CN104102876A - Device for safeguarding operational security of client side - Google Patents
Device for safeguarding operational security of client side Download PDFInfo
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- CN104102876A CN104102876A CN201410342446.2A CN201410342446A CN104102876A CN 104102876 A CN104102876 A CN 104102876A CN 201410342446 A CN201410342446 A CN 201410342446A CN 104102876 A CN104102876 A CN 104102876A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
- G06F21/53—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
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Abstract
An embodiment of the invention discloses a device for safeguarding operational security of a client side. The device comprises a security part, an unsecure operating system, a secure operating system, a first middleware proxy, a second middleware proxy and second middleware, wherein the first middleware proxy and the second middleware proxy operate in the unsecure operating system, and the second middleware operates in the secure operating system. Client-side applications are installed on the unsecure operating system and directly call first middleware and call the second middleware through the second middleware proxy. Sensitive data in the client-side applications are stored in the security part, the first middleware is used for completing a part of service functions in the client-side applications in the unsecure operating system, and the second middleware is used for completing another part of service functions of the client-side applications by interacting with the security part in the unsecure operating system. According to the embodiment, potential security hazards of operations completed by the client side are reduced or even avoided.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of embedding, in particular to a device for guaranteeing the operation safety of a client.
Background
An application system of an online banking system or an electronic financial system, etc. is generally composed of: the security of the whole application system is ensured by the operation security of the three parts. For example, in an internet banking system, the service end and the middle network layer are guaranteed by a bank to ensure the operation safety, and the client end is guaranteed by an internet banking safety device to ensure the operation safety.
At present, the mainstream internet banking security device is: the internet banking shield (also called as usb key, the shape of which looks like a portable usb disk) has been widely used in various terminal authentication products such as internet banking and electronic finance as a terminal for user identity authentication and transaction signature. Similarly, in other application systems besides the internet banking system, there is also a device for ensuring the operation safety of the client.
The devices for ensuring the operation safety of the client side are integrated with a microprocessor, a memory and a Chip On Sysetem (COS) and form an independent computer system with independent data processing capacity. And, the security of data processing and transmission in the device is guaranteed through the security mechanism of COS.
Since these devices for securing the operation of the client are small in size, the configuration of the on-chip operating system and the hardware thereof are usually not too high. Due to the configuration limitation, only some operations with very high security requirements can be given to the device to execute, and the rest operations with relatively low security requirements can be given to the client to execute, so as to avoid causing too much work pressure on the device.
However, in the process of implementing the present invention, the inventors of the present invention found that at least the following problems exist in the prior art: since the client runs in an open execution environment (the execution environment includes an operating system portion and a corresponding hardware portion), and the open execution environment itself is not secure and trusted, there is a great safety risk to the operations performed by the client. For example, when a user inputs a PIN code of an online banking shield on a client so that the client submits the PIN code to the online banking shield for verification, since an open execution environment cannot prevent attacks of malicious software such as keyboard records, the PIN code may be leaked.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above technical problem, embodiments of the present invention provide a device for ensuring the operation security of a client, so as to reduce or even avoid the potential safety hazard of operations performed by the client.
The embodiment of the invention discloses the following technical scheme:
an apparatus for securing client operations, comprising: the secure component, the non-secure operating system, the first middleware and the second middleware agent running in the non-secure operating system, and the second middleware running in the secure operating system; wherein,
installing a client application on the non-secure operating system, wherein the client application directly calls the first middleware, and the client application calls the second middleware through the second middleware agent;
the safety component is used for realizing the information safety of the device;
the first middleware is used for completing a first part of service functions preset in the client application in the non-secure operating system;
the second middleware is used for finishing a second part of service functions preset in the client application through interaction with the safety component in the safety operating system.
The secure operating system is located in a secure execution environment, the non-secure operating system is located in a non-secure execution environment, and the secure execution environment and the non-secure execution environment are isolated through a hardware firewall.
The secure execution environment and the insecure execution environment share a same hardware system.
The hardware system is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) chip hardware system.
And switching between the secure execution environment and the non-secure execution environment through a secure monitor.
The second middleware interacts with the security component through an application program interface, API.
