符、所有权证明存放在所有权证明集合内,并将所有权证明集合返回给汽车零部件制造商。Step 2.4: Combine the auto part identifier, the hash value of the proof of ownership, the entity ID of the auto part manufacturer, the flag indicating whether the auto part is sold, and the signature generated using the group signature technology, and Stored in the product information collection. Ultimately, the manufacturer stores a collection of product information on the blockchain. Store the auto part identifier, proof of ownership in the proof of ownership collection, and return the proof of ownership collection to the auto parts manufacturer.

步骤3:所有权转让。Step 3: Ownership transfer.

当卖方(汽车零部件制造商或汽车零部件代理商)准备将一批汽车零部件卖给买方(另一个汽车零部件代理商或汽车零部件零售商)时,调用智能合约将该汽车零部件的所有权转移给对应的零售商或代理商。在这个过程中,使用哈希链进行两个实体之间的身份认证,同时汽车零部件的所有权信息必须加密保存,以实现安全可靠以及隐私保护的所有权转移。When the seller (auto parts manufacturer or auto parts dealer) is ready to sell a batch of auto parts to the buyer (another auto parts dealer or auto parts retailer), the smart contract is invoked for the auto parts transfer of ownership to the corresponding retailer or agent. In this process, a hash chain is used for identity authentication between two entities, and the ownership information of auto parts must be encrypted and stored to achieve safe, reliable and privacy-protected ownership transfer.

具体地,步骤3包括以下步骤:Specifically, step 3 includes the following steps:

步骤3.1:在买方与卖方之间进行所有权转移之前,双方协商得到一条哈希链以及一个共享状态。其中,哈希链是一个多条哈希的集合,通过哈希函数进行链接。具体地,哈希链中的前一位哈希值来自于后一位哈希值的哈希,而最初的哈希值来自链下的协商。共享状态里包含一个计数器c以及对应计数器位置的哈希链上的哈希值βcStep 3.1: Before transferring ownership between buyer and seller, both parties negotiate a hash chain and a shared state. Among them, a hash chain is a collection of multiple hashes, which are linked through a hash function. Specifically, the previous hash value in the hash chain comes from the hash of the next hash value, and the initial hash value comes from the off-chain negotiation. The shared state contains a counter c and the hash value β c on the hash chain corresponding to the counter position.

步骤3.2:卖方首先需要从步骤3.1中预先生成哈希链上找到第c+1个哈希值,记为βc+1,然后对该哈希值和步骤2中生成的该汽车零部件的所有权证明信息加密,将加密后的信息以区块链交易的形式存储在区块链上,对应的交易标识符为TidStep 3.2: The seller first needs to find the c+1th hash value from the pre-generated hash chain in step 3.1, denoted as β c+1 , and then the hash value and the auto parts generated in step 2. The ownership certificate information is encrypted, and the encrypted information is stored on the blockchain in the form of a blockchain transaction, and the corresponding transaction identifier is T id .

步骤3.3:卖方实体继续对两个实体之间协商的共享状态内的哈希值βc、步骤3.2中存储加密信息的交易标识符Tid以及哈希链上的第c+1个哈希值βc+1三者进行加密,得到一个交易检索令牌,并将该令牌发送给买方。Step 3.3: The seller entity continues to evaluate the hash value β c in the shared state negotiated between the two entities, the transaction identifier T id of the encrypted information stored in step 3.2, and the c+1th hash value on the hash chain β c+1 encrypts the three to obtain a transaction retrieval token and sends the token to the buyer.

步骤3.4:卖方将更新共享状态,将步骤3.1中与买方共享的计数器加一。此时卖方的状态信息变为计数器c+1和βc+1Step 3.4: The seller will update the shared state, incrementing the counter shared with the buyer in step 3.1. At this time, the state information of the seller becomes the counter c+1 and β c+1 .

步骤4:所有权验证。Step 4: Ownership Verification.

当汽车零部件零售商、汽车零部件代理商或用户购买汽车零部件时,检查对应的汽车零部件是否为真正想购买的汽车零部件,并且对其所有权信息、是否出售等进行验证,当全部检查均通过时,则接受汽车零部件品,否则该产品会被当作假货拒绝。When auto parts retailers, auto parts agents or users buy auto parts, check whether the corresponding auto parts are the auto parts they really want to buy, and verify their ownership information, whether they are sold, etc. When all inspections pass, the auto parts will be accepted, otherwise the product will be rejected as a fake.

其中,对于作为买方的汽车零部件代理商和汽车零部件零售商,利用步骤 3.3中卖方传送的令牌验证汽车零部件的所有权信息是否正确,是否由对应的卖方转让,以及汽车零部件的标识符和签名等信息正确,如果检查成功,则更新汽车零部件的所有权信息,并将更新后的信息保存在区块链上。Among them, for the auto parts dealers and auto parts retailers as buyers, use the token transmitted by the seller in step 3.3 to verify whether the ownership information of the auto parts is correct, whether it is transferred by the corresponding seller, and the identification of the auto parts If the information such as sign and signature is correct, if the check is successful, the ownership information of the auto parts will be updated and the updated information will be saved on the blockchain.

