AU2019232845A1 - A security method - Google Patents
A security method Download PDFInfo
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- AU2019232845A1 AU2019232845A1 AU2019232845A AU2019232845A AU2019232845A1 AU 2019232845 A1 AU2019232845 A1 AU 2019232845A1 AU 2019232845 A AU2019232845 A AU 2019232845A AU 2019232845 A AU2019232845 A AU 2019232845A AU 2019232845 A1 AU2019232845 A1 AU 2019232845A1
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 38
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 35
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 25
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 14
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 14
- 230000015654 memory Effects 0.000 description 12
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 9
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000002093 peripheral effect Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000001105 regulatory effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010420 art technique Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 description 1
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000004973 liquid crystal related substance Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012806 monitoring device Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003449 preventive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000004575 stone Substances 0.000 description 1
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Abstract
A security method for verifying and detecting physical tampering of a boot loader of a client gaming machine, the method comprising: sending a first cryptographic element from a boot compliance server to the client gaming machine; receiving a first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server from the client gaming machine, the first cryptographic response generated with the first cryptographic element based on at least part of the instructions of a boot loader that executes at the client gaming machine; verifying the first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server, wherein the verification includes determining whether the first cryptographic response corresponds to a version of the boot loader executed at the client device ; and sending at least a second cryptographic element to the client gaming machine subsequent to the successful verification of the first cryptographic response, wherein the at least a second cryptographic element enables the client gaming machine to continue a boot process. 11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
Description
A security method for verifying and detecting physical tampering of a boot loader of a client gaming machine, the method comprising: sending a first cryptographic element from a boot compliance server to the client gaming machine; receiving a first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server from the client gaming machine, the first cryptographic response generated with the first cryptographic element based on at least part of the instructions of a boot loader that executes at the client gaming machine; verifying the first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server, wherein the verification includes determining whether the first cryptographic response corresponds to a version of the boot loader executed at the client device ; and sending at least a second cryptographic element to the client gaming machine subsequent to the successful verification of the first cryptographic response, wherein the at least a second cryptographic element enables the client gaming machine to continue a boot process.
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
Title
A SECURITY METHOD
Related Application
This application is a divisional application of Australian patent application number 2017203667, which in turn is a divisional application of Australian patent application number 2015227533, which in turn is a divisional application of Australian patent application number 2012211356, which in turn is a divisional application of Australian patent application number 2009222577. The disclosures of each of these applications are incorporated herein by reference.
Field
The present invention relates to a security method, a verification system and a client device.
Background
Devices which require a high level of security, such as gaming devices which have to meet stringent regulations, require a secure boot chain so that there is a high level of certainty that the device has booted without being tampered with. One prior art technique is to provide a separate device on the board of the device to monitor an early part of the boot sequence to check that the boot loader (or BIOS) has not been tampered with. Further elements in the boot chain then build on the corner stone of the initial part of the boot sequence being secure to conduct further security checks. A problem with this technique is that if there is a need to update the boot loader, it is also necessary to update the monitoring device. There is a need for an alternative security method.
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
Summary of the Invention
In a first aspect, the invention provides a security method for verifying and detecting physical tampering of a boot loader of a client gaming machine, the method comprising:
sending a first cryptographic element from a boot compliance server to the client gaming machine;
receiving a first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server from the client gaming machine, the first cryptographic response generated with the first cryptographic element based on at least part of the instructions of a boot loader that executes at the client gaming machine;
verifying the first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server, wherein the verification includes determining whether the first cryptographic response corresponds to a version of the boot loader executed at the client device; and sending at least a second cryptographic element to the client gaming machine subsequent to the successful verification of the first cryptographic response, wherein the at least a second cryptographic element enables the client gaming machine to continue a boot process.
In an embodiment, the first cryptographic element is a first hash key and generating the cryptographic response comprises applying a corresponding hash function to the boot loader using the first hash key.
In an embodiment, sending at least a second cryptographic element comprises sending a valid second cryptographic response to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can verify the operating system without further reference to the boot compliance server.
In an embodiment, the method comprises sending a plurality
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5 of second cryptographic elements corresponding to respective ones of a plurality of possible operating versions to the client gaming machine, whereby the client gaming machine can determine a relevant one of the second cryptographic elements to apply.
In an embodiment, the method comprises receiving the boot loader version from the client gaming machine when establishing a communication channel with the client gaming machine.
