CN114095930B - Method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication and related equipment - Google Patents
Method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication and related equipment Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明涉及通信技术领域,尤其涉及一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法及相关设备。The invention relates to the field of communication technologies, and in particular, to a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication and related equipment.
背景技术Background technique
随着通信卫星通信网络的发展和广泛应用,越来越多的不安全因素也随之产生,其中不乏通过冒充合法用户身份而发起网络攻击的案例。为此,在用户端正式接入卫星通信网络进行大量数据的通信传输之前,往往需要进行双向安全的接入认证:一方面,卫星网络端需要认证接入的是合法用户,以防护系统安全;另一方面,用户端也需要认证接入的是合法的卫星通信网络,以防被伪基站欺骗和攻击,损害数据安全。With the development and wide application of communication satellite communication networks, more and more unsafe factors have also emerged, and there are many cases of launching network attacks by posing as legitimate user identities. For this reason, before the user terminal formally accesses the satellite communication network to transmit a large amount of data, it is often necessary to perform two-way secure access authentication: on the one hand, the satellite network terminal needs to authenticate that the access is a legitimate user to protect the security of the system; On the other hand, the user terminal also needs to authenticate that the access is a legitimate satellite communication network, in order to prevent being deceived and attacked by the fake base station and compromising data security.
然而,现有的由卫星网络认证中心进行单点集中式的接入认证方式,存在单点故障风险与性能瓶颈的问题,且容易产生较大的网络传输时延。此外,出于认证轻量化的考虑,现有的卫星网络用户接入认证方案中,一些不支持身份匿名性保护,一旦用户端身份泄漏或被恶意追踪,将带来极大的通信安全隐患;一些方案虽提供了不同程度的身份匿名性保护,但未充分考虑相应的违规身份追溯与处理机制,若合法用户端在认证通过并匿名接入网络后出现违规行为,或将给系统造成难以估量的损失。However, the existing single-point centralized access authentication method performed by the satellite network authentication center has the problems of single-point failure risk and performance bottleneck, and is prone to large network transmission delay. In addition, due to the consideration of lightweight authentication, some of the existing satellite network user access authentication schemes do not support identity anonymity protection. Once the user's identity is leaked or maliciously tracked, it will bring great potential communication security risks; Although some schemes provide different degrees of identity anonymity protection, they do not fully consider the corresponding illegal identity traceability and processing mechanisms. If the legitimate user side has illegal behavior after passing the authentication and anonymously accessing the network, it may cause incalculable damage to the system. Loss.
发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
有鉴于此,本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法及相关设备,通过联合卫星网络前端的各卫通基站进行接入认证与违规处理,以缓解中心式接入认证方式容易产生的卫星网络中心单点故障风险与性能瓶颈,并解决合法用户端在匿名接入网络后出现违规行为时难以被及时有效地限制通信的问题。In view of this, the present invention provides a satellite network user violation processing method and related equipment combined with access authentication. Access authentication and violation processing are performed by cooperating with each satellite network front-end base station, so as to alleviate the centralized access authentication method. It is easy to generate single point failure risks and performance bottlenecks in the center of the satellite network, and solves the problem that it is difficult for legitimate users to limit communication in a timely and effective manner when illegal behavior occurs after anonymous access to the network.
第一方面,本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法,应用于卫星网络中心,包括:In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication, which is applied to a satellite network center, including:
接收违规判定请求信息,结合所述违规判定请求信息计算出令牌第一参数,并根据有关违规判定方法与标准,确定用户端是否存在违规行为以及所述违规行为对应违规等级的最终判定结果;Receive the violation judgment request information, calculate the first parameter of the token in combination with the violation judgment request information, and determine whether there is a violation on the client side and the final judgment result of the violation level corresponding to the violation according to the relevant violation judgment method and standard;
在判定所述用户端存在第二等级违规行为的情况下,将所述令牌第一参数加入令牌二级黑名单;在判定所述用户端存在第一等级违规行为的情况下,将所述令牌第一参数加入令牌一级黑名单,此外,根据所述令牌第一参数,计算所述用户端的真实身份,并将所述真实身份加入真实身份黑名单,且生成令牌黑名单更新信息,将所述令牌黑名单更新信息经信关站广播给各通信卫星、卫通基站。When it is determined that the user end has a second-level violation, the token first parameter is added to the token second-level blacklist; when it is determined that the user end has a first-level violation, all The first parameter of the token is added to the first-level blacklist of tokens. In addition, according to the first parameter of the token, the real identity of the user terminal is calculated, and the real identity is added to the real-identity blacklist, and a token blacklist is generated. List update information, broadcast the token blacklist update information to each communication satellite and satellite base station through the gateway station.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
卫星网络中心定期对系统公共参数进行配置,并根据所述系统公共参数生成系统参数更新信息;The satellite network center regularly configures the system public parameters, and generates system parameter update information according to the system public parameters;
其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;Wherein, the system public parameters include at least: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, token public verification parameters, validity period of the token public verification parameters, satellite The communication encryption parameters of the network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center;
经信关站、各通信卫星、卫通基站,将所述系统参数更新信息进行全网广播。The system parameter update information is broadcast on the entire network through the gateway station, each communication satellite, and the satellite base station.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
卫星网络中心接收用户端在初次申请入网时的注册请求信息,获取所述注册请求信息中的用户端初始身份标识与初始校验信息;The satellite network center receives the registration request information of the user terminal when applying for network access for the first time, and obtains the initial identification and initial verification information of the user terminal in the registration request information;
根据所述初始校验信息,验证所述初始身份标识是否属实,并查询所述初始身份标识是否已注册;According to the initial verification information, verify whether the initial identity is true, and query whether the initial identity has been registered;
在所述初始身份标识属实且尚未注册的情况下,为所述用户端配置在卫星通信网络中唯一的真实身份、具备有效期限的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数;In the case that the initial identity identifier is true and has not been registered, configure the user terminal with a unique real identity in the satellite communication network, a token first parameter with an expiration date, and a token second parameter;
根据所述真实身份、所述具备有效期限的令牌第一参数以及所述令牌第二参数生成注册响应信息,并将所述初始身份标识与所述真实身份进行关联存储,且将所述注册响应信息经安全信道发送至所述用户端;Generate registration response information according to the real identity, the first parameter of the token with the validity period, and the second parameter of the token, associate and store the initial identity with the real identity, and store the The registration response information is sent to the user terminal through the secure channel;
其中,所述注册响应信息至少包含:所述真实身份、所述令牌第一参数、所述令牌第二参数,所述真实身份可由所述初始身份标识结合随机数而计算得出,所述令牌第一参数根据所述真实身份、预先配置的系统公共参数而计算得出,所述令牌第二参数可根据所述令牌第一参数、预先配置的系统公共参数计算得出;Wherein, the registration response information includes at least: the real identity, the first parameter of the token, the second parameter of the token, and the real identity can be calculated by combining the initial identity with a random number, so The token first parameter is calculated according to the real identity and preconfigured system public parameters, and the token second parameter can be calculated according to the token first parameter and preconfigured system public parameters;
其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限。Wherein, the system public parameters include at least: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, token public verification parameters, validity period of the token public verification parameters, satellite The communication encryption parameters of the network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
卫星网络中心接收令牌更新第二请求信息,对所述令牌更新第二请求信息进行校验,其中,所述令牌更新第二请求信息是由卫通基站对来自用户端的令牌更新第一请求信息校验通过后计算生成的,并经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,转发给卫星网络中心;The satellite network center receives the token update second request information, and verifies the token update second request information, wherein the token update second request information is the token update first request information from the user terminal by the satellite network base station. 1. The request information is calculated and generated after passing the verification, and is forwarded to the satellite network center through several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations;
在所述令牌更新第二请求信息校验通过的情况下,计算有关令牌更新请求校验参数;其中,所述有关令牌更新请求校验参数至少包含:真实身份、令牌第一参数以及令牌剩余可更新次数;In the case that the verification of the second token update request information is passed, the related token update request verification parameters are calculated; wherein, the related token update request verification parameters at least include: real identity, token first parameter and the remaining number of times the token can be renewed;
在所述真实身份以及所述令牌第一参数均不在黑名单之列,所述令牌剩余可更新次数大于零,且所述真实身份、令牌剩余可更新次数与存储记录相匹配的情况下,为所述用户端配置新的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数;When neither the real identity nor the token first parameter is in the blacklist, the remaining number of updates of the token is greater than zero, and the real identity and the number of remaining updates of the token match the stored records Next, configure a new first token parameter and a new token second parameter for the user terminal;
对所述令牌剩余可更新次数进行递减,并将递减的所述令牌剩余可更新次数与所述真实身份进行关联存储;decrementing the remaining renewable times of the token, and storing the decremented remaining renewable times of the token in association with the real identity;
生成令牌更新响应信息,并经信关站、若干跳通信卫星、卫通基站,将所述令牌更新响应信息返回给所述用户端;Generate token update response information, and return the token update response information to the user terminal through the gateway station, several hop communication satellites, and satellite communication base stations;
其中,所述令牌更新响应信息至少包含:令牌更新响应校验参数、加密形式的已更新令牌第一参数以及令牌第二参数,其中,所述令牌更新响应校验参数由所述有关令牌更新请求校验参数计算得到。Wherein, the token update response information includes at least: token update response verification parameters, the updated token first parameter in encrypted form, and the token second parameter, wherein the token update response verification parameter is determined by all The verification parameters of the token update request are calculated according to the above.
第二方面,本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法,应用于通信卫星,包括:In a second aspect, the present invention provides a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication, which is applied to communication satellites, including:
在接收到来自卫星网络中心附属信关站或者上一跳通信卫星的上行信息的情况下,对所述上行信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;In the case of receiving the uplink information from the gateway station affiliated to the satellite network center or the previous hop communication satellite, perform a message source and integrity check on the uplink information;
在所述上行信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,根据有关路由选择算法,将校验通过的所述上行信息转发给卫通基站或者下一跳通信卫星;In the case that the message source and integrity verification of the uplink information pass, according to the relevant routing algorithm, forward the uplink information that has passed the verification to the Satcom base station or the next-hop communication satellite;
在接收到来自卫通基站的下行信息的情况下,并对所述下行信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;In the case of receiving downlink information from the Satcom base station, verify the message source and integrity of the downlink information;
在所述下行信息的来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,将所述下行信息附上自身的节点标识,并计算新的消息认证码,从而生成处理后的下行信息;In the case of passing the source and integrity verification of the downlink information, attach the downlink information with its own node identifier, and calculate a new message authentication code, thereby generating processed downlink information;
根据所述有关路由选择算法,将所述处理后的下行信息转发至所述卫星网络中心附属信关站或者下一跳通信卫星。According to the relevant routing algorithm, the processed downlink information is forwarded to the gateway station attached to the satellite network center or the next-hop communication satellite.
第三方面,本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法,应用于卫通基站,包括:In a third aspect, the present invention provides a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication, which is applied to Satcom base stations, including:
当接入认证通过的用户端使用匿名身份进行数据通信的过程中,卫通基站结合接入认证后缓存的所述匿名身份、令牌第一参数,根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,对所述用户端是否存在违规行为进行检测,并对所述违规行为的违规等级进行初步判定;When the client that has passed the access authentication uses the anonymous identity for data communication, the satellite base station combines the anonymous identity and the first parameter of the token cached after the access authentication, according to the relevant violation detection methods and judgment standards, to Check whether there is any illegal behavior on the user terminal, and make a preliminary judgment on the violation level of the illegal behavior;
其中,所述有关违规检测方法可以基于但不限于以下原理:相关性分析、聚类分析、KL散度,等等;Wherein, the relevant violation detection method may be based on but not limited to the following principles: correlation analysis, cluster analysis, KL divergence, etc.;
其中,所述违规行为可以包括但不限于:短时间内多次发起相同的数据请求、不符合用户通信行为习惯的异常通信请求、DoS攻击、DDoS攻击、非法窃取系统权限与数据,等等;Wherein, the violations may include but are not limited to: initiating the same data request multiple times in a short period of time, abnormal communication requests that do not conform to the user's communication behavior habits, DoS attacks, DDoS attacks, illegally stealing system permissions and data, etc.;
其中,所述违规等级可结合实际情况,由系统进行定义,在本发明中,仅以第三、第四违规等级来代表较低违规等级,以第一、第二违规等级来代表较高违规等级,对相应的违规处理进行说明,其余可以此类推,以下不再进行赘述;The violation level can be defined by the system in combination with the actual situation. In the present invention, only the third and fourth violation levels are used to represent lower violation levels, and the first and second violation levels are used to represent higher violation levels. level, and explain the corresponding violation treatment, and the rest can be deduced by analogy, and will not be repeated below;
需要说明的是,所述匿名身份在接入认证通过后,将分别缓存于所述卫通基站和用户端,以允许两者之间建立本次通信连接,在数据通信过程中,所述用户端将所述匿名身份封装进通信数据帧头,卫通基站对数据帧头中未正确包含所述匿名身份的用户数据进行过滤,将数据帧头中正确包含有所述匿名身份的用户数据进行转发,并根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,对包含有所述匿名身份的用户数据进行违规检测、初步判定与处理,在初步判定存在第一等级或第二等级违规行为的情况下,查询缓存的与所述匿名身份所对应的令牌第一参数,并生成违规判定请求信息,当通信结束时,卫通基站释放本次通信连接,并删除缓存的所述用户匿名身份;It should be noted that, after the access authentication is passed, the anonymous identity will be cached in the Satcom base station and the user terminal respectively to allow the establishment of this communication connection between the two. During the data communication process, the user The terminal encapsulates the anonymous identity into the communication data frame header, and the satellite base station filters the user data that does not correctly contain the anonymous identity in the data frame header, and filters the user data that correctly contains the anonymous identity in the data frame header. Forward, and according to the relevant violation detection methods and judgment standards, conduct violation detection, preliminary judgment and processing on the user data containing the anonymous identity, and in the case of preliminary judgment that there is a first-level or second-level violation, query the cache The first parameter of the token corresponding to the anonymous identity is generated, and the violation judgment request information is generated. When the communication ends, the Satcom base station releases the communication connection and deletes the cached anonymous identity of the user;
在判定所述用户端存在第三等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送第三提示信息,且终断与所述用户端的此次通信连接,并删除缓存中的所述匿名身份;In the case of determining that the user terminal has a third-level violation, sending third prompt information to the user terminal, terminating this communication connection with the user terminal, and deleting the anonymous identity in the cache;
在判定所述用户端存在第四等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送第四提示信息,并暂停与所述用户端的通信连接;In the case of determining that the user terminal has a fourth-level violation, sending fourth prompt information to the user terminal, and suspending the communication connection with the user terminal;
其中,所述第三提示信息用于指示连接断开的原因是所述用户端存在第三等级违规行为,且所述第三提示信息用于指示所述用户端再次建立通信连接需要重新进行接入认证;The third prompt information is used to indicate that the reason for the disconnection is that the user terminal has a third-level violation, and the third prompt information is used to indicate that the user terminal needs to reconnect to establish a communication connection again. entry certification;
其中,所述第四提示信息用于指示连接断开的原因是所述用户端存在第四等级违规行为,且所述第四提示信息用于指示所述用户端在指定时间后恢复通信连接;The fourth prompt information is used to indicate that the reason for the disconnection is that the user terminal has a fourth-level violation, and the fourth prompt information is used to instruct the user terminal to resume the communication connection after a specified time;
在卫通基站初步判定所述用户端存在第一等级或第二等级违规行为的情况下,在缓存中查询与所述匿名身份相对应的令牌第一参数,并生成违规判定请求信息;When the Satcom base station preliminarily determines that the user terminal has a first-level or second-level violation, query the cache for the token first parameter corresponding to the anonymous identity, and generate violation judgment request information;
经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,将所述违规判定请求信息转发给所述卫星网络中心,其中,所述违规判定请求信息至少包含:加密后的所述令牌第一参数;The violation judgment request information is forwarded to the satellite network center through several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations, wherein the violation judgment request information at least includes: the encrypted first parameter of the token;
接收令牌黑名单更新信息,对所述令牌黑名单更新信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;receiving token blacklist update information, and performing source and integrity verification on the token blacklist update information;
在所述令牌黑名单更新信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,更新存储的令牌黑名单,并向所述令牌黑名单中的违规用户端发送提示信息;Update the stored token blacklist and send a prompt message to the offending client in the token blacklist when the message source and integrity verification of the token blacklist update information pass;
断开与所述违规用户端的通信连接;并在违规追责期限内,封禁所述违规用户端的接入认证权限和令牌更新权限;Disconnect the communication connection with the violating client; and within the period of accountability for the violation, ban the access authentication authority and token update authority of the violating client;
其中,对于令牌一级黑名单内的违规用户端,卫通基站发送第一提示信息,所述第一提示信息用于指示所述用户端存在第一等级违规行为,且所述用户端的接入认证权限与令牌更新权限已被永久封禁;Among them, for the violating users in the first-level blacklist of tokens, the Satcom base station sends first prompt information, and the first prompt information is used to indicate that the user has a first-level violation, and the connection of the user The login authentication authority and token update authority have been permanently banned;
对于令牌二级黑名单内的违规用户端,卫通基站发送第二提示信息;其中,所述第二提示信息用于指示所述用户端存在第二等级违规行为,在违规追责截止期限之后,存在第二等级违规行为的用户端恢复正常的接入认证权限与令牌更新权限。For the violating users in the second-level blacklist of tokens, the Satcom base station sends second prompt information; wherein, the second prompt information is used to indicate that the user has a second-level violation, and the deadline for accountability for violations will be met. Afterwards, the client with the second-level violations restores the normal access authentication authority and token update authority.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
卫通基站定期接收系统参数更新信息,并对所述系统参数更新信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;The Satcom base station regularly receives the system parameter update information, and performs a message source and integrity check on the system parameter update information;
在所述系统参数更新信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,将所述系统参数更新信息广播给域内的用户端,并对所述系统参数更新信息的系统公共参数进行存储;In the case that the message source and integrity check of the system parameter update information are passed, broadcast the system parameter update information to the user terminal in the domain, and store the system public parameters of the system parameter update information;
其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限。Wherein, the system public parameters include at least: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, token public verification parameters, validity period of the token public verification parameters, satellite The communication encryption parameters of the network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center.