The second middleware at least comprises input middleware, output middleware, identity authentication middleware, signature middleware and file management middleware.
The second middleware agent includes at least: the system comprises an input middleware agent, an output middleware agent, an identity authentication middleware agent, a signature middleware agent and a file management middleware agent.
The security components include an on-chip operating system COS and a secure element SE chip hardware system.
The COS at least comprises an input subsystem, an output subsystem, an identity authentication subsystem, a signature subsystem and a file management subsystem.
The COS further comprises: and the life cycle subsystem is used for managing each life cycle of the COS.
As can be seen from the above embodiments, compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:
the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client is built in the equipment where the client is located, that is, the client and the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client are integrated in the same equipment. In the device, two isolated operating systems are included: the system comprises a secure operating system and a non-secure operating system, wherein the secure execution environment of the secure operating system and the non-secure execution environment of the non-secure operating system share the same hardware system. For operations with no or very low security requirements, the execution may be controlled by a non-secure operating system. And the operation with higher safety requirement can be controlled and executed by the safe execution environment. For example, the input of a PIN code or the like. Thus, the safety risks of the operations performed by the client can be reduced or even avoided.
In addition, because the secure execution environment in which the secure operating system is located and the non-secure execution environment in which the non-secure operating system is located share the same hardware system, the cost is saved, and the complexity and the power consumption are reduced.
Moreover, the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client is arranged in the equipment where the client is located, so that the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client can be prevented from being pulled out by a user in the service execution process, and the smooth execution of the service is guaranteed.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a structural diagram of an embodiment of an apparatus for securing operation of a client according to the present invention;
fig. 2 is a block diagram of another embodiment of an apparatus for securing client operation according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of another embodiment of an apparatus for securing client operations according to the present invention;
fig. 4 is a flowchart of a method for implementing signature operation by the device for ensuring the operation security of the client according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The embodiment of the invention provides a device for guaranteeing the operation safety of a client. The core of the technical scheme of the invention is that stronger hardware and software performance is provided for the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client, and the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client is built in the equipment where the client is located, namely, the client and the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client are integrated in the same equipment. The integrated equipment is the novel device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client. The device can be a PC, and can also be various mobile terminals (including mobile phones, tablet computers and the like). Wherein, in the apparatus, two parallel execution environments are isolated: an unsecure execution environment and a secure execution environment. Operations with no or very low security requirements may be placed in an unsecure execution environment for execution. And operations with higher safety requirements can be executed in a safe execution environment.
At present, a "secure operating system" (which may also be referred to as a trusted operating system) means that a computer information system meets corresponding security technical requirements in ten aspects of autonomous access control, mandatory access control, tagging, identity authentication, object reuse, auditing, data integrity, covert channel analysis, trusted path, trusted recovery, and the like. The main characteristics of the "secure operating system" are:
1. the least privileged principle, i.e. each privileged user has only the right to do his work.
2. And implementing autonomous access control and mandatory access control, wherein the mandatory access control comprises confidentiality access control and integrity access control.
3. And (6) safety audit.
4. The security domains are isolated.
With these bottom-level security functions, viruses, trojans, network intrusions and human illegal operations mixed as "application software" can be truly resisted, because the viruses, the trojans, the network intrusions and the human illegal operations violate the security rules of the operating system and lose the running basis.
A secure execution environment, for example, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) refers to a secure operating system that runs on a terminal device adopting a secure design, so as to provide a Trusted application execution environment on an existing terminal device. Equipment running a TEE may reach EAL2, 3 or higher levels as needed. The security design includes aspects such as the SoC (System On Chip) Chip and the circuit board layout rule. In the aspect of SoC chips, currently, most of application processor cores on mobile terminals use Cortex series chips of ARM corporation, and ARM corporation realizes TrustZone technology on Cortex processors.
The TrustZone technology enables the SoC chip to have a normal state and a safe state, and in the normal state, non-safe operating systems such as Android and the like can be operated, and corresponding application programs can be executed. In the secure state, a secure operating system (Trusted OS) may be run and perform certain operations and services that require greater security, such as user password entry, transaction information display, secure session establishment with a remote server, encryption and decryption of data, preservation of user sensitive information, and the like. When in the secure state, each application under the non-secure operating system has no control right on the whole terminal device, and only the corresponding application under the secure operating system can access the terminal device, such as a display, a keyboard, an SD card, and an NFC (Near Field Communication) device on the terminal device.