对于作为买方的用户来说,只需验证车辆产品的所有权信息和车辆标识符等信息是否正确,如果验证成功,则说明该汽车零部件为真品。当用户成功购买该汽车零部件后,汽车零部件的销售状态将被更新,且更新后的信息会被保存在区块链上。As a buyer, the user only needs to verify whether the ownership information and vehicle identifier of the vehicle product are correct. If the verification is successful, it means that the auto part is genuine. When the user successfully purchases the auto parts, the sales status of the auto parts will be updated, and the updated information will be saved on the blockchain.

具体地,步骤4包括以下步骤:Specifically, step 4 includes the following steps:

对于汽车零部件代理商和汽车零部件零售商,采用如下方式:For auto parts dealers and auto parts retailers, the following methods are used:

步骤4.1:买方利用步骤3.1中和卖方共享的状态信息,向自己售卖汽车零部件的卖方处得到的交易检索令牌,对该令牌解密得到密文形式的交易标识符 Tid,以及用作一次性会话密钥的哈希链上的计数器下一位的哈希值βc+1Step 4.1: The buyer uses the state information shared with the seller in Step 3.1 to obtain the transaction retrieval token from the seller who sells the auto parts, decrypt the token to obtain the transaction identifier T id in cipher text, and use it as a token for the transaction. The hash value β c+1 of the next bit of the counter on the hash chain of the one-time session key.

步骤4.2:对一次性会话密钥的哈希值进行哈希,将哈希内容与共享状态的哈希内容进行比对,如果比对成功则说明双方身份认证成功,否则认证失败,拒绝执行之后的操作。Step 4.2: Hash the hash value of the one-time session key, and compare the hash content with the hash content of the shared state. If the comparison is successful, the identity authentication of both parties is successful. Otherwise, the authentication fails and the execution is rejected. operation.

步骤4.3:在步骤4.2验证成功后,获取存储在区块链上的交易标识符Tid,并对对应交易上存储的密文信息进行解密,得到含有汽车零部件的所有权信息的集合,并通过调用智能合约从区块链上查找对应的产品信息。对于每一个汽车零部件信息,对比收到的所有权信息集合内的所有权证明的哈希值与区块链上存储的对应产品信息中的哈希值是否相同,以及该汽车零部件的状态是否为未出售状态,最后检查该签名内容是否正确。当信息全部检查成功后,说明该汽车零部件是真品,执行步骤4.4,否则该产品将被看作假冒产品,买方将拒绝接受产品。Step 4.3: After the verification in step 4.2 is successful, obtain the transaction identifier T id stored on the blockchain, and decrypt the ciphertext information stored on the corresponding transaction to obtain a collection of ownership information containing auto parts, and pass Call the smart contract to find the corresponding product information from the blockchain. For each auto part information, compare whether the hash value of the ownership certificate in the received ownership information set is the same as the hash value in the corresponding product information stored on the blockchain, and whether the status of the auto part is Not sold status, finally check whether the signature content is correct. When all the information is successfully checked, it means that the auto parts are genuine and go to step 4.4, otherwise the product will be regarded as a counterfeit product and the buyer will refuse to accept the product.

步骤4.4:买方执行和步骤2.2中相同的操作,即,使用买方自己的身份ID 以及密钥K生成新的所有权证明以及所有权证明的哈希值。然后执行和步骤2.3 中相同的操作,即,利用群公钥和买方自己拥有的私钥生成签名信息。Step 4.4: The buyer performs the same operations as in step 2.2, ie, uses the buyer's own ID and key K to generate a new proof of ownership and a hash of the proof of ownership. Then perform the same operation as in step 2.3, that is, generate the signature message using the group public key and the private key owned by the buyer.

步骤4.5:针对每一个收到的汽车零部件,更新其区块链上存储的产品信息,包括汽车零部件所有权证明信息的哈希值和汽车零部件签名信息。Step 4.5: For each received auto part, update the product information stored on its blockchain, including the hash value of the auto parts ownership certificate and the auto part signature information.

对于用户,采用如下方式:For users, use the following methods:

步骤4-1:汽车零部件零售商给出对应汽车零部件的产品所有权信息集合,根据其中包含的产品标识符,查看对应汽车零部件的产品信息,并计算所有权证明的哈希值是否与区块链上保存的信息一致,以及查看该汽车零部件的状态是否已经卖出,如果信息一致且汽车零部件仍处于未售卖状态,则执行步骤4-2,否则该产品将被看作假冒产品,买方将拒绝接受产品。Step 4-1: The auto parts retailer gives the product ownership information set of the corresponding auto parts, checks the product information of the corresponding auto parts according to the product identifier contained in it, and calculates whether the hash value of the ownership certificate is the same as the area. The information saved on the blockchain is consistent, and check whether the status of the auto parts has been sold. If the information is consistent and the auto parts are still unsold, go to step 4-2, otherwise the product will be regarded as a counterfeit product , the buyer will refuse to accept the product.