卫通基站定期对域内公共参数进行配置,并根据所述域内公共参数生成域内参数更新信息,并将所述域内参数更新信息广播至域内的各用户端;其中,所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数以及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限。The Satcom base station regularly configures the public parameters in the domain, and generates the parameter update information in the domain according to the public parameters in the domain, and broadcasts the parameter update information in the domain to each client in the domain; wherein, the public parameters in the domain include at least: The communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
接收来自用户端的接入认证请求信息,校验所述接入认证请求信息的消息新鲜度;Receive the access authentication request information from the client, and verify the message freshness of the access authentication request information;
在所述接入认证请求信息的消息新鲜度校验通过的情况下,根据所述系统公共参数与域内公共参数,计算此次的用户匿名身份,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系,其中,所述接入认证请求信息至少包含以下字段:接入认证请求时间戳、接入认证第一加密参数、加密的令牌第一参数以及令牌第二参数的校验参数,其中所述令牌第二参数的校验参数是由令牌第二参数计算得出的;In the case that the message freshness verification of the access authentication request information is passed, according to the public parameters of the system and the public parameters in the domain, the anonymous identity of the user is calculated this time, and the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token are verified. Whether the verification parameter of the parameter satisfies the specified relationship, wherein the access authentication request information contains at least the following fields: access authentication request timestamp, access authentication first encryption parameter, encrypted token first parameter and token first encryption parameter Two-parameter verification parameter, wherein the verification parameter of the token second parameter is calculated from the token second parameter;
在所述令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数满足指定关系的情况下,根据所述接入认证请求信息,计算接入认证响应参数,并根据所述认证响应参数生成接入认证响应信息并发送给所述用户端;In the case that the verification parameters of the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship, calculate the access authentication response parameter according to the access authentication request information, and generate an access authentication response parameter according to the authentication response parameter. input authentication response information and send it to the client;
其中,所述接入认证响应信息至少包含以下字段:接入认证响应时间戳以及接入认证响应参数,所述接入认证响应参数由所述接入认证请求信息解密后的原始参数计算得到;Wherein, the access authentication response information includes at least the following fields: an access authentication response timestamp and an access authentication response parameter, and the access authentication response parameter is calculated from the decrypted original parameter of the access authentication request information;
缓存此次认证的用户匿名身份,以及与所述用户匿名身份对应的令牌第一参数;Cache the anonymous identity of the user authenticated this time, and the first parameter of the token corresponding to the anonymous identity of the user;
需要说明的是,卫通基站在对所述用户端完成接入认证之后,接下来,将根据缓存的用户匿名身份,允许与所述用户端建立通信连接,在数据通信过程中,卫通基站对数据帧头中未正确包含所述匿名身份的用户数据进行过滤,将数据帧头中正确包含有所述匿名身份的用户数据进行转发,并根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,对包含有所述匿名身份的用户数据进行违规检测、初步判定与处理,在初步判定存在第一等级或第二等级违规行为的情况下,查询缓存的与所述匿名身份所对应的令牌第一参数,并生成违规判定请求信息,当通信结束时,卫通基站释放本次通信连接,并删除缓存的所述用户匿名身份。It should be noted that after the Satcom base station completes the access authentication for the user terminal, it will then allow the establishment of a communication connection with the user terminal according to the cached anonymous identity of the user. During the data communication process, the Satcom base station Filter the user data that does not correctly contain the anonymous identity in the data frame header, forward the user data that correctly contains the anonymous identity in the data frame header, and according to the relevant violation detection methods and judgment standards, contain some data. The user data of the anonymous identity is subjected to violation detection, preliminary determination and processing, and in the case of preliminary determination that there is a first-level or second-level violation, query the cached first parameter of the token corresponding to the anonymous identity, and Generate violation judgment request information, and when the communication ends, the satellite base station releases the current communication connection and deletes the cached anonymous identity of the user.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
接收来自用户端的令牌更新第一请求信息,校验所述令牌更新第一请求信息的消息新鲜度,其中,所述令牌更新第一请求信息至少包含以下字段:令牌更新第一请求时间戳、令牌更新第一加密参数、加密形式的令牌更新请求校验参数、令牌第二参数的校验参数,所述令牌更新请求校验参数至少包含:真实身份、令牌第一参数以及令牌剩余可更新次数;Receive the first token update request information from the client, and verify the message freshness of the token update first request information, wherein the token update first request information at least includes the following fields: Token update first request Timestamp, token update first encryption parameter, token update request verification parameter in encrypted form, and token update request verification parameter, the token update request verification parameter at least includes: real identity, token first A parameter and the remaining number of times the token can be updated;
在所述令牌更新第一请求信息的消息新鲜度校验通过的情况下,根据所述系统公共参数与所述域内公共参数,计算令牌第一参数,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系;In the case that the message freshness check of the first token update request information is passed, calculate the first token parameter according to the system public parameter and the public parameter in the domain, and verify the first token parameter and the command Whether the verification parameters of the second parameter of the card satisfy the specified relationship;
在所述令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数满足指定关系的情况下,生成令牌更新第二请求信息,并发送给域内的通信卫星,其中,所述令牌更新第二请求信息至少包含:所述令牌更新第一加密参数、所述令牌第一参数以及加密形式的令牌更新请求校验参数;When the verification parameters of the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship, generate a second request for token update, and send it to the communication satellite in the domain, wherein the token update the first request information 2. The request information at least includes: the token update first encryption parameter, the token first parameter and the token update request verification parameter in encrypted form;
接收令牌更新响应信息,对所述令牌更新响应信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;Receive the token update response information, and perform message source and integrity verification on the token update response information;
在所述令牌更新响应信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,将所述令牌更新响应信息转发给所述用户端。In the case that the source and integrity verification of the token update response information is passed, the token update response information is forwarded to the client.
第四方面,本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法,应用于用户端,包括:In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication, which is applied to the user terminal, including:
定期接收系统参数更新信息,并对所述系统参数更新信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;Regularly receive system parameter update information, and perform message source and integrity verification on the system parameter update information;
在所述系统参数更新信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,对所述系统参数更新信息中的系统公共参数进行存储;Under the condition that the message source and integrity verification of the system parameter update information pass, storing the system public parameters in the system parameter update information;
所述系统公共参数由卫星网络中心定期进行配置,并经信关站、通信卫星、卫通基站在全网进行广播,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The system public parameters are regularly configured by the satellite network center, and broadcast on the entire network through gateway stations, communication satellites, and satellite communication base stations, wherein the system public parameters at least include: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption , the validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, the validity period of the token public verification parameters, the validity period of the token public verification parameters, the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center;
定期接收域内参数更新信息,并对所述域内参数更新信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;Periodically receive the parameter update information in the domain, and perform a message source and integrity check on the parameter update information in the domain;
在所述域内参数更新信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,对所述域内参数更新信息中的域内公共参数进行存储;Under the condition that the message source and integrity check of the parameter update information in the domain pass, storing the public parameters in the domain in the parameter update information in the domain;
所述域内公共参数由卫通基站定期进行配置,并在域内进行广播,其中,所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数以及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限。The public parameters in the domain are regularly configured by the Satcom base station and broadcast in the domain, wherein the public parameters in the domain at least include: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
用户端在初次申请入网时,根据所述用户端的初始身份标识、初始校验信息,生成注册请求信息;When the user terminal applies for network access for the first time, the registration request information is generated according to the initial identification and initial verification information of the user terminal;
通过安全信道,将所述注册请求信息发送至所述卫星网络中心;Send the registration request information to the satellite network center through a secure channel;
经安全信道接收所述卫星网络中心的注册响应信息,获取所述注册响应信息中的真实身份、令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,其中,所述真实身份具有全网唯一性,所述令牌第一参数以及所述令牌第二参数具备有效期限,且所述令牌第一参数以及所述令牌第二参数的最长有效期限由当前的系统公共参数的有效期限确定;Receive the registration response information of the satellite network center through the secure channel, and obtain the real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the second parameter of the token in the registration response information, wherein the real identity is unique in the whole network, so The first token parameter and the second token parameter have an expiration date, and the longest expiration date of the first token parameter and the second token parameter is determined by the expiration date of the current system public parameter;
对所述真实身份、所述令牌第一参数以及所述令牌第二参数进行安全存储。The real identity, the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token are securely stored.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
当用户端需要接入卫星通信网络时,根据安全存储的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合所述系统公共参数与域内公共参数,计算所述用户端的匿名身份,并生成接入认证请求信息,且将所述接入认证请求信息发送给附近的卫通基站,其中,所述接入认证请求信息至少包含以下字段:接入认证请求时间戳、接入认证第一加密参数、加密的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数的校验参数;When the user terminal needs to access the satellite communication network, the anonymous identity of the user terminal is calculated according to the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token stored in a secure manner, combined with the public parameters of the system and the public parameters in the domain, and the access is generated. authentication request information, and send the access authentication request information to a nearby satellite communication base station, wherein the access authentication request information at least includes the following fields: access authentication request timestamp, access authentication first encryption parameter, The verification parameters of the encrypted first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token;
接收来自卫通基站的接入认证响应信息,并根据所述接入认证响应信息对所述卫通基站进行接入认证计算与校验,其中,所述接入认证响应信息至少包含以下字段:接入认证响应时间戳、接入认证响应参数,其中,所述接入认证响应参数由所述接入认证请求信息解密后的原始参数计算得到;Receive the access authentication response information from the Satcom base station, and perform access authentication calculation and verification on the Satcom base station according to the access authentication response information, wherein the access authentication response information at least includes the following fields: an access authentication response timestamp and an access authentication response parameter, wherein the access authentication response parameter is calculated from the original parameter decrypted by the access authentication request information;
在所述接入认证校验通过的情况下,计算会话密钥与完整性保护密钥,并对所述会话密钥、完整性保护密钥以及此次认证的匿名身份进行安全存储,以用于正式的数据通信过程,其中,所述会话密钥用于对通信数据进行对称加密,所述完整性保护密钥用于计算消息认证码。In the case that the access authentication verification is passed, the session key and the integrity protection key are calculated, and the session key, the integrity protection key and the authenticated anonymous identity are securely stored for use In a formal data communication process, the session key is used for symmetric encryption of the communication data, and the integrity protection key is used to calculate the message authentication code.
需要说明的是,在接入认证后的数据通信过程中,用户端将所述匿名身份封装进数据帧,并使用所述会话密钥对需要传输的数据进行加密,且使用所述完整性保护密钥计算消息认证码,通过所述卫通基站在卫星网络中进行通信数据传输。It should be noted that, in the data communication process after access authentication, the user end encapsulates the anonymous identity into a data frame, and uses the session key to encrypt the data to be transmitted, and uses the integrity protection The key calculates the message authentication code, and the communication data is transmitted in the satellite network through the satellite communication base station.
可选地,还包括:Optionally, also include:
当用户端需要进行令牌更新时,用户端将待更新的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数、结合所述系统公共参数与域内公共参数,计算生成令牌更新第一请求信息,并将所述令牌更新第一请求信息发送给附近的卫通基站;When the client needs to update the token, the client calculates and generates the first token update request information by combining the first parameter of the token to be updated, the second parameter of the token, the public parameters of the system and the public parameters in the domain, and generates the token update first request information. sending the token update first request information to a nearby Satcom base station;
其中,所述令牌更新第一请求信息至少包含以下字段:令牌更新第一请求时间戳、令牌更新第一加密参数、加密形式的令牌更新请求校验参数、令牌第二参数的校验参数,其中所述令牌更新请求校验参数至少包含:真实身份、令牌第一参数、令牌剩余可更新次数;Wherein, the first token update request information includes at least the following fields: the first token update request timestamp, the token update first encryption parameter, the token update request verification parameter in encrypted form, the Verification parameters, wherein the token update request verification parameters at least include: real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the remaining number of times the token can be updated;
接收令牌更新响应信息,并对所述令牌更新响应信息进行消息来源与完整性校验;Receive token update response information, and perform message source and integrity verification on the token update response information;
在所述令牌更新响应信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,计算令牌更新响应校验参数、更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数,其中,所述令牌更新响应校验参数是由令牌更新请求校验参数计算得到,其中所述令牌更新请求校验参数至少包含:真实身份、令牌第一参数、令牌剩余可更新次数;In the case that the message source and integrity verification of the token update response information are passed, the token update response verification parameter, the updated first token parameter, and the updated token second parameter are calculated, wherein, The token update response verification parameter is calculated from the token update request verification parameter, wherein the token update request verification parameter at least includes: the real identity, the token first parameter, and the remaining number of times the token can be updated;
验证所述令牌更新响应校验参数是否正确,且验证更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数是否满足指定关系;Verifying whether the token update response verification parameter is correct, and verifying whether the updated first parameter of the token and the updated second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship;
在验证通过的情况下,对所述更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数进行安全存储。In the case of passing the verification, the updated first parameter of the token and the updated second parameter of the token are securely stored.
需要说明的是,当所述令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数在用户端存储或使用了一定时间,而可能出现泄漏或被窃取等安全风险时,可以在目前系统公共参数的有效期限内,进行令牌更新,且用户端在目前系统公共参数的有效期内,拥有一定次数的令牌更新权限,每进行一次令牌更新,则消耗一次令牌更新权限;用户端可结合安全性需求,在系统允许的更新次数范围内,自行选择进行令牌更新的时机和次数,以消减由于所述令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数长期在用户端存储而可能带来的安全性隐患。It should be noted that when the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token have been stored or used on the user side for a certain period of time, and there may be security risks such as leakage or theft, the validity period of the current system public parameters can be within the validity period of the current system public parameters, the client has a certain number of token update permissions, and each time a token update is performed, the token update permission is consumed once; the client can combine the security requirements. , within the range of the number of updates allowed by the system, choose the timing and number of token updates by yourself, so as to reduce the potential security risks caused by the long-term storage of the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token on the user side .
第五方面,本发明提供一种卫星网络中心,包括:In a fifth aspect, the present invention provides a satellite network center, comprising:
系统参数更新模块,用于定期对系统公共参数进行配置,并根据所述系统公共参数生成系统参数更新信息,经信关站、各通信卫星、卫通基站,将所述系统参数更新信息进行全网广播,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The system parameter update module is used to regularly configure the system public parameters, and generate system parameter update information according to the system public parameters. Webcast, wherein the system public parameters at least include: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, the validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, the token public verification parameters, the validity of the token public verification parameters Term, the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center;
注册响应模块,用于接收并验证注册请求信息,对于所述注册请求信息属实且尚未注册过的用户端,配置所述用户端在卫星通信网络中唯一的真实身份,具备有效期限的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,并根据所述真实身份、所述具备有效期限的令牌第一参数以及所述令牌第二参数生成注册响应信息,且将所述注册响应信息经安全信道返回至所述用户端;The registration response module is used to receive and verify the registration request information. For the user terminal whose registration request information is true and has not been registered, configure the unique real identity of the user terminal in the satellite communication network. a parameter, the second parameter of the token, and the registration response information is generated according to the real identity, the first parameter of the token with the validity period, and the second parameter of the token, and the registration response information is sent through the secure channel return to the client;
违规判定模块,用于接收违规判定请求信息,并结合所述违规判定请求信息计算出的令牌第一参数,根据有关违规判定方法与标准,确定用户端是否存在违规行为以及所述违规行为对应违规等级的最终判定结果;The violation judgment module is used to receive the violation judgment request information, and based on the first parameter of the token calculated by the violation judgment request information, according to the relevant violation judgment methods and standards, to determine whether there is a violation of the user terminal and the corresponding violation of the violation. The final judgment result of the violation level;
违规处理模块,用于在判定所述用户端存在第二等级违规行为的情况下,将所述令牌第一参数加入令牌二级黑名单;在判定所述用户端存在第一等级违规行为的情况下,将所述令牌第一参数加入令牌一级黑名单,此外,根据所述令牌第一参数,计算所述用户端的真实身份,并将所述真实身份加入真实身份黑名单,且生成令牌黑名单更新信息,并且将所述令牌黑名单更新信息经信关站广播给各通信卫星、卫通基站;A violation processing module, configured to add the token first parameter to the token second-level blacklist when it is determined that the user terminal has a second-level violation; In the case of the token, the first parameter of the token is added to the first-level blacklist of the token, in addition, the real identity of the user terminal is calculated according to the first parameter of the token, and the real identity is added to the real-identity blacklist , and generate token blacklist update information, and broadcast the token blacklist update information to each communication satellite and satellite base station through the gateway station;
令牌更新响应模块,用于接收并校验令牌更新第二请求信息,在所述令牌更新第二请求信息校验通过的情况下,配置更新后的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,并计算生成令牌更新响应信息,将所述令牌更新响应信息经信关站、若干跳通信卫星、卫通基站发送给所述用户端。The token update response module is used to receive and verify the second token update request information, and configure the updated first parameter of the token, the first Second parameter, and calculate and generate token update response information, and send the token update response information to the user terminal through the gateway station, several hop communication satellites, and satellite communication base stations.