The security operating system can resist various remote attacks and local software attacks known at present, and partial hardware attacks, and can not resist various anti-tampering hardware attacks of the smart card.
In addition, in terms of software, the application program can be divided into two parts, one part is the application program running under a non-secure operating system such as Android and the like, the application program provides a friendly interface for a user, and the other part is the secure service running in the secure operating system, and the secure service performs higher-security operations, such as user information input, transaction content confirmation and the like.
In order to make the aforementioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention comprehensible, embodiments accompanied with figures are described in detail below.
Please refer to fig. 1, which is a block diagram of an embodiment of an apparatus for securing client operation according to the present invention, wherein the apparatus 10 includes: the secure component 11, the insecure operating system 12, the secure operating system 13, the first middleware 121 and the second middleware agent 122 running in the insecure operating system 12, and the second middleware 131 running in the secure operating system 13. Wherein,
the client application 20 is installed on the non-secure operating system 12, the client application 20 directly calls the first middleware 121 running in the non-secure operating system 12, and the client application 20 calls the second middleware 131 running in the secure operating system 13 through the second middleware agent 122 running in the non-secure operating system 12.
The security component 11 is used to implement the information security of the device.
The first middleware 121 is configured to complete a first part of service functions preset in the client application 20 in the insecure operating system 12. The second middleware 131 is configured to complete a second part of service functions preset in the client application by interacting with the security component 11 in the secure operating system 13. For example, when the device 10 for securing the operation of the client is applied to an internet banking application, the security component 11 stores sensitive data 21 including, but not limited to, a PIN code and a transaction key.
The preset first part of service functions are preset service functions with low security, that is, the first middleware completes the service functions with low security in the client application. And the preset second part of service functions are preset service functions with high safety, namely, the second middleware completes the service functions with high safety in the client application. For example, high security service functions include, but are not limited to: user information input and transaction signatures, etc.
The security component 11 may be specifically a usb key module (for storing sensitive data), and the second middleware interacts with the usb key module in the secure operating system, so as to implement mathematical operations such as transaction signature, encryption, decryption, and the like.
The middleware is arranged on the upper layers of an operating system, a network and a database and the lower layer of an application program, and is generally used for providing an operation and development environment for the application program on the upper layer of the middleware, and helping a user to develop and integrate the complex application program flexibly and efficiently.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 2, the secure operating system 12 is located in a secure execution environment, the non-secure operating system 13 is located in a non-secure execution environment, and the secure execution environment is separated from the non-secure execution environment by a hardware firewall.
In another preferred embodiment of the invention, the secure execution environment and the non-secure execution environment share the same hardware system. For example, the hardware system is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) chip hardware system.
In another preferred embodiment of the invention, the switching between the secure execution environment and the non-secure execution environment is performed by a security monitor.
Wherein, the switch between two physical address spaces in the safe execution environment and the non-safe execution environment can be realized through the memory attribute. I.e., a secure address space and a non-secure address space, the non-secure execution environment can only access the non-secure address space and not the secure address space.
In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 3, the second middleware 131 interacts with the secure element 11 through an Application Programming Interface (API).
In the technical scheme of the invention, the secure operating system provides a secure operating environment for the second middleware, and the second middleware is a secure and trusted middleware. Therefore, the middleware related to the operation with a very high security requirement in the client application can be used as the second middleware to run in the secure operating system, and the middleware related to the operation with a relatively low security requirement in the client application can be used as the first middleware to run in the non-secure operating system. Of course, all of the middleware related to all operations in the client application may be regarded as the second middleware.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the second intermediate member includes at least: the system comprises input middleware, output middleware, identity authentication middleware, signature middleware and file management middleware.
For example, the input middleware may be a keyboard or a middleware of a touch device, and the input middleware is operated in the secure operating system as a second middleware, so that attacks of some malicious software such as keyboard records and the like can be prevented, the problems of PIN code leakage and the like are avoided, and the security is ensured.
