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CN108599958B - Cloud-based ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method - Google Patents

Cloud-based ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method Download PDF

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CN108599958B
CN108599958B CN201810362401.XA CN201810362401A CN108599958B CN 108599958 B CN108599958 B CN 108599958B CN 201810362401 A CN201810362401 A CN 201810362401A CN 108599958 B CN108599958 B CN 108599958B
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tag
label
message
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CN108599958A (en
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董庆宽
李随鑫
陈原
李庆春
霍玉荣
杨丰源
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Xidian University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/10—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation
    • G06K7/10009—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves
    • G06K7/10257—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves arrangements for protecting the interrogation against piracy attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0625—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

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Abstract

本发明提出了一种基于云数据库的超轻量级无线射频识别标签所有权转移方法，主要解决现有标签所有权转移安全性差的问题。其实现方案是：阅读器向标签发送认证请求；标签对请求验证并发送反馈信息，阅读器将其进行处理并发送给云数据库；云数据库查找对应信息返回给阅读器，阅读器向标签发送验证请求和新标签所有人相关信息；标签验证阅读器并更新信息；阅读器和新标签所有人交换标签信息；新标签所有人向标签发送认证请求；标签验证新标签所有人并发送反馈信息；新标签所有人验证标签并发送更新信息；标签验证新标签所有人并储存和反馈相关信息。本发明提高了超轻量级标签所有权转移的安全性和效率，可用于具有低成本要求的无线射频识别系统。

Figure 201810362401

The invention proposes an ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method based on a cloud database, which mainly solves the problem of poor security of the existing tag ownership transfer. The implementation scheme is: the reader sends an authentication request to the tag; the tag verifies the request and sends feedback information, the reader processes it and sends it to the cloud database; the cloud database finds the corresponding information and returns it to the reader, and the reader sends the verification to the tag. Request information with new tag owner; tag verifies reader and updates information; reader and new tag owner exchange tag information; new tag owner sends certification request to tag; tag verifies new tag owner and sends feedback; new The label owner verifies the label and sends updated information; the label verifies the new label owner and stores and feeds back the relevant information. The invention improves the security and efficiency of the transfer of ownership of the ultra-lightweight tag, and can be used in a radio frequency identification system with low cost requirements.

Figure 201810362401

Description

Cloud-based ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method which can be used for a radio frequency identification system with a low cost requirement.
Background
The radio frequency identification technology is also called as radio frequency identification technology, is a non-contact automatic identification technology, and is mainly applied to various aspects such as logistics management, access control systems, automatic charging of roads and bridges, library book classification and management and the like. The traditional radio frequency identification system mainly comprises an electronic tag, a reader and a background server.
The background server and the reader of the traditional radio frequency identification authentication scheme are connected by a wired channel, and although the system security is improved by adopting the connection mode, the working capacity of the background database is small and the operation place is controlled and inflexible. With the development of the internet of things, articles are managed, identified and authenticated by means of the radio frequency identification technology, and the radio frequency identification system is required to support application of big data and have flexible reading conditions, so that the cloud database is introduced to replace a traditional background server to construct the radio frequency identification system, and the problem can be solved. Meanwhile, the cost of the RFID tag is far higher than that of the traditional bar code, so that the manufacturing cost becomes a bottleneck of popularization of the RFID technology, and the RFID tag has the characteristics of low cost and low manufacturing cost, so that the ultra-lightweight RFID tag begins to become a hot spot in recent years. The cost of the tag has a direct relation with an internal logic gate circuit, and low cost means that a high-level encryption mode is unavailable, so that the safety is influenced.
In the existing Ownership transfer Protocol based on ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification, most tags are fed back by using random numbers sent by a reader during Authentication, which means that the tags do not have initiative in the Authentication stage, and adversaries are easily disguised as legal owners to steal information during attack, thereby causing information leakage, and meanwhile, the reader is required to store all secret information of the tags in the information storage stage, which seriously affects the storage space of the reader, thereby reducing the utilization rate, for example, an Ownership Management Protocol of the ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag is published in 'EPC 2V2 RFID Authentication and Ownership Management Protocol' published by Niu et al in IEEE Transaction on Mobile Computing in 2016, after the scheme is initialized, an Authentication Protocol is firstly proposed, which requires all secret information of the tags to be stored by the owners of the tags, then the reader sends authentication information to the tag, the stored secret information is hidden in the authentication information by using a large random number XOR method, then the information is integrated and sent to the tag, the tag performs the same processing on the stored information and then compares the processed information with the received information, a piece of confirmation information is returned to the reader after authentication, and the reader verifies the tag according to the information extracted by the confirmation information. After passing the authentication, the reader sends ownership to the tag, the reader sends two messages containing secret information and the same random number to the tag respectively, the tag solves the random number according to one of the messages after receiving the messages, the random number is operated and compared with the second message, confirmation information containing the secret key and the random number is returned to the reader after the confirmation is correct, and the protocol is ended. The protocol uses the authentication information which is sent after the information is sent, so that no secret information can be directly acquired, and meanwhile, a new random number is used in each communication, and the freshness and the safety are ensured by using a one-time pad. In the scheme for ownership management of the radio frequency identification tag, the tag does not have any initiative, and the response stage completely depends on the random number sent by the reader to carry out the response, so that the tag is easy to be subjected to disguised attack, and the scheme requires the reader to store all tag secret information, and each round of information adopts a mode of two authentication messages, so that the working efficiency is reduced.