第六方面,本发明提供一种通信卫星,包括:In a sixth aspect, the present invention provides a communication satellite, comprising:
上行信息处理模块,用于在接收到的来自卫星网络中心附属信关站或者上一跳通信卫星的上行信息的情况下,对所述上行信息进行消息来源与完整性的校验,在所述上行信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,根据有关路由选择算法,将校验通过的上行信息转发给卫通基站或者下一跳通信卫星;The uplink information processing module is used to check the source and integrity of the uplink information in the case of the received uplink information from the satellite network center affiliated gateway station or the previous hop communication satellite. When the source and integrity of the uplink information are verified, forward the verified uplink information to the satellite base station or the next-hop communication satellite according to the relevant routing algorithm;
下行信息处理模块,用于在接收到的来自卫通基站的下行信息的情况下,并对所述下行信息进行消息来源与完整性的校验,将校验失败的下行信息丢弃,将校验通过的下行信息附上自身的节点标识,并计算新的消息认证码,从而生成处理后的下行信息,并且根据所述有关路由选择算法,将所述处理后的下行信息转发至卫星网络中心附属信关站或者下一跳通信卫星。The downlink information processing module is used to verify the message source and integrity of the downlink information in the case of the received downlink information from the satellite base station, discard the downlink information that fails to verify, and verify the downlink information. The passed downlink information is attached with its own node identifier, and a new message authentication code is calculated to generate processed downlink information, and according to the relevant routing algorithm, the processed downlink information is forwarded to the satellite network center affiliated Gateway station or next-hop communication satellite.
第七方面,本发明提供一种卫通基站,包括:In a seventh aspect, the present invention provides a Satcom base station, comprising:
参数更新模块,用于定期接收并校验系统参数更新信息;在所述系统参数更新信息校验通过的情况下,对所述系统参数更新信息中的系统公共参数进行存储,并将所述系统参数更新信息广播给域内的用户端,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The parameter update module is used for regularly receiving and verifying the system parameter update information; in the case of passing the verification of the system parameter update information, the system public parameters in the system parameter update information are stored, and the system parameter update information is stored. The parameter update information is broadcast to the user terminal in the domain, wherein the system public parameters at least include: basic cryptography parameters used for encryption and decryption, the validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, token public verification parameters, the password The validity period of the card public verification parameters, the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center, and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center;
所述参数更新模块,还用于定期对域内公共参数进行配置,并根据所述域内公共参数生成域内参数更新信息,并且将所述域内参数更新信息广播至域内的各用户端,其中,所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数以及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限;The parameter update module is further configured to periodically configure the public parameters in the domain, and generate parameter update information in the domain according to the public parameters in the domain, and broadcast the parameter update information in the domain to each client in the domain, wherein the The public parameters in the domain include at least: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station;
接入认证响应模块,用于接收并校验来自用户端的接入认证请求信息,在所述接入认证请求信息校验通过的情况下,计算用户匿名身份,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系,在所述令牌第一参数与所述令牌第二参数的校验参数满足指定关系的情况下,生成接入认证响应信息,并将所述接入认证响应信息发送给所述用户端,缓存此次认证的用户匿名身份,以及所述令牌第一参数;The access authentication response module is used to receive and verify the access authentication request information from the user terminal, and in the case that the access authentication request information is verified, calculate the anonymous identity of the user, and verify the first parameter of the token and the token. Whether the verification parameter of the second parameter of the token satisfies the specified relationship, in the case that the verification parameter of the first parameter of the token and the verification parameter of the second parameter of the token meet the specified relationship, generate access authentication response information, sending the access authentication response information to the client, caching the anonymous identity of the user authenticated this time, and the first parameter of the token;
通信数据传输模块,用于在与用户端进行接入认证之后,根据缓存的用户匿名身份,允许与所述用户端建立通信连接,并在数据通信过程中,对数据帧头中未正确包含所述匿名身份的用户数据进行过滤,将数据帧头中正确包含有所述匿名身份的用户数据转发给域内的通信卫星,并在此次通信结束时,删除缓存的所述用户匿名身份;The communication data transmission module is used to allow the establishment of a communication connection with the user terminal according to the cached anonymous identity of the user after performing access authentication with the user terminal, and during the data communication process, the data frame header does not contain the correct information. The user data of the anonymous identity is filtered, the user data that correctly contains the anonymous identity in the data frame header is forwarded to the communication satellite in the domain, and when the communication ends, the cached anonymous identity of the user is deleted;
违规检测模块,用于在数据通信过程中,结合缓存的用户匿名身份、令牌第一参数,根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,对所述用户端进行违规检测与初步判定;The violation detection module is used to perform violation detection and preliminary judgment on the user terminal according to the relevant violation detection method and judgment standard in combination with the cached user anonymous identity and the first parameter of the token during the data communication process;
违规初步处理模块,用于在判定所述用户端存在第三等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送所述第三提示信息,并终断与所述用户端的此次通信连接,且删除缓存中的所述匿名身份;A violation preliminary processing module, configured to send the third prompt information to the user terminal when it is determined that the user terminal has a third-level violation behavior, and terminate this communication connection with the user terminal, and delete said anonymous identity from the cache;
所述违规初步处理模块,还用于在判定所述用户端存在第四违规等级行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送所述第四提示信息,并暂停与所述用户端的此次通信连接;The violation preliminary processing module is further configured to send the fourth prompt information to the user terminal and suspend this communication connection with the user terminal when it is determined that the user terminal has a fourth violation level behavior ;
违规判定请求模块,用于在初步判定所述用户端存在第一等级或第二等级违规行为的情况下,在缓存中查询与用户匿名身份相对应的令牌第一参数,并生成所述违规判定请求信息,且经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,将所述违规判定请求信息发送至卫星网络中心;The violation judgment request module is used to query the cache for the token first parameter corresponding to the anonymous identity of the user when it is preliminarily determined that the user terminal has a first-level or second-level violation, and generate the violation Judgment request information, and send the violation judgment request information to the satellite network center via several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations;
违规判定响应处理模块,用于接收并校验所述令牌黑名单更新信息,在所述令牌黑名单更新信息校验通过的情况下,更新存储的令牌黑名单,并向违规用户端发送提示信息,且断开与违规用户端的网络连接,并且在违规追责期限内封禁违规用户端的接入认证权限和令牌更新权限;The violation judgment response processing module is used to receive and verify the token blacklist update information, update the stored token blacklist when the token blacklist update information is verified and pass the verification, and report to the violating client Send a prompt message, disconnect the network connection with the violating client, and ban the access authentication authority and token update authority of the violating client within the period of accountability for violation;
令牌更新第一请求处理模块,用于接收并校验来自用户端的所述令牌更新第一请求信息,在所述令牌更新第一请求信息校验通过的情况下,计算令牌第一参数,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系,在验证通过的情况下,生成所述令牌更新第二请求信息,并将所述令牌更新第二请求信息发送给域内的通信卫星;A token update first request processing module, configured to receive and verify the token update first request information from the client, and calculate the token update first request information when the token update first request information is verified. parameters, and verify whether the verification parameters of the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship, in the case of passing the verification, generate the second request information for the token update, and update the token 2. Request information to be sent to communication satellites in the domain;
令牌更新响应处理模块,用于接收并校验所述令牌更新响应信息,在校验通过的情况下,将所述令牌更新响应信息转发给所述用户端。The token update response processing module is configured to receive and verify the token update response information, and forward the token update response information to the user end when the verification is passed.
第八方面,本发明提供一种用户端,包括:In an eighth aspect, the present invention provides a user terminal, comprising:
参数配置模块,用于定期接收并校验系统参数更新信息,在校验通过的情况下,对所述系统参数更新信息中的系统公共参数进行存储,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The parameter configuration module is used to periodically receive and verify the system parameter update information, and in the case of passing the verification, store the system public parameters in the system parameter update information, wherein the system public parameters at least include: The basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, the validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, the token public verification parameters, the validity period of the token public verification parameters, the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center and the satellite network The validity period of the central communication encryption parameters;
所述参数配置模块,还用于定期接收并校验域内参数更新信息,在校验通过的情况下,对所述域内参数更新信息中的域内公共参数进行存储,其中,所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限;The parameter configuration module is also configured to periodically receive and verify the parameter update information in the domain, and in the case of passing the verification, store the public parameters in the domain in the parameter update information in the domain, wherein the public parameters in the domain are at least Including: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station;
注册请求模块,用于根据初始身份标识及初始校验信息,生成注册请求信息,并将所述注册请求信息经安全信道发送给卫星网络中心;A registration request module is used to generate registration request information according to the initial identity identifier and the initial verification information, and send the registration request information to the satellite network center through a secure channel;
注册响应处理模块,用于通过安全信道接收所述卫星网络中心的注册响应信息,并获取所述注册响应信息中的网络唯一真实身份、具备有效期限的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,并对所述真实身份、所述令牌第一参数、所述令牌第二参数进行安全存储;The registration response processing module is used to receive the registration response information of the satellite network center through a secure channel, and obtain the unique real identity of the network in the registration response information, the first parameter of the token with the validity period, and the second parameter of the token , and securely store the real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the second parameter of the token;
接入认证请求模块,用于所述用户端在需要接入卫星通信网络时,根据安全存储的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合所述系统公共参数和域内公共参数,计算匿名身份,生成所述接入认证请求信息,并将所述接入认证请求信息发送至卫通基站;The access authentication request module is used for the user terminal to calculate the anonymity according to the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token stored in a secure manner, in combination with the public parameters of the system and the public parameters in the domain, when the user terminal needs to access the satellite communication network. identity, generate the access authentication request information, and send the access authentication request information to the Satcom base station;
接入认证响应处理模块,用于接收并校验所述卫通基站的接入认证响应信息,在校验通过的情况下,对于异常的接入认证响应提示信息,对所述接入认证响应提示信息进行解析,对于正常的接入认证响应信息,对所述接入认证响应信息中的参数进行校验,在参数校验通过的情况下,计算会话密钥与完整性保护密钥,并安全存储会话密钥、完整性保护密钥、以及此次认证的匿名身份;The access authentication response processing module is used to receive and verify the access authentication response information of the satellite communication base station, and in the case of passing the verification, for the abnormal access authentication response prompt information, respond to the access authentication response The prompt information is parsed, and for the normal access authentication response information, the parameters in the access authentication response information are verified, and if the parameter verification is passed, the session key and the integrity protection key are calculated, and Securely store session keys, integrity protection keys, and anonymous identities for this authentication;
通信数据传输模块,用于在与所述卫通基站完成接入认证之后的数据通信过程中,将所述匿名身份封装进数据帧,并使用所述会话密钥对需要传输的数据进行加密,且使用所述完整性保护密钥计算消息认证码,并且通过所述卫通基站在卫星网络中进行通信数据传输;The communication data transmission module is used to encapsulate the anonymous identity into a data frame during the data communication process after completing the access authentication with the satellite communication base station, and use the session key to encrypt the data to be transmitted, And use the integrity protection key to calculate the message authentication code, and carry out communication data transmission in the satellite network through the Satcom base station;
令牌更新请求模块,用于在需要进行令牌更新时,根据待更新的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合所述系统公共参数和域内公共参数,生成所述令牌更新第一请求信息,并将所述令牌更新第一请求信息发送至卫通基站;The token update request module is used to generate the token update first parameter according to the token first parameter and the token second parameter to be updated, combined with the system public parameters and the public parameters in the domain, when the token update needs to be performed. a request message, and send the token update first request message to the Satcom base station;
令牌更新响应处理模块,用于接收并校验所述令牌更新响应信息,在所述令牌更新响应信息校验通过的情况下,计算并验证令牌更新响应校验参数是否正确,且验证更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数是否满足指定关系,在验证通过的情况下,对更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数进行安全存储。a token update response processing module, configured to receive and verify the token update response information, calculate and verify whether the token update response verification parameters are correct when the token update response information is verified successfully, and Verify whether the updated first parameter of the token and the updated second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship, and in the case of passing the verification, perform security on the updated first parameter of the token and the updated second parameter of the token storage.
第九方面,本发明提供一种终端设备,包括存储器、处理器、收发器;In a ninth aspect, the present invention provides a terminal device, including a memory, a processor, and a transceiver;
所述存储器存储计算机执行指令;the memory stores computer-executable instructions;
所述处理器执行所述存储器存储的计算机执行指令,使得所述处理器执行如上所述的结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法;The processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory, so that the processor executes the above-mentioned method for handling violations of satellite network users in combination with access authentication;
所述收发器用于接收外部设备发送的信息以及向外部设备发送信息。The transceiver is used for receiving information sent by an external device and sending information to the external device.
第十方面,本发明提供一种计算机可读存储介质,所述计算机可读存储介质中存储有计算机执行指令,所述计算机执行指令被处理器执行时,用于实现如上所述的结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法。In a tenth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, where computer-executable instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, are used to implement the above-mentioned combined access How to deal with violations by certified satellite network users.
本发明提供的结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法及相关设备,通过网络前端的各卫通基站来完成对大量用户端的高频次接入认证,以缓解中心式认证容易产生的单点故障风险与性能瓶颈,减少认证传输时延;在接入认证通过后,用户端结合认证的匿名身份进行数据通信,卫通基站结合缓存的匿名身份与令牌第一参数,进行违规检测与初步判定,并对存在较低等级违规行为的用户端进行处理;对于存在较高等级违规行为的用户端,则由卫星网络中心在进一步的违规判定后,计算违规用户端的真实身份,更新有关黑名单,并联合各卫通基站进行违规处理,从而在兼顾用户接入身份匿名性的同时,也便于在发现违规行为后进行违规追溯与处理。The method and related equipment for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication provided by the present invention completes high-frequency access authentication for a large number of users through each satellite communication base station at the front end of the network, so as to alleviate the single point that is easily generated by centralized authentication. Failure risks and performance bottlenecks, reducing the authentication transmission delay; after the access authentication is passed, the user terminal combines the authenticated anonymous identity for data communication, and the Satcom base station combines the cached anonymous identity and the first parameter of the token to conduct violation detection and preliminary Judgment, and deal with the users with lower-level violations; for users with higher-level violations, the satellite network center will calculate the real identities of the violating users and update the relevant blacklist after further violation judgments. , and cooperate with each Satcom base station to handle violations, so that while taking into account the anonymity of user access identities, it is also convenient to trace and deal with violations after violations are discovered.
附图说明Description of drawings
此处的附图被并入说明书中并构成本说明书的一部分,示出了符合本公开的实施例,并与说明书一起用于解释本公开的原理。The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the disclosure and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the disclosure.
图1为本发明实现结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的场景示意图;Fig. 1 is the scene schematic diagram that the present invention realizes the satellite network user violation processing method combined with access authentication;
图2为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的第一实施例的总体流程示意图;FIG. 2 is a schematic overall flow chart of the first embodiment of the method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication according to the present invention;
图3为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法第二实施例的接入认证流程示意图;3 is a schematic diagram of the access authentication flow of the second embodiment of the satellite network user violation processing method combined with access authentication according to the present invention;
图4为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法第三实施例的违规检测与处理流程示意图;4 is a schematic diagram of a violation detection and processing flow diagram of a third embodiment of a method for processing violations of satellite network users in combination with access authentication according to the present invention;
图5为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法第四实施例的令牌更新流程示意图;FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a token update process according to the fourth embodiment of the method for processing violations of satellite network users in combination with access authentication according to the present invention;
图6为本发明卫星网络中心的模块示意图;Fig. 6 is the module schematic diagram of the satellite network center of the present invention;
图7为本发明通信卫星的模块示意图;Fig. 7 is the module schematic diagram of the communication satellite of the present invention;
图8为本发明卫通基站的模块示意图;8 is a schematic diagram of a module of a Satcom base station of the present invention;
图9为本发明用户端的模块示意图;Fig. 9 is the module schematic diagram of the user terminal of the present invention;
图10为本发明终端设备的结构示意图。FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device of the present invention.
