CN105991540A

CN105991540A - Data interaction method and system

Info

Publication number: CN105991540A
Application number: CN201510055908.7A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 李东声
Original assignee: Tendyron Technology Co Ltd
Current assignee: Tendyron Technology Co Ltd
Priority date: 2014-11-07
Filing date: 2015-02-03
Publication date: 2016-10-05

Abstract

The present invention provides a data interaction method and a data interaction system. The method includes the following steps that: a card sleeve sends a login request to a real card management device; a secure connection is built between the card sleeve and the real card management device, and a card sleeve end second secure transmission key and a real card management device end secure transmission key for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card management device are obtained; the card sleeve carries out first processing on received login passwords through the card sleeve end second secure transmission key and sends processed login passwords to the real card management device; the real card management device receives the data sent by the card sleeve, and carries out second processing on the received data through using the real card management device end secure transmission key and verifies the correctness of data obtained after the second processing; and after the real card management device successfully verifies the data which have been subjected to second processing, the card sleeve logins the real card management device. Based on the data interaction method and the data interaction system of the invention, the card sleeve can securely login the real card management device.

Description

Data interaction method and system

Technical Field

The invention relates to the technical field of electronic information security, in particular to a data interaction method and system.

Background

In the existing transaction flow, for example: when a user withdraws money or swipes a card for shopping, the user usually needs to carry a bank card transacted from a bank, certain safety risk exists when the user carries the bank card, and once the bank card is lost, the property of the user is easily lost. In addition, because the bank cards are various in types, a user may have a plurality of bank cards of different banks at the same time, and if the user needs to carry the bank cards of the different banks, the user is not portable enough, and if the user only carries some bank cards of the bank cards for carrying the bank cards conveniently, when the user uses the bank cards to withdraw money or uses a card for swiping a card for shopping, cross-bank transactions may occur, which may cause unnecessary expenses to occur in the transactions.

Therefore, there is a need in the art to provide a login solution with high security.

Disclosure of Invention

The present invention is directed to solving the above problems.

The invention mainly aims to provide a data interaction method;

another object of the present invention is to provide a data interaction system.

In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme of the invention is realized as follows:

one aspect of the present invention provides a data interaction method, including: the card sleeve sends a login request to a real card manager; the card sleeve is in safe connection with the real card manager, and a second safe transmission key at the card sleeve end and a safe transmission key at the real card manager end for data safe transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager are obtained; the card sleeve performs first processing on the received login password through a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sends the processed login password to the real card manager; the real card manager receives the data sent by the card sleeve, and verifies the correctness of the data after second processing after the received data is subjected to second processing by utilizing the safe transmission key of the real card manager; and after the real card manager verifies that the data processed by the second processing passes, the card sleeve logs in the real card manager.

In addition, the verifying the correctness of the data after the second processing by the real card manager after the second processing is performed on the received data by using the real card manager end secure transmission key comprises the following steps: the real card manager performs second processing on the received data by using the real card manager end secure transmission key to obtain a password to be verified; the real card manager judges whether the password to be verified is an alarm password; if the password to be verified is the alarm password, the real card manager determines that the password to be verified passes the verification and executes the alarm operation; and if the password to be verified is not the alarm password and is the login password, the real card manager determines that the password to be verified passes the verification.

In addition, the card sleeve further comprises a heartbeat sleep mode, wherein the heartbeat sleep mode is a low-power consumption non-working mode, and after the card sleeve is safely connected with the real card manager, the data interaction method further comprises the following steps: the card sleeve sends detection information to a real card manager at intervals of first preset time under a heartbeat sleep mode; the real card manager receives the detection information and sends response information to the card sleeve; if the card sleeve does not receive the response information within the second preset time, the safe connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager is disconnected; and if the card sleeve receives the response information within the second preset time, the card sleeve is kept in the safe connection with the real card manager.

In addition, the secure connection established by the card sleeve and the real card manager comprises: the card sleeve sends a third secure connection instruction for indicating establishment of secure connection to the real card manager, wherein the third secure connection instruction comprises: the card sleeve encrypts the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the generated fifth connection random factor by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate to obtain a fifth connection ciphertext, and the card sleeve signs the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fifth connection signature; the real card manager receives the third safe connection instruction, decrypts the fifth connection ciphertext by using a private key of the real card manager, and obtains a second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end and a fifth connection random decryption factor; the real card manager verifies the fifth connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the second binding decryption factor and the fifth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; after the real card manager verifies that the fifth connection signature is correct, verifying whether the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end; the real card manager verifies that the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end, and then generates a sixth connection random factor; the real card manager encrypts the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a sixth connection ciphertext, and signs the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a sixth connection signature; the real card manager sends a third secure connection response to the card sleeve, wherein the third secure connection response comprises: a sixth concatenated ciphertext and a sixth concatenated signature; the card sleeve receives the third secure connection response, decrypts the sixth connection ciphertext by using a card sleeve private key, and obtains a decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and a decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor; the card sleeve verifies the sixth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the card sleeve verifies that the sixth connection signature is correct, verifying whether the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor; after the card sleeve verifies that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random decryption factor, generating a card sleeve end second secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random decryption factor; and the real card manager generates a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connecting random factor.

In addition, the secure connection established by the card sleeve and the real card manager comprises: the card sleeve receives a seventh connection random factor and a unique identifier of the real card manager, which are sent by the real card manager and generated by the real card manager; the card sleeve sends a fourth safety connection instruction for indicating to establish safety connection to the real card manager, wherein the fourth safety connection instruction comprises: the card sleeve unique identification, a seventh connection ciphertext obtained by encrypting the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by the card sleeve by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate, and a seventh connection signature obtained by signing the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key by the card sleeve; the real card manager receives the fourth safe connection instruction and judges whether the unique identifier of the card sleeve is in the real card manager end binding list or not; if the unique card sleeve identifier is in the real card manager end binding list, the real card manager decrypts the seventh connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key to obtain a seventh connection random decryption factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor; the real card manager verifies the seventh connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; after the real card manager verifies that the seventh connection signature is correct, verifying whether the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor; if the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor, the real card manager signs the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a private key of the real card manager to obtain an eighth connection signature; the real card manager sends a fourth secure connection response to the card sleeve, wherein the fourth secure connection response comprises: an eighth concatenated signature; the card sleeve receives the fourth secure connection response, and verifies the eighth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor in the real card manager certificate; after the card sleeve verifies that the eighth connection signature is correct, generating a card sleeve end second secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least an eighth connection random factor and a card sleeve end second binding factor; the real card manager generates a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random decryption factor and the real card manager end binding factor; the card sleeve sends the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor to the real card manager after carrying out first processing on the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end; the real card manager performs first processing on the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a real card manager end secure transmission key and then sends the processed results to the card sleeve; the card sleeve receives the data sent by the real card manager, carries out second processing on the received data by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end, and compares whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor; and the real card manager receives the data sent by the card sleeve, performs second processing on the received data by using the secure transmission key of the real card manager, and compares whether the data after the second processing is the same as the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor.

In addition, before the card sleeve establishes a secure connection with the real card manager, the data interaction method further comprises the following steps: the card sleeve and the real card manager perform a binding operation.

In addition, the card case and the real card manager performing the binding operation includes: the card sleeve receives a trigger command for indicating the binding with the real card manager; the card sleeve sends a second binding instruction to the real card manager through a wireless network, wherein the second binding instruction comprises: a third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve, a card sleeve certificate and a card sleeve unique identifier; the real card manager receives the second binding instruction and verifies the card sleeve certificate by using the root certificate; after the real card manager verifies that the card sleeve certificate is legal, a fourth binding random factor is generated; the real card manager encrypts the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a second binding ciphertext, and signs the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a third binding signature; the real card manager sends a second binding response to the card sleeve through the wireless network, wherein the second binding response comprises: the second binding ciphertext, the third binding signature, the real card manager certificate and the unique identifier of the real card manager; the card sleeve receives the second binding response and verifies the real card manager certificate by using the root certificate; after the card sleeve verifies that the certificate of the real card manager is legal, the card sleeve decrypts the second binding ciphertext by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor; the card sleeve verifies the third binding signature by using the real card manager public key, the third binding random decryption factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the card sleeve verifies that the third binding signature is correct, whether the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor is verified; after the card sleeve verifies that the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor, the card sleeve prompts the unique identifier of the real card manager; the card sleeve receives a trigger command for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct, signs a third binding random factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fourth binding signature, and stores the unique identifier of the real card manager, the certificate of the real card manager and a second binding factor of the card sleeve end to a second binding list of the card sleeve end, wherein the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the fourth binding random decryption factor; the card sleeve sends a fourth binding signature to the real card manager; the real card manager receives the fourth binding signature, and verifies the fourth binding signature by using the card sleeve public key, the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor in the card sleeve certificate; and after the fourth binding signature is verified to be correct by the real card manager, storing the unique card sleeve identifier, the card sleeve certificate and the real card manager end binding factor to a real card manager end binding list, wherein the real card manager end binding factor is a fourth binding random factor.

Further, the first processing includes: an encryption process, the second process comprising: carrying out decryption processing; or the first processing includes: a check calculation process, the second process including: checking, verifying and calculating; or the first processing includes: an encryption and verification calculation process, the second process comprising: and (5) decryption and verification calculation processing.

In addition, the cutting ferrule is the mobile device.

In addition, the card sleeve is a mobile device and an electronic signature device, or the card sleeve is an electronic signature device.

In another aspect, the present invention provides a data interaction system, including: a card sleeve and a real card manager; the card sleeve is used for sending a login request to the real card manager; establishing a secure connection with a real card manager to obtain a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager; the real card manager is used for establishing safe connection with the card sleeve and obtaining a real card manager end safe transmission key for data safe transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager; the card sleeve is also used for carrying out first processing on the received login password through a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sending the processed login password to the real card manager; the real card manager is also used for receiving the data sent by the card sleeve, and verifying the correctness of the data after second processing after the second processing is carried out on the received data by utilizing the safe transmission key at the real card manager end; and after the data after the second processing is verified to pass, the card sleeve logs in the real card manager.