In a second aspect, the invention provides a boot compliance server configured to:
send a first cryptographic element from the boot compliance server to a client gaming machine;
receive a first cryptographic response generated by the client machine with the first cryptographic element based on at least part of the instructions of a boot loader that executes at the client gaming machine;
verify the first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server, wherein the verification includes determining whether the first cryptographic response corresponds to a version of the boot loader executed at the client device; and send at least a second cryptographic element to the client gaming machine subsequent to the successful verification of the first cryptographic response, wherein the at least a second cryptographic element enables the client gaming machine to continue a boot process.
In an embodiment, the first cryptographic element is a first hash key.
In an embodiment, the boot compliance server sends a valid second cryptographic response to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can verify the operating
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5 system without further reference to the boot compliance server.
In an embodiment, the boot compliance server sends a plurality of second cryptographic elements corresponding to respective ones of a plurality of possible operating versions to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can determine a relevant one of the second cryptographic elements to apply.
In an embodiment, the boot compliance server is configured to receive the boot loader version from the client gaming machine when establishing a communication channel with the client gaming machine.
There is also provided a verification system comprising the boot compliance server described above and a boot loader update server adapted to communicate an updated boot loader to the client gaming machine, whereafter the client gaming machine replaces the current boot loader with the updated boot loader.
In an embodiment, the verification system further comprises an operating system update server adapted to communicate an updated operating system to the client gaming machine, whereafter the client gaming machine replaces the current operating system with the updated operating system.
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
Brief Description of the Drawings
Figure 1 is a perspective view of a gaming machine;
Figure 2 is a block diagram of a gaming machine;
Figure 3 is a block diagram of the memory of a gaming machine;
Figure 4 is a block diagram of a player tracking module of the of the embodiment;
Figure 5 is a block diagram showing how a plurality of gaming machines are networked and in data communication with a boot compliance server;
Figure 6 is a functional block diagram of a player tracking module;
Figure 7 is a functional block diagram of a boot compliance server; and
Figure 8 is a flowchart of a method of the embodiment.
Detailed Description
Referring to the drawings, there is shown a verification system which has a boot compliance server controller which participates in the verification of a client device, such as a gaming device. Advantageously, the verification system is provided so as to maintain a secure boot sequence while enabling the boot loader and operating system of the client device to be updated by downloading an updated boot loader or updated operating system to the client device. In the embodiments described below, the client devices are gaming devices at gaming venues which require a high level of trust because of regulatory
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019 requirements .
Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that some venues have electronic gaming tables playable by a plurality of players under control of a controller. For the purpose of this specification, such a table should be understood as being within the meaning of a gaming device. Accordingly, within this specification gaming device includes any gaming device adapted to be connected to a network, for example, a single player, electronic gaming machine arranged to play one or more games, a player tracking module adapted to be fitted to a gaming machine, an interactive video gaming terminal in a server based gaming system, a bonus controller, a jackpot controller, a display server etc.
A gaming device in the form of a typical stand alone gaming machine 10 is illustrated in Figure 1. The gaming machine 10 includes a console 12 having a display 14 on which is displayed representations of a game that can be played by a player. A mid-trim 20 of the gaming machine 10 houses a bank of buttons 22 for enabling a player to interact with the gaming machine, in particular during game play. The mid-trim 20 also houses a credit input mechanism for example a coin input chute and/or a bill collector 24B. Other credit input mechanisms may also be employed, for example, a card reader for reading a smart card, debit card or credit card.
Artwork and/or information, for example pay tables and details of bonus awards and other information or images relating to the game may be provided on a front panel 29 of the console 12. A coin tray 30 is mounted beneath the front panel 29 for dispensing cash payouts from the gaming 35 machine 10.
The display 14 shown in Figure 1 is in the form of a video
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019 display unit, particularly a cathode ray tube screen device. Alternatively, the display 14 may be a liquid crystal display, plasma screen, any other suitable video display unit, or the visible portion of an electromechanical device. The top box 26 also includes a display which may be of the same type as the display 14, or of a different type.
Another gaming device in the form of a player tracking module (PTM) 50 (also known as a player marketing module) having a display 52 is connected to the gaming machine 10. One purpose of the PTM 50 is to allow the player to interact with a player loyalty system. The PTM has a magnetic card reader for the purpose of reading a player tracking device in the form of a magnetic swipe card, for example as part of a loyalty program. However other reading devices may be employed and the player tracking device may be in the form of a card, flash drive or any other portable storage medium capable of being read by a reading device.
Figure 2 shows a block diagram of operative components of a typical gaming machine which may be the same as or different to the gaming machine of Figure 1.
The gaming machine 100 includes a game controller 101 having a processor 102. Instructions and data to control operation of the processor 102 are stored in a memory 103, which is in data communication with the processor 102.