通过上述附图,已示出本公开明确的实施例,后文中将有更详细的描述。这些附图和文字描述并不是为了通过任何方式限制本公开构思的范围,而是通过参考特定实施例为本领域技术人员说明本公开的概念。The above-mentioned drawings have shown clear embodiments of the present disclosure, and will be described in more detail hereinafter. These drawings and written descriptions are not intended to limit the scope of the disclosed concepts in any way, but rather to illustrate the disclosed concepts to those skilled in the art by referring to specific embodiments.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
这里将详细地对示例性实施例进行说明,其示例表示在附图中。下面的描述涉及附图时,除非另有表示,不同附图中的相同数字表示相同或相似的要素。以下示例性实施例中所描述的实施方式并不代表与本公开相一致的所有实施方式。相反,它们仅是与如所附权利要求书中所详述的、本公开的一些方面相一致的装置和方法的例子。Exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. Where the following description refers to the drawings, the same numerals in different drawings refer to the same or similar elements unless otherwise indicated. The implementations described in the illustrative examples below are not intended to represent all implementations consistent with this disclosure. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatus and methods consistent with some aspects of the present disclosure as recited in the appended claims.
本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法及相关设备。The invention provides a satellite network user violation processing method and related equipment combined with access authentication.
参照图1,图1为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的场景示意图。Referring to FIG. 1 , FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario of a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication according to the present invention.
其中,卫通基站3000通过星地链路与通信卫星2000进行通信;通信卫星2000根据有关路由选择算法,经星间链路与下一跳通信卫星2000进行通信,或者经星地链路与卫星网络中心1000及其附属信关站(未标示)进行通信;Among them, the satellite
卫通基站3000、通信卫星2000、卫星网络中心1000之间,已预先完成相互认证、会话密钥与完整性保护密钥的协商,并建立了系统安全信道;Between
用户端4000可在与卫通基站3000完成双向接入认证之后,接入卫星网络进行数据通信;卫通基站3000结合接入认证后缓存的用户匿名身份,根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,在用户端4000进行违规检测、初步判定与处理;The
卫通基站3000对于存在较低违规等级的用户端4000进行违规处理;对于疑似存在较高违规等级的用户端4000,查询缓存的用户匿名身份所对应的令牌第一参数,并生成违规判定请求信息;然后,经若干跳通信卫星2000、信关站(未标示),将所述违规判定请求信息转发给卫星网络中心1000;卫星网络中心1000根据有关违规判定方法和标准,给出最终的违规判定结果,据此更新黑名单,生成令牌黑名单更新信息,并经信关站(未标示)、通信卫星2000,广播给各卫通基站3000;卫通基站3000根据所述令牌黑名单信息,对违规用户端4000进行违规处理。The
下面以具体地实施例对本发明的技术方案以及本申请的技术方案如何解决上述技术问题进行详细说明。下面这几个具体的实施例可以相互结合,对于相同或相似的概念或过程可能在某些实施例中不再赘述。下面将结合附图,对本发明的实施例进行描述。The technical solutions of the present invention and how the technical solutions of the present application solve the above-mentioned technical problems will be described in detail below with specific examples. The following specific embodiments may be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be repeated in some embodiments. Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
本发明提供一种结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法及其总体流程。The present invention provides a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication and its overall flow.
参照图2,图2为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的第一实施例。其中包括以下步骤:Referring to FIG. 2 , FIG. 2 is a first embodiment of a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication according to the present invention. It includes the following steps:
步骤S10,卫星网络中心作为信任根节点,在系统初始化阶段,配置自身的节点标识、公私钥对、数字证书,并为各通信卫星、卫通基站配置节点标识、数字证书,且与各通信卫星、卫通基站完成相互认证,以及会话密钥与完整性保护密钥的协商,从而建立系统安全信道。Step S10, the satellite network center, as a trust root node, configures its own node identifier, public-private key pair, and digital certificate in the system initialization stage, and configures node identifiers and digital certificates for each communication satellite and satellite base station, and communicates with each communication satellite. , Satcom base station completes mutual authentication, and negotiation of session key and integrity protection key to establish a system security channel.
具体的,可以参考目前已发展较为成熟的PKI 公钥加密体系等有关技术,此处不再展开详述。Specifically, you can refer to the relatively mature PKI public key encryption system and other related technologies, which will not be described in detail here.
步骤S20,卫星网络中心定期更新系统公共参数,并通过信关站、通信卫星、卫通基站进行全网广播,卫通基站定期更新域内公共参数,并向域内用户端进行广播。In step S20, the satellite network center regularly updates the public parameters of the system, and broadcasts the whole network through the gateway station, communication satellite, and Satcom base station.
其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;Wherein, the system public parameters include at least: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, token public verification parameters, validity period of the token public verification parameters, satellite The communication encryption parameters of the network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center;
所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数以及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限;The public parameters in the domain include at least: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station;
卫星网络中心定期更新系统公共参数,并生成系统参数更新信息;然后,经信关站、通信卫星、卫通基站,将所述系统参数更新信息广播给全网的用户端;The satellite network center regularly updates the public parameters of the system, and generates system parameter update information; then, the system parameter update information is broadcast to the users of the entire network through the gateway station, communication satellite, and satellite base station;
其中,各卫通基站、用户端在接收到所述系统参数更新信息后,对其进行消息来源与完整性校验;并在所述消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,对其中的系统公共参数进行存储。Among them, after receiving the system parameter update information, each Satcom base station and user terminal will perform message source and integrity verification on it; and if the message source and integrity verification pass, the System public parameters are stored.
在本实施例中,所述系统参数更新信息可参考如下:In this embodiment, the system parameter update information may refer to the following:
{ IDNOCC||TYPE||LT1||G||N||LT2||PK0||K||LT3||RNOCC||SIGNNOCC }{ ID NOCC ||TYPE||LT 1 ||G||N||LT 2 ||PK 0 ||K||LT 3 ||R NOCC ||SIGN NOCC }
其中,{}内表示信息中包含的参数有哪些(以下不再赘述);||表示参数拼接操作(以下不再赘述);IDNOCC为卫星网络中心的节点标识;TYPE为消息类型码,具体的,此处可将TYPE字段设置为“000”以代表系统参数更新信息;G为椭圆曲线的生成元,N为G的阶数;LT1为卫星网络中心为N、G配置的有效期限;此外,卫星网络中心从循环加法群中分别选取三个不同的安全随机数SK0、k、rNOCC,然后计算:认证令牌校验公钥PK0=SK0·G、认证令牌公共参数K= k·G,以及卫星网络中心通信加密参数RNOCC= rNOCC·G;并为PK0、K配置有效期限LT2;为RNOCC配置有效期限LT3;SIGNNOCC为卫星网络中心对该消息计算的数字签名。Among them, {} indicates which parameters are included in the information (not repeated below); || indicates the parameter splicing operation (not repeated below); ID NOCC is the node identifier of the satellite network center; TYPE is the message type code, specific , the TYPE field can be set to "000" here to represent the system parameter update information; G is the generator of the elliptic curve, N is the order of G; LT 1 is the validity period of the satellite network center configuration for N and G; In addition, the satellite network center selects three different secure random numbers SK 0 , k and r NOCC from the cyclic addition group, and then calculates: authentication token verification public key PK 0 =SK 0 ·G, authentication token public parameters K=k·G, and the communication encryption parameter R NOCC = r NOCC ·G of the satellite network center; and configure the validity period LT 2 for PK 0 and K; configure the validity period LT 3 for R NOCC ; SIGN NOCC is the satellite network center for this The digital signature of the message computation.
此外,卫通基站定期配置域内公共参数,生成域内参数更新信息,并向域内的用户端进行广播;In addition, the satellite base station regularly configures the public parameters in the domain, generates parameter update information in the domain, and broadcasts it to the users in the domain;
在本实施例中,域内参数更新信息可参考如下:In this embodiment, the parameter update information in the domain can be referred to as follows:
{ IDSTB||type||LT4||RSTB||SIGNSTB }{ ID STB ||type||LT 4 ||R STB ||SIGN STB }
其中,IDSTB为卫通基站的节点标识;type为消息类型码,具体的,此处可将type字段设置为“000”以代表域内参数更新信息;卫通基站先从循环加法群中选取一个安全随机数rSTB,然后,计算卫通基站通信加密参数RSTB= rSTB·G,其中G为所述椭圆曲线的生成元;LT4是卫通基站为RSTB配置的有效期限;SIGNSTB是卫通基站对该消息计算的数字签名;Among them, ID STB is the node identifier of the Satcom base station; type is the message type code. Specifically, the type field can be set to "000" here to represent the parameter update information in the domain; the Satcom base station first selects one from the cyclic addition group. Secure random number r STB , then, calculate the communication encryption parameter of Satcom base station R STB = r STB · G, where G is the generator of the elliptic curve; LT 4 is the validity period configured by Satcom base station for R STB ; SIGN STB is the digital signature calculated by the Satcom base station for the message;
通过定期对系统公共参数和域内公共参数进行更新和广播,可消减长期使用固定参数而可能产生的安全性隐患。By regularly updating and broadcasting the public parameters of the system and the public parameters in the domain, the potential security risks caused by the long-term use of fixed parameters can be reduced.
需要说明的是,在本公开的所有实施例中,TYPE用以指代卫星网络中心的消息类型码,type用以指代卫通基站或通信卫星的消息类型码,特此说明,以示区分,后续不再进行赘述。It should be noted that, in all the embodiments of the present disclosure, TYPE is used to refer to the message type code of the satellite network center, and type is used to refer to the message type code of the satellite communication base station or the communication satellite. No further description will be given subsequently.
步骤S30,用户端在初次申请入网时,经安全信道向卫星网络中心发送注册请求信息,卫星网络中心接收并校验通过后,为所述用户端配置在网络中唯一的真实身份,以及具备有效期限的令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数,并以注册响应信息返回给所述用户端,用户端对所述真实身份、令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数进行安全存储。In step S30, when the user terminal applies for network access for the first time, the registration request information is sent to the satellite network center through the secure channel. After the satellite network center receives and passes the verification, the user terminal is configured with a unique real identity in the network, and has a valid identity. The first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token are returned to the user terminal with the registration response information, and the user terminal securely stores the real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the second parameter of the token.
其中,所述注册请求信息可以包括但不限于:用户端的出厂编号等具有全网唯一性的初始身份标识,以及用以校验所述初始身份标识真伪的初始校验信息;Wherein, the registration request information may include, but is not limited to: an initial identity identifier with unique network-wide uniqueness, such as the factory serial number of the client, and initial verification information used to verify the authenticity of the initial identity identifier;
所述真实身份具有全网唯一性,所述令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数具有一定的有效期限,其最长有效期限由目前系统公共参数的有效期限决定。The real identity is unique in the whole network, the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token have a certain validity period, and the longest validity period is determined by the validity period of the current system public parameters.
在本实施例中,所述真实身份、令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数的计算如下:In this embodiment, the real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the second parameter of the token are calculated as follows:
UID= Hash(IDe||info||RAND) 【1】UID= Hash(ID e ||info||RAND) [1]
α= fsym(KEYNOCC , UID||LT2||rand) 【2】α= f sym (KEY NOCC , UID||LT 2 ||rand) [2]
θ= α·SK0 + k (mod N) 【3】θ= α·SK 0 + k (mod N) [3]
其中,UID、α、θ分别为网络中心为用户端配置的真实身份、令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数;Hash( )表示哈希函数;fsym表示对称加密算法;||表示对参数进行拼接操作(以下不再赘述),“·”表示椭圆曲线上的点乘运算(以下不再赘述),“+”表示椭圆曲线上的点加运算(以下不再赘述);mod为取余数运算(以下不再赘述);IDe为所述初始身份标识;info为所述初始校验信息;RAND、rand分别表示不同的随机数;KEYNOCC是卫星网络中心选取的安全注册密钥;N、LT2、SK0、k是步骤S20中所涉及的参数。Among them, UID, α, θ are the real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the second parameter of the token configured by the network center for the client respectively; Hash( ) represents the hash function; f sym represents the symmetric encryption algorithm; || represents the pair The parameters are spliced (not repeated below), "·" represents the point multiplication operation on the elliptic curve (not repeated below), "+" represents the point addition operation on the elliptic curve (not repeated below); mod is the Remainder operation (not repeated below); ID e is the initial identification; info is the initial verification information; RAND and rand represent different random numbers respectively; KEY NOCC is the security registration key selected by the satellite network center; N, LT 2 , SK 0 , and k are parameters involved in step S20.
步骤S40,用户端在需要接入卫星网络时,根据令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合所述系统公共参数、域内公共参数,以及有关接入认证参数,计算匿名身份,并与附近的卫通基站进行双向接入认证。Step S40, when the user terminal needs to access the satellite network, according to the first parameter of the token, the second parameter of the token, combined with the public parameters of the system, the public parameters in the domain, and the relevant access authentication parameters, calculate the anonymous identity, and match it with the user. The nearby Satcom base station conducts two-way access authentication.
其中,所述有关接入认证参数可以包括但不限于:时间戳、随机数;Wherein, the relevant access authentication parameters may include but are not limited to: timestamp, random number;
所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The system public parameters include at least: basic cryptography parameters for encryption and decryption, validity period of the basic cryptography parameters, token public verification parameters, validity period of the token public verification parameters, satellite network center The communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the satellite network center;
所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数以及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限;The public parameters in the domain include at least: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station;
需要说明的是,步骤S40中所涉及的接入认证流程,将结合图3的第二实施例,在步骤S41~S44中给出进一步的具体说明。It should be noted that the access authentication process involved in step S40 will be further detailed in steps S41 to S44 in conjunction with the second embodiment of FIG. 3 .
步骤S50,用户端通过所述卫通基站接入卫星网络,并结合此次认证的匿名身份、计算出的会话密钥、完整性保护密钥进行通信数据传输。Step S50, the user terminal accesses the satellite network through the Satcom base station, and transmits communication data in combination with the authenticated anonymous identity, the calculated session key, and the integrity protection key.
具体的,封装的通信数据中至少包含以下字段:Specifically, the encapsulated communication data contains at least the following fields:
{ PID||EncData||MACU }{ PID||EncData||MAC U }
其中,PID为所述用户端此次认证的匿名身份,在接入认证通过后,分别缓存于所述用户端和卫通基站;EncData为所述用户端使用会话密钥,对通信数据进行对称加密后的加密数据;MACU为所述用户端使用完整性保护密钥计算出的消息认证码,以用于消息完整性校验;Among them, PID is the anonymous identity of the authentication of the client, and after the access authentication is passed, it is cached in the client and the Satcom base station respectively; EncData is the session key used by the client to symmetric the communication data Encrypted encrypted data; MAC U is the message authentication code calculated by the user terminal using the integrity protection key, to be used for message integrity verification;
在本次数据通信结束后,所述卫通基站断开与所述用户端的通信连接,并删除缓存的所述用户匿名身份;当所述用户端后续需要接入卫星通信网络时,需要再次进行接入认证。After this data communication ends, the satellite communication base station disconnects the communication connection with the user terminal, and deletes the cached anonymous identity of the user; when the user terminal needs to access the satellite communication network in the future, it needs to be performed again. Access authentication.
步骤S60,卫通基站根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,结合接入认证后缓存的匿名身份与令牌第一参数,对接入用户端进行违规检测、初步判定与处理,必要时联合卫星网络中心做进一步的违规判定与处理。Step S60, according to the relevant violation detection methods and judgment standards, and in combination with the anonymous identity cached after the access authentication and the first parameter of the token, the satellite network base station performs violation detection, preliminary judgment and processing on the access client, and if necessary, cooperates with the satellite network. The center will make further violation judgment and processing.
需要说明的是,步骤S60中所涉及的违规检测与处理流程,将结合图4的第三实施例,在步骤S61~S66中给出进一步的具体说明。It should be noted that, the violation detection and processing flow involved in step S60 will be further detailed in steps S61 to S66 in conjunction with the third embodiment of FIG. 4 .
步骤S70,当需要进行令牌更新时,用户端根据待更新的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数、结合系统公共参数、域内公共参数,以及有关令牌更新请求校验参数,生成令牌更新第一请求信息,经卫通基站校验后生成令牌更新第二请求信息,经若干跳通信卫星、信关站发送至卫星网络中心,卫星网络中心接收并校验通过后,为所述用户端配置新的第一参数与令牌第二参数。Step S70, when the token update needs to be performed, the user terminal generates a token according to the first parameter of the token to be updated, the second parameter of the token, the public parameters of the combined system, the public parameters in the domain, and the verification parameters of the relevant token update request. The first request information for card update is generated after verification by the satellite base station, and the second request information for token update is generated, which is sent to the satellite network center through several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations. The user terminal configures the new first parameter and the token second parameter.