In order to achieve secure isolation between the secure operating system and the non-secure operating system, and thereby ensure the security of each second middleware running in the secure operating system, a client application located in the non-secure operating system must invoke the second middleware through an authorized agent (i.e., a second middleware agent). It will be appreciated that the second middleware agent acts as a secure channel between the non-secure operating system and the secure operating system.
In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, corresponding to the second middleware, the second middleware agent includes at least: the system comprises an input middleware agent, an output middleware agent, an identity authentication middleware agent, a signature middleware agent and a file management middleware agent.
In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the security component 11 includes a COS (Chip Operating System) and a SE (Secure Element) Chip hardware System.
The security mechanism of the COS can ensure the security of data operation and data transmission in the security component 11. The safety unit 11 has a high safety level, all related operations with high safety requirements can be executed in the safety operating system 13 and the safety unit 11, the safety operating system 13 provides high safety operation performance, and the safety unit 11 provides high safety storage and operation performance.
In order to cooperate with the second middleware in the secure operating system to complete the operation with higher security requirement, in another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the COS at least comprises an input subsystem, an output subsystem, an identity authentication subsystem, a signature subsystem and a file management subsystem, corresponding to the second middleware.
It will be appreciated that the input middleware in the second middleware performs input functions in the client application by interacting with the input subsystem in the COS. The output middleware in the second middleware interacts with the output subsystem in the COS to complete the output function in the client application. And the identity authentication middleware in the second middleware interacts with the identity authentication subsystem in the COS to complete the identity authentication function in the client application. And the signature middleware in the second middleware interacts with the signature subsystem in the COS to complete the signature function in the client application. And the file management middleware in the second middleware interacts with the file management subsystem in the COS to complete the file management function in the client application. And, since the second middleware located in the secure operating system initiates the establishment of communication with the COS in the secure element, all operations are completed in the secure operating system, thus guaranteeing high security of the operations.
In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the above COS further comprises a lifecycle subsystem for managing the individual lifecycle of the COS.
For example, the various life cycles of the COS include, but are not limited to, the development and production stages.
As can be seen from the above embodiments, compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:
the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client is built in the equipment where the client is located, that is, the client and the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client are integrated in the same equipment. In the device, two isolated operating systems are included: the system comprises a secure operating system and a non-secure operating system, wherein the secure execution environment of the secure operating system and the non-secure execution environment of the non-secure operating system share the same hardware system. For operations with no or very low security requirements, the execution may be controlled by a non-secure operating system. And the operation with higher safety requirement can be controlled and executed by the safe execution environment. For example, the input of a PIN code or the like. Thus, the safety risks of the operations performed by the client can be reduced or even avoided.
In addition, because the secure execution environment in which the secure operating system is located and the non-secure execution environment in which the non-secure operating system is located share the same hardware system, the cost is saved, and the complexity and the power consumption are reduced.
Moreover, the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client is arranged in the equipment where the client is located, so that the device for guaranteeing the operation safety of the client can be prevented from being pulled out by a user in the service execution process, and the smooth execution of the service is guaranteed.
In the internet banking system, for the client application of the internet banking, one of the most important operations in the transaction operations performed between the client application and the server is the signature operation, and the operation has a very high security requirement. The following describes how to implement a signature operation in the device for ensuring the security of client operation according to the present invention, by taking a transaction signature operation as an example. Please refer to fig. 4, which is a flowchart illustrating a method for implementing a signature operation by using the apparatus for ensuring the security of client operation according to the present invention, which specifically includes the following steps:
step 401: and starting the online banking client application in the non-secure operating system.
Step 402: and the online banking client application calls a first middleware in the non-secure operating system.
Step 403: and the online banking client application calls a second middleware agent in the non-secure operating system so as to call second middleware in the secure operating system through the second middleware agent.
Step 404: the security monitor monitors for a switch of the operating system from the non-secure operating system to the secure operating system.
Step 405: in the secure operating system, the secure operating system controls the input middleware to receive the PIN code input by the user.
Step 406: the secure operating system establishes a secure channel between it and the secure element and sends a request message requesting verification of the PIN code to the secure element over the secure channel.
Wherein, the request message carries the PIN code.