步骤4-2:利用群公钥检查签名信息是否正确,如果正确则继续下一步骤,否则该产品将被看作假冒产品,买方将拒绝接受产品。Step 4-2: Use the public key of the group to check whether the signature information is correct, if it is correct, proceed to the next step, otherwise the product will be regarded as a counterfeit product, and the buyer will refuse to accept the product.

步骤4-3:当步骤4-1和步骤4-2的检查均通过,则说明该汽车零部件是真品。在用户购买该产品后,用户将调用智能合约更改汽车零部件的销售状态,此时汽车零部件的状态将变为已销售。Step 4-3: When the inspections of steps 4-1 and 4-2 are passed, it means that the auto parts are genuine. After the user purchases the product, the user will call the smart contract to change the sales status of the auto parts, and the status of the auto parts will change to sold.

有益效果beneficial effect

本发明,对比现有技术,具有以下优点:The present invention, compared with the prior art, has the following advantages:

1.本发明实现了无中心化。与传统的防伪供应链相比,利用区块链技术来存储所有权证明、所有权转移过程等汽车零部件信息和交易信息,可以实现无中心化和不可篡改的汽车零部件防伪供应链。1. The present invention realizes decentralization. Compared with the traditional anti-counterfeiting supply chain, the use of blockchain technology to store auto parts information and transaction information such as ownership certificate and ownership transfer process can realize a decentralized and tamper-resistant auto parts anti-counterfeiting supply chain.

2.本发明实现了隐私保护。与传统的基于区块链的防伪供应链相比,本发明利用哈希链和群签名等密码学技术,保护了汽车供应链中各供应商之间的商业关系等隐私信息,群签名技术可以确保在出现任何纷争时,被可信机构溯源追踪。2. The present invention realizes privacy protection. Compared with the traditional anti-counterfeiting supply chain based on block chain, the present invention uses cryptographic technologies such as hash chain and group signature to protect the private information such as business relationship between suppliers in the automotive supply chain, and the group signature technology can Make sure that in the event of any disputes, it is traced and traced by a trusted agency.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1为本发明方法的示意图。Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the method of the present invention.

图2为保存在区块链上的汽车零部件信息示意。Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of auto parts information stored on the blockchain.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图,对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述。显然,所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明的一部分实施例,而不是全部的实施例。例如本发明的实施例,可能汽车零部件代理商会交给下一级汽车零部件代理商,再交给汽车零部件零售商。The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, but not all, embodiments of the present invention. For example, in the embodiment of the present invention, it is possible that the auto parts dealer will hand over to the next-level auto parts dealer, and then to the auto parts retailer.

实施例Example

本案例中,汽车零部件制造商生产出一批具有唯一标识符的汽车零部件,然后将汽车零部件的所有权交给汽车零部件代理商,再由汽车零部件代理商交给汽车零部件零售商,最后汽车零部件零售商卖给用户。In this case, the auto parts manufacturer produces a batch of auto parts with a unique identifier, and then passes the ownership of the auto parts to the auto parts dealer, who in turn transfers the auto parts dealer to the auto parts retailer dealers, and finally auto parts retailers to sell to users.

如图1所示,一种基于区块链的隐私保护防伪汽车供应链方法,包括以下步骤:As shown in Figure 1, a blockchain-based privacy protection and anti-counterfeiting automotive supply chain method includes the following steps:

步骤1:系统初始化。Step 1: System initialization.

步骤1.1:向可信机构TA提供一个需要注册的实体信息集合U={u1,...,um} 和安全参数λ(λ=256),其中,实体信息集合包含m个需要注册实体。Step 1.1: Provide an entity information set U={u 1 , . . . , um } and security parameter λ (λ=256) to be registered to the trusted authority TA, wherein the entity information set contains m entities that need to be registered .

对于实体信息集合U中的任意实体ui,其用于注册的信息包含实体i在现实世界的身份idi和实体类型typei,实体类型表示为typei= {manufacturer,agent,retailer},其中,manufacturer代表汽车零部件制造商、 agent代表汽车零部件代理商、retailer代表汽车零部件零售商。可信机构初始化一个集合R,用于存储之后生成的注册信息。For any entity ui in the entity information set U, the information used for registration includes the identity id i of the entity i in the real world and the entity type type i , and the entity type is represented as type i = {manufacturer, agent, retailer}, where , manufacturer on behalf of auto parts manufacturers, agent on behalf of auto parts dealers, retailer on behalf of auto parts retailers. The trusted authority initializes a set R for storing the registration information generated later.

步骤1.2:可信机构首先生成主密钥KM,然后执行群签名方案GS中的密钥生成算法GS.KeyGen生成群签名所需要的群公钥gpk、主私钥gsk以及为每个注册实体生成的用于群签名的m个私钥{sk1,…,skm}。Step 1.2: The trusted authority first generates the master key K M , and then executes the key generation algorithm GS.KeyGen in the group signature scheme GS to generate the group public key gpk, master private key gsk required for the group signature, and for each registered entity Generated m private keys {sk 1 ,...,sk m } for group signature.