其中,所述有关令牌更新请求校验参数至少包含:真实身份、令牌第一参数以及令牌剩余可更新次数;Wherein, the relevant token update request verification parameters at least include: real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the remaining number of times the token can be updated;
需要说明的是,步骤S70中所涉及的令牌更新流程,将结合图5的第四实施例中,在步骤S71~S76中给出进一步的具体说明。It should be noted that, the token update process involved in step S70 will be further detailed in steps S71 to S76 in conjunction with the fourth embodiment of FIG. 5 .
本发明提供结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法中所涉及的接入认证流程。The present invention provides an access authentication process involved in a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication.
参照图3,图3为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的第二实施例。其中包括以下步骤:Referring to FIG. 3 , FIG. 3 is a second embodiment of a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication according to the present invention. It includes the following steps:
步骤S41,当用户端需要接入网络时,根据安全存储的令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数,结合系统公共参数与域内公共参数,计算此次的匿名身份,并生成接入认证请求信息发送给附近的卫通基站。Step S41, when the user terminal needs to access the network, according to the securely stored first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token, combined with the public parameters of the system and the public parameters in the domain, calculate the anonymous identity this time, and generate an access authentication request The information is sent to a nearby Satcom base station.
具体的,在本实施例中,所述接入认证请求信息可参考如下格式:Specifically, in this embodiment, the access authentication request information may refer to the following format:
{ T1 || RU ||Xα||λ}{ T 1 || R U ||X α ||λ}
其中,T1为接入认证请求时间戳;RU为接入认证第一加密参数;Xα为加密的令牌第一参数;λ为令牌第二参数的校验参数。所涉及的参数计算如下:Wherein, T 1 is the access authentication request timestamp; R U is the first encryption parameter of the access authentication; X α is the encrypted first parameter of the token; λ is the verification parameter of the second parameter of the token. The parameters involved are calculated as follows:
RU=rU·G 【4】R U =r U ·G [4]
Xα= α⊕H(rU·RSTB) 【5】X α = α⊕H(r U · R STB ) 【5】
PID= hash(α)⊕hash(rU·RSTB) 【6】PID= hash(α)⊕hash(r U · R STB ) 【6】
β= H(T1||RU||α||PID) 【7】β= H(T 1 ||R U ||α||PID) 【7】
λ= θ+β·rU (mod N) 【8】λ= θ+β·r U (mod N) [8]
其中,所述公式【4】~【8】中涉及的参数与符号含义如下:||表示参数拼接操作(以下不再赘述);⊕表示按位异或运算(以下不再赘述),hash( )、H( )表示哈希函数(以下不再赘述);mod表示取余数运算(以下不再赘述);rU为用户端生成的接入认证秘密随机数,α为令牌第一参数;PID为用户端此次接入认证的匿名身份;β是中间参数;θ为令牌第二参数;G、N、RSTB为步骤S20中所述的参数。Among them, the meanings of the parameters and symbols involved in the formulas [4]~[8] are as follows: || represents the parameter splicing operation (not repeated below); ⊕ represents the bitwise XOR operation (not repeated below), hash( ), H( ) represent the hash function (not repeated below); mod represents the remainder operation (not repeated below); r U is the access authentication secret random number generated by the client, and α is the first parameter of the token; PID is the anonymous identity of the user terminal for this access authentication; β is an intermediate parameter; θ is the second parameter of the token; G, N, R STB are the parameters described in step S20.
步骤S42,卫通基站接收并校验所述接入认证请求信息,并结合所述系统公共参数与所述域内公共参数,计算匿名身份,且验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系。Step S42, the satellite communication base station receives and verifies the access authentication request information, and combines the public parameters of the system with the public parameters in the domain, calculates the anonymous identity, and verifies the difference between the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token. Check whether the parameters satisfy the specified relationship.
在本实施例中,卫通基站先通过| T2-T1 | 是否小于ΔtSTB来校验接入认证请求信息的新鲜度;其中,T2为卫通基站接收到所述接入认证请求信息时的时间戳;ΔtSTB为卫通基站既定的时间间隔;In this embodiment, the Satcom base station first checks the freshness of the access authentication request information by whether | T 2 -T 1 | is less than Δt STB ; where T 2 is the access authentication request received by the Satcom base station The time stamp of the information; Δt STB is the time interval set by the Satcom base station;
在所述新鲜度验证通过的情况下(| T2-T1 | 小于于ΔtSTB通过校验),计算令牌第一参数α= Xα⊕H(RU·rSTB);其中,Xα、RU为分别为步骤S41中所述的加密的令牌第一参数、接入认证第一加密参数;rSTB为步骤S20中所述的参数;In the case that the freshness verification passes (| T 2 -T 1 | is less than Δt STB passes the verification), the first parameter of the calculation token α= X α ⊕H(R U ·r STB ); wherein, X α and R U are respectively the encrypted first parameter of the token and the first encrypted parameter of the access authentication described in step S41; r STB is the parameter described in step S20;
然后,查验α是否在令牌黑名单之列;若α不在令牌黑名单,计算此次的用户匿名身份PID= hash(α)⊕hash(RU·rSTB),以及中间参数β= H(T1||RU||α||PID);然后,校验公式【9】:λ·G=α·PK0+K+β·RU 是否成立;其中,G、PK0、K、rSTB为步骤S20中所述的参数;Then, check whether α is in the token blacklist; if α is not in the token blacklist, calculate the user's anonymous identity PID= hash(α)⊕hash(R U ·r STB ), and the intermediate parameter β= H (T 1 ||R U ||α||PID); then, check the formula [9]: λ·G=α·PK 0 +K+β·R U is established; among them, G, PK 0 , K , r STB are the parameters described in step S20;
在公式【9】成立的情况下,则表明所述令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数满足指定关系,进而表明所述用户端的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数是结合了卫星网络中心的私钥而计算出的合法有效令牌参数,可允许所述用户端接入卫星通信网络。When formula [9] is established, it indicates that the verification parameters of the first token parameter and the second token parameter satisfy the specified relationship, and further indicates that the first token parameter and the second token parameter of the user end It is a legal and valid token parameter calculated in combination with the private key of the satellite network center, which allows the user terminal to access the satellite communication network.
步骤S43,在所述令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数满足指定关系的情况下,卫通基站缓存此次认证的用户匿名身份与令牌第一参数,并生成接入认证响应信息发送至所述用户端,且生成通信参数传输信息,经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,发送至卫星网络中心。Step S43, in the case that the verification parameters of the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship, the Satcom base station caches the user's anonymous identity and the first parameter of the token for this authentication, and generates an access token. The authentication response information is sent to the user terminal, and communication parameter transmission information is generated, and sent to the satellite network center through several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations.
具体的,在本实施例中,所述接入认证响应信息可参考如下格式:{ T2||RES };其中,T2是卫通基站接收到所述接入认证请求信息时的时间戳;RES = H( T2||β);β是步骤S42中计算出的中间参数。Specifically, in this embodiment, the access authentication response information may refer to the following format: { T 2 ||RES }; where T 2 is the timestamp when the Satcom base station receives the access authentication request information ; RES = H( T 2 ||β); β is the intermediate parameter calculated in step S42.
所述有关通信参数至少包含:PID||RU;所述通信参数传输信息可参考如下格式:{ IDSTB||type||CSTB||MACSTB };The relevant communication parameters at least include: PID|| RU ; the communication parameter transmission information may refer to the following format: { ID STB ||type||C STB ||MAC STB };
其中,CSTB = fsym(EKSTB-SAT, PID||RU),where C STB = f sym (EK STB-SAT , PID||R U ),
MACSTB= fint(IKSTB-SAT, IDSTB|| type||CSTB);MAC STB = f int (IK STB-SAT , ID STB || type||C STB );
其中,IDSTB为所述卫通基站的节点标识;type为消息类型码,具体的,此处可将type字段设置为“111”以代表通信参数传输信息;CSTB为卫通基站加密后的通信参数;MACSTB为卫通基站计算的消息认证码;fsym为对称加密算法,fint为完整性保护算法;EKSTB-SAT 、IKSTB-SAT分别为系统安全信道建立后,卫通基站与通信卫星之间协商出的会话密钥、完整性保护密钥;Among them, the ID STB is the node identifier of the Satcom base station; type is the message type code. Specifically, the type field can be set to "111" here to represent the communication parameter transmission information; C STB is the encrypted data of the Satcom base station. Communication parameters ; MAC STB is the message authentication code calculated by the Satcom base station; f sym is the symmetric encryption algorithm, and f int is the integrity protection algorithm; The session key and the integrity protection key negotiated with the communication satellite;
通信卫星收到所述通信参数传输信息后,先校验其中的消息认证码MACSTB,然后解密CSTB得出PID||RU;并缓存其中的PID,以允许对应的用户数据在网络中传输;然后,进行类似的计算,随后根据有关路由选择算法,将处理后的通信参数传输信息:{ IDSAT||type||CSAT ||MACSAT }转发给卫星网络中心的附属信关站,或者下一跳通信卫星;After the communication satellite receives the communication parameter transmission information, it first checks the message authentication code MAC STB therein, and then decrypts the CSTB to obtain PID|| RU ; and caches the PID therein to allow corresponding user data to be stored in the network Then, perform a similar calculation, and then forward the processed communication parameter transmission information: { ID SAT ||type||C SAT ||MAC SAT } to the affiliated gateway station of the satellite network center according to the relevant routing algorithm. , or the next hop communication satellite;
其中,IDSAT为所述通信卫星的节点标识;type为消息类型码,具体的,此处可将type字段设置为“111”以代表通信参数传输信息;CSAT = fsym(EKSAT-NOCC, PID||RU) ,MACSAT=fint(IKSAT-NOCC,IDSAT||type||CSAT);其中,CSAT为通信卫星加密后的通信参数;MACSAT为通信卫星计算的消息认证码;fsym为对称加密算法,fint为完整性保护算法;EKSAT-NOCC、IKSAT-NOCC分别为系统安全信道建立后,通信卫星与卫星网络中心之间协商出的会话密钥、完整性保护密钥;Wherein, ID SAT is the node identification of the communication satellite; type is the message type code, specifically, the type field can be set to "111" here to represent the communication parameter transmission information; C SAT = f sym (EK SAT-NOCC , PID||R U ) , MAC SAT =f int (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT ||type||C SAT ); where C SAT is the encrypted communication parameter of the communication satellite; MAC SAT is calculated by the communication satellite message authentication code; f sym is a symmetric encryption algorithm, f int is an integrity protection algorithm; EK SAT-NOCC and IK SAT-NOCC are the session keys negotiated between the communication satellite and the satellite network center after the system security channel is established respectively. , integrity protection key;
卫星网络中心在接收到所述通信参数传输信息后,先校验其中的消息认证码MACSAT;然后,解密CSAT得出PID||RU;再计算KEYS=H(RU·rNOCC),其中rNOCC为步骤S20中所述的参数;取KEYS的高16位即为会话密钥EK,取KEYS的低16位即为完整性保护密钥IK;然后,缓存PID、EK、IK,以用于数据通信过程。After receiving the described communication parameter transmission information, the satellite network center first checks the message authentication code MAC SAT wherein; then, decrypts C SAT and obtains PID||R U ; calculates KEYS=H(R U ·r NOCC ) again , wherein r NOCC is the parameter described in step S20; take the high 16 bits of KEYS to be the session key EK, and take the low 16 bits of KEYS to be the integrity protection key IK; then, cache PID, EK, IK, for the data communication process.
步骤S44,用户端根据所述接入认证响应信息,对所述卫通基站进行认证,在认证通过的情况下,计算出会话密钥与完整性保护密钥,并对所述匿名身份、会话密钥、完整性保护密钥进行安全存储。Step S44, the user terminal authenticates the Satcom base station according to the access authentication response information, and in the case of passing the authentication, calculates the session key and the integrity protection key, and verifies the anonymous identity, session Keys, integrity-protected keys for secure storage.
具体的,在本实施例中,用户端先通过| T3-T2 | 是否小于 ΔtU来校验接入认证响应信息的新鲜度;其中,T3为用户端接收到所述接入认证响应信息时的时间戳,ΔtU为用户端既定的时间间隔;Specifically, in this embodiment, the user terminal first checks the freshness of the access authentication response information by whether | T 3 -T 2 | is less than Δt U ; where T 3 is when the user terminal receives the access authentication Timestamp when responding to information, Δt U is the time interval set by the client;
若所述新鲜度校验通过(| T3-T2 | 小于 ΔtU通过校验),则校验公式【10】:RES =H(T2||β)是否成立。其中,β为步骤S41中所述的中间参数;If the freshness check passes (| T 3 -T 2 | is less than Δt U passes the check), then check whether the formula [10]: RES =H(T 2 ||β) holds. Wherein, β is the intermediate parameter described in step S41;
在公式【10】校验通过的情况下,用户端计算:KEYS=H(rU·RNOCC),其中RNOCC为步骤S20中所述的参数;rU为步骤S41中所述的接入认证秘密随机数;然后,取KEYS的高16位即为会话密钥EK,取KEYS的低16位即为完整性保护密钥IK;并安全存储PID、EK、IK,以用于数据通信过程。In the case that the verification of formula [10] is passed, the user terminal calculates: KEYS=H(r U · R NOCC ), where R NOCC is the parameter described in step S20; r U is the access described in step S41 Authentication secret random number; then, taking the high 16 bits of KEYS is the session key EK, and taking the low 16 bits of KEYS is the integrity protection key IK; and securely store PID, EK, IK for data communication process .
由此,所述用户端与卫通基站之间完成双向接入认证。Thus, two-way access authentication is completed between the user terminal and the Satcom base station.
步骤S50,用户端通过所述卫通基站接入卫星网络,并结合此次认证的匿名身份,以及计算出的会话密钥与完整性保护密钥,进行通信数据传输。In step S50, the user terminal accesses the satellite network through the satellite network, and transmits communication data in combination with the anonymous identity authenticated this time, and the calculated session key and integrity protection key.
用户端在完成步骤S41~S44的接入认证流程后,接下来可接入卫星通信网络,进行通信数据传输。After completing the access authentication process in steps S41 to S44, the user terminal can then access the satellite communication network for communication data transmission.
具体的,封装的通信数据中至少包含以下字段:Specifically, the encapsulated communication data contains at least the following fields:
{ PID||EncData||MACU }{ PID||EncData||MAC U }
其中,PID为所述用户端此次认证的匿名身份,在接入认证通过后,分别缓存于所述用户端和卫通基站;EncData为所述用户端使用会话密钥,对通信数据进行对称加密后的加密数据;MACU为所述用户端使用完整性保护密钥计算出的消息认证码,以用于消息完整性校验;Among them, PID is the anonymous identity of the authentication of the client, and after the access authentication is passed, it is cached in the client and the Satcom base station respectively; EncData is the session key used by the client to symmetric the communication data Encrypted encrypted data; MAC U is the message authentication code calculated by the user terminal using the integrity protection key, to be used for message integrity verification;
在本次数据通信结束的情况下,所述卫通基站断开与所述用户端的通信连接,并删除缓存的所述用户匿名身份,当所述用户端后续需要接入卫星通信网络时,需要再次进行接入认证。When this data communication ends, the satellite communication base station disconnects the communication connection with the user terminal, and deletes the cached anonymous identity of the user. When the user terminal needs to access the satellite communication network in the future, it needs to Perform access authentication again.
本发明提供结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法中所涉及的违规检测与处理流程。The present invention provides a violation detection and processing flow involved in a satellite network user violation processing method combined with access authentication.
参照图4,图4为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的第三实施例。其中包括以下步骤:Referring to FIG. 4 , FIG. 4 is a third embodiment of a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication according to the present invention. It includes the following steps:
步骤S61,卫通基站根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,结合接入认证后缓存的用户匿名身份与令牌第一参数,对接入用户端进行违规检测与初步判定。Step S61, according to the relevant violation detection methods and judgment criteria, and in combination with the user anonymous identity cached after the access authentication and the first parameter of the token, the Satcom base station performs violation detection and preliminary judgment on the access client.
其中,卫通基站可根据缓存的用户匿名身份PID,结合步骤S50中所述的用户通信数据封装内容,对于其中未正确包含已认证PID字段的用户数据进行过滤;将其中正确包含有已认证PID字段的用户数据,转发给域内的通信卫星;Wherein, according to the cached user anonymous identity PID, the satellite base station can filter the user data that does not contain the authenticated PID field correctly in combination with the user communication data encapsulation content described in step S50; User data in the field, forwarded to communication satellites in the field;
此外,卫通基站可将用户数据中封装的PID字段作为特征字段,结合缓存的对应令牌第一参数,根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,对所述用户端进行违规检测与初步判定;In addition, the Satcom base station can use the PID field encapsulated in the user data as a feature field, combined with the cached first parameter of the corresponding token, and perform violation detection and preliminary judgment on the user terminal according to the relevant violation detection methods and judgment criteria;
其中,所述违规检测方法可以基于但不限于以下原理:相关性分析、聚类分析、KL散度,等等。Wherein, the violation detection method may be based on but not limited to the following principles: correlation analysis, cluster analysis, KL divergence, and so on.