In addition, the real card manager is specifically configured to perform second processing on the received data by using the real card manager end secure transmission key to obtain a password to be verified; judging whether the password to be verified is an alarm password or not; if the password to be verified is the alarm password, determining that the password to be verified passes verification, and executing alarm operation; and if the password to be verified is not the alarm password and is the login password, determining that the password to be verified passes the verification.

In addition, the card sleeve also comprises a heartbeat sleep mode, wherein the heartbeat sleep mode is a low-power consumption non-working mode, and after the card sleeve is safely connected with the real card manager, the card sleeve is also used for sending detection information to the real card manager at intervals of first preset time in the heartbeat sleep mode; the real card manager is also used for receiving the detection information and sending response information to the card sleeve; the card sleeve is also used for disconnecting the safe connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager if the response information is not received within the second preset time; if response information is received within a second predetermined time, the secure connection established by the card sleeve and the real card manager is maintained.

In addition, the card sleeve is specifically configured to send a third secure connection instruction for instructing establishment of a secure connection to the real card manager, where the third secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve encrypts the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the generated fifth connection random factor by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate to obtain a fifth connection ciphertext, and the card sleeve signs the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fifth connection signature; the real card manager is specifically used for receiving the third secure connection instruction, decrypting the fifth connection ciphertext by using a private key of the real card manager, and obtaining a second binding decryption factor and a fifth connection random decryption factor at the card sleeve end; verifying the fifth connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the second binding decryption factor and the fifth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; after the fifth connection signature is verified to be correct, verifying whether the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end; verifying that the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end, and then generating a sixth connection random factor; encrypting the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a card sleeve public key in a card sleeve certificate to obtain a sixth connection ciphertext, and signing the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a sixth connection signature; sending a third secure connection response to the ferrule, wherein the third secure connection response comprises: a sixth concatenated ciphertext and a sixth concatenated signature; the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a third secure connection response, decrypting a sixth connection ciphertext by using a card sleeve private key, and obtaining a decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and a decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor; verifying the sixth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the sixth connection signature is verified to be correct, whether the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor is verified; after verifying that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random decryption factor, generating a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random decryption factor; the real card manager is specifically further configured to generate a real card manager-side secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least a sixth connection random factor.

In addition, the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a seventh connection random factor generated by the real card manager and sent by the real card manager and the unique identifier of the real card manager; sending a fourth secure connection instruction for instructing to establish secure connection to the real card manager, wherein the fourth secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve unique identification, a seventh connection ciphertext obtained by encrypting the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by the card sleeve by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate, and a seventh connection signature obtained by signing the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key by the card sleeve; the real card manager is specifically used for receiving the fourth secure connection instruction and judging whether the unique card sleeve identifier is in a real card manager end binding list or not; if the unique card sleeve identifier is in the real card manager end binding list, decrypting the seventh connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key to obtain a seventh connection random decryption factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor; verifying the seventh connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; after the seventh connection signature is verified to be correct, whether the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor is verified; if the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor, signing the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a private key of the real card manager to obtain an eighth connection signature; sending a fourth secure connection response to the ferrule, wherein the fourth secure connection response comprises: an eighth concatenated signature; the card sleeve is specifically further used for receiving a fourth secure connection response, and verifying an eighth connection signature by using a real card manager public key, a seventh connection random factor and an eighth connection random factor in a real card manager certificate; after the eighth connection signature is verified to be correct, generating a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by at least utilizing the eighth connection random factor and a second binding factor at the card sleeve end; the real card manager is specifically used for generating a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random decryption factor and the real card manager end binding factor; the card sleeve is specifically used for performing first processing on the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sending the processed result to the real card manager; the real card manager is specifically used for sending the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor to the card sleeve after first processing is carried out on the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a real card manager end secure transmission key; the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving data sent by the real card manager, performing second processing on the received data by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end, and comparing whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor; the real card manager is specifically further configured to receive data sent by the card sleeve, perform second processing on the received data by using the secure transmission key of the real card manager, and compare whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor.

In addition, the card sleeve is also used for executing binding operation with the real card manager before the card sleeve establishes safe connection with the real card manager.

In addition, the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a trigger command for indicating the binding with the real card manager; sending a second binding instruction to the real card manager through the wireless network, wherein the second binding instruction comprises: a third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve, a card sleeve certificate and a card sleeve unique identifier; the real card manager is specifically used for receiving the second binding instruction and verifying the card sleeve certificate by using the root certificate; generating a fourth binding random factor after verifying that the card certificate is legal; encrypting the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a card sleeve public key in a card sleeve certificate to obtain a second binding ciphertext, and signing the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a third binding signature; sending a second binding response to the card cover through the wireless network, wherein the second binding response comprises: the second binding ciphertext, the third binding signature, the real card manager certificate and the unique identifier of the real card manager; the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a second binding response and verifying the real card manager certificate by using the root certificate; after the certificate of the real card manager is verified to be legal, the second binding ciphertext is decrypted by using the card sleeve private key to obtain a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor; verifying the third binding signature by using a real card manager public key, a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the third binding signature is verified to be correct, whether the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor is verified; after the third binding random decryption factor is verified to be the same as the third binding random factor, prompting the unique identifier of the real card manager; receiving a trigger command for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct, signing a third binding random factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fourth binding signature, and storing the unique identifier of the real card manager, a certificate of the real card manager and a second binding factor of a card sleeve end to a second binding list of the card sleeve end, wherein the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the fourth binding random decryption factor; sending a fourth binding signature to the real card manager; the real card manager is specifically used for receiving a fourth binding signature, and verifying the fourth binding signature by using a card sleeve public key, a third binding random factor and a fourth binding random factor in a card sleeve certificate; and after the fourth binding signature is verified to be correct, storing the unique card sleeve identifier, the card sleeve certificate and the real card manager end binding factor to a real card manager end binding list, wherein the real card manager end binding factor is a fourth binding random factor.

In addition, the cutting ferrule is the mobile device.

According to the technical scheme provided by the invention, the card sleeve can safely log in the real card manager based on the data interaction method and the data interaction system.

Drawings

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments are briefly introduced below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art to obtain other drawings based on the drawings without creative efforts.

Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a card sleeve logging in a real card manager in a data interaction method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 2 is a flowchart of a first secure connection method established between the card sleeve and the real card manager in the data interaction method according to the embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 3 is a flowchart of a second secure connection mode established between the card sleeve and the real card manager in the data interaction method according to the embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a binding operation performed by a card sleeve and a real card manager in the data interaction method according to the embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a data interaction system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed Description

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

In the description of the present invention, it is to be understood that the terms "center", "longitudinal", "lateral", "up", "down", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", and the like, indicate orientations or positional relationships based on those shown in the drawings, and are used only for convenience in describing the present invention and for simplicity in description, and do not indicate or imply that the referenced devices or elements must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus, are not to be construed as limiting the present invention. Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," and the like are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying a relative importance or quantity or location.

In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," and "connected" are to be construed broadly, e.g., as meaning either a fixed connection, a removable connection, or an integral connection; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be connected directly or indirectly through intervening media, or they may be interconnected between two elements. The specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood in specific cases to those skilled in the art.

Embodiments of the present invention will be described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

The invention provides a data interaction architecture, which is used for providing a transaction solution which is convenient for a user to carry and has higher safety. The data interaction architecture comprises: simulated cards, cases, and real card managers.

Wherein:

the simulation card can comprise one or more cards, and the simulation card can be a separately manufactured card or a real card reserved with simulation card functions. The simulated card has the same size as the existing bank card, and replaces a real card to complete transaction in the data interaction architecture. The analog card has a contact and/or contactless interface to complete a transaction in conjunction with an existing transaction terminal (e.g., ATM, POS, bus card charger, etc.). The simulation card also has a wireless interface through which the simulation card can perform data interaction with the card sleeve. The contact type interface can be a contact point and the like, the non-contact type interface can be an NFC interface and the like, and the wireless interface can be a Bluetooth interface, an infrared interface, a 2.4GHz interface, a WIFI interface, an RFID interface and the like.

The card sleeve can comprise one or more card sleeves, and the card sleeve can manage one or more simulation cards, and each simulation card only belongs to one card sleeve and is managed by the card sleeve. This cutting ferrule can be for making alone the equipment of card overcoat shape, also can be for having the mobile device of the cutting ferrule function that provides in this data framework, includes: smart phones, tablet computers (PADs), PDAs (e.g., palm top computers, learning machines), laptop computers, e-book reading devices, wearable devices (e.g., smart wristwatches, smart glasses, etc.), and the like. The card sleeve can be provided with a contact type interface and/or a non-contact type interface so as to be matched with the contact type interface and/or the non-contact type interface of the simulation card for data interaction, the card sleeve can also be provided with a wireless interface so as to be matched with the corresponding interface of the simulation card for data interaction through the wireless interface, wherein the contact type interface can be a contact point and the like, the non-contact type interface can be an NFC interface and the like, and the wireless interface can be a Bluetooth interface, an infrared interface, a 2.4GHz interface, a WIFI interface, an RFID interface and the like; the card sleeve is further provided with a network interface so as to perform data interaction with a corresponding network interface of the real card manager through the network interface, wherein the network interface can be a WIFI interface, a mobile internet interface (such as a 3G network and a 4G network) and the like. In addition, the card holder may also be a combination of a mobile device and an electronic signature device, where the network interface of the card holder is implemented by means of a network interface of the mobile device, and other interfaces (e.g., a wireless interface, a contact and/or contactless interface, etc.) may all be located on the electronic signature device, or the other interfaces may all be located on the mobile device, or a part of the other interfaces may be located on the electronic signature device and a part of the interfaces may be located on the mobile device; the processing operations executed by the card sleeve are all executed on the electronic signature equipment; the case may also be an electronic signature device only. The electronic signature device may be a key device, such as a U shield of a work bank, a K bank of a farming bank, or the like.