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects in the prior art and provides a cloud-based ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method so as to improve the initiative of tags and improve the working efficiency and safety of tag ownership transfer.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows: the reader stores the tag information in a cloud database, and the tag generates a random number for encrypting the pseudo-identity of the tag in the authentication stage and then sends the random number to the reader; the reader sends the received hash value of the label pseudo-identity to the cloud, the cloud searches the stored label information by taking the hash value as an index, if the label information cannot be searched, error information is returned, and if corresponding information is searched, the corresponding information is sent to the reader
(1) Data initialization:
after the tag identity ID, the tag information info and the tag secret key K are cascaded, the secret key K of the reader R is usedREncrypting and storing the tag T pseudo identity TID in a cloud database in the form of H (TID) as an index, and storing a communication secret key K between the reader and the cloudRCThe tag pseudo identity TID is stored in a cloud database C, wherein H (·) represents hash operation;
the label ID, the label pseudo-identity TID, the label secret key K, the reader identity RID and the random number generator seed K1Storing in a tag;
sharing a secret key K with the reader identity RID, the new label owner identity RID', the reader and the new label ownerRR'Communication secret key K between reader and cloudRCStoring in a reader;
sharing the reader identity RID, the new tag owner identity RID' and the reader and the new tag owner by a secret key KRR'Stored in the new tag owner;
(2) the reader generates a first random number N of the reader1And reader first message
Figure GDA0003118560400000031
Sending to the tag, after the tag determines its validity, designing a PRNG random number generator to generate a first random number PRNG (k) of the tag1) Generating the first message T of label1And tag second message T2Returning to the reader, wherein:
Figure GDA0003118560400000032
{. represents a set of information,
Figure GDA0003118560400000033
representing exclusive-or processing, | | | represents message concatenation, cro (·) represents performing confusion operation on information, per (·) represents performing permutation operation on the information, and PRNG (·) represents performing nonlinear random number generation processing on seed data;
(3) the reader obtains the label pseudo identity TID through two label messages, calculates the Hash value H (TID) thereof, and generates a second random number N of the reader2Then, a second message of the reader is generated
Figure GDA0003118560400000034
Sending the information to a cloud database, and generating a cloud message by the cloud database
Figure GDA0003118560400000035
Returned to the reader where
Figure GDA0003118560400000036
The representative uses a shared secret key between the reader and the cloud to carry out encryption operation on the information;
(4) the reader obtains the K, the ID and the info of the tag through the cloud message, starts an ownership request stage, and generates a third random number N of the reader3And a communication secret key S, and four messages R of the reader are generated through calculation3 R4 R5 R6Sending to the tag, wherein: third message of reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000037
Reader fourth message
Figure GDA0003118560400000038
Reader fifth message
Figure GDA0003118560400000039
Reader sixth message
Figure GDA00031185604000000310
(5) R of tag passing reader3 R4 R5 R6The four messages obtain a third random number N of the reader3PRNG random number generator generates a tag second random number PRNG (k) and a tag owner identity RID2) Then, a third message of label is generated
Figure GDA00031185604000000311
And tag fourth message
Figure GDA00031185604000000312
Sending the ownership transfer request to the reader, and completing the ownership transfer request phase;
(6) the reader generates a fourth random number N of the reader4According to a fourth random number N4Generating a reader seventh message
Figure GDA00031185604000000313
Sending the information to the new label owner, generating a message verification code MAC according to a seventh message of the reader after the new label owner confirms the validity of the new label owner, and then generating verification information of the reader
Figure GDA00031185604000000314
Feed reader, reader off-field, wherein
Figure GDA00031185604000000315
Encrypting the information by using a shared secret key of the reader and the owner of the new tag on behalf of the reader;
(7) the new tag owner generates a first random number n of new tag owners1Then, the first message of the new label owner is generated
Figure GDA00031185604000000316
Sending to the tag, the tag confirming the validity of the new tag owner, designing a PRNG random number generator to generate a third machine number PRNG (k) of the tag3) Then, the fifth message of the label is generated
Figure GDA0003118560400000041
And tag sixth message
Figure GDA0003118560400000042
Sending to the new tag owner;
(8) new tag owner according to T3And T4The two label messages confirm the validity of the label and generate a second random number n of the new label owner2After new label secret key K 'and new label pseudo identity TID', three new label owner messages r are generated2 r3r4Sending to the tag, updating the stored information, designing a PRNG random number generator to generate a fourth random number PRNG (k) of the tag4) Then, two label messages T are generated7 T8And feeding back to the new tag owner, completing ownership transfer, wherein: new tag owner second message
Figure GDA0003118560400000043
New tag owner third message
Figure GDA0003118560400000044
New tag owner fourth message
Figure GDA0003118560400000045
Tag seventh message
Figure GDA0003118560400000046
Tag eighth message
Figure GDA0003118560400000047
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
first, the present invention enables ultra lightweight tags to also have the capability to generate random numbers by designing a PRNG random number generator to generate the tag random numbers.