Herein the term processor is used to refer generically to any device that can process game play instructions in accordance with game play rules and may include: a microprocessor, microcontroller, programmable logic device or other computational device, a general purpose computer (e.g. a PC) or a server.
Typically, the gaming machine 100 will include both
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019 volatile and non-volatile memory and more than one of each type of memory, with such memories being collectively represented by the memory 103.
The gaming machine has hardware meters 104 for purposes including ensuring regulatory compliance and monitoring player credit, an input/output (I/O) interface 105 for communicating with peripheral devices of the gaming machine 100. The input/output interface 105 and/or the 10 peripheral devices may be intelligent devices with their own memory for storing associated instructions and data for use with the input/output interface or the peripheral devices. A random number generator module 113 generates random numbers for use by the processor 102. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that the reference to random numbers includes pseudo-random numbers.
In the example shown in Figure 2, a player interface 120 includes peripheral devices that communicate with the game 20 controller 101 has one or more displays 106, a touch screen 107, a card and/or ticket reader 108, a printer 109, a bill acceptor and/or coin input mechanism 110 and a coin output mechanism 111. Additional hardware may be included as part of the gaming machine 100, or hardware 25 may be omitted as required for the specific implementation.
In addition, the gaming machine 100 may include a network card 112 to enable the gaming machine to communicate over 30 the network with the boot compliance server. The network card may also send status information, accounting information or other information to a central controller, server or database and receive data or commands from the central controller, server or database.
Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the main components of an exemplary memory 103. The memory 103 includes RAM
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
103A, EPROM 103B and a mass storage device 103C. The RAM 103A typically temporarily holds program files for execution by the processor 102 and related data. The EPROM 103B may be a boot ROM device and/or may contain some system or game related code. The mass storage device 103C is typically used to store game programs, the integrity of which may be verified and/or authenticated by the processor 102 using protected code from the EPROM 103B or elsewhere.
It is also possible for the operative components of the gaming machine 100 to be distributed, for example input/output devices 106,107,108,109,110,111 to be provided remotely from the game controller 101.
Figure 4 is a block diagram of a player tracking module 50. The player tracking module 50 is connected via input/output port 57 to a serial input output port of the input/output section 105 of the electronic gaming machine. The player tracking module has a card reader 54 and a display 52 which may be a touch screen display. The PTM 50 may also have buttons 53 for receiving a player input (at least in embodiments where there is no touch screen display) and a speaker 51. Input received from the card reader 54 is processed by processor 55 based on the data stored in memory 56. The PTM 50 is connected to the network by network card 58 enabling it to communicate with a loyalty system, the boot compliance server, and the update server. Thus, in the embodiment, the gaming machine 10 communicates with the loyalty system via the PTM.
Processor 55 is also arranged to communicate with a gaming machine 10 via input output port 54 to cause locking of the gaming machine in response to an instruction received via the network card 58.
Figure 5 shows an embodiment of a verification system 500 for verifying the boot sequence of a plurality of player
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019 tracking modules. A series of electronic gaming machines have respective player tracking modules 50 connected via communications network 510 to a boot compliance server 520. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that if the gaming machines 10 have a network card they could be connected to the network in the same manner. The communications network 510 may be any suitable communications network for example an Ethernet.
Verification system 500 also includes an update server 540 which has a first database 541A storing boot loader updates and the second database 541B storing operating system updates. The update server also stores in databases 541A to 54IB the versions of each player tracking modules 50 so that it can control the update process to bring each player tracking machine up to the relevant version. In this manner, the update server provides both a boot loader update server and an operating system update server.
A person skilled in the art will appreciate that terms such as boot loader, boot strap or BIOS are used in different contexts to refer to a set of instructions to be operated by a processor upon start-up in order to initiate 25 operation of the processor. Herein, the term boot loader is used to invoke all of these terms. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that the actual files included within the boot loader may vary depending on the implementation and generally, the boot loader is split into a series of separate segments. Further, in some implementations some functions may be formed by the operating system rather than the boot loader.
Accordingly, it will be appreciated that in many implementations in order to verify the boot loader it will 35 only be necessary to verify a part of the boot loader and it may not be necessary to verify the entirety of it in order to be sure of having a secure platform. For
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5 example, in the example described in further detail below it may only be necessary to verify a part of the boot loader having the instructions which enable a connection with the boot compliance server to be made as well as the instructions which have been used as part of the verification process.