Real card manager, can manage a plurality of cutting ferrule, and this real card manager has a plurality of contact (for example draw-in grooves etc.) interfaces and/or non-contact (for example NFC etc.) interfaces to make things convenient for real card manager can connect different kind's real cards through different modes, wherein, real card manager is connected with at least one real card, and the real card information list of real card manager end is stored, real card manager end real card information list includes the real card information of the real card of being connected with real card manager, this real card information can include: card number, card authentication information, and the like, the card authentication information being information for authenticating whether a real card is issued by a regular channel (e.g., a bank, a public transport company, and the like); the real card can be a function card (such as a bus card, a meal card, a shopping card, a membership card, a bonus card and the like) or a bank card issued by a bank; optionally, the real card manager may be configured to store real card information of all or part of real cards in the real cards connected to the real card manager, so that a user may make different settings according to security requirements for the real cards, for example, the real card manager may be configured to set real card information that does not allow some real cards to be acquired, thereby ensuring security of the real cards. The real card manager also has a network interface so as to perform data interaction with a corresponding network interface of the card sleeve through the network interface, wherein the network interface may be a WIFI interface, a mobile internet interface (e.g. 3G, 4G network), and the like.

In the data interaction architecture, the simulation card and the real card are intelligent chip cards.

The terms used in the present invention are explained below:

the first process includes: an encryption process, the second process comprising: carrying out decryption processing; specifically, the data transmission security is ensured by pure encryption, and when the security level requirement of the data to be transmitted is high, the data can be processed by adopting the method. Or

The first process includes: a check calculation process, the second process including: checking, verifying and calculating; specifically, the data transmission integrity is guaranteed through simple verification, tampering is prevented, and when the requirement on the integrity of the data to be transmitted is high, the data to be transmitted can be processed in the mode. Or

The first process includes: an encryption and verification calculation process, the second process comprising: and (5) decryption and verification calculation processing. Specifically, a mixed encryption and verification mode is adopted to ensure the safety and the integrity of data transmission, and when the requirement on the safety level of data to be transmitted is highest, the data can be processed by adopting the mode.

Based on the data interaction architecture, the invention provides a data interaction method, and a data interaction solution for the card sleeve to safely log in the real card manager can be realized through the data interaction method.

Fig. 1 shows a flowchart of a card sleeve logging real card manager in a data interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present invention, and referring to fig. 1, the card sleeve logging real card manager of the present invention includes:

the card sleeve sends a login request to a real card manager; specifically, the login request may be generated for a login physical key separately arranged on the card sleeve, or may be generated for a login virtual key on a touch screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated after the boot password is verified correctly, or may be generated for selecting a login function in a menu displayed on a screen of the card sleeve; the login request may include a unique identification of the card sleeve so that the real card manager knows which card sleeve requests to login.

The card sleeve is in safe connection with the real card manager, and a second safe transmission key at the card sleeve end and a safe transmission key at the real card manager end for data safe transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager are obtained; specifically, after the card sleeve sends a login request, the card sleeve establishes secure connection with the real card manager so as to obtain a secure transmission key and perform data interaction by using the secure transmission key, thereby improving the security of data interaction.

The card sleeve performs first processing on the received login password through a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sends the processed login password to the real card manager; specifically, the card sleeve can prompt the user to input a login password, after the user inputs the login password, the login password is subjected to first processing by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then is sent to the real card manager, and therefore the security of login password transmission can be improved.

The real card manager receives the data sent by the card sleeve, and verifies the correctness of the data after second processing after the received data is subjected to second processing by utilizing the safe transmission key of the real card manager; specifically, after the real card manager performs second processing on data sent by the card sleeve by using the real card manager end secure transmission key, the login password input by the user is obtained and compared with the stored legal login password, and the card sleeve is allowed to log in the real card manager only when the login password input by the user is the same as the stored legal login password, so that the login security is improved, and the security of subsequent data transmission is ensured.

And after the real card manager verifies that the data processed by the second processing passes, the card sleeve logs in the real card manager.

Therefore, based on the data interaction method, the card sleeve can safely log in the real card manager. Furthermore, before the secure connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager is established, the card sleeve initiates a login request in advance, the establishment of the secure connection is triggered while the card sleeve sends the login request, and after the secure connection is established, the login password is verified, so that the process can be saved, and the processing speed is increased.

In addition, in order to realize the overall security of the data interaction architecture, if the real card manager has an alarm function, a legal login password and a legal alarm password can be set in the real card manager in advance, and at the moment, an alarm can be given in the following way:

the real card manager performs second processing on the received data by using the real card manager end secure transmission key to obtain a password to be verified;

the real card manager judges whether the password to be verified is an alarm password;

if the password to be verified is the alarm password, the real card manager determines that the password to be verified passes the verification and executes the alarm operation;

and if the password to be verified is not the alarm password and is the login password, the real card manager determines that the password to be verified passes the verification.

Due to the fact that the alarm password is set, when the login password input by the user is the alarm password, the real card manager can recognize that the current login has safety risks and execute alarm operation (for example, the real card manager sends an alarm short message, dials an alarm phone to law enforcement departments, and the like).

Certainly, the card sleeve of the present invention has a heartbeat sleep mode in addition to a normal operating mode, wherein the heartbeat sleep mode is a non-operating mode with low power consumption, that is, some unnecessary power consumption programs are closed. Specifically, the card sleeve can enter the heartbeat sleep mode after no operation within a preset time, and can also enter the heartbeat sleep mode under the control of the operation of a user.

The card sleeve can also judge whether to keep the safe connection established between the card sleeve and the real card manager or not in the heartbeat sleep mode, so that when the card sleeve is restored to the working mode from the heart sleep mode, the safe connection does not need to be established with the real card manager again, and convenience is improved.

The following provides a specific implementation manner for judging whether to keep the secure connection established between the card sleeve and the real card manager in the heartbeat sleep mode by the card sleeve:

the card sleeve sends detection information to a real card manager at intervals of first preset time under a heartbeat sleep mode;

the real card manager receives the detection information and sends response information to the card sleeve;

if the card sleeve does not receive the response information within the second preset time, the safe connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager is disconnected;

and if the card sleeve receives the response information within the second preset time, the card sleeve is kept in the safe connection with the real card manager.

The card sleeve does not receive the response information within the second preset time, which may be that the network between the card sleeve and the real card manager is unstable or the real card manager works abnormally, and at the moment, the safety connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager is disconnected, so that the safety is ensured; the card sleeve receives the response information within the second preset time, the card sleeve keeps safe connection with the real card manager, when the card sleeve recovers the working mode, safe connection does not need to be reestablished, and the card sleeve is convenient to use.

Of course, in the heartbeat sleep mode, the user may also select to manually disconnect the secure connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager, for example, to log out the card sleeve from the real card manager or perform a shutdown operation on the card sleeve.

The first preset time may be the same as or different from the second preset time.

Based on the data interaction architecture, in order to improve the security of the card sleeve logging in the real card manager in the data interaction method, the card sleeve and the real card manager can be safely connected in the following way:

the method comprises the steps that the card sleeve and the real card manager mutually authenticate the identity of the other party, whether the binding factors stored by the two parties are the same or not is compared in the process of mutually authenticating the identity of the other party, and after the binding factors stored by the two parties are the same and the mutually authenticated identity of the other party passes, the secure transmission keys (the second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and the secure transmission key at the real card manager end) for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager are generated.

It should be noted that, if the mutual authentication between the card sleeve and the real card manager and the identity of the other party are performed before the card sleeve and the real card manager establish the secure connection, and after both parties pass the authentication, the binding operations of the binding factors generated in the authentication process are respectively stored (see the following binding performing operation), in the first embodiment, the mutual authentication between the card sleeve and the real card manager is that of the other party is performed again.

The invention provides a specific implementation of the first mode:

fig. 2 shows a flowchart of a first method for establishing a secure connection between a card sleeve and a real card manager in a data interaction method provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and referring to fig. 2, establishing a secure connection between a card sleeve and a real card manager includes:

the card sleeve sends a third secure connection instruction for indicating establishment of secure connection to the real card manager, wherein the third secure connection instruction comprises: the card sleeve encrypts the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the generated fifth connection random factor by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate to obtain a fifth connection ciphertext, and the card sleeve signs the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fifth connection signature; specifically, before data interaction is performed with the card sleeve and the real card manager using the card sleeve, optionally, a secure connection is established between the card sleeve and the real card manager, so as to improve the security of subsequent data interaction. The third secure connection instruction received by the card sleeve for indicating establishment of secure connection may be generated for a connection physical key separately provided on the card sleeve, or may be generated for a connection virtual key on a touch screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated after the boot password is verified correctly, or may be generated when the card sleeve sends a login request to the real card manager, or may be generated for selecting a connection function in a menu displayed on a screen of the card sleeve. Of course, the present invention is not limited thereto, and may be generated in any other manner. The fifth connection random factor can be a random number, a random character or a combination thereof generated by the card sleeve, and certainly, after the fifth connection random factor is generated, the randomness of the fifth connection random factor can be verified so as to improve the randomness of the fifth connection random factor and prevent cracking; specifically, the card sleeve encrypts the second binding factor and the fifth random connection factor of the card sleeve end by using the public key of the real card manager to ensure the transmission security of the second binding factor and the fifth random connection factor of the card sleeve end, and signs the second binding factor and the fifth random connection factor of the card sleeve end by using the private key of the card sleeve to ensure that the subsequent real card manager can authenticate the legality of the identity of the card sleeve. And sending the second binding factor of the card sleeve end to the real card manager so that the subsequent real card manager can judge whether the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the stored binding factor of the card sleeve end, thereby judging whether the card sleeve is bound with the real card manager. Optionally, before this step, after the card sleeve detects the real card manager, the card sleeve may determine whether the real card manager is in the second binding list at the card sleeve end, for example: the determination can be made as follows: after detecting the real card manager, the card sleeve receives real card manager information (such as a unique identifier of the real card manager and/or a certificate of the real card manager) sent by the real card manager, and judges whether the real card manager is in a second binding list at the card sleeve end or not according to the received real card manager information; and/or the real card manager may also determine whether the card sleeve is in the real card manager binding list, for example: the determination can be made as follows: after detecting the real card manager, the card sleeve sends the card sleeve information (such as unique card sleeve identification and/or card sleeve certificate) to the real card manager, and the real card manager judges whether the card sleeve is in a real card manager end binding list or not according to the received card sleeve information; and only after the other side is judged to be in the binding list of the other side, the subsequent flow is executed, so that the flow is optimized, and the efficiency is improved.