步骤1.3:对于实体信息集合U内的每一个实体信息,可信机构生成对应的注册信息。对于第i个实体,首先计算实体IDi=F(KM,ui),其中F为一个安全的伪随机函数,输入一个长度为256比特的字符串和一个长度为任意比特的字符串,输出为一个长度为256比特的字符串。这里,KM为步骤1.2生成的主密钥, ui为步骤1.1中实体信息集合的实体信息。然后,可信机构生成实体i对应的密钥Ki。最后,可信机构TA为实体i生成注册信息ri=(IDi,ui,ski,Ki),其中ski为步骤1.2中可信机构生成的用于群签名的m个私钥里实体i对应的私钥。Step 1.3: For each entity information in the entity information set U, the trusted authority generates corresponding registration information. For the i-th entity, first calculate the entity ID i = F(K M , ui ), where F is a secure pseudo-random function, input a string with a length of 256 bits and a string with a length of any bits, The output is a string of length 256 bits. Here, K M is the master key generated in step 1.2, and ui is the entity information of the entity information set in step 1.1. Then, the trusted authority generates the key K i corresponding to the entity i . Finally, the trusted authority TA generates registration information ri =(ID i , ui ,ski ,K i ) for entity i , where ski is the m private keys for group signature generated by the trusted authority in step 1.2 The private key corresponding to entity i.

步骤1.4:最后,可信机构将群公钥gpk作为公共参数,公开发布到区块链网络上。而具有m个实体注册信息的集合R={r1,…,rm}和主私钥gsk由可信机构保存,用于产品溯源。同时,汽车零部件制造商、汽车零部件代理商以及汽车零部件零售商都需生成对应的区块链地址并将地址发送给可信机构。Step 1.4: Finally, the trusted authority uses the group public key gpk as a public parameter and publicly publishes it on the blockchain network. The set R={r 1 , . . . , r m } with m entity registration information and the master private key gsk are stored by a trusted organization for product traceability. At the same time, auto parts manufacturers, auto parts dealers and auto parts retailers all need to generate corresponding blockchain addresses and send them to trusted institutions.

步骤2:汽车零部件制造商注册汽车零部件。Step 2: Auto Parts Manufacturer Registers Auto Parts.

步骤2.1:在实体注册之后,设汽车零部件制造商生产n个汽车零部件,其中每个汽车零部件i均对应一个唯一标识符PIDi,对应的产品标识符集合为P= {PID1,...,PIDn}。Step 2.1: After entity registration, let the auto parts manufacturer produce n auto parts, where each auto part i corresponds to a unique identifier PID i , and the corresponding set of product identifiers is P = {PID 1 , ...,PID n }.

步骤2.2:汽车零部件制造商调用智能合约初始化两个空集合PI和PO。Step 2.2: The auto parts manufacturer calls the smart contract to initialize two empty collections PI and PO.

对于步骤2.1中生成的产品标识符集合P中的每一个汽车零部件PIDi,首先计算所有权证明pi=F(K,ID||PIDi),这里F为步骤1.3中定义的伪随机函数,|| 为字符串拼接操作,K是步骤1.3中该汽车零部件制造商的密钥,ID是步骤1.3 中该汽车零部件制造商的实体ID,并计算所有权证明的哈希值hi=H(pi),这里 H代表SHA256哈希函数。For each auto part PID i in the product identifier set P generated in step 2.1, first calculate the ownership certificate p i =F(K,ID||PID i ), where F is the pseudo-random function defined in step 1.3 , || is the string splicing operation, K is the key of the auto parts manufacturer in step 1.3, ID is the entity ID of the auto parts manufacturer in step 1.3, and the hash value of the proof of ownership h i = H( pi ), where H stands for the SHA256 hash function.

然后,制造商使用群签名技术对车辆产品所有权证明的哈希值进行签名σi=GS.Sign(gpk,sk,hi),其中GS为一个安全的群签名方案,GS.Sign为群签名函数,输入为群公钥、进行签名的用户私钥和签名内容,输出为对应的数字签名。Then, the manufacturer uses the group signature technology to sign the hash value of the vehicle product ownership certificate σ i =GS.Sign(gpk,sk, hi ), where GS is a secure group signature scheme and GS.Sign is a group signature Function, the input is the group public key, the user's private key for signing and the signature content, and the output is the corresponding digital signature.

最后,制造商将对应的产品信息(PIDi,hi,ID,false,σi)添加至集合PI,并将(PIDi,pi)添加至集合PO中,其中ID是该汽车零部件制造商身份信息,false代表汽车零部件还未卖给任何用户。在步骤6中,若汽车零部件被卖给用户,对应的false状态将被改为true。Finally, the manufacturer adds the corresponding product information (PID i , hi ,ID,false,σ i ) to the set PI and (PID i , pi ) to the set PO, where ID is the auto part Manufacturer's identity information, false means that the auto parts have not been sold to any user. In step 6, if the auto part is sold to the user, the corresponding false state will be changed to true.