Step 407: and the safety component responds to the request message, verifies the PIN code, and sends a response message that the PIN code passes the verification to the safety operating system through the safety channel after the PIN code passes the verification.
Step 408: the secure operating system controls the signature middleware to perform transaction negotiation and check transaction data.
For example, the verification of the transaction data may include verifying whether the total length of the transaction data is consistent with the total number of the transaction data, verifying whether the format of the transaction data meets requirements, and verifying whether the transaction data is complete.
Step 409: and after the transaction negotiation and the transaction data verification are passed, the secure operating system controls the signature middleware to send the transaction data to the secure component.
Meanwhile, the safe operating system can also control the output middleware to display the transaction amount and the related information.
Step 410: the safety component carries out transaction signature on the transaction data and sends the transaction signature data to the safety operating system through the signature middleware.
Step 411: and the secure operating system controls the output middleware to display the transaction signature result.
Step 412: the secure operating system control input middleware receives a transaction confirmation key code input by a user.
Step 413: the security monitor switches the operating system from the secure operating system back to the non-secure operating system.
Step 414: and the non-secure operating system returns the transaction signature result to the online banking client application.
It can be clearly understood by those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described systems, apparatuses and units may refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and are not described herein again.
In the embodiments provided in the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed system, apparatus and method may be implemented in other ways. For example, the above-described embodiments of the apparatus are merely illustrative, and for example, the division of the units is only one logical division, and there may be other divisions when the actual implementation is performed, for example, a plurality of units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not performed. In addition, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be an indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units through some interfaces, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.
The units described as separate parts may be or may be physically separate, and parts displayed as units may be or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
In addition, functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in a form of hardware, and can be realized in a form of a software functional unit.
It should be noted that, as will be understood by those skilled in the art, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments may be implemented by a computer program, which may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, may include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. The storage medium may be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), or the like.
The above detailed description is provided for the device for ensuring the operation security of the client, and the principle and the implementation of the present invention are explained in the present document by applying specific embodiments, and the description of the above embodiments is only used to help understanding the method and the core idea of the present invention; meanwhile, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present invention, there may be variations in the specific embodiments and the application scope, and in summary, the content of the present specification should not be construed as a limitation to the present invention.
Claims (11)
1. An apparatus for securing client operation, comprising: the secure component, the non-secure operating system, the first middleware and the second middleware agent running in the non-secure operating system, and the second middleware running in the secure operating system; wherein,
installing a client application on the non-secure operating system, wherein the client application directly calls the first middleware, and the client application calls the second middleware through the second middleware agent;
the safety component is used for realizing the information safety of the device;
the first middleware is used for completing a first part of service functions preset in the client application in the non-secure operating system;
the second middleware is used for finishing a second part of service functions preset in the client application through interaction with the safety component in the safety operating system.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the secure operating system is located in a secure execution environment and the non-secure operating system is located in a non-secure execution environment, and wherein the secure execution environment and the non-secure execution environment are separated by a hardware firewall.
3. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the secure execution environment and the insecure execution environment share a same hardware system.
4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the hardware system is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) chip hardware system.
5. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein switching between the secure execution environment and the non-secure execution environment is performed via a security monitor.
6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the second middleware interacts with the security component through an Application Program Interface (API).
7. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the second middleware comprises at least input middleware, output middleware, authentication middleware, signature middleware, and file management middleware.
8. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the second middleware agent comprises at least: the system comprises an input middleware agent, an output middleware agent, an identity authentication middleware agent, a signature middleware agent and a file management middleware agent.
9. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the security component comprises an operating system on a Chip (COS) and a Secure Element (SE) chip hardware system.
10. The apparatus as recited in claim 9, wherein the COS includes at least an input subsystem, an output subsystem, an authentication subsystem, a signature subsystem, and a file management subsystem.
11. The apparatus as recited in claim 10, wherein the COS further comprises: and the life cycle subsystem is used for managing each life cycle of the COS.
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| CN201410342446.2A CN104102876A (en) | 2014-07-17 | 2014-07-17 | Device for safeguarding operational security of client side |
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| CN201410342446.2A CN104102876A (en) | 2014-07-17 | 2014-07-17 | Device for safeguarding operational security of client side |
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