The real card manager receives the third safe connection instruction, decrypts the fifth connection ciphertext by using a private key of the real card manager, and obtains a second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end and a fifth connection random decryption factor; specifically, the fifth connection ciphertext is decrypted by using the real card manager private key, and if a data transmission error occurs in data transmission or tampering occurs in data transmission, the fifth connection ciphertext cannot be successfully decrypted, or the decrypted second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end and the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor are different from the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor. And the public key of the real card manager is used for encryption, only the private key of the real card manager can be successfully decrypted, and therefore the security of data decryption can be ensured.

The real card manager verifies the fifth connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the second binding decryption factor and the fifth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; specifically, the real card manager verifies the signature sent by the card sleeve by using the card sleeve public key to ensure the legal source of the data.

After the real card manager verifies that the fifth connection signature is correct, verifying whether the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end; specifically, the real card manager also verifies whether the decrypted second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as a real card manager end binding factor stored by the real card manager, if so, the card sleeve is already bound before establishing a secure connection with the real card manager, and based on the fact, the real card manager can judge whether the card sleeve is bound with the real card manager.

The real card manager verifies that the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end, and then generates a sixth connection random factor; specifically, the sixth connecting random factor may be a random number, a random character, or a combination thereof generated by the real card manager, and certainly, after the sixth connecting random factor is generated, the randomness of the sixth connecting random factor may also be verified, so as to improve the randomness of the sixth connecting random factor and prevent cracking.

The real card manager encrypts the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a sixth connection ciphertext, and signs the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a sixth connection signature; specifically, the real card manager encrypts the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using the card sleeve public key to ensure the transmission security of the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor, and signs the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using the real card manager private key to ensure that the subsequent card sleeve can authenticate the validity of the identity of the real card manager.

The real card manager sends a third secure connection response to the card sleeve, wherein the third secure connection response comprises: a sixth concatenated ciphertext and a sixth concatenated signature; specifically, the real card manager sends the sixth concatenated ciphertext and the sixth concatenated signature to the card sleeve, so that the card sleeve decrypts and verifies the received data.

The card sleeve receives the third secure connection response, decrypts the sixth connection ciphertext by using a card sleeve private key, and obtains a decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and a decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor; specifically, the sixth connection ciphertext is decrypted by using the card sleeve private key, and if a data transmission error occurs in data transmission or tampering occurs in data transmission, the decryption cannot be successfully performed, or the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor are different from the fifth connection random factor and the sixth connection random factor. And the card sleeve public key is used for encryption, only the card sleeve private key can be successfully decrypted, and therefore the security of data decryption can be ensured.

The card sleeve verifies the sixth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; specifically, the card sleeve verifies the signature sent by the real card manager by using the public key of the real card manager to ensure the legal source of the data.

After the card sleeve verifies that the sixth connection signature is correct, verifying whether the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor; specifically, the card sleeve verifies that the fifth connection random factor generated by the card sleeve is the same as the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor, so that the data is not tampered, and the encrypted data source is indeed the object of the card sleeve sending the fifth connection random factor.

After the card sleeve verifies that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random decryption factor, generating a card sleeve end second secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random decryption factor; and the real card manager generates a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connecting random factor. Specifically, the card sleeve may generate a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the sixth connection random decryption factor, may also generate a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the fifth connection random factor and the sixth connection random decryption factor, and may also generate a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the fifth connection random factor, the sixth connection random decryption factor, and the second binding factor at the card sleeve end; similarly, the real card manager may also generate a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the sixth connection random factor, generate a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor, and generate a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the fifth connection random decryption factor, the sixth connection random factor and the real card manager end binding factor; as long as the card sleeve and the real card manager generate the secure transmission key by adopting the same algorithm with the same parameters. Therefore, in the invention, the secure transmission key factor at the card sleeve end can be the sixth connection random decryption factor, or the sixth connection random decryption factor and the fifth connection random factor; the secure transmission key factor may be a sixth connection random factor, or a sixth connection random factor and a fifth connection random decryption factor at the real card manager. In addition, the secure transmission key may include an encryption/decryption key and/or a verification key, the data transmission may be ensured by using the encryption/decryption key to participate in the data transmission, and the data transmission may be ensured to be complete by using the verification key to participate in the data transmission.

Certainly, in the present invention, the step of the real card manager generating the real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random factor is not limited to the step in the first embodiment, and the real card manager end secure transmission key may be generated after the real card manager generates the sixth connection random factor, or the real card manager end secure transmission key may be generated after the card sleeve verifies that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor and receives the success information sent by the card sleeve.

Therefore, based on the secure connection established between the card sleeve and the real card manager, the security of data transmission can be improved. Meanwhile, whether the two parties are bound or not can be verified, and the safety is further improved.

If the card sleeve and the real card manager perform operations such as manual binding and storing of the binding factor before establishing secure connection (the operations can be described in the binding section), in this first embodiment, the card sleeve and the real card manager need to mutually authenticate the identity of each other, and also need to mutually authenticate the certificate of each other.

In addition, the invention is not limited to the card sleeve initiating the establishment of the secure connection, and the card sleeve can trigger the real card manager to initiate the establishment of the secure connection, at this time, the real card manager sends a third secure connection instruction to the card sleeve, and other processes can be realized by being opposite to the process implementation main body, and are not described in detail herein.

And in the second mode, the card sleeve and the real card manager mutually authenticate the identity of the other party (for example, mutually authenticate the signature data of the other party), a secure transmission key factor is generated in the process of mutually authenticating the identity of the other party, after the mutual authentication of the other party passes, a secure transmission key (a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and a secure transmission key at the real card manager end) for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager is generated at least by using the stored binding factor and the secure transmission key factor, and whether the generated secure transmission keys of the two parties are the same is verified.

It should be noted that, if the mutual authentication between the card sleeve and the real card manager for the certificate of the other party and the identity of the other party is performed before the card sleeve and the real card manager establish the secure connection, and after both parties pass the authentication, the binding operations of the binding factors generated in the authentication process are respectively stored, in the second mode, the mutual authentication between the card sleeve and the real card manager for the identity of the other party is that the mutual authentication between the card sleeve and the real card manager for the identity of the other party is performed again.

The invention provides a specific implementation of the second mode:

fig. 3 shows a flowchart of a second method for establishing a secure connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager in the data interaction method provided by the embodiment of the present invention, and referring to fig. 3, establishing a secure connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager includes:

the card sleeve receives a seventh connection random factor generated by the real card manager and the unique identifier of the real card manager, which are sent by the real card manager; specifically, the seventh connection random factor may be a random number, a random character, or a combination thereof generated by the real card manager, and certainly, after the seventh connection random factor is generated, the randomness of the seventh connection random factor may also be verified, so as to improve the randomness of the seventh connection random factor and prevent cracking. Before the step, the real card manager generates a seventh connection random factor, and after the card sleeve detects the real card manager, the real card manager sends the seventh connection random factor and the unique identifier of the real card manager to the card sleeve.

The card sleeve sends a fourth safety connection instruction for indicating to establish safety connection to the real card manager, wherein the fourth safety connection instruction comprises: the card sleeve unique identification, a seventh connection ciphertext obtained by encrypting the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by the card sleeve by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate, and a seventh connection signature obtained by signing the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key by the card sleeve; specifically, before data interaction is performed with the card sleeve and the real card manager using the card sleeve, optionally, a secure connection is established between the card sleeve and the real card manager, so as to improve the security of subsequent data interaction. The fourth secure connection instruction received by the card sleeve and used for indicating establishment of secure connection may be generated for a connection physical key separately arranged on the card sleeve, or may be generated for a connection virtual key on a touch screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated after a boot password is verified correctly, or may be generated when the card sleeve sends a login request to a real card manager, or may be generated for selecting a connection function in a menu displayed on a screen of the card sleeve. Of course, the present invention is not limited thereto, and may be generated in any other manner. Specifically, the card sleeve encrypts the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by using the public key of the real card manager to ensure the transmission security of the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor, and signs the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by using the private key of the card sleeve to ensure that the subsequent real card manager can authenticate the legality of the identity of the card sleeve. In addition, the eighth connection random factor may be a random number, a random character or a combination thereof generated by the card sleeve, and certainly, after the eighth connection random factor is generated, the randomness of the eighth connection random factor may also be verified, so as to improve the randomness of the eighth connection random factor and prevent cracking; optionally, before this step, after the card sleeve receives the unique identifier of the real card manager, the card sleeve may determine whether the real card manager is in the second binding list of the card sleeve end according to the unique identifier of the real card manager, and execute the subsequent process only after determining that the real card manager is in the second binding list of the card sleeve end, so that the process is optimized, and the efficiency is improved.

The real card manager receives the fourth safe connection instruction and judges whether the unique identifier of the card sleeve is in the real card manager end binding list or not; specifically, the real card manager judges whether the card sleeve is in a real card manager end binding list according to the received unique card sleeve identifier; only after the card sleeve is judged to be in the binding list of the real card manager end, the subsequent process is executed, the process is optimized, and the efficiency is improved.