Secondly, the cloud database is adopted to replace the traditional database, so that the authentication is more convenient, the consumption of the storage space of the reader is greatly reduced, and the utilization rate and the working efficiency of the reader are improved.
Thirdly, the invention encrypts and transmits the information in all the sentences, ensures that all the information has good confidentiality, and ensures that no useful information can be obtained even if an adversary intercepts and captures the information, thereby ensuring the safety of the information.
Fourthly, the operation methods used in the invention are all ultra-light operation methods, so that the operation burden of the tag and the reader is greatly reduced, and the operation efficiency is greatly improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an implementation of the method for ownership transfer of an ultra lightweight tag according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the cro aliasing algorithm of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the per permutation operator of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a sub-flow diagram of the design of a PRNG random number generator in the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Referring to fig. 1, the implementation steps of the invention are as follows:
step 1, data initialization.
The purpose of data initialization is to pre-store all required information in a designated device, and the specific implementation steps are as follows:
1a) setting a tag key K and a reader key KRSetting a communication secret key K between the reader and the cloud databaseRC；
1b) Storing the key set in 1a) and the related information of the tag and the reader:
concatenating the ID with the tag identity ID, the tag information info and the tag key K, and using the reader key KREncrypting the operation result and storing the operation result in a cloud database;
carrying out hash function processing on the tag pseudo identity TID, and storing a processed result H (TID) as an index in a cloud database C;
communication secret key K between reader and cloud databaseRCStoring the label pseudo identity TID in a cloud database, wherein H (·) represents hash operation;
the label identity ID, the label pseudo-identity TID, the label secret key K, the reader identity RID and the random number generator seed K1Stored in tag T;
the reader identity RID, the new tag owner identity RID' and a communication secret key K between the reader and the cloud databaseRCStored in the reader R;
the reader identity RID, the new tag owner identity RID 'are stored in the new tag owner R'.
And 2, the reader sends an authentication request to the tag.
(2a) The reader generates a first random number of the reader with 32bits by using a random number generation method ANSI X9.17:
(2a1) selecting current time and date DTiAs input for the random number generation method ANSI X9.17, seed V was chosen at williDefining a 56-bits encryption key s by user;
(2a2) the whole process of the encryption operation comprises three times of triple DES encryption, and the time and date DT is firstly encryptediAnd seed ViPerforming XOR operation, and performing triple DES encryption operation on the XOR operation result and the encryption key s to obtain an output RiTime and date DTiAnd RiAfter XOR operation, triple DES encryption operation is performed with the encryption key s to obtain a new Vi+1Namely the random number which is finally generated;
(2b) the identity information and the first random number of the reader are subjected to cro confusion operation,
referring to fig. 2, the processing steps of the cro aliasing operation are as follows:
(2b1) inputting two 32-bits bit strings of identity information and a first random number of a reader;
(2b2) taking 16 bits at odd positions such as 1, 3 and 5 of the identity information and 16 bits at even positions such as 2, 4 and 6 of the first random number of the reader, and combining the taken bits into a new 32-bit string, namely a cro confusion operation result, wherein the selected bits are placed according to the positions in the original bit string;
(2c) the reader will confuse the operationThe result of (1) and the first random number N of the reader1The first message R of the reader is obtained by cascading1R is to be1Is sent to a tag, wherein
Figure GDA0003118560400000061
{. represents a set of information,
Figure GDA0003118560400000062
indicating exclusive or processing and | | l indicating message concatenation.
And 3, responding to the request of the reader by the tag.
(3a) The tag receives a first message R of the reader1Then, directly reading the first random number N of the reader1Performing the same obfuscation operation as that in step (2b) on all the identities stored in the mobile terminal, and combining the obfuscation operation result with the identity R1And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the two results are consistent, authenticating the first message R of the reader1For a legitimate message, performing (3 b);
if the two results are not consistent, the tag considers the first message R of the reader1Terminating the communication for an illegal message;
(3b) tag uses initial seed k1Generating a tag first random number PRNG (k)1):
Referring to fig. 4, the PRNG random number generator generates a random number as follows:
(3b1) initial seed k1Sequentially inputting the data into a linear feedback shift register from 1 to 32bits, and using a primitive polynomial y with the degree of 32 as x32+x18+x17+ x +1 pairs of initial seeds k1Iterative processing is carried out, a new digit is generated each time, the new digits are sequentially input into the linear feedback shift register, and the last digit is deleted to obtain ki+1；
(3b2) Inputting 32-bit digits in the current linear feedback shift register into a Boolean function filter for nonlinear processing to obtain a digit;
(3b3) continuously performing the steps (3b1) and (3b2) for 32 times to obtain 32-bit output, namely the final output result of the PRNG random number generator, wherein the final output result is the random number generated by the label;
(3c) the tag generates two tag messages to the reader:
(3c1) the tag will have a reader identity RID and its own first random number PRNG (k)1) After the XOR operation, per replacement operation is carried out with the reader identity RID,
referring to fig. 3, the per permutation operation includes the following specific steps: setting two equal-length input bit strings as x and y, arranging the position ordinal number of 1 in x from small to large, then arranging the position ordinal number of 0 from large to small to obtain a new position ordinal number arrangement table, then rearranging the bit in y according to the new position ordinal number arrangement table to generate a label first message
Figure GDA0003118560400000063
(3c2) First random number N of tag to reader1And its own first random number PRNG (k)1) Performing XOR operation on the pseudo identity TID to generate a second label message
Figure GDA0003118560400000064
(3c3) The label sends its first message T1And a second message T2And sending the data to a reader.