步骤S62,在卫通基站检测到用户端存在第三等级、第四等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送提示信息,并暂停或终断与所述用户端的此次通信连接。Step S62 , when the Satcom base station detects that the user terminal has third-level and fourth-level violations, it sends a prompt message to the user terminal, and suspends or terminates the communication connection with the user terminal.
其中,在卫通基站判定所述用户端存在第三等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送第三提示信息,终断与所述用户端的此次通信连接,并删除缓存中的所述匿名身份;Wherein, when the Satcom base station determines that the user terminal has a third-level violation, it sends a third prompt message to the user terminal, terminates the communication connection with the user terminal, and deletes all the cached data. anonymity;
所述第三提示信息用于指示连接断开的原因是所述用户端存在第三等级违规行为,再次建立通信连接需要重新进行接入认证;The third prompt information is used to indicate that the reason for the disconnection is that the user terminal has a third-level violation, and re-establishing a communication connection requires re-access authentication;
其中,在卫通基站判定所述用户端存在第四等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送第四提示信息,并暂停与所述用户端的通信连接;Wherein, when the Satcom base station determines that the user terminal has a fourth-level violation, it sends a fourth prompt message to the user terminal, and suspends the communication connection with the user terminal;
其中,所述第四提示信息用于指示连接断开的原因是所述用户端存在第四等级违规行为,需要在指定时间后才能恢复通信连接。The fourth prompt information is used to indicate that the reason for the disconnection is that the user terminal has a fourth-level violation, and the communication connection can be restored after a specified time.
所述违规行为可以包括但不限于:短时间内多次发起相同的数据请求、不符合用户通信行为习惯的异常通信请求、DoS攻击、DDoS攻击、非法窃取系统权限与数据,等等;The violations may include, but are not limited to: initiating the same data request multiple times within a short period of time, abnormal communication requests that do not conform to user communication habits, DoS attacks, DDoS attacks, illegal theft of system permissions and data, etc.;
需要说明的是,所述违规等级可结合实际情况,由系统进行定义;在本公开中,仅以第三、第四违规等级代表较低违规等级,以第一、第二违规等级来代表较高违规等级,对相应的违规处理进行说明,其余可以此类推。It should be noted that the violation level can be defined by the system in combination with the actual situation; in the present disclosure, only the third and fourth violation levels represent lower violation levels, and the first and second violation levels represent higher violation levels. If the violation level is high, the corresponding violation treatment will be explained, and the rest can be deduced by analogy.
步骤S63,在卫通基站初步判定用户端存在第一等级、第二等级违规行为的可能性的情况下,根据用户匿名身份查询缓存中所对应的令牌第一参数,并生成违规判定请求信息发送至域内的通信卫星。Step S63, when the Satcom base station preliminarily determines that the user terminal has the possibility of the first-level and second-level violations, the first parameter of the token corresponding to the cache is inquired according to the anonymous identity of the user, and the violation judgment request information is generated. Sent to communication satellites in the domain.
具体的,所述违规判定请求信息可参考以下格式:Specifically, the violation judgment request information may refer to the following format:
{ IDSTB|| type||CSTB||MACSTB }{ ID STB || type||C STB ||MAC STB }
其中,IDSTB为所述卫通基站的节点标识;type为消息类型码,具体的,此处可将type字段设置为“001”以代表第一等级违规判定请求信息;或将type字段设置为“010”以代表第二等级违规判定请求信息;CSTB = fsym(EKSTB-SAT,α),其中,fsym为对称加密算法;EKSTB-SAT为系统安全信道建立后,卫通基站与通信卫星之间协商出的会话密钥;α为所述卫通基站根据疑似存在第一、第二等级违规行为的用户匿名身份,在缓存中查询到对应的令牌第一参数;CSTB为卫通基站对所述令牌第一参数α进行对称加密所得的密文;MACSTB= fint(IKSTB-SAT,IDSTB||type||CSTB),其中,fint为完整性保护算法,IKSTB-SAT为系统安全信道建立后,卫通基站与通信卫星之间协商出的完整性保护密钥,MACSTB为卫通基站计算出的消息认证码,以用于对所述违规判定请求信息进行完整性校验。Among them, ID STB is the node identifier of the satellite communication base station; type is the message type code, specifically, the type field can be set to "001" here to represent the first-level violation judgment request information; or the type field can be set to "010" represents the second-level violation judgment request information; C STB = f sym (EK STB - SAT ,α), where f sym is the symmetric encryption algorithm; The session key negotiated between the communication satellite and the communication satellite; α is the first parameter of the corresponding token in the cache according to the anonymous identity of the user suspected of having the first and second level violations; C STB It is the ciphertext obtained by symmetric encryption of the first parameter α of the token by the Satcom base station; MAC STB = f int (IK STB-SAT , ID STB ||type||C STB ), where f int is the integrity Protection algorithm, IK STB-SAT is the integrity protection key negotiated between Satcom base station and communication satellite after the system security channel is established, and MAC STB is the message authentication code calculated by Satcom base station, which is used to Violation determination request information for integrity check.
步骤S64,通信卫星接收所述违规判定请求信息,对其进行校验和处理后,转发给下一跳通信卫星,经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,将所述违规判定请求信息转发给卫星网络中心。Step S64, the communication satellite receives the violation judgment request information, and after verifying and processing it, forwards it to the next hop communication satellite, and forwards the violation judgment request information to the satellite through several hop communication satellites and gateway stations. network centre.
具体的,通信卫星在接收到所述违规判定请求信息后,根据其中的卫通基站节点标识IDSTB,查找出与所述卫通基站之间协商的会话密钥EKSTB-SAT、完整性保护密钥IKSTB-SAT;然后校验消息认证码是否满足MACSTB= fint(IKSTB-SAT, IDSTB||type|| CSTB)。其中,fint为完整性保护算法;IDSTB为所述卫通基站的节点标识;type为步骤S63中所述的消息类型码;CSTB为卫通基站对所述令牌第一参数α进行对称加密所得的密文。Specifically, after receiving the violation determination request information, the communication satellite finds out the session key EK STB-SAT , integrity protection negotiated with the Satcom base station according to the ID STB of the Satcom base station node in it. Key IK STB-SAT ; then check whether the message authentication code satisfies MAC STB = f int (IK STB-SAT , ID STB ||type|| C STB ). Wherein, f int is the integrity protection algorithm; ID STB is the node identifier of the satellite communication base station; type is the message type code described in step S63; C STB is the first parameter α of the token performed by the satellite communication station Ciphertext from symmetric encryption.
若所述消息认证码MACSTB校验不通过(MACSTB≠ fint(IKSTB-SAT, IDSTB||type||CSTB)),则对所述违规判定请求信息予以丢弃;若所述消息认证码MACSTB校验通过(MACSTB=fint(IKSTB-SAT, IDSTB||type|| CSTB)),则表明所述违规判定请求信息来源可靠且信息完整,接下来进行以下处理:If the MAC STB verification of the message authentication code fails (MAC STB ≠ f int (IK STB-SAT , ID STB ||type||C STB )), then discard the violation judgment request information; if the If the MAC STB verification of the message authentication code passes (MAC STB =f int (IK STB-SAT , ID STB ||type|| C STB )), it indicates that the information source of the violation judgment request is reliable and complete, and the following steps are performed next deal with:
使用所述会话密钥EKSTB-SAT解密CSTB得出所述令牌第一参数α;然后,查找出与卫星网络中心之间的会话密钥EKSAT-NOCC、完整性保护密钥IKSAT-NOCC;并计算出处理后的违规判定请求信息,即:Use the session key EK STB -SAT to decrypt the CSTB to obtain the first parameter α of the token; then, find out the session key EK SAT-NOCC and the integrity protection key IK SAT with the satellite network center -NOCC ; and calculate the processed violation judgment request information, namely:
{ IDSAT||type||CSAT||MACSAT }{ ID SAT ||type||C SAT ||MAC SAT }
其中,IDSAT为所述通信卫星的节点标识;type为步骤S63中所述的消息类型码;CSAT =fsym(EKSAT-NOCC,α),MACSAT=fint(IKSAT-NOCC, IDSAT|| type||CSAT),其中,fsym为对称加密算法,fint为完整性保护算法;CSAT为通信卫星对所述令牌第一参数α进行对称加密所得的密文;MACSAT为通信卫星计算出的消息认证码;Wherein, ID SAT is the node identification of the described communication satellite; type is the message type code described in step S63; C SAT = f sym (EK SAT-NOCC ,α), MAC SAT = fint (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT || type||C SAT ), wherein f sym is a symmetric encryption algorithm, and f int is an integrity protection algorithm; C SAT is a ciphertext obtained by the communication satellite performing symmetric encryption on the first parameter α of the token; MAC SAT is the message authentication code calculated by the communication satellite;
然后,所述通信卫星根据有关路由选择算法,将所述处理后的违规判定请求信息转发给下一跳通信卫星;经若干跳通信卫星、信关站后,将所述违规判定请求信息转发给卫星网络中心。Then, the communication satellite forwards the processed violation judgment request information to the next-hop communication satellite according to the relevant routing algorithm; after several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations, forwards the violation judgment request information to the next hop communication satellite. Satellite Network Center.
步骤S65,卫星网络中心接收并校验所述违规判定请求信息,在校验通过的情况下,根据有关违规判定方法和标准,对违规行为及相应等级进行最终判定;据此更新黑名单,并生成令牌黑名单更新信息,且将所述令牌黑名单更新信息经信关站、通信卫星,发送至各卫通基站。Step S65, the satellite network center receives and verifies the violation judgment request information, and in the case of passing the verification, according to the relevant violation judgment methods and standards, make a final judgment on the violation behavior and the corresponding level; update the blacklist accordingly, and Generate token blacklist update information, and send the token blacklist update information to each Satcom base station via a gateway station and a communication satellite.
其中,卫星网络中心在接收到所述违规判定请求信息后,首先进行消息来源和完整性验证;具体的,卫星网络中心根据其中的通信卫星节点标识IDSAT,查找出与所述通信卫星之间协商的会话密钥EKSAT-NOCC、完整性保护密钥IKSAT-NOCC;然后校验消息认证码是否满足MACSAT= fint(IKSAT-NOCC, IDSAT||type||CSAT)。其中,fint为完整性保护算法;IDSAT为所述通信卫星的节点标识;type为消息类型码;CSAT为通信卫星对所述令牌第一参数α进行对称加密所得的密文。Wherein, after receiving the violation judgment request information, the satellite network center firstly performs message source and integrity verification; specifically, the satellite network center finds out the connection between the communication satellite and the communication satellite according to the ID SAT of the communication satellite node therein. Negotiated session key EK SAT-NOCC and integrity protection key IK SAT-NOCC ; then check whether the message authentication code satisfies MAC SAT = f int (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT ||type||C SAT ). Wherein, f int is the integrity protection algorithm; ID SAT is the node identifier of the communication satellite; type is the message type code; C SAT is the ciphertext obtained by the communication satellite symmetric encryption of the first parameter α of the token.
若卫星网络中心对所述消息认证码MACSAT校验失败(MACSAT≠ fint(IKSAT-NOCC, IDSAT||type||CSAT)),则将所述违规判定请求信息予以丢弃;若卫星网络中心对所述消息认证码MACSAT校验通过(MACSAT= fint(IKSAT-NOCC, IDSAT||type||CSAT)),则表明所述违规判定请求信息来源可靠且信息完整,接下来进行以下处理:If the satellite network center fails to verify the message authentication code MAC SAT (MAC SAT ≠ f int (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT ||type||C SAT )), then discard the violation judgment request information; If the satellite network center passes the verification of the message authentication code MAC SAT (MAC SAT = f int (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT ||type||C SAT )), it indicates that the information source of the violation determination request is reliable and If the information is complete, proceed as follows:
获取所述违规判定请求信息中的type字段;使用与所述通信卫星之间的会话密钥EKSAT-NOCC解密CSAT,得出对应的令牌第一参数α;然后,卫星网络中心根据有关违规判定方法与标准,对违规行为及其相应等级进行最终判定;Obtain the type field in the violation judgment request information; use the session key EK SAT-NOCC with the communication satellite to decrypt C SAT to obtain the corresponding token first parameter α; then, the satellite network center according to the relevant Violation determination methods and standards, and final determination of violations and their corresponding grades;
其中,所述有关违规判定方法与标准可以基于但不限于以下原理:相关性分析、聚类分析、KL散度,等等;Wherein, the relevant violation determination methods and standards may be based on but not limited to the following principles: correlation analysis, cluster analysis, KL divergence, etc.;
具体的,所述最终违规判定结果可以分为:经最终判定不存在违规行为、经最终判定存在第一等级违规行为、经最终判定存在第二等级违规行为;Specifically, the final violation judgment result can be divided into: the final judgment that there is no violation, the final judgment that there is a first-level violation, and the final judgment that there is a second-level violation;
其中,对于经最终判定不存在违规行为的违规判定请求信息,卫星网络中心无需再做处理;对于经最终判定存在第二等级违规行为的,卫星网络中心将对应的令牌第一参数α加入令牌二级黑名单;对于经最终判定存在第一等级违规行为的,卫星网络中心将对应的令牌第一参数α加入令牌一级黑名单,并使用步骤S30中所述的安全注册密钥,解密所述令牌第一参数α,得到所述用户端的真实身份UID,并将所述UID加入真实身份黑名单;Among them, the satellite network center does not need to process the violation judgment request information that is finally determined that there is no violation; for the final judgment that there is a second-level violation, the satellite network center will add the corresponding token first parameter α to the order The second-level blacklist of tokens; for the final determination that there is a first-level violation, the satellite network center will add the corresponding token first parameter α to the first-level blacklist of tokens, and use the security registration key described in step S30. , decrypt the first parameter α of the token, obtain the real identity UID of the user terminal, and add the UID to the real identity blacklist;
卫星网络中心根据所述令牌一级黑名单、令牌二级黑名单中新加入的α,分别生成令牌一级黑名单更新信息、令牌二级黑名单更新信息;并经信关站、通信卫星,将所述令牌一级黑名单更新信息、令牌二级黑名单更新信息转发给各通信卫星。According to the newly added α in the first-level token blacklist and the second-level token blacklist, the satellite network center respectively generates the update information of the first-level token blacklist and the update information of the second-level token blacklist; and a communication satellite, which forwards the update information of the first-level blacklist of tokens and the update information of the second-level blacklist of tokens to each communication satellite.
具体的,所述令牌黑名单更新信息可参考如下格式:{ IDNOCC||TYPE||α|PToTime||SIGNNOCC }Specifically, the token blacklist update information may refer to the following format: { ID NOCC ||TYPE||α|PToTime||SIGN NOCC }
其中,IDNOCC为卫星网络中心的节点标识;TYPE为消息类型码,具体的,此处可将TYPE字段设置为“001”以代表令牌一级黑名单更新信息;将TYPE字段设置为“010”以代表令牌二级黑名单更新信息;α为违规用户端对应的令牌第一参数;ToTime为违规追责截止期限;其中,对于令牌一级黑名单中的ToTime字段,可以将其设置为一个代表无限长的特殊标识,具体的可以是INF,以此来对第一等级违规用户端进行永久封禁;SIGNNOCC为卫星网络中心对消息计算的数字签名。Among them, ID NOCC is the node identification of the satellite network center; TYPE is the message type code. Specifically, the TYPE field can be set to "001" here to represent the token first-level blacklist update information; the TYPE field can be set to "010" ” to represent the update information of the token second-level blacklist; α is the first parameter of the token corresponding to the violating client; ToTime is the deadline for accountability for violations; among them, for the ToTime field in the token-level blacklist, it can be It is set to a special identifier representing infinite length, specifically INF, so as to permanently ban the first-level illegal user terminal; SIGN NOCC is the digital signature calculated by the satellite network center on the message.
步骤S66,各卫通基站接收并校验所述令牌黑名单更新信息;在校验通过的情况下,解析其中的内容,据此更新令牌黑名单,并向违规用户端发送提示信息,且断开与所述违规用户端的通信连接,并且在违规追责期限内限制所述违规用户端的接入认证权限与令牌更新权限。Step S66, each Satcom base station receives and verifies the token blacklist update information; in the case of passing the verification, parses the content, updates the token blacklist accordingly, and sends a prompt message to the offending user, And disconnect the communication connection with the violating client, and limit the access authentication authority and token update authority of the violating client within the violation accountability period.