If the unique card sleeve identifier is in the real card manager end binding list, the real card manager decrypts the seventh connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key to obtain a seventh connection random decryption factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor; specifically, the seventh concatenated ciphertext is decrypted by using the private key of the real card manager, and if a data transmission error occurs in data transmission or tampering occurs in data transmission, the seventh concatenated random decryption factor and the eighth concatenated random decryption factor that are obtained are different from the seventh concatenated random factor and the eighth concatenated random factor, which will result in a failure in decryption. And the public key of the real card manager is used for encryption, only the private key of the real card manager can be successfully decrypted, and therefore the security of data decryption can be ensured.

The real card manager verifies the seventh connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; specifically, the real card manager verifies the signature sent by the card sleeve by using the card sleeve public key to ensure the legal source of the data.

After the real card manager verifies that the seventh connection signature is correct, verifying whether the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor; specifically, the real card manager verifies that the seventh connection random factor generated by the real card manager is the same as the seventh connection random decryption factor, so that the data is not tampered, and the encrypted data source is an object for the real card manager to send the seventh connection random factor.

If the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor, the real card manager signs the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a private key of the real card manager to obtain an eighth connection signature; specifically, the real card manager signs the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using the private key of the real card manager, so as to ensure that the subsequent card sleeve can authenticate the validity of the identity of the real card manager.

The real card manager sends a fourth secure connection response to the card sleeve, wherein the fourth secure connection response comprises: an eighth concatenated signature; specifically, the real card manager sends the eighth connection signature to the card sleeve so that the card sleeve verifies the received data.

The card sleeve receives the fourth secure connection response, and verifies the eighth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor in the real card manager certificate; specifically, the card sleeve verifies the signature sent by the real card manager by using the public key of the real card manager to ensure the legal source of the data.

After the card sleeve verifies that the eighth connection signature is correct, generating a card sleeve end second secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least an eighth connection random factor and a card sleeve end second binding factor; the real card manager generates a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random decryption factor and the real card manager end binding factor; specifically, the card sleeve may generate a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the eighth connection random factor and the second binding factor at the card sleeve end, or generate a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the seventh connection random factor, the eighth connection random factor and the second binding factor at the card sleeve end; similarly, the real card manager may also generate a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the eighth connection random decryption factor and the real card manager end binding factor, and may also generate a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using the seventh connection random factor, the eighth connection random decryption factor and the real card manager end binding factor; as long as the card sleeve and the real card manager generate the secure transmission key by adopting the same algorithm with the same parameters. Therefore, in the invention, the secure transmission key factor at the card sleeve end may be the eighth connection random factor, or the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor; the secure transmission key factor may be an eighth connection random decryption factor, or a seventh connection random factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor at the real card manager. In addition, the secure transmission key may include an encryption/decryption key and/or a verification key, the data transmission may be ensured by using the encryption/decryption key to participate in the data transmission, and the data transmission may be ensured to be complete by using the verification key to participate in the data transmission.

The card sleeve sends the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor to the real card manager after carrying out first processing on the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end; the real card manager performs first processing on the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a real card manager end secure transmission key and then sends the processed results to the card sleeve; specifically, the two parties perform first processing on data by using the respective generated secure transmission keys and then send the data to the other party, so that the other party can verify whether the secure transmission keys generated by the two parties are the same.

The card sleeve receives the data sent by the real card manager, carries out second processing on the received data by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end, and compares whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor; and the real card manager receives the data sent by the card sleeve, performs second processing on the received data by using the secure transmission key of the real card manager, and compares whether the data after the second processing is the same as the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor. Specifically, after the two parties perform the second processing on the received data by using the respective generated secure transmission keys, the two parties respectively compare whether the second processed data is the same as the respective sent data, and if the second processed data is the same as the respective sent data, the secure transmission keys generated by the two parties are the same, so that the two parties can be ensured to perform the secure data transmission by using the respective generated secure transmission keys. In addition, when the same safe transmission key is generated by both parties, the same stored binding factor can be verified, the other party is further verified to be a real binding object, and the safety of subsequent data transmission is further improved.

Certainly, in the present invention, the step of generating the secure transmission key of the real card manager end by the real card manager is not limited to the step in the second mode, and the secure transmission key of the real card manager end may be generated after the eighth connection random decryption factor is obtained through decryption, or the secure transmission key of the real card manager end may be generated after the card sleeve verifies that the eighth connection signature sent by the real card manager is correct, and the successful information sent by the card sleeve is received; the step of generating the second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end by the card sleeve is not limited to the step in the second embodiment, and the second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end may also be generated after the eighth connection random factor is generated by the card sleeve.

If the card sleeve and the real card manager perform operations such as manual binding and storing of the binding factor before establishing secure connection (the operations can be described in the binding section), in the second embodiment, the card sleeve and the real card manager need to mutually authenticate the identity of each other, and also need to mutually authenticate the certificate of each other.

In addition, the invention is not limited to the card sleeve initiating the establishment of the secure connection, and the card sleeve can trigger the real card manager to initiate the establishment of the secure connection, at this time, the real card manager sends the fourth secure connection instruction to the card sleeve, and other processes can be realized by being opposite to the process implementation main body, and are not described in detail herein.

Of course, in the above-described first and second modes, in the process of generating the secure transmission key for securely transmitting data between the card sleeve and the real card manager, the binding factor used is the binding factor generated and stored in the binding process between the card sleeve and the real card manager, and the binding factor may be a binding factor generated in the authentication process by mutually authenticating the certificate of the other party and the identity of the other party by the following card sleeve and the real card manager, and after both parties pass the authentication, the binding factor is stored separately, or may be a binding factor input and stored in a manual binding mode.

In addition, if the binding operation is not executed between the card sleeve and the real card manager, the binding factors adopted in the first mode and the second mode can be random values manually input in the process of establishing the secure connection; or in the process of establishing the secure connection, the secure transmission key is generated only by the random factor, and the binding factor is not verified or is not adopted to generate the secure transmission key.

Before the card sleeve is safely connected with the real card manager, in order to guarantee the authenticity of the identities of both parties of data interaction, the card sleeve and the real card manager can also execute binding operation:

in the invention, the card sleeve and the real card manager can be bound by the following modes:

the card sleeve and the real card manager mutually authenticate the certificate of the other party and the identity of the other party, and after the two parties pass the authentication, the card sleeve and the real card manager respectively store the binding factors generated in the authentication process.

The following provides a specific implementation manner for the card sleeve and the real card manager to execute the binding operation:

fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a card sleeve and a real card manager performing a binding operation in a data interaction method provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and referring to fig. 4, the card sleeve and the real card manager performing a binding operation include:

the card sleeve receives a trigger command for indicating the binding with the real card manager; specifically, before the card sleeve is used, a boot operation may be performed on the card sleeve in advance, at this time, optionally, the card sleeve prompts a user to input a boot password, receives the boot password input by the user, verifies the correctness of the boot password input by the user, performs the boot operation after verifying that the boot password input by the user is correct, and the card sleeve enters a working mode. Before the card sleeve and the real card manager are used for data interaction, optionally, the card sleeve and the real card manager are bound to improve the security of subsequent data interaction. The trigger command received by the card sleeve for indicating the card sleeve to be bound with the real card manager may be generated by a binding physical key separately arranged on the card sleeve, or may be generated by a binding virtual key on a touch screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated after the boot password is verified correctly, or may be generated by selecting a binding function in a menu displayed on a screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated by any other method, which is not limited in the present invention.

The card sleeve sends a second binding instruction to the real card manager, wherein the second binding instruction comprises: a third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve, a card sleeve certificate and a card sleeve unique identifier; specifically, the card sleeve may send the second binding instruction to the real card manager in a wireless manner (e.g., mobile network, WIFI, etc.). The second binding instruction carries a card sleeve certificate so that a real card manager can authenticate the card sleeve, and the second binding instruction carries a card sleeve unique identifier so that the real card manager can know which card sleeve is bound with the card sleeve; the third binding random factor can be a random number, a random character or a combination thereof generated by the card sleeve, and certainly, after the third binding random factor is generated, the randomness of the third binding random factor can be verified so as to improve the randomness of the third binding random factor and prevent the third binding random factor from being cracked; the unique identification of the card sleeve can be any one or the combination of the serial number of the card sleeve, the equipment identification code, the MAC address and the like to uniquely identify the card sleeve.

The real card manager receives the second binding instruction and verifies the card sleeve certificate by using the root certificate; specifically, the real card manager stores a root certificate in advance, and completes verification of the card sleeve certificate by using the root certificate so as to ensure the security of subsequent use of the card sleeve certificate.

After the real card manager verifies that the card sleeve certificate is legal, a fourth binding random factor is generated; specifically, the fourth binding random factor may be a random number, a random character, or a combination thereof generated by the real card manager; of course, after the fourth binding random factor is generated, the randomness of the fourth binding random factor can be verified, so that the randomness of the fourth binding random factor is improved, and the fourth binding random factor is prevented from being cracked.

The real card manager encrypts the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a second binding ciphertext, and signs the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a third binding signature; specifically, the real card manager encrypts the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using the card sleeve public key to ensure the transmission security of the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor, and the real card manager signs the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using the real card manager private key to ensure that the subsequent card sleeve can authenticate the identity validity of the real card manager.

The real card manager sends a second binding response to the card sleeve, wherein the second binding response comprises: the second binding ciphertext, the third binding signature, the real card manager certificate and the unique identifier of the real card manager; specifically, a second binding response sent by the real card manager carries a real card manager certificate so that the card sleeve authenticates the real card manager, and the second binding response carries a unique identifier of the real card manager so that the card sleeve knows which real card manager is bound with the real card manager; the unique identifier of the real card manager can be any one or a combination of a serial number of the real card manager, an equipment identification code, an MAC address and the like so as to uniquely identify the identifier of the real card manager.