Referring to Figure 8 the method 80 of the embodiment, involves starting the boot 805 at the player tracking module 50 and early in the boot sequence establishing 810 an Ethernet session to the boot compliance server. This session is established 810 by establishing a secure channel by obtaining the public key of the boot compliance server and encrypting further communications with the public key. Once a secure channel has been established, the boot compliance server 815 sends a cryptographic element in the form of a hash key to the client gaming device to enable it to compute a message digest. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that if other techniques are employed other types of cryptographic responses could be generated, for example in one embodiment, the verification may be performed using a cyclic redundancy check or the like.
It will be appreciated from the above description that the boot compliance server either knows the version of the operating server run by this client or the gaming client device communicates the boot loader version when establishing a channel with the boot compliance server.
In one example, the key is for the MD5 message-digest algorithm provided by RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 is a cryptographic hash function which produces a 128 bit hash value. Accordingly, the boot loader program includes the MD5 algorithm to enable the boot loader to calculate 820 the MD5 message digest of the boot loader program and sending 825 the message digest to the boot compliance
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5 server. A person skilled in the art will appreciate that other algorithms could be chosen such as RSA or DSA. In this embodiment MD5 is chosen because it enables different keys to be sent to the client each time it is necessary to compute a message digest. Advantageously, the server determines 830 whether the message digest is valid. If it is invalid the boot compliance server informs 835A the client gaming device that it is invalid and the boot loader halts 840 the boot processor and outputs an appropriate error message on its display.
In the alternative, the boot compliance server informs 845 the client device that the message digest is valid upon which the boot process continues by the boot compliance server sending 850 a plurality of keys and digest results for all operating systems which could be installed on the client gaming device. Generally, there will only be a small number of valid operating systems and it is quicker for the boot compliance server to send the keys and digest results for all valid operating systems rather than initiate a cycle where the server requests the identity of the operating system and sends the relevant key and operating system digest.
The boot loader then calculates a hash 855 using the relevant key and compares this to the relevant result. If it is valid, the boot loader proceeds by loading the operating system 870. Alternatively, if it determined 860 that the result is invalid the boot process halts 865 and an error message is displayed.
An advantage of this process is that as the boot compliance server verifies the boot loader, the boot loader can be changed at the gaming device. Similarly, the operating system can be changed.
The modules which are instantiated by the player tracking
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5 module and the boot compliance server to carry out the above process are illustrated in Figure 6 and 7. The processor 55 of the player tracking module implements an encrypted communication module 55A within the boot loader which is established in order to carry out communications with the boot compliance server 520. It also has a hash calculation module 55B for calculating the message digest to be sent to the server and the case of the first message digest which is calculated and a comparison module 55C which compares the hash to the result sent by the boot compliance server in the case of the hash of the operating system. A preventive action module 55D is activated if either message is invalid. The example given above of a preventative action is to halt the boot process and issue an error message. A person skilled in the art will appreciate that other techniques can also be used to take preventative action, for example by disabling some functions of the player tracking module.
The boot compliance server 520 also has an encrypted communication module 522 and a verification module 523 for verifying any message digest sent to the boot compliance server 520 it has a crypto module 524 for generating any required hashes and database 521 stores digest of the live operating systems and boot loaders. Crypto module 524 generates the keys to be sent via encrypted communication module 522 to the gaming device. To this end a cryptographic element supply module 524 controls supply of the relevant keys .
Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that while hash key results are transmitted in this embodiment, other cryptographic elements could be transmitted in other embodiments to be used to generate a cryptographic result. For example, rather than sending a key, an alternative would be to use a signature or a certificate or the like.
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
Various modifications will be apparent to persons skilled in the art and will be understood as falling within the scope of the invention described herein. Further, persons skilled in the art will appreciate that various features described above can be combined to form further embodiments .
Persons skilled in the art will also appreciate that the method of the embodiment could be embodied in program code. The program code could be supplied in a number of ways, for example on a tangible computer readable medium, such as a disc or a memory (for example, that could replace part of memory 103) or as a data signal (for example, by downloading it from a server).
In the claims which follow and in the preceding description of the invention, except where the context requires otherwise due to express language or necessary implication, the word comprise or variations such as comprises or comprising is used in an inclusive sense,
i.e. to specify the presence of the stated features but not to preclude the presence or addition of further features in various embodiments of the invention.
It is to be understood that the reference to prior art herein does not constitute an admission that the prior art forms a part of the common general knowledge in the art any country.