具体的,各卫通基站在接收到所述令牌一级黑名单更新信息、令牌二级黑名单更新信息后,首先校验其中的数字签名SIGNNOCC;在所述数字签名SIGNNOCC校验失败的情况下,对所述令牌黑名单更新信息予以丢弃;在所述数字签名SIGNNOCC校验通过的情况下,对于TYPE字段为“001”的令牌一级黑名单更新信息,卫通基站将其中的令牌第一参数α、违规追责截止期限ToTime加入所存储的令牌一级黑名单;对于TYPE字段为“010”的令牌二级黑名单更新信息,卫通基站将其中的令牌第一参数α、违规追责截止期限ToTime加入所存储的令牌二级黑名单;Specifically, after receiving the update information of the first-level blacklist of tokens and the update information of the second-level blacklist of tokens, each Satcom base station firstly verifies the digital signature SIGN NOCC therein ; In the case of failure, the token blacklist update information is discarded; in the case that the digital signature SIGN NOCC verification is passed, for the token first-level blacklist update information whose TYPE field is "001", Satcom The base station adds the token first parameter α and the violation accountability deadline ToTime to the stored token first-level blacklist; for the token second-level blacklist update information whose TYPE field is "010", the Satcom base station will The first parameter α of the token and the deadline for accountability for violation ToTime are added to the stored token second-level blacklist;
对于令牌一级黑名单内的违规用户端,卫通基站向其发送第一提示信息,然后断开其通信连接;其中,所述第一提示信息用于指示所述用户端存在第一等级违规行为,其接入认证权限与令牌更新权限已被永久封禁;For the illegal users in the first-level blacklist of tokens, the satellite base station sends the first prompt information to them, and then disconnects their communication connection; wherein, the first prompt information is used to indicate that the user terminal has the first level Violations, its access authentication authority and token update authority have been permanently banned;
对于令牌二级黑名单内的违规用户端,卫通基站向其发送第二提示信息,然后断开其通信连接;其中,所述第二提示信息用于指示所述用户端存在第二等级违规行为,在违规追责截止期限ToTime之后,才可以恢复正常的接入认证权限与令牌更新权限。For the illegal users in the token secondary blacklist, the satellite base station sends the second prompt information to them, and then disconnects their communication connection; wherein, the second prompt information is used to indicate that the user terminal has the second level For violations, the normal access authentication authority and token update authority can be restored only after the violation accountability deadline ToTime.
至此,即完成本实施例的违规检测与处理流程。So far, the violation detection and processing flow of this embodiment is completed.
本发明提供结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法中所涉及的令牌更新流程。The present invention provides a token update process involved in a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication.
参照图5,图5为本发明结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的第四实施例。其中包括以下步骤:Referring to FIG. 5 , FIG. 5 is a fourth embodiment of a method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication according to the present invention. It includes the following steps:
步骤S71,当需要进行令牌更新时,用户端根据待更新的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合系统公共参数、域内公共参数,以及有关令牌更新请求校验参数,计算生成令牌更新第一请求信息,并发送至附近的卫通基站。Step S71, when the token update needs to be performed, the user terminal calculates and generates the token based on the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token to be updated, combined with the public parameters of the system, the public parameters in the domain, and the verification parameters of the relevant token update request. The token updates the first request information and sends it to the nearby Satcom base station.
其中,所述有关令牌更新请求校验参数至少包含:真实身份、令牌第一参数以及令牌剩余可更新次数;Wherein, the relevant token update request verification parameters at least include: real identity, the first parameter of the token, and the remaining number of times the token can be updated;
具体的,在本实施例中,所述令牌更新第一请求信息可采用如下格式:Specifically, in this embodiment, the token update first request information may adopt the following format:
{ TU || RU ||XU||λ}{ T U || R U ||X U ||λ}
其中,TU为令牌更新第一请求时间戳;RU为令牌更新第一加密参数;XU为令牌更新第二加密参数,λ为令牌第二参数的校验参数;所涉及的参数计算如下:Among them, T U is the token update first request timestamp; R U is the token update first encryption parameter; X U is the token update second encryption parameter, λ is the verification parameter of the token second parameter; The parameters are calculated as follows:
RU= rU·G 【11】R U = r U · G [11]
REFU= H(UID||NUM)⊕H(rU·RNOCC) 【12】REF U = H(UID||NUM)⊕H(r U ·R NOCC ) 【12】
XU= (α||REFU)⊕H(rU·RSTB) 【13】X U = (α||REF U )⊕H(r U ·R STB ) 【13】
β= H(TU||RU||α||REFU) 【14】β= H(T U ||R U ||α||REF U ) [14]
λ= θ+β·rU (mod N) 【15】λ= θ+β·r U (mod N) [15]
其中,所述公式【11】~【15】中涉及的符号与参数含义如下:H( )表示哈希函数;||表示对参数进行拼接操作;⊕表示按位异或运算;N、G、RNOCC、RSTB为步骤S20中所述的参数;rU为用户端生成的令牌更新第一随机数;UID为真实身份;NUM为令牌剩余可更新次数;α为令牌第一参数;θ为令牌第二参数。Among them, the meanings of the symbols and parameters involved in the formulas [11]~[15] are as follows: H( ) represents the hash function; || represents the splicing operation on the parameters; ⊕ represents the bitwise XOR operation; N, G, R NOCC and R STB are the parameters described in step S20; r U is the first random number of the token update generated by the user terminal; UID is the real identity; NUM is the remaining number of times the token can be updated; α is the first parameter of the token ; θ is the token second parameter.
步骤S72,卫通基站收到所述令牌更新第一请求信息后,校验消息新鲜度,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系,在验证通过的情况下,计算生成令牌更新第二请求信息,并发送给域内的通信卫星。Step S72, after receiving the first token update request information, the satellite base station verifies the freshness of the message, and verifies whether the verification parameters of the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token satisfy the specified relationship, and the verification is passed. In the case of , the calculation generates a token to update the second request information, and sends it to the communication satellite in the domain.
在本实施例中,卫通基站收到所述令牌更新第一请求信息后,首先通过|TSTB-TU|是否小于ΔtSTB校验所述令牌更新第一请求信息的新鲜度;其中,TSTB为卫通基站接收到所述令牌更新第一请求信息时的时间戳,ΔtSTB为卫通基站既定的时间间隔;In this embodiment, after receiving the first token update request information, the Satcom base station first checks the freshness of the token update first request information by whether |T STB - T U | is less than Δt STB ; Wherein, T STB is the time stamp when the Satcom base station receives the token update first request information, and Δt STB is the predetermined time interval of the Satcom base station;
在所述新鲜度验证通过的情况下(|TSTB-TU| 小于ΔtSTB通过校验),卫通基站计算:α||REFU = XU⊕H(RU·rSTB),其中rSTB为步骤S20中所述的参数;然后,查验α是否在令牌黑名单之列;In the case that the freshness verification passes (|T STB -T U | is less than Δt STB to pass the verification), the Satcom base station calculates: α||REF U = X U ⊕H(R U ·r STB ), where r STB is the parameter described in step S20; then, check whether α is in the token blacklist;
当α不在令牌黑名单之列的情况下,计算参数β= H(TU||RU||α||REFU);然后,校验公式【16】:λ·G=α·PK0+K+β·RU 是否成立;其中,G、PK0为步骤S20中所述的参数;When α is not in the token blacklist, calculate the parameter β = H(T U ||R U ||α||REF U ); then, check the formula [16]: λ·G=α·PK Whether 0 +K+β·R U is established; wherein, G, PK 0 are the parameters described in step S20;
在公式【16】成立的情况下(λ·G=α·PK0+K+β·RU),则表明所述用户端拥有经卫星网络中心私钥配置的合法有效的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数;然后,卫通基站计算生成令牌更新第二请求信息,并将所述令牌更新第二请求信息发送给域内的通信卫星。In the case where formula [16] is established (λ·G=α·PK 0 +K+β·R U ), it means that the user terminal has a legal and valid token first parameter configured by the private key of the satellite network center , the second parameter of the token; then, the Satcom base station calculates and generates the second token update request information, and sends the token update second request information to the communication satellites in the domain.
在本实施例中,所述令牌更新第二请求信息可采用以下格式:In this embodiment, the token update second request information may be in the following format:
{ IDSTB||type||XSTB||MACSTB }{ ID STB ||type||X STB ||MAC STB }
其中,IDSTB为所述卫通基站的节点标识;type为消息类型码,具体的,可将type字段设置为“101”以代表令牌更新第二请求信息;XSTB=RU||α||REFU;MACSTB= fint(IKSTB-SAT,IDSTB||type||XSTB),其中,fint为完整性保护算法;IKSTB-SAT为系统安全信道建立后,卫通基站与通信卫星之间协商出的完整性保护密钥;MACSTB为卫通基站计算出的消息认证码,以用于对所述令牌更新第二请求信息进行完整性校验。Among them, ID STB is the node identification of the satellite communication base station; type is the message type code, specifically, the type field can be set to "101" to represent the token update second request information; X STB =R U ||α ||REF U ; MAC STB = f int (IK STB-SAT ,ID STB ||type||X STB ), where f int is the integrity protection algorithm; IK STB-SAT is the system security channel established, Satcom The integrity protection key negotiated between the base station and the communication satellite; the MAC STB is the message authentication code calculated by the Satcom base station, which is used to perform integrity verification on the token update second request information.
步骤S73,通信卫星收到所述令牌更新第二请求信息后,进行校验与处理,并将处理后的令牌更新第二请求信息经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,发送至卫星网络中心。Step S73: After the communication satellite receives the second token update request information, it performs verification and processing, and sends the processed second token update request information to the satellite network through several hops of communication satellites and gateway stations. center.
在本实施例中,通信卫星在接收到所述令牌更新第二请求信息后,根据其中的卫通基站节点标识IDSTB,查找出与所述卫通基站之间的完整性保护密钥IKSTB-SAT;然后校验消息认证码是否满足MACSTB= fint(IKSTB-SAT, IDSTB||type||XSTB)。In this embodiment, after receiving the token update second request information, the communication satellite finds out the integrity protection key IK with the Satcom base station according to the ID STB of the Satcom base station node identification. STB-SAT ; then check whether the message authentication code satisfies MAC STB = f int (IK STB-SAT , ID STB ||type||X STB ).
若所述消息认证码MACSTB校验不通过,则对所述令牌更新第二请求信息予以丢弃;若所述消息认证码校验通过,则表明所述令牌更新第二请求信息来源可靠且信息完整;然后,通信卫星计算消息认证码MACSAT= fint(IKSAT-NOCC, IDSAT||type||XSTB),其中,fint为完整性保护算法,IKSAT-NOCC为系统安全信道建立后,通信卫星与卫星网络中心之间协商出的完整性保护密钥;IDSAT为所述通信卫星的节点标识;type为步骤S72中所述的消息类型码;XSTB为步骤S72中所述的参数;If the MAC STB verification of the message authentication code fails, the token update second request information will be discarded; if the message authentication code verification is passed, it indicates that the source of the token update second request information is reliable And the information is complete; then, the communication satellite calculates the message authentication code MAC SAT = f int (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT ||type||X STB ), where f int is the integrity protection algorithm, and IK SAT-NOCC is the system After the secure channel is established, the integrity protection key negotiated between the communication satellite and the satellite network center; ID SAT is the node identifier of the communication satellite; type is the message type code described in step S72; X STB is step S72 parameters described in;
然后,通信卫星根据有关路由选择算法,将处理过的令牌更新第二请求信息:{IDSAT||type||XSTB||MACSAT },经若干跳通信卫星的转发后,最终由信关站转发给卫星网络中心。Then, according to the relevant routing algorithm, the communication satellite updates the processed token to the second request information: {ID SAT ||type||X STB ||MAC SAT }, after several hops of communication satellite forwarding, it is finally sent by the communication satellite. The off station is forwarded to the satellite network center.
步骤S74,卫星网络中心接收并校验所述令牌更新第二请求信息;在校验通过的情况下,计算有关令牌更新请求校验参数;在所述令牌更新请求校验参数与存储记录相匹配且不在黑名单的情况下,配置新的令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数,并存储新的令牌更新请求校验参数,且生成令牌更新响应信息,并且将所述令牌更新响应信息经信关站转发给通信卫星。Step S74, the satellite network center receives and verifies the second token update request information; in the case of passing the verification, calculates the relevant token update request verification parameters; in the token update request verification parameters and storage When the records match and are not in the blacklist, configure the new token first parameter and the token second parameter, store the new token update request verification parameter, generate the token update response information, and use the The token update response information is forwarded to the communication satellite via the gateway.
在本实施例中,卫星网络中心在接收到所述令牌更新第二请求信息后,根据其中的通信卫星节点标识IDSAT,查找出与所述通信卫星之间的完整性保护密钥IKSAT-NOCC;然后校验消息认证码是否满足MACSAT= fint(IKSAT-NOCC, IDSAT||type||XSTB)。In this embodiment, after receiving the second token update request information, the satellite network center searches out the integrity protection key IK SAT with the communication satellite according to the ID SAT of the communication satellite node therein. -NOCC ; then check whether the message authentication code satisfies MAC SAT = f int (IK SAT-NOCC , ID SAT ||type||X STB ).
若卫星网络中心对所述消息认证码MACSAT校验失败,则将所述令牌更新第二请求信息予以丢弃;若卫星网络中心对所述消息认证码MACSAT校验通过,则表明所述令牌更新第二请求信息来源可靠且信息完整;接下来,卫星网络中心获取XSTB中的参数,即:RU||α||REFU;If the satellite network center fails to verify the message authentication code MAC SAT , it will discard the second token update request information; if the satellite network center passes the MAC SAT verification of the message authentication code, it indicates that the The information source of the second request for token update is reliable and complete; next, the satellite network center obtains the parameters in the X STB , namely: R U ||α||REF U ;
然后,查验其中的令牌第一参数α是否在令牌一级黑名单、令牌二级黑名单中;若α不在所述令牌一级黑名单、令牌二级黑名单中,则使用步骤S30中所述的安全注册密钥KEYNOCC,对其中的令牌第一参数α进行对称解密,得出真实身份UID,并查验所述真实身份UID是否在真实身份黑名单中;Then, check whether the first token parameter α is in the first-level token blacklist and the second-level token blacklist; if α is not in the first-level token blacklist and the second-level token blacklist, use The security registration key KEY NOCC described in step S30 is symmetrically decrypted in the token first parameter α, obtains the real identity UID, and checks whether the real identity UID is in the real identity blacklist;
若所述真实身份UID不在真实身份黑名单中,在存储记录中查询与所述真实身份UID所对应的令牌剩余可更新次数NUM;然后,校验公式【17】:H(UID||NUM)=REFU⊕H(RU·rNOCC)是否成立。其中,rNOCC为步骤S20中所述的参数;If the real-identity UID is not in the real-identity blacklist, query the storage record for the remaining updateable times NUM of the token corresponding to the real-identity UID; then, check the formula [17]: H(UID||NUM )=REF U ⊕H(R U ·r NOCC ) is established. Wherein, r NOCC is the parameter described in step S20;
在所述公式【17】成立的情况下,卫星网络中心将所述令牌剩余可更新次数NUM进行递减,并与所述真实身份UID进行关联存储;然后,为所述用户端配置更新后的令牌第一参数α*、令牌第二参数θ*;In the case that the formula [17] is established, the satellite network center decrements the remaining updateable times NUM of the token, and stores it in association with the real identity UID; then, configure the updated user terminal for the token first parameter α * , token second parameter θ * ;
其中,α*= fsym(KEYNOCC,UID||LT2||rand*),θ*= α·SK0 + k(mod N);fsym表示对称加密算法,UID为真实身份,rand*表示新的随机数,KEYNOCC为步骤S30中所述的参数,N、LT2、SK0、k为步骤S20中所述的参数;Among them, α * = f sym (KEY NOCC ,UID||LT 2 ||rand * ), θ * = α·SK 0 + k(mod N); f sym represents the symmetric encryption algorithm, UID is the real identity, rand * represents a new random number, KEY NOCC is the parameter described in step S30, N, LT 2 , SK 0 , and k are the parameters described in step S20;
然后,卫星网络中心计算生成令牌更新响应信息,并经信关站将所述令牌更新响应信息转发给通信卫星;Then, the satellite network center calculates and generates the token update response information, and forwards the token update response information to the communication satellite through the gateway;
具体的,所述令牌更新响应信息可以参考如下格式:Specifically, the token update response information may refer to the following format:
{ IDNOCC||TYPE||XNOCC||SIGNNOCC }{ ID NOCC ||TYPE||X NOCC ||SIGN NOCC }
其中,IDNOCC为卫星网络中心的节点标识;TYPE为消息类型标识码;具体的,此处可将TYPE字段设置为“101”以代表令牌更新响应信息;XNOCC为令牌更新响应加密参数;SIGNNOCC为卫星网络中心对消息计算的数字签名。所涉及的参数计算如下:Among them, ID NOCC is the node identification of the satellite network center; TYPE is the message type identification code; specifically, the TYPE field can be set to "101" here to represent the token update response information; X NOCC is the token update response encryption parameter ; SIGN NOCC is the digital signature calculated by the satellite network center on the message. The parameters involved are calculated as follows:
REFNOCC=H(NUM*||UID),REF NOCC = H(NUM * ||UID),
XNOCC=(REFNOCC||α*||θ*)⊕H(RU·rNOCC)||H2(RU·rNOCC) ||H3(RU·rNOCC),X NOCC =(REF NOCC ||α * ||θ * )⊕H(R U ·r NOCC )||H 2 (R U ·r NOCC ) ||H 3 (R U ·r NOCC ),
其中,H( )为哈希函数;H2( )表示进行两次哈希运算;H3( )表示进行三次哈希运算; RU为步骤S71中所述的参数;rNOCC为步骤S20中所述的参数;NUM*、α*、θ*分别为更新后的令牌剩余可更新次数、令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数;UID为真实身份。Wherein, H ( ) is a hash function; H 2 ( ) represents performing two hash operations; H 3 ( ) represents performing three hash operations; R U is the parameter described in step S71; r NOCC is in step S20 The parameters; NUM * , α * , θ * are respectively the remaining updateable times of the updated token, the first parameter of the token, and the second parameter of the token; UID is the real identity.