The card sleeve receives the second binding response and verifies the real card manager certificate by using the root certificate; specifically, the card sleeve stores a root certificate in advance, and the root certificate is utilized to complete verification of the real card manager certificate so as to ensure the safety of subsequent use of the real card manager certificate.

After the card sleeve verifies that the certificate of the real card manager is legal, the card sleeve decrypts the second binding ciphertext by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor; specifically, the second bound ciphertext is decrypted by using the card sleeve private key, and if a data transmission error occurs in data transmission or tampering occurs in data transmission, the second bound ciphertext cannot be successfully decrypted, or the decrypted third bound random decryption factor and the decrypted fourth bound random decryption factor are different from the third bound random factor and the fourth bound random factor. And the card sleeve public key is used for encryption, only the card sleeve private key can be successfully decrypted, and therefore the security of data decryption can be ensured.

The card sleeve verifies the third binding signature by using the real card manager public key, the third binding random decryption factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; specifically, the card sleeve verifies the signature sent by the real card manager by using the public key of the real card manager after the verification is passed so as to ensure the legal source of the data.

After the card sleeve verifies that the third binding signature is correct, whether the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor is verified; specifically, the card sleeve verifies that the third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve is the same as the third binding random decryption factor, so that the data is not tampered, and the encrypted data source is indeed the object of the card sleeve sending the third binding random factor.

After the card sleeve verifies that the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor, the card sleeve prompts the unique identifier of the real card manager; specifically, the card sleeve can display the unique identifier of the real card manager, and can also play the unique identifier of the real card manager through voice (such as speaker playing or playing through a headphone or the like), so that a user can confirm the authenticity of the real card manager, and the binding safety is improved.

The card sleeve receives a trigger command for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct, signs a third binding random factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fourth binding signature, and stores the unique identifier of the real card manager, the certificate of the real card manager and a second binding factor of the card sleeve end to a second binding list of the card sleeve end, wherein the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the fourth binding random decryption factor; specifically, the trigger command received by the card sleeve for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct may be generated by a confirmation physical key separately disposed on the card sleeve, or may be generated by a confirmation virtual key on a touch screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated by selecting a confirmation function in a menu displayed on a screen of the card sleeve, or may be generated after a voice confirmation instruction received by a voice acquisition device (e.g., a microphone) of the card sleeve passes verification, or may be generated after a fingerprint confirmation instruction is received and verified by a fingerprint acquisition device of the card sleeve, or may be generated after an iris confirmation instruction is received and verified by an iris acquisition device of the card sleeve passes verification, or may be generated in any other manner, which is not limited in the present invention; signing the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor by using a card sleeve private key so as to facilitate a subsequent real card manager to authenticate the identity of the card sleeve; of course, the card sleeve can also store a card sleeve end second binding list, which is used to record the information related to the real card manager bound with the card sleeve, such as: the unique identifier of the real card manager, the certificate of the real card manager and the like, and in addition, the second binding list of the card sleeve end is also used for storing a second binding factor of the card sleeve end, the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is a fourth binding random factor of ciphertext transmission, and the ciphertext transmission is based on the fourth binding random factor, so the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is safe and is not tampered.

The card sleeve sends a fourth binding signature to the real card manager; specifically, the card sleeve sends a fourth binding signature to the real card manager so that the real card manager authenticates the card sleeve identity.

The real card manager receives the fourth binding signature, and verifies the fourth binding signature by using the card sleeve public key, the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor in the card sleeve certificate; specifically, the real card manager verifies the signature sent by the card sleeve by using the card sleeve public key after verification is passed so as to ensure the legal source of the data.

And after the fourth binding signature is verified to be correct by the real card manager, storing the unique card sleeve identifier, the card sleeve certificate and the real card manager end binding factor to a real card manager end binding list, wherein the real card manager end binding factor is a fourth binding random factor. Specifically, the real card manager may further store a real card manager side binding list for recording information about the card sleeve bound to the real card manager, such as: the card sleeve unique identifier, the card sleeve certificate and the like, and in addition, the real card manager end binding list is also used for storing real card manager end binding factors, and the real card manager end binding factors are fourth binding random factors generated by the real card manager.

Therefore, based on the binding of the card sleeve and the real card manager, the safety of data interaction between the subsequent card sleeve and the real card manager can be ensured.

In addition, the operation of binding the card sleeve and the real card manager is not an essential step, and the operation of binding the card sleeve and the real card manager can be selected not to be executed according to the requirements of different application scenes.

Certainly, the operation of binding between the card sleeve and the real card manager is not limited to the implementation manner provided above, and for example, manual binding may also be adopted, that is, in a trusted environment, an identifier of the real card manager to be bound is input to the card sleeve as a first binding factor of the card sleeve end, and the real card manager defaults to the identifier of the real card manager as a binding factor of the real card manager end; or inputting the identification of the card sleeve to be bound on the real card manager as a real card manager end binding factor, and taking the identification of the default card sleeve of the card sleeve as a card sleeve end second binding factor; or inputting any random value on the card sleeve as the second binding factor of the card sleeve end, inputting the same random value on the real card manager as the binding factor of the real card manager end, and the like, as long as the card sleeve and the real card manager can both obtain the same binding factor, all belong to the protection scope of the invention.

The present invention further provides a data interaction system, which is used for implementing card sleeve login to a real card manager, and adopts the flow shown in fig. 1, and details are not described here, and only a structure of the data interaction system is briefly described, specifically referring to fig. 5, the data interaction system of the present invention includes: a card sleeve and a real card manager; wherein,

the card sleeve is used for sending a login request to the real card manager; establishing a secure connection with a real card manager to obtain a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager;

the real card manager is used for establishing safe connection with the card sleeve and obtaining a real card manager end safe transmission key for data safe transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager;

the card sleeve is also used for carrying out first processing on the received login password through a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sending the processed login password to the real card manager;

the real card manager is also used for receiving the data sent by the card sleeve, and verifying the correctness of the data after second processing after the second processing is carried out on the received data by utilizing the safe transmission key at the real card manager end; and after the data after the second processing is verified to pass, the card sleeve logs in the real card manager.

Therefore, based on the data interaction system, the card sleeve can safely log in the real card manager.

Furthermore, before the secure connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager is established, the card sleeve initiates a login request in advance, the establishment of the secure connection is triggered while the card sleeve sends the login request, and after the secure connection is established, the login password is verified, so that the process can be saved, and the processing speed is increased.

the real card manager is specifically used for carrying out second processing on the received data by using the real card manager end secure transmission key to obtain a password to be verified; judging whether the password to be verified is an alarm password or not; if the password to be verified is the alarm password, determining that the password to be verified passes verification, and executing alarm operation; and if the password to be verified is not the alarm password and is the login password, determining that the password to be verified passes the verification.

Based on this, after the card sleeve establishes a secure connection with the real card manager,

the card sleeve is also used for sending detection information to the real card manager at intervals of first preset time in a heartbeat sleep mode;

the real card manager is also used for receiving the detection information and sending response information to the card sleeve;

the card sleeve is also used for disconnecting the safe connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager if the response information is not received within the second preset time; if response information is received within a second predetermined time, the secure connection established by the card sleeve and the real card manager is maintained.

In addition, in order to improve the security of the card sleeve logging in the real card manager in the data interaction system, the card sleeve and the real card manager can be safely connected in the following way:

the first method is as follows:

the card sleeve is specifically used for sending a third safety connection instruction for indicating establishment of safety connection to the real card manager, wherein the third safety connection instruction comprises: the card sleeve encrypts the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the generated fifth connection random factor by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate to obtain a fifth connection ciphertext, and the card sleeve signs the second binding factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fifth connection signature;

the real card manager is specifically used for receiving the third secure connection instruction, decrypting the fifth connection ciphertext by using a private key of the real card manager, and obtaining a second binding decryption factor and a fifth connection random decryption factor at the card sleeve end; verifying the fifth connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the second binding decryption factor and the fifth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; after the fifth connection signature is verified to be correct, verifying whether the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end; verifying that the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end, and then generating a sixth connection random factor; encrypting the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a card sleeve public key in a card sleeve certificate to obtain a sixth connection ciphertext, and signing the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a sixth connection signature; sending a third secure connection response to the ferrule, wherein the third secure connection response comprises: a sixth concatenated ciphertext and a sixth concatenated signature;

the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a third secure connection response, decrypting a sixth connection ciphertext by using a card sleeve private key, and obtaining a decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and a decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor; verifying the sixth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the sixth connection signature is verified to be correct, whether the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor is verified; after verifying that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random decryption factor, generating a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random decryption factor;

the real card manager is specifically further configured to generate a real card manager-side secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least a sixth connection random factor.

The second method comprises the following steps:

the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a seventh connection random factor generated by the real card manager and sent by the real card manager and the unique identifier of the real card manager; sending a fourth secure connection instruction for instructing to establish secure connection to the real card manager, wherein the fourth secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve unique identification, a seventh connection ciphertext obtained by encrypting the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by the card sleeve by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate, and a seventh connection signature obtained by signing the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key by the card sleeve;

the real card manager is specifically used for receiving the fourth secure connection instruction and judging whether the unique card sleeve identifier is in a real card manager end binding list or not; if the unique card sleeve identifier is in the real card manager end binding list, decrypting the seventh connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key to obtain a seventh connection random decryption factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor; verifying the seventh connection signature by using the card sleeve public key, the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor in the card sleeve certificate; after the seventh connection signature is verified to be correct, whether the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor is verified; if the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor, signing the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a private key of the real card manager to obtain an eighth connection signature; sending a fourth secure connection response to the ferrule, wherein the fourth secure connection response comprises: an eighth concatenated signature;

the card sleeve is specifically further used for receiving a fourth secure connection response, and verifying an eighth connection signature by using a real card manager public key, a seventh connection random factor and an eighth connection random factor in a real card manager certificate; after the eighth connection signature is verified to be correct, generating a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by at least utilizing the eighth connection random factor and a second binding factor at the card sleeve end;

the real card manager is specifically used for generating a real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random decryption factor and the real card manager end binding factor;

the card sleeve is specifically used for performing first processing on the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sending the processed result to the real card manager;

the real card manager is specifically used for sending the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor to the card sleeve after first processing is carried out on the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using a real card manager end secure transmission key;

the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving data sent by the real card manager, performing second processing on the received data by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end, and comparing whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor;

the real card manager is specifically further configured to receive data sent by the card sleeve, perform second processing on the received data by using the secure transmission key of the real card manager, and compare whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor.