And 4, the reader sends a data acquisition request to the cloud database.
(4a) The reader receives a first message T of the label1Inverse per permutation operation is performed to obtain a first random number PRNG (k) of the tag1) Then using the self-identity RID and the first random number PRNG (k) of the label1) First message T with tag1Performing exclusive or operation to obtain a label pseudo identity TID;
(4b) the reader generates a second random number N of the reader using the same method as in the step (2a)2And simultaneously carrying out hash operation on the label pseudo identity TID to obtain a hash value H (TID):
(4b1) filling 128 bits of label pseudo identity information, filling 1 in the 129 th bit, and then filling 318 bits of 0 to ensure that the length of the whole number series is 512, and ensuring that the result of the whole number series after modulo 512 processing is 448;
(4b2) randomly selecting 64 bits, representing the length of the message before filling in a little-endian mode, namely storing the highest 64 bits in the highest address and storing the last 64 bits in the lowest address, and sequentially dividing the 512-bit message into 16 32-bit strings;
(4b3) initializing a program internal module, storing an intermediate result and a final hash result by using a 128-bit long buffer, and expressing the intermediate result and the final hash result by using the buffer as 4 32-bit long registers (A, B, C and D), wherein each register stores data in a lite-endian manner, and the initial value is A (01234567), B (89 ABCDEF), C (FEDCBA 98) and D (76543210);
(4b4) by compression function HMD5Sequentially compressing 16 32bit strings to obtain an operation result, namely a hash value H (TID);
(4c) the reader sends the second random number N to the reader2Cascading with the hash value of the label pseudo-identity, and using a communication secret key K between the reader and the cloud databaseRCThe concatenated result is encrypted in RC 4:
(4c1) setting the length of a key core part S-box to be 128, setting the length of a communication key to be 128, and initializing a byte sequence in the key core part S-box by using a key-scheduling algorithm;
(4c2) processing the key core part S-box and the communication key by using a pseudorandom sub-password generation algorithm to obtain a sub-key sequence, and performing exclusive or operation on the sub-key sequence and a plaintext to obtain an encryption result;
(4d) the reader will encrypt the result and the second random number N of the reader2Cascading to obtain a second message of the reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000071
And sending to the cloud database.
And 5, the cloud database feeds back the requested information to the reader.
(5a1) The cloud database is according to the second message R of the reader2Directly reading the second random number N of the reader2Then, the second message of the reader is decrypted to obtain a second random number N of the reader2N obtained at this time2And a second random number N read directly2And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the comparison result is inconsistent, the message is tampered, the cloud database generates warning information warning, and the communication is terminated;
if the comparison result is consistent, performing the step (5a 2);
(5a2) the cloud database is searched by using the obtained index value:
if the corresponding storage unit is not searched, the cloud database end generates an error message and returns the error message to the reader, the communication is ended, and the reader believes that the tag which is communicated with the reader before is an illegal tag after receiving the error message;
if the corresponding storage unit is found, the stored label pseudo-identity TID and other stored information are used
Figure GDA0003118560400000081
And a second random number N of the reader2Cascading, and then encrypting by using a symmetric communication secret key between the cloud database and the reader to obtain cloud database information
Figure GDA0003118560400000082
And sent to the reader.
And 6, the reader sends an ownership transfer request to the tag.
(6a) The reader compares the label pseudo identity received in the cloud database message M with the label pseudo identity received from the label end:
if the comparison result is inconsistent, the reader determines that the data of the cloud database end is invaded, tampered or damaged;
if the comparison result is consistent, the reader stores the secret information of the ID, the key K and the info of the tag, and executes the step (6 b);
(6b) the reader generates a third random number N of the reader3And a communication key S:
the reader generates a third random number N of the reader by using the same random number generation method as the steps (2a) and (4b)3
The reader carries out XOR operation on the tag key K and random numbers with the same length as the tag key K to obtain a communication secret key S;
(6c) the reader generates four reader messages and sends the four reader messages to the tag:
the reader sends the first random number of the label and the third random number N of the reader3Performing XOR operation with the tag key K to generate a third message of the reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000083
The reader sends its third random number N3And carrying out XOR with the tag identity, and then carrying out per replacement operation on the XOR operation result and the tag identity to obtain a fourth message of the reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000084
The reader carries out XOR operation on the label key K and the communication key S, and carries out XOR operation on the result of the XOR operation and a third random number N of the reader3Per permutation operation is carried out to obtain the fifth message of the reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000085
The reader carries out XOR operation on the identity of the reader and the identity of the owner of the new label, and per replacement operation is carried out on the operation result and the communication key S to obtain a sixth message of the reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000091
The reader sends a third message R of the reader3A fourth message R4A fifth message R5And a sixth message R6And sending to the tag.