步骤S75,通信卫星对所述令牌更新响应信息进行消息来源和完整性校验,经若干跳通信卫星、卫通基站,将所述令牌更新响应信息发送至所述用户端。Step S75, the communication satellite performs a message source and integrity check on the token update response information, and sends the token update response information to the user terminal through several hops of communication satellites and satellite base stations.
其中,通信卫星在接收到所述令牌更新响应信息后,首先校验其中的数字签名SIGNNOCC;在所述数字签名SIGNNOCC校验失败的情况下,对所述令牌更新响应信息予以丢弃;在所述数字签名SIGNNOCC校验通过的情况下,则表明所述令牌更新响应信息来自卫星网络中心且信息完整;然后,经若干跳通信卫星、卫通基站,将校验通过的令牌更新响应信息转发给所述用户端。Wherein, after receiving the token update response information, the communication satellite firstly verifies the digital signature SIGN NOCC therein ; in the case that the verification of the digital signature SIGN NOCC fails, the token update response information is discarded ; In the case that the digital signature SIGN NOCC is checked and passed, then it is indicated that the token update response information comes from the satellite network center and the information is complete; Then, through a number of jumping communication satellites, satellite communication base stations, will check the passed command The card update response information is forwarded to the client.
步骤S76,所述用户端接收并校验所述令牌更新响应信息,在校验通过的情况下,解密并校验令牌更新响应参数,且验证更新后的令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数是否满足指定关系,在通过的情况下,对所述令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数进行安全存储。Step S76, the user terminal receives and verifies the token update response information, and in the case of passing the verification, decrypts and verifies the token update response parameter, and verifies the updated token first parameter and the token Whether the second parameter satisfies the specified relationship, in the case of passing, the first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token are securely stored.
在本实施例中,所述用户端在接收到所述令牌更新响应信息后,首先校验其中的数字签名SIGNNOCC;在所述数字签名SIGNNOCC校验失败的情况下,对所述令牌更新响应信息予以丢弃;在所述数字签名SIGNNOCC校验通过的情况下,则表明所述令牌更新响应信息来自卫星网络中心且信息完整;然后,进行以下计算:In this embodiment, after receiving the token update response information, the user terminal first verifies the digital signature SIGN NOCC therein ; in the case that the verification of the digital signature SIGN NOCC fails, the user terminal verifies the digital signature SIGN NOCC. The token update response information is discarded; in the case that the digital signature SIGN NOCC is verified, it indicates that the token update response information comes from the satellite network center and the information is complete; then, perform the following calculations:
(REFNOCC||α*||θ*)= XNOCC⊕H(rU·RNOCC)||H2(rU·RNOCC)||H3(rU·RNOCC),(REF NOCC ||α * ||θ * )= X NOCC ⊕H(r U ·R NOCC )||H 2 (r U ·R NOCC )||H 3 (r U ·R NOCC ),
校验公式【18】:REFNOCC=H(NUM*||UID)是否成立。Check whether the formula [18]: REF NOCC =H(NUM * ||UID) is established.
校验公式【19】:θ*= α*·PK0 + K 是否成立。Check whether the formula [19]: θ * = α * ·PK 0 + K is established.
其中,H( )为哈希函数;H2( )表示进行两次哈希运算;H3( )表示进行三次哈希运算;UID为真实身份;α*、θ*分别为更新后的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数;NUM*为目前的令牌剩余可更新次数,可通过对步骤S71中的NUM进行递减得到;rU为步骤S71中所述的参数;PK0、K、G、RNOCC为步骤S20中所述的系统公共参数;Among them, H( ) is a hash function; H 2 ( ) means to perform two hash operations; H 3 ( ) means to perform three hash operations; UID is the real identity; α * and θ * are the updated tokens, respectively The first parameter, the second parameter of the token; NUM * is the current remaining updateable times of the token, which can be obtained by decrementing the NUM in step S71; r U is the parameter described in step S71; PK 0 , K, G, R NOCC are the system public parameters described in step S20;
在所述公式【18】、【19】均成立的情况下,用户端对更新后的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数进行安全存储。In the case that the formulas [18] and [19] are both established, the user terminal securely stores the updated first parameter of the token and the second parameter of the token.
至此,即完成本实施例的令牌更新流程。So far, the token update process of this embodiment is completed.
此外,本发明还提供一种卫星网络中心,参照图6,卫星网络中心1000包括:In addition, the present invention also provides a satellite network center. Referring to FIG. 6 , the
系统参数更新模块1010,用于定期对系统公共参数进行配置,并根据所述系统公共参数生成系统参数更新信息,经信关站、各通信卫星、卫通基站,将所述系统参数更新信息进行全网广播,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The system
注册响应模块1020,用于接收并验证注册请求信息,对于所述注册请求信息属实且尚未注册过的用户端,配置所述用户端在卫星通信网络中唯一的真实身份,具备有效期限的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,并根据所述真实身份、所述具备有效期限的令牌第一参数以及所述令牌第二参数生成注册响应信息,且将所述注册响应信息经安全信道返回至所述用户端;The
违规判定模块1030,用于接收违规判定请求信息,并结合所述违规判定请求信息计算出的令牌第一参数,根据有关违规判定方法与标准,确定用户端是否存在违规行为以及所述违规行为对应违规等级的最终判定结果;The
违规处理模块1040,用于在判定所述用户端存在第二等级违规行为的情况下,将所述令牌第一参数加入令牌二级黑名单;在判定所述用户端存在第一等级违规行为的情况下,将所述令牌第一参数加入令牌一级黑名单,此外,根据所述令牌第一参数,计算所述用户端的真实身份,并将所述真实身份加入真实身份黑名单,且生成令牌黑名单更新信息,并且将所述令牌黑名单更新信息经信关站广播给各通信卫星、卫通基站;The
令牌更新响应模块1050,用于接收并校验令牌更新第二请求信息,在所述令牌更新第二请求信息校验通过的情况下,配置更新后的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,并计算生成令牌更新响应信息,将所述令牌更新响应信息经信关站、若干跳通信卫星、卫通基站发送给所述用户端。The token
本发明还提供一种通信卫星,参照图7,通信卫星2000包括:The present invention also provides a communication satellite. Referring to FIG. 7 , the
上行信息处理模块2010,用于在接收到的来自卫星网络中心附属信关站或者上一跳通信卫星的上行信息的情况下,对所述上行信息进行消息来源与完整性的校验,在所述上行信息的消息来源与完整性校验通过的情况下,根据有关路由选择算法,将校验通过的上行信息转发给卫通基站或者下一跳通信卫星;The uplink
下行信息处理模块2020,用于在接收到的来自卫通基站的下行信息的情况下,并对所述下行信息进行消息来源与完整性的校验,将校验失败的下行信息丢弃,将校验通过的下行信息附上自身的节点标识,并计算新的消息认证码,从而生成处理后的下行信息,并且根据所述有关路由选择算法,将所述处理后的下行信息转发至卫星网络中心附属信关站或者下一跳通信卫星。The downlink
本发明还提供一种卫通基站,参照图8,卫通基站3000包括:The present invention also provides a Satcom base station. Referring to FIG. 8 , the
参数更新模块3010,用于定期接收并校验系统参数更新信息;在所述系统参数更新信息校验通过的情况下,对所述系统参数更新信息中的系统公共参数进行存储,并将所述系统参数更新信息广播给域内的用户端,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The
所述参数更新模块,还用于定期对域内公共参数进行配置,并根据所述域内公共参数生成域内参数更新信息,并且将所述域内参数更新信息广播至域内的各用户端,其中,所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数以及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限;The parameter update module is further configured to periodically configure the public parameters in the domain, and generate parameter update information in the domain according to the public parameters in the domain, and broadcast the parameter update information in the domain to each client in the domain, wherein the The public parameters in the domain include at least: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station;
接入认证响应模块3020,用于接收并校验来自用户端的接入认证请求信息,在所述接入认证请求信息校验通过的情况下,计算用户匿名身份,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系,在所述令牌第一参数与所述令牌第二参数的校验参数满足指定关系的情况下,生成接入认证响应信息,并将所述接入认证响应信息发送给所述用户端,缓存此次认证的用户匿名身份,以及所述令牌第一参数;The access
通信数据传输模块3030,用于在与用户端进行接入认证之后,根据缓存的用户匿名身份,允许与所述用户端建立通信连接,并在数据通信过程中,对数据帧头中未正确包含所述匿名身份的用户数据进行过滤,将数据帧头中正确包含有所述匿名身份的用户数据转发给域内的通信卫星,并在此次通信结束时,删除缓存的所述用户匿名身份;The communication
违规检测模块3040,用于在数据通信过程中,结合缓存的用户匿名身份、令牌第一参数,根据有关违规检测方法与判定标准,对所述用户端进行违规检测与初步判定;The
违规初步处理模块3050,用于在判定所述用户端存在第三等级违规行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送所述第三提示信息,并终断与所述用户端的此次通信连接,且删除缓存中的所述匿名身份;The violation
所述违规初步处理模块,还用于在判定所述用户端存在第四违规等级行为的情况下,向所述用户端发送所述第四提示信息,并暂停与所述用户端的此次通信连接;The violation preliminary processing module is further configured to send the fourth prompt information to the user terminal and suspend this communication connection with the user terminal when it is determined that the user terminal has a fourth violation level behavior ;
违规判定请求模块3060,用于在初步判定所述用户端存在第一等级或第二等级违规行为的情况下,在缓存中查询与用户匿名身份相对应的令牌第一参数,并生成所述违规判定请求信息,且经若干跳通信卫星、信关站,将所述违规判定请求信息发送至卫星网络中心;The violation
违规判定响应处理模块3070,用于接收并校验所述令牌黑名单更新信息,在所述令牌黑名单更新信息校验通过的情况下,更新存储的令牌黑名单,并向违规用户端发送提示信息,且断开与违规用户端的网络连接,并且在违规追责期限内封禁违规用户端的接入认证权限和令牌更新权限;Violation judgment
令牌更新第一请求处理模块3080,用于接收并校验来自用户端的所述令牌更新第一请求信息,在所述令牌更新第一请求信息校验通过的情况下,计算令牌第一参数,并验证令牌第一参数与令牌第二参数的校验参数是否满足指定关系,在验证通过的情况下,生成所述令牌更新第二请求信息,并将所述令牌更新第二请求信息发送给域内的通信卫星;The token update first
令牌更新响应处理模块3090,用于接收并校验所述令牌更新响应信息,在校验通过的情况下,将所述令牌更新响应信息转发给所述用户端。The token update
本发明还提供一种用户端,参照图9,用户端4000包括:The present invention also provides a user terminal. Referring to FIG. 9, the
参数配置模块4010,用于定期接收并校验系统参数更新信息,在校验通过的情况下,对所述系统参数更新信息中的系统公共参数进行存储,其中,所述系统公共参数至少包含:用于加解密的密码学基础参数、所述密码学基础参数的有效期限、令牌公共校验参数、所述令牌公共校验参数的有效期限、卫星网络中心的通信加密参数以及所述卫星网络中心通信加密参数的有效期限;The
所述参数配置模块,还用于定期接收并校验域内参数更新信息,在校验通过的情况下,对所述域内参数更新信息中的域内公共参数进行存储,其中,所述域内公共参数至少包含:卫通基站通信加密参数及所述卫通基站通信加密参数的有效期限;The parameter configuration module is also configured to periodically receive and verify the parameter update information in the domain, and in the case of passing the verification, store the public parameters in the domain in the parameter update information in the domain, wherein the public parameters in the domain are at least Including: the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station and the validity period of the communication encryption parameters of the Satcom base station;
注册请求模块4020,用于根据初始身份标识及初始校验信息,生成注册请求信息,并将所述注册请求信息经安全信道发送给卫星网络中心;The
注册响应处理模块4030,用于通过安全信道接收所述卫星网络中心的注册响应信息,并获取所述注册响应信息中的网络唯一真实身份、具备有效期限的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,并对所述真实身份、所述令牌第一参数、所述令牌第二参数进行安全存储;The registration
接入认证请求模块4040,用于所述用户端在需要接入卫星通信网络时,根据安全存储的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合所述系统公共参数和域内公共参数,计算匿名身份,生成所述接入认证请求信息,并将所述接入认证请求信息发送至卫通基站;The access
接入认证响应处理模块4050,用于接收并校验所述卫通基站的接入认证响应信息,在校验通过的情况下,对于异常的接入认证响应提示信息,对所述接入认证响应提示信息进行解析,对于正常的接入认证响应信息,对所述接入认证响应信息中的参数进行校验,在参数校验通过的情况下,计算会话密钥与完整性保护密钥,并安全存储会话密钥、完整性保护密钥、以及此次认证的匿名身份;The access authentication
通信数据传输模块4060,用于在与所述卫通基站完成接入认证之后的数据通信过程中,将所述匿名身份封装进数据帧,并使用所述会话密钥对需要传输的数据进行加密,且使用所述完整性保护密钥计算消息认证码,并且通过所述卫通基站在卫星网络中进行通信数据传输;The communication
令牌更新请求模块4070,用于在需要进行令牌更新时,根据待更新的令牌第一参数、令牌第二参数,结合所述系统公共参数和域内公共参数,生成所述令牌更新第一请求信息,并将所述令牌更新第一请求信息发送至卫通基站;The token
令牌更新响应处理模块4080,用于接收并校验所述令牌更新响应信息,在所述令牌更新响应信息校验通过的情况下,计算并验证令牌更新响应校验参数是否正确,且验证更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数是否满足指定关系,在验证通过的情况下,对更新后的令牌第一参数、更新后的令牌第二参数进行安全存储。The token update
参照图10,图10是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种终端设备的硬件结构图。Referring to FIG. 10, FIG. 10 is a hardware structure diagram of a terminal device according to an exemplary embodiment.
终端设备100可以包括:处理器101,例如CPU,存储器102,收发器103。The
本领域技术人员可以理解,图10中示出的结构并不构成对终端设备的限定,可以包括比图示更多或更少的部件,或者组合某些部件,或者不同的部件布置。Those skilled in the art can understand that the structure shown in FIG. 10 does not constitute a limitation on the terminal device, and may include more or less components than the one shown, or combine some components, or arrange different components.
存储器102可以由任何类型的易失性或非易失性存储设备或者它们的组合实现,如静态随机存取存储器(SRAM),电可擦除可编程只读存储器(EEPROM),可擦除可编程只读存储器(EPROM),可编程只读存储器(PROM),只读存储器(ROM),磁存储器,快闪存储器,磁盘或光盘。
处理器101可以调用存储器102内存储的计算机程序,以完成上述的结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法的全部或部分步骤。The
收发器103用于接收外部设备发送的信息以及向外部设备发送信息。The
一种非临时性计算机可读存储介质,当该存储介质中的指令由终端设备的处理器执行时,使得终端设备能够执行上述结合接入认证的卫星网络用户违规处理方法。A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, when an instruction in the storage medium is executed by a processor of a terminal device, enables the terminal device to execute the above-mentioned method for handling violations of satellite network users combined with access authentication.
本领域技术人员在考虑说明书及实践这里公开的发明后,将容易想到本公开的其它实施方案。本发明旨在涵盖本公开的任何变型、用途或者适应性变化,这些变型、用途或者适应性变化遵循本公开的一般性原理并包括本公开未公开的本技术领域中的公知常识或惯用技术手段。说明书和实施例仅被视为示例性的,本公开的真正范围和精神由下面的权利要求书指出。Other embodiments of the present disclosure will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. The present invention is intended to cover any variations, uses or adaptations of the present disclosure that follow the general principles of the present disclosure and include common general knowledge or techniques in the technical field not disclosed by the present disclosure . The specification and examples are to be regarded as exemplary only, with the true scope and spirit of the disclosure being indicated by the following claims.
应当理解的是,本公开并不局限于上面已经描述并在附图中示出的精确结构,并且可以在不脱离其范围进行各种修改和改变。本公开的范围仅由所附的权利要求书来限制。It is to be understood that the present disclosure is not limited to the precise structures described above and illustrated in the accompanying drawings, and that various modifications and changes may be made without departing from the scope thereof. The scope of the present disclosure is limited only by the appended claims.
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