Before the card sleeve is in safe connection with the real card manager, in order to guarantee authenticity of identities of both parties of data interaction, the card sleeve is also used for executing binding operation with the real card manager.

the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a trigger command for indicating the binding with the real card manager; sending a second binding instruction to the real card manager through the wireless network, wherein the second binding instruction comprises: a third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve, a card sleeve certificate and a card sleeve unique identifier;

the real card manager is specifically used for receiving the second binding instruction and verifying the card sleeve certificate by using the root certificate; generating a fourth binding random factor after verifying that the card certificate is legal; encrypting the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a card sleeve public key in a card sleeve certificate to obtain a second binding ciphertext, and signing the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a third binding signature; sending a second binding response to the card cover through the wireless network, wherein the second binding response comprises: the second binding ciphertext, the third binding signature, the real card manager certificate and the unique identifier of the real card manager;

the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a second binding response and verifying the real card manager certificate by using the root certificate; after the certificate of the real card manager is verified to be legal, the second binding ciphertext is decrypted by using the card sleeve private key to obtain a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor; verifying the third binding signature by using a real card manager public key, a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the third binding signature is verified to be correct, whether the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor is verified; after the third binding random decryption factor is verified to be the same as the third binding random factor, prompting the unique identifier of the real card manager; receiving a trigger command for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct, signing a third binding random factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fourth binding signature, and storing the unique identifier of the real card manager, a certificate of the real card manager and a second binding factor of a card sleeve end to a second binding list of the card sleeve end, wherein the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the fourth binding random decryption factor; sending a fourth binding signature to the real card manager;

the real card manager is specifically used for receiving a fourth binding signature, and verifying the fourth binding signature by using a card sleeve public key, a third binding random factor and a fourth binding random factor in a card sleeve certificate; and after the fourth binding signature is verified to be correct, storing the unique card sleeve identifier, the card sleeve certificate and the real card manager end binding factor to a real card manager end binding list, wherein the real card manager end binding factor is a fourth binding random factor.

Wherein:

the first process includes: an encryption process, the second process comprising: carrying out decryption processing; or

The first process includes: a check calculation process, the second process including: checking, verifying and calculating; or

The first process includes: an encryption and verification calculation process, the second process comprising: and (5) decryption and verification calculation processing.

Any process or method descriptions in flow charts or otherwise described herein may be understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of code which include one or more executable instructions for implementing specific logical functions or steps of the process, and alternate implementations are included within the scope of the preferred embodiment of the present invention in which functions may be executed out of order from that shown or discussed, including substantially concurrently or in reverse order, depending on the functionality involved, as would be understood by those reasonably skilled in the art of the present invention.

It should be understood that portions of the present invention may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, the various steps or methods may be implemented in software or firmware stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented in hardware, as in another embodiment, any one or combination of the following techniques, which are known in the art, may be used: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function on a data signal, an application specific integrated circuit having an appropriate combinational logic gate circuit, a Programmable Gate Array (PGA), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or the like.

It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the steps carried by the method for implementing the above embodiments may be implemented by hardware related to instructions of a program, which may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and when the program is executed, the program includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiments.

In addition, functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into one processing module, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated into one module. The integrated module can be realized in a hardware mode, and can also be realized in a software functional module mode. The integrated module, if implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may also be stored in a computer readable storage medium.

The storage medium mentioned above may be a read-only memory, a magnetic or optical disk, etc.

In the description herein, references to the description of the term "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "an example," "a specific example," or "some examples," etc., mean that a particular feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the terms used above do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples.

Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described above, it is understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and should not be construed as limiting the present invention, and that variations, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in the above embodiments by those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the principle and spirit of the present invention. The scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and equivalents thereof.

Claims

1. A method for data interaction, comprising:

the card sleeve sends a login request to a real card manager;

the card sleeve is in safe connection with the real card manager, and a second safe transmission key at the card sleeve end and a safe transmission key at the real card manager end for data safe transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager are obtained;

the card sleeve performs first processing on the received login password through a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end and then sends the processed login password to the real card manager;

the real card manager receives the data sent by the card sleeve, and verifies the correctness of the data after second processing is carried out on the received data by utilizing the safe transmission key at the real card manager end;

and after the real card manager verifies that the data after the second processing passes, the card sleeve logs in the real card manager.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the verifying the correctness of the second processed data after the real card manager performs the second processing on the received data by using the real card manager-side secure transmission key comprises:

if the password to be verified is an alarm password, the real card manager determines that the password to be verified passes verification and executes alarm operation;

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the card sleeve further comprises a heartbeat sleep mode, wherein the heartbeat sleep mode is a low power non-operational mode, and wherein after the card sleeve establishes a secure connection with the real card manager, the method further comprises:

the card sleeve sends detection information to the real card manager at intervals of first preset time under a heartbeat sleep mode;

if the card sleeve does not receive the response information within second preset time, disconnecting the safe connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager;

and if the card sleeve receives the response information within second preset time, the card sleeve keeps the safe connection established between the card sleeve and the real card manager.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein establishing a secure connection of the card sleeve with a real card manager comprises:

the card sleeve sends a third secure connection instruction for indicating establishment of secure connection to the real card manager, wherein the third secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve encrypts a second binding factor at the card sleeve end and a generated fifth connection random factor by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate to obtain a fifth connection ciphertext, and the card sleeve signs the second binding factor at the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fifth connection signature;

the real card manager receives the third safe connection instruction, decrypts the fifth connection ciphertext by using a private key of the real card manager, and obtains a second binding decryption factor and a fifth connection random decryption factor of the card sleeve end;

the real card manager verifies the fifth connection signature by using a card sleeve public key in a card sleeve certificate, the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random decryption factor;

after verifying that the fifth connection signature is correct, the real card manager verifies whether a second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as a binding factor of the real card manager end;

after the real card manager verifies that the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end, a sixth connection random factor is generated;

the real card manager encrypts the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using the card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a sixth connection ciphertext, and signs the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using the real card manager private key to obtain a sixth connection signature;

the real card manager sends a third secure connection response to the card sleeve, wherein the third secure connection response comprises: the sixth concatenated ciphertext and the sixth concatenated signature;

the card sleeve receives the third secure connection response, decrypts the sixth connection ciphertext by using the card sleeve private key, and obtains a decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and a decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor;

the card sleeve verifies the sixth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate;

after the card sleeve verifies that the sixth connection signature is correct, verifying whether the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor;

after the card sleeve verifies that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor, the card sleeve end second secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager is generated by using at least the sixth connection random decryption factor; and the real card manager generates the real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random factor.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein establishing a secure connection of the card sleeve with a real card manager comprises:

the card sleeve receives a seventh connection random factor and a unique identifier of the real card manager, which are sent by the real card manager and generated by the real card manager;

the card sleeve sends a fourth secure connection instruction for indicating establishment of secure connection to the real card manager, wherein the fourth secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve unique identifier, a seventh connection ciphertext obtained by encrypting the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by the card sleeve by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate, and a seventh connection signature obtained by signing the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key by the card sleeve;

the real card manager receives the fourth safe connection instruction and judges whether the unique card sleeve identifier is in a real card manager end binding list or not;

if the unique card sleeve identifier is in the real card manager end binding list, the real card manager decrypts the seventh connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key to obtain a seventh connection random decryption factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor;

the real card manager verifies the seventh connection signature by using a card sleeve public key, the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor in a card sleeve certificate;

after verifying that the seventh connection signature is correct, the real card manager verifies whether the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor;

if the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor, the real card manager signs the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using the private key of the real card manager to obtain an eighth connection signature;

the real card manager sends a fourth secure connection response to the card sleeve, wherein the fourth secure connection response comprises: the eighth connection signature;

the card sleeve receives the fourth secure connection response, and verifies the eighth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, a seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor in the real card manager certificate;

after the card sleeve verifies that the eighth connection signature is correct, generating a second card sleeve end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random factor and a second card sleeve end binding factor; the real card manager generates the real card manager end secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random decryption factor and a real card manager end binding factor;

the card sleeve sends the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor to the real card manager after carrying out first processing on the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end; the real card manager sends the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor to the card sleeve after performing first processing on the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using the real card manager end secure transmission key;

the card sleeve receives the data sent by the real card manager, carries out second processing on the received data by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end, and compares whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor; and the real card manager receives the data sent by the card sleeve, performs second processing on the received data by using the secure transmission key of the real card manager, and compares whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor.