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019
Claims (12)
1. A security method for verifying and detecting physical tampering of a boot loader of a client gaming machine, the method comprising:
sending a first cryptographic element from a boot compliance server to the client gaming machine;
receiving a first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server from the client gaming machine, the first cryptographic response generated with the first cryptographic element based on at least part of the instructions of a boot loader that executes at the client gaming machine;
verifying the first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server, wherein the verification includes determining whether the first cryptographic response corresponds to a version of the boot loader executed at the client device ; and sending at least a second cryptographic element to the client gaming machine subsequent to the successful verification of the first cryptographic response, wherein the at least a second cryptographic element enables the client gaming machine to continue a boot process.
2. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first cryptographic element is a first hash key.
3. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein sending at least a second cryptographic element comprises sending a valid second cryptographic response to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can verify the operating system without further reference to the boot compliance server.
4. A method as claimed in claim 1 or claim 3, comprising sending a plurality of second cryptographic elements corresponding to respective ones of a plurality of
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019 possible operating versions to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can determine a relevant one of the second cryptographic elements to apply.
5. A method as claimed in claim 1, comprising receiving the boot loader version from the client gaming machine when establishing a communication channel with the client gaming machine.
6. A boot compliance server configured to:
send a first cryptographic element from the boot compliance server to a client gaming machine;
receive a first cryptographic response generated by the client machine with the first cryptographic element based on at least part of the instructions of a boot loader that executes at the client gaming machine;
verify the first cryptographic response at the boot compliance server, wherein the verification includes determining whether the first cryptographic response corresponds to a version of the boot loader executed at the client device; and send at least a second cryptographic element to the client gaming machine subsequent to the successful verification of the first cryptographic response wherein the at least a second cryptographic element enables the client gaming machine to continue a boot process.
7. A boot compliance server as claimed in claim 6, wherein the first cryptographic element is a first hash key.
8. A boot compliance server as claimed in claim 6 or claim 7, wherein the boot compliance server sends a valid second cryptographic response to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can verify the operating system without further reference to the boot compliance server.
11714597_1 (GHMatters) P79122.AU.5
2019232845 18 Sep 2019
9. A boot compliance server as claimed in claim 6or claim 8, wherein the boot compliance server sends a plurality of second cryptographic elements corresponding to respective ones of a plurality of possible operating versions to the client gaming machine whereby the client gaming machine can determine a relevant one of the second cryptographic elements to apply.
10. A boot compliance server as claimed in any one of claims 6 to 9, configured to receive the boot loader version from the client gaming machine when establishing a communication channel with the client gaming machine.
11. A verification system comprising the boot compliance server as claimed in any one of claims 6 to 10, and a boot loader update server adapted to communicate an updated boot loader to the client gaming machine, whereafter the client gaming machine replaces the current boot loader with the updated boot loader.
12. A verification system as claimed in claim 11, further comprising an operating system update server adapted to communicate an updated operating system to the client gaming machine, whereafter the client gaming machine replaces the current operating system with the updated operating system.
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1/7
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Figure 1
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120
Figure 2
RAM 103A
EPROM 103B
Mass storage device 103C
103
Figure 3
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Figure 4
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5/7
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Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| AU2019232845A AU2019232845A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2019-09-18 | A security method |
Applications Claiming Priority (5)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| AU2008905085 | 2008-09-30 | ||
| AU2012211356A AU2012211356B2 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2012-08-03 | A security method |
| AU2015227533A AU2015227533A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2015-09-18 | A security method |
| AU2017203667A AU2017203667A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2017-05-31 | A security method |
| AU2019232845A AU2019232845A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2019-09-18 | A security method |
Related Parent Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| AU2017203667A Division AU2017203667A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2017-05-31 | A security method |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| AU2019232845A1 true AU2019232845A1 (en) | 2019-10-10 |
Family
ID=54290118
Family Applications (3)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| AU2015227533A Abandoned AU2015227533A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2015-09-18 | A security method |
| AU2017203667A Abandoned AU2017203667A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2017-05-31 | A security method |
| AU2019232845A Abandoned AU2019232845A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2019-09-18 | A security method |
Family Applications Before (2)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| AU2015227533A Abandoned AU2015227533A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2015-09-18 | A security method |
| AU2017203667A Abandoned AU2017203667A1 (en) | 2008-09-30 | 2017-05-31 | A security method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| AU (3) | AU2015227533A1 (en) |
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2015
- 2015-09-18 AU AU2015227533A patent/AU2015227533A1/en not_active Abandoned
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2017
- 2017-05-31 AU AU2017203667A patent/AU2017203667A1/en not_active Abandoned
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2019
- 2019-09-18 AU AU2019232845A patent/AU2019232845A1/en not_active Abandoned
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| AU2017203667A1 (en) | 2017-06-15 |
| AU2015227533A1 (en) | 2015-10-08 |
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