And 7, after authenticating the reader, the tag stores the updating information and returns confirmation information.
(7a) The tag authenticates the reader, and the tag sends the first random number of the tag, a tag key K and a third message R of the reader3Performing XOR operation to obtain a third random number N of the reader3Using the third random number N of the reader3Performing XOR operation with the identity of the reader, performing per permutation operation on the XOR operation result and the identity of the reader, and performing the permutation operation result with the fourth message R of the reader4And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the comparison result is consistent, the label determines that the sender is legal, and the step (7b) is continued;
if the comparison result is not consistent, the label determines that the sender is illegal and terminates the communication;
(7b) the label stores the updated information:
the third random number N of the reader is used by the tag3To reader fifth message R5Carrying out inverse per replacement operation, and carrying out exclusive or operation on a replacement operation result and the tag key K to obtain and store a communication key S;
the tag uses the communication key S to send a sixth message R to the reader6Carrying out inverse per displacement operation, and carrying out exclusive OR on the displacement operation result and the reader identity to obtain and store the identity RID' of the new tag owner;
(7c) the tag returns confirmation information to the reader:
(7c1) the label uses the same random number generation method as in step (3b), using seed k2Generating a tag second random number PRNG (k)2)；
(7c2) The tag sends two tag messages to the reader:
the tag sends its own second random number PRNG (k)2) A communication key S and a third random number N of the reader3Performing XOR operation to generate a third label message
Figure GDA0003118560400000092
The tag respectively compares the received new tag owner identity RID' and the communication key S with a tag second random number PRNG (k)2) Performing XOR operation, and performing XOR operation on the two resultsGenerating a fourth message of the label by the line per permutation operation
Figure GDA0003118560400000093
Tag will tag the third message T3And a tag authentication message T4And sending the data to a reader.
And 8, the reader confirms that the label successfully receives the updating information.
The reader receives the third message T of the label3Then, the third random number N is added to the communication secret key S and the reader3Performing XOR operation to obtain a second random number PRNG (k) of the tag2) The new tag owner identity RID' and the communication key S are then respectively associated with the tag second random number PRNG (k)2) Performing XOR operation, and finally comparing the result with the tag verification message T4And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the comparison result is consistent, it indicates that the tag has correctly obtained the identity of the new tag owner and the communication key of the new tag owner, and the reader starts to perform step 9;
if the comparison result is inconsistent, the reader will re-transmit and verify the relevant information if the tag does not receive the correct information.
And 9, the reader confirms that the new label owner receives the label information.
(9a) The reader sends the tag information to the new tag owner:
the reader generates a fourth random number N of the reader by using the same random number generation method as that in the step (2a), the step (4b) and the step (6b)4；
The reader sends the ID RID, the tag pseudo-ID TID, the tag ID, the tag information info, the communication key S and the fourth random number N of the reader4After the cascade connection, the communication secret key K between the reader and the new label owner is usedRR'Performing encryption operation on the cascading result by the same encryption method as the step (4c) to generate a seventh message of the reader
Figure GDA0003118560400000101
And sending the seventh message to the new tag owner;
(9b) the new label owner directly reads the fourth random number N of the reader4And then, decrypting the seventh message of the reader, and comparing the reader identity obtained after decryption with the stored reader identity:
if the comparison result is not consistent, the owner of the new label determines that the information sender is illegal, and the communication is terminated;
if the comparison result is consistent, the new label owner determines that the information sender is legal, stores the label information contained in the information and carries out the step (9 c);
(9c) the new label owner calculates the received secret information by using the same Hash operation method as the Hash operation method in the step (4b) to obtain a message authentication code MAC, and the message authentication code MAC and the received fourth random number N of the reader4After the cascade connection, the communication secret key K between the reader and the new label owner is usedRR'Encrypting the cascade result in the same encryption mode as the step (4c) to obtain the reader verification message
Figure GDA0003118560400000102
And sending the verification message to the reader;
(9d) the reader receives the reader verification message r1Afterwards, the corresponding information contained in the MAC is verified:
if the received MAC is incorrect, the reader determines that the new label owner does not correctly receive the label information, and the reader retransmits the label information;
if the received MAC is correct, the reader determines that the new label owner has correctly received the corresponding information of the label, and the reader leaves the field.
Step 10, ownership transfer.
The new tag owner generates a first random number n of the new tag owner using the same method as the random number generation method in the step (2a), the step (4b), the step (6b) and the step (8a)1And the new label owner is given a first random number n1With self identityXOR processing, namely performing cro confusion operation on the XOR operation result and the identity of the user and then performing cro confusion operation on the XOR operation result and the identity of the user and the first random number n of the new label owner1Cascading to obtain a first message of a new label owner
Figure GDA0003118560400000111
And sending the owner first message to the tag;
step 11, the new tag owner verifies the tag.