步骤2.3:制造商调用智能合约将集合PI存储至区块链中,并将集合PO返回给汽车零部件供应商。Step 2.3: The manufacturer calls the smart contract to store the collection PI in the blockchain, and returns the collection PO to the auto parts supplier.

步骤3:汽车零部件制造商进行所有权转移。Step 3: The auto parts manufacturer makes a transfer of ownership.

步骤3.1:汽车零部件制造商IDa将已经注册成功的汽车零部件所有权转移给汽车零部件代理商IDb,首先两方需要事先协商一条哈希链

Figure BDA0003572140990000101
和一个共享状态Sc=(c,βc)。其中哈希链
Figure BDA0003572140990000105
的生成规则如下:hp为一个长度为256 比特的字符串,由IDa和IDb通过事先协商得到,当i=1,2,…,p-1时,hi= H(hi+1),其中H为SHA256哈希函数。共享状态Sc中的c为计数器,而βc=hc为对应的哈希链
Figure BDA0003572140990000102
上的第c个哈希值。Step 3.1: The auto parts manufacturer ID a transfers the ownership of the registered auto parts to the auto parts dealer ID b . First, the two parties need to negotiate a hash chain in advance
Figure BDA0003572140990000101
and a shared state S c =(c, β c ). where the hash chain
Figure BDA0003572140990000105
The generation rules of , are as follows: h p is a character string with a length of 256 bits, obtained by ID a and ID b through prior negotiation, when i=1,2,...,p-1, h i = H(h i+ 1 ), where H is the SHA256 hash function. c in the shared state S c is a counter, and β c =h c is the corresponding hash chain
Figure BDA0003572140990000102
The c-th hash value on .

步骤3.2:汽车零部件制造商IDa从哈希链上

Figure BDA0003572140990000106
获得第c+1个哈希hc+1,并设置βc+1=hc+1,对βc+1以及由步骤2.2中生成这批汽车零部件的注册集合PO进行加密处理,将使用密钥βc+1加密后的密文信息AES.Enc(βc+1,PO)以交易的形式存储到区块链上,对应的交易标识符为Tid。其中AES为一种安全的对称加密算法,AES.Enc为加密操作。Step 3.2: Auto Parts Manufacturer ID a from the hash chain
Figure BDA0003572140990000106
Obtain the c+1th hash h c+1 , set β c+1 =h c+1 , encrypt β c+1 and the registration set PO of the batch of auto parts generated in step 2.2, and set the The ciphertext information AES.Enc(β c+1 , PO) encrypted with the key β c+1 is stored on the blockchain in the form of a transaction, and the corresponding transaction identifier is T id . AES is a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, and AES.Enc is an encryption operation.

步骤3.3:汽车零部件制造商IDa使用密钥βc+1对步骤3.2中得到的交易标识符Tid和将要在下一次与IDb的产品所有权转移中用到的密钥加密,生成查询令牌

Figure BDA0003572140990000103
其中AES.Enc为步骤3.2定义的对称加密函数,||为字符串拼接操作。之后,将生成的令牌
Figure BDA0003572140990000104
发送给车辆代理商IDb。Step 3.3: The auto parts manufacturer ID a uses the key β c+1 to encrypt the transaction identifier T id obtained in step 3.2 and the key to be used in the next product ownership transfer with ID b to generate a query order Card
Figure BDA0003572140990000103
AES.Enc is the symmetric encryption function defined in step 3.2, and || is the string concatenation operation. After that, the generated token will be
Figure BDA0003572140990000104
Sent to vehicle dealer ID b .

步骤3.4:汽车零部件代理商IDa更新共享状态Sc+1=(c+1,βc+1)。Step 3.4: The auto parts agency ID a updates the shared state S c+1 =(c+1, β c+1 ).

步骤4:汽车零部件代理商进行所有权验证。Step 4: Auto parts dealer conducts ownership verification.

步骤4.1:设汽车零部件代理商IDb与汽车零部件制造商IDa之间共享的状态信息为Sc=(c,βc)。当接收到IDa发送的令牌T=AES.Enc(βc,Tid||βc+1)后,代理商首先利用自己的密钥进行解密Tdec=AES.Dec(βc,T),得到交易标识符Tid和一次性密钥βc+1。其中AES.Dec为AES加密方案的对称解密函数。Step 4.1: Let the state information shared between the auto parts agent ID b and the auto parts manufacturer ID a be S c =(c, β c ). After receiving the token T=AES.Enc(β c ,T id ||β c+1 ) sent by ID a , the agent first uses its own key to decrypt T dec =AES.Dec(β c ,T ) to obtain the transaction identifier T id and the one-time key β c+1 . AES.Dec is the symmetric decryption function of the AES encryption scheme.