6. The method of any of claims 1, 4 or 5, further comprising, prior to the ferrule establishing a secure connection with a real card manager:

the card sleeve and the real card manager perform a binding operation.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the binding of the card sleeve with a real card manager comprises:

the card sleeve receives a trigger command for indicating binding with the real card manager;

the card sleeve sends a second binding instruction to the real card manager through a wireless network, wherein the second binding instruction comprises: the third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve, the card sleeve certificate and the unique card sleeve identifier;

the real card manager receives the second binding instruction and verifies the card sleeve certificate by using a root certificate;

after the real card manager verifies that the card sleeve certificate is legal, a fourth binding random factor is generated;

the real card manager encrypts the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a second binding ciphertext, and signs the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a third binding signature;

the real card manager sends a second binding response to the card sleeve through a wireless network, wherein the second binding response comprises: the second binding ciphertext, the third binding signature, a real card manager certificate, and a unique identification of the real card manager;

the card sleeve receives the second binding response and verifies the real card manager certificate by using a root certificate;

after the card sleeve verifies that the real card manager certificate is legal, the card sleeve decrypts the second binding ciphertext by using the card sleeve private key to obtain a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor;

the card sleeve verifies the third binding signature by using a real card manager public key, the third binding random decryption factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate;

after the card sleeve verifies that the third binding signature is correct, verifying whether the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor;

after the card sleeve verifies that the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor, the card sleeve prompts the unique identifier of the real card manager;

the card sleeve receives a trigger command for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct, signs the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fourth binding signature, and stores the unique identifier of the real card manager, the certificate of the real card manager and a second binding factor of a card sleeve end to a second binding list of the card sleeve end, wherein the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the fourth binding random decryption factor;

the card sleeve sends the fourth binding signature to the real card manager;

the real card manager receives the fourth binding signature, and verifies the fourth binding signature by using the card sleeve public key, a third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor in the card sleeve certificate;

and after verifying that the fourth binding signature is correct, the real card manager stores the unique card sleeve identifier, the card sleeve certificate and a real card manager end binding factor to a real card manager end binding list, wherein the real card manager end binding factor is the fourth binding random factor.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7,

the first processing includes: an encryption process, the second process comprising: carrying out decryption processing; or

The first processing includes: a check computation process, the second process comprising: checking, verifying and calculating; or

The first processing includes: an encryption and verification calculation process, the second process comprising: and (5) decryption and verification calculation processing.

9. The method of any of claims 1 to 8, wherein the ferrule is a mobile device.

10. The method according to any of claims 1 to 8, wherein the card sleeve is a mobile device and an electronic signature device, or the card sleeve is an electronic signature device.

11. A data interaction system, comprising: a card sleeve and a real card manager;

the card sleeve is used for sending a login request to the real card manager; establishing a secure connection with the real card manager to obtain a card sleeve end second secure transmission key for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager;

the real card manager is used for establishing a secure connection with the card sleeve to obtain a real card manager end secure transmission key for data secure transmission between the card sleeve and the real card manager;

the real card manager is also used for receiving the data sent by the card sleeve, and verifying the correctness of the data after second processing after the received data is subjected to second processing by utilizing the safe transmission key of the real card manager; and after the second processed data is verified to pass, the card sleeve logs in the real card manager.

12. The system of claim 11,

the real card manager is specifically configured to perform second processing on the received data by using the real card manager end secure transmission key to obtain a password to be verified; judging whether the password to be verified is an alarm password; if the password to be verified is the alarm password, determining that the password to be verified passes verification, and executing alarm operation; and if the password to be verified is not the alarm password and is the login password, determining that the password to be verified passes the verification.

13. The system of claim 11, wherein said card sleeve further comprises a heartbeat sleep mode, wherein said heartbeat sleep mode is a low power consumption non-operational mode, wherein after said card sleeve establishes a secure connection with said real card manager,

the card sleeve is also used for disconnecting the safe connection between the card sleeve and the real card manager if the response information is not received within second preset time; and if the response message is received within a second preset time, maintaining the secure connection established between the card sleeve and the real card manager.

14. The system of claim 11,

the card sleeve is specifically configured to send a third secure connection instruction for instructing establishment of secure connection to the real card manager, where the third secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve encrypts a second binding factor at the card sleeve end and a generated fifth connection random factor by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate to obtain a fifth connection ciphertext, and the card sleeve signs the second binding factor at the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key to obtain a fifth connection signature;

the real card manager is specifically configured to receive the third secure connection instruction, decrypt the fifth connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key, and obtain a second binding decryption factor and a fifth connection random decryption factor at the card socket end; verifying the fifth connection signature by using a card sleeve public key in a card sleeve certificate, the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end and the fifth connection random decryption factor; after the fifth connection signature is verified to be correct, verifying whether the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end; after verifying that the second binding decryption factor of the card sleeve end is the same as the binding factor of the real card manager end, generating a sixth connection random factor; encrypting the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using the card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a sixth connection ciphertext, and signing the fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random factor by using the real card manager private key to obtain a sixth connection signature; sending a third secure connection response to the ferrule, wherein the third secure connection response comprises: the sixth concatenated ciphertext and the sixth concatenated signature;

the card sleeve is specifically further configured to receive the third secure connection response, decrypt the sixth connection ciphertext using the card sleeve private key, and obtain a decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and a decrypted sixth connection random decryption factor; verifying the sixth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor and the sixth connection random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the sixth connection signature is verified to be correct, verifying whether the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor; after verifying that the decrypted fifth connection random decryption factor is the same as the fifth connection random factor, generating a second secure transmission key of the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random decryption factor;

the real card manager is specifically further configured to generate the real card manager-side secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the sixth connection random factor.

15. The system of claim 11,

the card sleeve is specifically configured to receive a seventh connection random factor generated by the real card manager and sent by the real card manager, and a unique identifier of the real card manager; sending a fourth secure connection instruction to the real card manager, the fourth secure connection instruction being used to instruct establishment of a secure connection, wherein the fourth secure connection instruction includes: the card sleeve unique identifier, a seventh connection ciphertext obtained by encrypting the seventh connection random factor and the generated eighth connection random factor by the card sleeve by using a real card manager public key in a real card manager certificate, and a seventh connection signature obtained by signing the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a card sleeve private key by the card sleeve;

the real card manager is specifically configured to receive the fourth secure connection instruction, and determine whether the unique card sleeve identifier is in a real card manager end binding list; if the unique card sleeve identifier is in the real card manager end binding list, decrypting the seventh connection ciphertext by using a real card manager private key to obtain a seventh connection random decryption factor and an eighth connection random decryption factor; verifying the seventh connection signature by using a card holder public key in a card holder certificate, the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor; after verifying that the seventh connection signature is correct, verifying whether the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor; if the seventh connection random decryption factor is the same as the seventh connection random factor, signing the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using the private key of the real card manager to obtain an eighth connection signature; sending a fourth secure connection response to the ferrule, wherein the fourth secure connection response comprises: the eighth connection signature;

the card sleeve is specifically further configured to receive the fourth secure connection response, and verify the eighth connection signature by using the real card manager public key, a seventh connection random factor, and the eighth connection random factor in the real card manager certificate; after the eighth connection signature is verified to be correct, generating a second secure transmission key of the card sleeve end between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random factor and a second binding factor of the card sleeve end;

the real card manager is specifically further configured to generate the real card manager-side secure transmission key between the card sleeve and the real card manager by using at least the eighth connection random decryption factor and a real card manager-side binding factor;

the card sleeve is specifically further configured to send the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor to the real card manager after performing first processing on the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end;

the real card manager is specifically further configured to send the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor to the card sleeve after performing first processing on the seventh connection random decryption factor and the eighth connection random decryption factor by using the real card manager secure transmission key;

the card sleeve is specifically further configured to receive data sent by the real card manager, perform second processing on the received data by using a second secure transmission key at the card sleeve end, and compare whether the second processed data is the same as the seventh connection random factor and the eighth connection random factor;

16. The system of any one of claims 11, 14 or 15, wherein the ferrule is further configured to perform a binding operation with a real card manager before the ferrule establishes a secure connection with the real card manager.

17. The system of claim 16,

the card sleeve is specifically used for receiving a trigger command for indicating the binding with the real card manager; sending a second binding instruction to the real card manager through a wireless network, wherein the second binding instruction comprises: the third binding random factor generated by the card sleeve, the card sleeve certificate and the unique card sleeve identifier;

the real card manager is specifically configured to receive the second binding instruction, and verify the card sleeve certificate by using a root certificate; generating a fourth binding random factor after verifying that the card certificate is legal; encrypting the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a card sleeve public key in the card sleeve certificate to obtain a second binding ciphertext, and signing the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random factor by using a real card manager private key to obtain a third binding signature; sending a second binding response to the card sheath over a wireless network, wherein the second binding response comprises: the second binding ciphertext, the third binding signature, a real card manager certificate, and a unique identification of the real card manager;

the card sleeve is specifically further configured to receive the second binding response, and verify the real card manager certificate by using a root certificate; after the certificate of the real card manager is verified to be legal, the second binding ciphertext is decrypted by using the card sleeve private key to obtain a third binding random decryption factor and a fourth binding random decryption factor; verifying the third binding signature by using a real card manager public key, the third binding random decryption factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor in the real card manager certificate; after the third binding signature is verified to be correct, verifying whether the third binding random decryption factor is the same as the third binding random factor; after the third binding random decryption factor is verified to be the same as the third binding random factor, prompting the unique identifier of the real card manager; receiving a trigger command for confirming that the unique identifier of the real card manager is correct, signing the third binding random factor and the fourth binding random decryption factor by using the card sleeve private key to obtain a fourth binding signature, and storing the unique identifier of the real card manager, the certificate of the real card manager and a second binding factor of a card sleeve end to a second binding list of the card sleeve end, wherein the second binding factor of the card sleeve end is the fourth binding random decryption factor; sending the fourth binding signature to the real card manager;

the real card manager is specifically further configured to receive the fourth binding signature, and verify the fourth binding signature by using the card sleeve public key, the third binding random factor, and the fourth binding random factor in the card sleeve certificate; and after the fourth binding signature is verified to be correct, storing the unique card sleeve identifier, the card sleeve certificate and a real card manager end binding factor to a real card manager end binding list, wherein the real card manager end binding factor is the fourth binding random factor.

18. The system according to any one of claims 11 to 17,

19. The system of any one of claims 11 to 18, wherein the ferrule is a mobile device.

20. The system according to any one of claims 11 to 18, wherein the card sleeve is a mobile device and an electronic signature device, or the card sleeve is an electronic signature device.