(11a) The label receives a first message r of a new label owner1Then, directly reading the first random number n of the new tag owner1After cre confusion operation is carried out on the identity of the stored new label owner and the identity of the new label owner, the identity of the new label owner and the received first message r of the new label owner are carried out1And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the comparison result is consistent, the label believes that the sender is legal, and meanwhile, the step (11b) is carried out;
if the comparison result is not consistent, the label considers that the message sender is illegal, and the label terminates the communication;
(11b) the tag sends two messages to the new tag owner:
(11b1) the tag generates a third random number PRNG (k) of the tag using the same random number generation method as in steps (3b) and (7c1)3)；
(11b2) The tag compares the new tag owner identity with a third random number PRNG (k) of the tag3) After XOR operation, per replacement operation is carried out on the identity of the new label owner to generate a fifth label message
Figure GDA0003118560400000112
(11b3) The label carries out XOR operation on the self identity, the third random number of the label and the identity of the owner of the new label to generate a sixth message of the label
Figure GDA0003118560400000113
(11b4) The label sends a third message T of the label3And its own fourth message T4Sending to the new tag owner;
(11c) after the new label owner receives the fifth and sixth messages of the label, per replacement operation is carried out on the fifth message of the label to obtain a third random number PRNG (k) of the label3) The new tag owner will receive the third random number PRNG (k) of the tag3) Self-identity RID' and tag fourth message T4Performing exclusive or operation to obtain a tag pseudo identity TID, and comparing the TID with a stored tag pseudo identity:
if the comparison result is inconsistent, the new label owner determines that the label is illegal, and the new label owner reports an error to the reader and terminates the communication with the label;
if the comparison result is consistent, the new label owner determines that the label is legal, and stores the third random number PRNG (k) of the label3) Then, step 12 is performed;
and step 12, updating the information of the label.
(12a) The new label owner generates a second random number n of the new label owner by using the same random number generation method as the random number generation method in the step (2a), the step (4b), the step (6b), the step (8a) and the step 92；
(12b) The new tag owner generates tag information that the tag needs to be updated:
(12b1) randomly selecting a random number with the same length as the communication key by the owner of the new tag, and carrying out XOR operation on the random number and the communication key to obtain a new tag key K';
(12b2) randomly selecting a random number with the same length as the pseudo-identity of the new label by the owner of the new label, and carrying out XOR operation on the random number and the pseudo-identity of the new label to obtain a pseudo-identity TID';
(12c) the new tag owner sends three new tag owner messages to the tag:
the new tag owner will tag a third random number PRNG (k)3) A new tag key K' and a second random number n of new tag owners2Carrying out XOR operation to obtain a second message of the new label owner
Figure GDA0003118560400000121
The new label owner performs XOR on the new label key K 'and the communication key S, and then performs XOR on the new label key K' and the communication key SSecond random number n of tag owners2Performing per replacement operation to generate third message of new label owner
Figure GDA0003118560400000122
After the new label owner carries out XOR operation on the label pseudo-identity and the new label pseudo-identity, per replacement operation is carried out on the new label owner and the new communication secret key K' to generate a fourth message of the new label owner
Figure GDA0003118560400000123
The new label owner sends own second message, third message and fourth message to the label;
(12d) tag updating information and deleting reader information
(12d1) After receiving the information, the label sends a second message of a new label owner to the PRNG (k)2) Carrying out XOR operation to obtain a second random number n of the new label owner2Then using a second random number n of new tag owners2Carrying out inverse per substitution operation on the third message of the new tag owner, and carrying out XOR operation on the result and the communication secret key S to obtain and store a new communication secret key K';
(12d2) the tag uses the new communication secret key K 'to perform reverse permutation operation on the fourth message of the new tag owner, and then performs exclusive or operation on the permutation operation result and the self pseudo identity to obtain and store a new tag pseudo identity TID';
(12d3) and deleting the original label pseudo identity TID and the communication secret key K by the label.
And step 13, the label sends update completion confirmation information to the new label owner.
(13a) The tag uses the same random number generation method as in step (3b), step (7c1), step (11b1) in k4Generating a fourth random number PRNG (k) of the tag for the seed4)；
(13b) The tag generates two tag messages to the new tag owner:
the tag will tag a fourth random number PRNG (k)4) A new tag key K' and a second random number n of the new tag owner2Performing XOR operation to obtain the seventh message of the label
Figure GDA0003118560400000131
The label respectively compares the new label pseudo identity TID 'with a new label key K' and a third random number PRNG (K) of the label3) Performing XOR operation, and per replacement operation on the two XOR operation results to obtain the eighth message of the label
Figure GDA0003118560400000132
The label sends its fifth message T5And a sixth message T6To the new tag owner.
And step 14, confirming the updating condition of the label information by the new label owner.
(14a) The new label owner will label the seventh message T7A new tag key K' and a second random number n of new tag owners2Performing XOR operation to obtain the fourth random number PRNG (k) of the tag4)；
(14b) The new tag owner will tag the fourth random number PRNG (k)4) Performing exclusive-or operation with the new tag pseudo-identity TID 'and the new tag key K', performing per replacement operation on the two exclusive-or operation results, and comparing the per replacement operation result with the eighth tag message:
if the comparison result is inconsistent, the new label owner determines that the label does not correctly receive the updating information, and the new label owner sends an updating request to the label again;
if the comparison result is consistent, the new label owner determines that the label correctly receives the updating information and has been updated successfully, the ownership transfer is successful, and the communication is finished.
The foregoing description is only an example of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention, so that it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications in form and detail may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.