步骤4.2:首先判断H(βc+1)与βc是否相等,如果不相等,则身份验证失败。如果成功则查找存储在区块链的标识符为Tid的交易,提取交易中存储的数据 data,对其解密得到PO=AES.Dec(βc+1,data),这里的PO代表每个汽车零部件的产品所有权信息集合,集合中的每一个条目都包含某个汽车零部件的产品标识符PIDi和对应的产品所有权证明信息pi,根据PO的汽车零部件产品标识符,可以从区块链中查找对应的汽车零部件信息,这些信息构成了产品信息集合PI。Step 4.2: First judge whether H(β c+1 ) and β c are equal, if not, the authentication fails. If successful, find the transaction with the identifier T id stored in the blockchain, extract the data data stored in the transaction, and decrypt it to obtain PO=AES.Dec(β c+1 ,data), where PO represents each A collection of product ownership information for auto parts, each entry in the collection contains the product identifier PID i of an auto part and the corresponding product ownership certification information pi , according to the PO's auto parts product identifier, it can be obtained from Find the corresponding auto parts information in the blockchain, which constitutes the product information set PI.

步骤4.3:获得汽车零部件所有权信息集合PO和产品信息集合PI后,对于PO 中的任意产品所有权信息POi=(PIDi,pi),其在PI中对应的产品信息为PIi= (PIDi,hi,ID,false,σi),其中PIDi为产品标识符,hi为产品所有权证明的哈希值, ID为产品制造商的ID,false代表该产品未被售卖给任何用户。代理商首先计算 h′=H(pi),并且将其与PIi内的哈希hi进行比较,如果相同并且售卖状态也为 false,则执行群签名验证算法GS.Verify(gpk,σ,h),继续验证签名是否正确。其中GS.Verify算法若输出为true,则代表验证成功,该产品被视为真品,执行步骤4.4,输出为false则验证失败,该产品被视为假冒产品。Step 4.3: After obtaining the auto parts ownership information set PO and the product information set PI, for any product ownership information PO i = (PID i , pi ) in PO, the corresponding product information in PI is PI i = ( PID i , hi ,ID,false,σ i ), where PID i is the product identifier, hi is the hash value of the product ownership certificate, ID is the ID of the product manufacturer, and false means that the product has not been sold to any user. The agent first calculates h′=H(pi ), and compares it with the hash hi in PI i , if it is the same and the sale status is also false, execute the group signature verification algorithm GS.Verify(gpk,σ ,h), continue to verify that the signature is correct. If the output of the GS.Verify algorithm is true, it means that the verification is successful, and the product is regarded as genuine. Step 4.4 is executed. If the output is false, the verification fails, and the product is regarded as a counterfeit product.

步骤4.4:对被视为真品的汽车零部件生成新的所有权证明p′i= F(Kb,IDb||PIDi),其中F为步骤1.3中定义的伪随机函数,||为字符串拼接操作。之后计算哈希值h′=H(p′i)以及签名σi=GS.Sign(gpk,sk,hi),其中GS.Sign为步骤2.2的签名函数。之后,代理商将新生成的(PIDi,p′i)添加到集合PO′,并调用智能合约更新标识符为PID的汽车零部件信息,其中产品所有权证明的哈希更新为h′i,签名更新为σiStep 4.4: Generate a new proof of ownership p′ i = F(K b ,ID b ||PID i ) for the car parts deemed authentic, where F is the pseudo-random function defined in step 1.3, and || is a character String concatenation operation. Then calculate the hash value h'=H(p' i ) and the signature σ i =GS.Sign(gpk,sk, hi ), where GS.Sign is the signature function of step 2.2. After that, the agent adds the newly generated (PID i , p′ i ) to the set PO′, and calls the smart contract to update the auto parts information with the identifier PID, where the hash of the product ownership certificate is updated to h′ i , The signature is updated to σ i .

步骤4.5:汽车零部件代理商IDb更新共享状态Sc+1=(c+1,βc+1)。Step 4.5: The auto parts agency ID b updates the shared state S c+1 =(c+1, β c+1 ).

步骤5:汽车零部件代理商将车辆零件交给汽车零部件零售商。Step 5: The auto parts dealer delivers the vehicle parts to the auto parts retailer.

该阶段,汽车零部件代理商执行步骤3将汽车零部件进行所有权转移,而汽车零部件零售商执行步骤4进行所有权验证。At this stage, the auto parts dealer performs step 3 to transfer the ownership of the auto parts, while the auto parts retailer performs step 4 for ownership verification.

步骤6:汽车零部件零售商将汽车零部件卖给用户。Step 6: The auto parts retailer sells the auto parts to users.

步骤6.1:汽车零部件零售商将汽车零部件售卖给用户,将需要售卖给用户的汽车零部件信息集合POi=(PIDi,pi)发送给用户,其中PIDi为产品的唯一标识符,pi为产品的所有权证明信息。Step 6.1: The auto parts retailer sells auto parts to users, and sends the auto parts information set PO i = (PID i , p i ) that needs to be sold to users to the user, where PID i is the unique identifier of the product , pi is the ownership certificate information of the product.

步骤6.2:用户根据PIDi调用智能合约,查找对应的产品信息PIi= (PIDi,hi,ID,false,σi)。Step 6.2: The user invokes the smart contract according to PID i to find the corresponding product information PI i = (PID i , hi ,ID,false,σ i ).