Claims (8)

1. A cloud database-based ultra-lightweight radio frequency identification tag ownership transfer method comprises the following steps:
(1) data initialization:
after the tag identity ID, the tag information info and the tag secret key K are cascaded, the secret key K of the reader R is usedREncrypting and storing the tag T pseudo identity TID in a cloud database in the form of H (TID) as an index, and storing a communication secret key K between the reader and the cloudRCThe tag pseudo identity TID is stored in a cloud database C, wherein H (·) represents hash operation;
the label ID, the label pseudo-identity TID, the label secret key K, the reader identity RID and the random number generator seed K1Storing in a tag;
sharing a secret key K with the reader identity RID, the new label owner identity RID', the reader and the new label ownerRR'Communication secret key K between reader and cloudRCStoring in a reader;
sharing the reader identity RID, the new tag owner identity RID' and the reader and the new tag owner by a secret key KRR'Storing in a reader of the new tag owner;
(2) the reader generates a first random number N of the reader1And reader first message
Figure FDA0003118560390000011
Sending to the tag, after the tag determines its validity, designing a PRNG random number generator to generate a first random number PRNG (k) of the tag1) Generating the first message T of label1And tag second message T2Returning to the reader, wherein:
Figure FDA0003118560390000012
{. represents a set of information,
Figure FDA0003118560390000013
representing exclusive-or processing, | | | represents message concatenation, cro (·) represents performing confusion operation on information, per (·) represents performing permutation operation on the information, and PRNG (·) represents performing nonlinear random number generation processing on seed data;
(3) the reader obtains the label pseudo identity TID through two label messages, calculates the Hash value H (TID) thereof, and generates a second random number N of the reader2Then, a second message of the reader is generated
Figure FDA00031185603900000110
Sending the information to a cloud database, and generating a cloud message by the cloud database
Figure FDA0003118560390000014
Returned to the reader where
Figure FDA0003118560390000015
The representative uses a shared secret key between the reader and the cloud to carry out encryption operation on the information;
(4) the reader obtains the K, the ID and the info of the tag through the cloud message, starts an ownership request stage, and generates a third random number N of the reader3And a communication secret key S, and four messages R of the reader are generated through calculation3 R4 R5 R6Sending to the tag, wherein: third message of reader
Figure FDA0003118560390000016
Reader fourth message
Figure FDA0003118560390000017
Reader fifth message
Figure FDA0003118560390000018
Reader sixth message
Figure FDA0003118560390000019
(5) R of tag passing reader3 R4 R5 R6The four messages obtain a third random number N of the reader3The communication secret key S new and the label owner identity RID' are realized by the following steps:
(5a) the tag will tag a first random number PRNG (k)1) A tag key K and a reader third message R3Performing XOR operation to obtain a third random number N of the reader3；
(5b) The third random number N of the reader to be obtained by the label3Per replacement operation is carried out with the own identity ID, and the replacement result and the fourth message R of the reader are carried out4And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the two results are the same, the tag determines that the received reader message is not tampered, and the tag continues to the step (5 c);
if the two results are different, the tag determines that the received reader message is tampered, and the tag terminates communication;
(5c) the label is according to the third random number N of the reader obtained in the step (5b)3For the reader, the fifth message R5Performing inverse per permutation operation and comparing the operation result
Figure FDA0003118560390000021
Performing XOR operation with the tag key to obtain a communication key S;
(5d) the tag sends a sixth message R to the reader according to the communication key S6Performing inverse per permutation operation and comparing the operation result
Figure FDA0003118560390000022
Carrying out exclusive or operation with the reader identity RID to obtain a new tag owner identity RID';
designing the PRNG random number generator to generate a tag second random number PRNG (k)2) Then, a third message of label is generated
Figure FDA0003118560390000023
And tag fourth message
Figure FDA0003118560390000024
Sending the ownership transfer request to the reader, and completing the ownership transfer request phase;
(6) the reader generates a fourth random number N of the reader4According to a fourth random number N4Generating a reader seventh message
Figure FDA0003118560390000025
Sending the information to the new label owner, generating a message verification code MAC according to a seventh message of the reader after the new label owner confirms the validity of the new label owner, and then generating verification information of the reader
Figure FDA0003118560390000026
Feed reader, reader off-field, wherein
Figure FDA0003118560390000027
Encrypting the information by using a shared secret key of the reader and the owner of the new tag on behalf of the reader;
(7) the new tag owner generates a first random number n of new tag owners1Then, the first message of the new label owner is generated
Figure FDA0003118560390000028
Sending to the tag, the tag confirming the validity of the new tag owner, designing a PRNG random number generator to generate a third machine number PRNG (k) of the tag3) Then, the fifth message of the label is generated
Figure FDA0003118560390000029
And tag sixth message
Figure FDA00031185603900000210
Sending to the new tag owner;
(8) new tag owner according to T3And T4The two label messages confirm the validity of the label and generate a second random number n of the new label owner2After new label secret key K 'and new label pseudo identity TID', three new label owner messages r are generated2 r3 r4Sending to the tag, updating the stored information, designing a PRNG random number generator to generate a fourth random number PRNG (k) of the tag4) Then, two label messages T are generated7 T8And feeding back to the new tag owner, completing ownership transfer, wherein: new tag owner second message
Figure FDA0003118560390000031
New tag owner third message
Figure FDA0003118560390000032
Seventh message of new tag owner
Figure FDA0003118560390000033
Tag fourth message
Figure FDA0003118560390000034
Tag eighth message
Figure FDA0003118560390000035
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the PRNG random number generator is designed in steps (2), (5), (7), (8) by:
first, an initial seed k is set1Sequentially inputting the data into a linear feedback shift register from 1 to 32bits, and using a primitive polynomial y with the degree of 32 as x32+x18+x17+ x +1 pairs of initial seeds k1Performing iterative processing, generating a new digit each time, sequentially inputting the new digits into the linear feedback shift register, and deleting the last digit;
then, inputting the 32-bit number in the linear feedback shift register into a Boolean function filter for nonlinear processing to obtain a one-bit number:
and finally, continuously performing the two steps for 32 times to obtain 32-bit output, namely the final output result of the PRNG random number generator, wherein the final output result is the random number generated by the label.
3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the tag in step (2) confirms the validity of the reader identity by the following steps:
(2a) tag slave reader first message R1Directly reading the first random number N of the reader1Performing XOR operation on the identity of the reader and the identity of the reader stored in the reader, and performing cro confusion operation on the operation result and the identity information of the reader stored in the reader;
(2b) mixing the result of the confusion operation with the received first message R of the reader1And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the comparison result is consistent, the tag identifies the reader as a legal reader and continues communication;
if the comparison result is not consistent, the tag determines that the reader is an illegal reader, does not respond and terminates the communication.
4. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the reader in step (4) generates the communication key S by randomly selecting a random number N having the same bit length as the tag key K, and then performing an exclusive or operation on the random number N and the tag key K to obtain a result, i.e., the communication key S
Figure FDA0003118560390000036
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the new tag owner in step (6) responds to the reader with a seventh message R7Generating a message authentication code MAC, and realizing the following steps:
(6a) seventh message R of new tag owner slave reader7Reading the fourth random number N directly4；
(6b) New tag owner uses reader and own shared secret key KRR'To reader seventh message R7Decrypting to obtain reader identity RID, label pseudo-identity TID, label identity ID, label related information info, communication key S and reading fourth random number N4
(6c) The new tag owner compares the reader identity obtained after decryption with the stored reader identity:
if the comparison result is consistent, the new tag owner determines that the seventh message source of the reader is legal, and the step (6d) is continued;
if the comparison result is inconsistent, the owner of the new tag determines that the seventh message source of the reader is illegal, and the communication is terminated;
(6d) and (4) the new tag owner compares the decrypted fourth random number of the reader with the fourth random number of the reader directly read in the step (6 a):
if the two are consistent, the new tag owner determines a seventh message R of the reader7Is not tampered, and stores the false ID TID, ID, related info, S and N4Continuing to step (6 d);
if the two are not consistent, the new tag owner determines that the seventh message of the reader is tampered, and returns an error message error to the reader;
(6e) and after the new tag owner cascades the tag pseudo identity TID, the tag identity ID, the tag related information info and the communication key S, carrying out hash operation on the concatenated tags to obtain a result, namely the message authentication code MAC.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the step (7) of validating the identity of the owner of the new tag comprises the steps of:
(7a) tag slave reader first message r1Directly reading the first random number n of the reader1Performing XOR operation on the identity of the reader and the identity of the reader stored in the reader, and performing cro confusion operation on the operation result and the identity information of the reader stored in the reader;
(7b) the tag will confuse the result of the operation with the received first message r of the reader1And (3) carrying out comparison:
if the comparison result is consistent, the tag determines that the owner of the new tag is legal and continues communication;
if the comparison result is not consistent, the tag determines that the new tag owner is illegal, does not respond and terminates the communication.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the new tag owner in step (8) is according to T3And T4The two label messages confirm the validity of the label, and the implementation steps are as follows:
(8a) third message T of new label owner to label using self-identity RID3Inverse per permutation operation is performed to obtain a third random number PRNG (k) of the tag3)；
(8b) The new label owner identifies itself, RID', third random number PRNG (k) of label3) And tag fourth message T4Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a label pseudo-identity, and comparing the obtained label pseudo-identity with a stored label pseudo-identity:
if the two are consistent, the tag identity is considered to be legal, and communication is continued;
if the two are not consistent, the tag identity is considered to be illegal and the communication is terminated.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the tag updates the stored information in step (8) by:
(9a) the tag will tag a fourth random number PRNG (k)4) Communication key S and new tag owner second message r2Performing XOR operation to obtain a second random number n of the new label owner2；
(9b) The label uses a second random number n of new label owners2Third message r to new tag owner3Carrying out inverse per replacement operation, and carrying out XOR operation on the operation result and the communication key S to obtain and store a new tag key K';
(9c) fourth message r of new label owner by label using new label key K4Carrying out inverse per permutation operation, and carrying out XOR operation on the operation result and the self pseudo identity TID to obtainArriving the new label pseudo-identity TID' and storing;
(9d) and deleting the label pseudo identity TID, the label secret key K and the reader identity RID which are stored during initialization by the label.
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