首先,根据PI内的汽车零部件所有权证明计算h′=H(pi),并且将其与PIi内的hi进行比较,如果h′=hi,并且对应的售卖状态也为false,即该产品未被卖给其他用户,则继续验证签名是否正确,如果上述验证全部通过,则该汽车零部件被视为真品。First, calculate h'=H(pi) according to the ownership certificate of the auto parts in PI, and compare it with hi in PI i , if h' = hi and the corresponding sales status is also false, That is, if the product has not been sold to other users, continue to verify whether the signature is correct. If all the above verifications are passed, the auto parts are considered genuine.

步骤6.3:在用户购买该汽车零部件后,用户调用智能合约,更新产品PIDi的状态,将销售状态更新为true,即该产品已被售卖。Step 6.3: After the user purchases the auto parts, the user invokes the smart contract to update the status of the product PID i and update the sales status to true, that is, the product has been sold.

为了说明本发明的内容及实施方法,本说明书给出了上述具体实施例。但是,本领域技术人员应理解,本发明不局限于上述最佳实施方式,任何人在本发明的启示下都可得出其他各种形式的产品,但不论在其形状或结构上作任何变化,凡是具有与本申请相同或相近似的技术方案,均落在本发明的保护范围之内。In order to illustrate the content and implementation method of the present invention, the above-mentioned specific embodiments are provided in this specification. However, those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned best embodiment, and anyone can draw other various forms of products under the inspiration of the present invention, but no matter what changes are made in its shape or structure , any technical solutions that are identical or similar to those of the present application fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (5)

1. A privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method based on a block chain is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: initializing a system;
the trusted authority registers each entity and generates public parameters, and finally, the public parameters are sent to each entity through a secure channel; the trusted authority deploys the intelligent contract part required by the whole scheme to the block chain through a standard block chain deployment tool; after the system is initialized, the trusted authority keeps an offline state unless disputes occur;
step 2: product registration;
after an automobile part manufacturer produces a batch of automobile parts containing unique identifiers, calling an intelligent contract to register the automobile parts, and publishing information sets of the automobile parts on a block chain;
and step 3: transfer of ownership;
when a seller prepares to sell a batch of automobile parts to a buyer, calling an intelligent contract to transfer ownership of the automobile parts to a corresponding retailer or agent; in the process, identity authentication between two entities is carried out by using a hash chain, and ownership information of the automobile parts must be encrypted and stored to realize safe and reliable ownership transfer with privacy protection;
and 4, step 4: verifying ownership;
when an automobile part retailer, an automobile part agent or a user purchases an automobile part, whether the corresponding automobile part is really the automobile part which wants to be purchased is checked, ownership information, whether the automobile part is sold and the like are verified, when all the checks are passed, the automobile part is accepted, otherwise, the automobile part is rejected as fake goods;
for the automobile part agent and the automobile part retailer which are taken as buyers, verifying whether the ownership information of the automobile part is correct and is transferred by the corresponding seller and the information such as the identifier, the signature and the like of the automobile part is correct by using the token transmitted by the seller in the step 3.3, updating the ownership information of the automobile part if the checking is successful, and storing the updated information on the block chain;
for a user serving as a buyer, only the ownership information, the vehicle identifier and other information of the vehicle product need to be verified to be correct, and if the verification is successful, the automobile part is a genuine product; when the user successfully purchases the automobile part, the sales state of the automobile part is updated, and the updated information is stored in the blockchain.
2. The block chain based privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method according to claim 1, wherein the step 1 comprises the following steps:
step 1.1: providing a set of entity information to the trusted authority for registration, wherein the set of entity information includes a real-world identity of the entity and a type of entity belonging to the automobile parts manufacturer, the automobile parts agent, and the automobile parts retailer; the trusted authority initializes a registration information set for storing the generated registration information;
step 1.2: the trusted authority firstly generates a master key, and then generates a group public key and a master private key required by group signature and a private key corresponding to each entity in a set by using a key generation algorithm in a group signature scheme;
step 1.3: for each entity information in the user information set, the trusted authority generates corresponding registration information;
specifically, a corresponding entity ID is generated by means of a master key and entity information, and then a new key K is generated; finally, the generated entity ID, the new key K, the identity information of the entity and the private key corresponding to the entity in the group signature form registration information of the entity; storing the registration information generated by all entities in the entity information set in a registration information set;
step 1.4: the trusted authority issues the group public key generated in the step 1.2 as a public parameter to a block chain, and the registration information set generated in the step 1.3 and the main private key generated in the step 1.2 are stored by the trusted authority for product tracing; meanwhile, automobile part manufacturers, automobile part dealers and automobile part retailers all need to generate corresponding blockchain addresses and send the addresses to trusted authorities.
3. The block chain based privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method according to claim 1, wherein the step 2 comprises the following steps:
step 2.1: storing the identifiers of the produced automobile parts in an automobile part information set, and initializing an ownership certification set and a product information set;
step 2.2: for each automobile part identifier in the automobile part information set, generating an ownership certificate by using the key K and the entity ID generated when the automobile part manufacturer is registered in the step 1, and calculating a hash value of the ownership certificate;
step 2.3: for the ownership certificate hash value calculated in the step 2.2, signing the ownership certificate hash value by using the group public key generated in the step 1 and the private key of the automobile part manufacturer by using a signature algorithm in a group signature scheme;
step 2.4: combining the identifier of the automobile part, the hash value of the ownership certificate, the entity ID of the manufacturer of the automobile part, a flag bit indicating whether the automobile part is sold or not and a signature generated by using a group signature technology, and storing the combined identifier and the hash value in a product information set; finally, the manufacturer stores the product information set on the blockchain; the vehicle component identifier, the proof of ownership are stored in a proof of ownership set, and the proof of ownership set is returned to the vehicle component manufacturer.
4. The block chain based privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method according to claim 1, wherein the step 3 comprises the following steps:
step 3.1: before ownership transfer is carried out between a buyer and a seller, the buyer and the seller negotiate to obtain a hash chain and a sharing state; the hash chain is a set of a plurality of hashes and is linked through a hash function; specifically, the previous hash value in the hash chain comes from the hash of the next hash value, and the initial hash value comes from the negotiation under the chain; the shared state contains a counter c and a hash value beta on the hash chain corresponding to the counter positionc
Step 3.2: the seller first needs to find the (c + 1) th hash value, denoted as β, from the pre-generated hash chain in step 3.1c+1Then encrypting the hash value and the ownership certification information of the automobile part generated in the step 2, and storing the encrypted information on a blockchain in the form of blockchain transaction, wherein the corresponding transaction identifier is Tid
Step 3.3: seller entity relayTo hash value beta in shared state negotiated between two entitiescStep 3.2 transaction identifier T of the stored encrypted informationidAnd the c +1 th hash value β on the hash chainc+1The three are encrypted to obtain a transaction retrieval token, and the token is sent to the buyer;
step 3.4: the seller will update the shared status and increment the counter shared with the buyer in step 3.1 by one; at this time, the status information of the seller becomes the counters c +1 and βc+1
5. The block chain based privacy protection anti-counterfeiting automobile supply chain method according to claim 1, wherein the step 4 comprises the following steps:
for automobile part dealers and automobile part retailers, the following is used:
step 4.1: the buyer uses the status information shared with the seller in step 3.1 to retrieve a transaction token from the seller selling the automobile component, decrypts the transaction token to obtain the transaction identifier T in the form of ciphertextidAnd a hash value β of the next bit of the counter on the hash chain used as the one-time session keyc+1
Step 4.2: performing hash on the hash value of the one-time session key, comparing the hash content with the hash content in the shared state, if the comparison is successful, indicating that the identity authentication of the two parties is successful, otherwise, failing to authenticate, and refusing to execute the subsequent operation;
step 4.3: after successful verification at step 4.2, the transaction identifier T stored on the blockchain is retrievedidDecrypting the ciphertext information stored in the corresponding transaction to obtain a set containing ownership information of the automobile parts, and searching corresponding product information from the block chain by calling an intelligent contract; for each piece of automobile part information, comparing whether the hash value of the ownership certificate in the received ownership information set is the same as the hash value in the corresponding product information stored on the block chain and whether the state of the automobile part is in an unsold state, and finally checking whether the signature content is correct; when the information is all checkedIf the result is successful, the automobile part is indicated to be a genuine product, step 4.4 is executed, otherwise the product is regarded as a fake product, and the buyer refuses to accept the product;
step 4.4: the buyer performs the same operation as in step 2.2, i.e. generates a new proof of ownership and a hash value of the proof of ownership using the buyer's own identity ID and the secret key K; then the same operation as in step 2.3 is performed, i.e. the signature information is generated using the group public key and the buyer's own private key;
step 4.5: updating product information stored on a block chain of each received automobile part, wherein the product information comprises a hash value of ownership certification information of the automobile part and signature information of the automobile part;
for the user, the following method is adopted:
step 4-1: giving a product ownership information set of the corresponding automobile parts by the automobile part retailer, checking the product information of the corresponding automobile parts according to the product identifiers contained in the product ownership information set, calculating whether the hash value of the ownership certificate is consistent with the information stored in the block chain or not, checking whether the state of the automobile parts is sold or not, if the information is consistent and the automobile parts are not sold, executing the step 4-2, otherwise, considering the product as a counterfeit product, and refusing to accept the product by a buyer;
step 4-2: checking whether the signature information is correct by using the group public key, if so, continuing the next step, otherwise, the product is regarded as a fake product, and the buyer refuses to accept the product;
step 4-3: when the checks in the step 4-1 and the step 4-2 are passed, the automobile part is proved to be a genuine product; after the user purchases the product, the user invokes the intelligent contract to change the sales state of the automobile parts, and the state of the automobile parts is changed into the sold state.
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