AU1108701A - Network-assisted chip card transaction process - Google Patents

Description

S&F Ref: 474399D1

AUSTRALIA

PATENTS ACT 1990 COMPLETE SPECIFICATION FOR A STANDARD PATENT

ORIGINAL

Name and Address of Applicant: Actual Inventor(s): Address for Service: Invention Title: Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme AG Heinz-Nixdorf-Ring 1 D-33106Paderborn Germany Gerhard Wiehler Spruson Ferguson St Martins Tower,Level 31 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000 Network-assisted Chip Card Transaction Process The following statement is a full description of this invention, including the best method of performing it known to me/us:- 5845c 97P6222 1 Network-assisted Chip Card Transaction Process Technical field The invention relates to processes and arrangements for the electronic settlement of goods and services, in particular by payments, by means of chip cards and utilizing open data networks.

Prior Art Cards with an embedded processor or memory, known as chip cards, are used to pay for goods and services.

A number of different card types for this are known; these are known as credit card, debit card, preloaded electronic purse or smart card with reloadable electronic purse.

In many countries nowadays there are electronic *purse solutions that have been developed and specified nationally in each case; e.g. "Avant" in Finland, *"Danmont" in Denmark, the EC card with chip in Germany, and "Quick" in Austria. The technology and processes used in these solutions are incompatible with one *oooo another.

SCredit card organizations are currently testing solutions intended for use internationally, e.g.

25 "Visacash" from Visa, "Mondex" from Mastercard, "Clip" from Europay, and "Proton" from American Express. These solutions are likewise incompatible with one another.

Although this group of vendors has specified a common standard, which is currently known under the working title "EMV", this does not take account of cards already issued and solutions already on the market.

-2- It has emerged that although some of these cards use the same hardware equipment for the most part, they differ with respect to different software programs and protocols and specific security modules in the chip card acceptance terminal.

Accordingly, solutions have been disclosed in which a chip card terminal, which handles the chip card during a payment transaction, is equipped with a number of different software modules, and to which a plurality of security modules are connected. Because it is expensive and inflexible, however, this solution is not suitable for widespread use.

The object of the invention is therefore to disclose a solution in which widespread use of a large number of different chip cards is possible without each terminal having to be equipped for all these chip cards.

Summary of the Invention According to one aspect of the present invention there is provided a process for processing transactions secured by a chip card, which can be connected to a terminal connected to a data network, said process comprising the steps of: determining a code for a transaction process according to which the transaction "i is to be executed, wherein said code is determined by an operating program contained in i said terminal after the chip card has been connected to the terminal; determining the network address of a transaction partner from the code of the o.o.oi transaction process; establishing a connection to the transaction partner protected by cryptographic processes utilising the operating program; and processing the transaction, wherein said operating program acts as an intermediary between the chip card and the transaction partner.

~According to another aspect of the present invention there is provided an 25 arrangement for processing transactions secured by a chip card, which can be connected to a terminal connected to a data network, said arrangement comprising: a first device for determining a code for the transaction process to be used by means of the connection of the chip card to the terminal; a means for address mapping from the code, a transaction partner that can be contacted over the data network; a connection device for establishing a connection to the transaction partner, R:\LIBPP\01697.doc -2Aat least one second device contained in the terminal and the transaction partner, with which the connection between the terminal and the transaction partner can be protected against manipulations; and a third device contained in the transaction partner for enabling transactions with the chip card to be processed securely using the terminal as an intermediary.

According to another aspect of the present invention there is provided a process for processing transactions secured by a chip card, said process comprising the steps of: determining a code for a transaction process according to which the transaction 1o is to be executed; determining the network address of a transaction partner from the code of the transaction process; establishing a connection to the transaction partner protected by cryptographic *:processes; and processing the transaction.

Brief Description of the Drawings Fig. 1 shows a schematic overview of the components for the processing of a transaction with a chip according to the invention, oeoeo o e R:\LIBPP\ 01697.doc 97P6222 3 Fig. 2 shows a representation of the prior art corresponding to Fig. 1.

Description of the Invention Fig. 2 shows a known arrangement for processing chip card payment transactions. In the text below, payments stand for all types of transactions where importance is attached to reliable processing. The chip cards used are ones such as comply with ISO 7816-1, -2, -3 for example.

In the arrangement, chip cards 10a, 10b and can be connected to terminals lla, llb, llc. Each terminal contains a transaction partner 13a, 13b1, 13b2, 13c which is connected to a security module 14a, 14bl, 14b2, 14c respectively. The configuration illustrated relates to two payment networks 15a, 15c, in which a °oo host 16a, 16c in turn contains a security module 17a, 17c respectively and the hosts can exchange transaction data with each other over a further network 18. Instead of security modules, the hosts may also be operated in a protected environment with, for example, strict access control and the keys may be stored on customary ooooe data media. The networks 15a, 15c are X25/Datex-P neteeoc works for example, usually connected as closed user groups. The terminal lla is assigned to the host 16a and the terminal llc to the host 16c and can therefore only handle such processes as are supported by the host. As a rule, the respective transaction partner 13a, 13c is specific to the vendor or service, also referred to as transaction type below. In the text below, hosts also stand for hierarchical or meshed networks of computers for which the host represents the access and the interface.

t 97P6222 4 In order therefore to enable two different cards to be used for the two different services in the terminal llb, two transaction partners 13bl, 13b2 are provided in the terminal llb which are connected to their own security module 14bl, 14b2 respectively and have in each case their own dedicated network connection to the respective network 15a, As long as there are only a few terminals and a few services, the outlay for multiple transaction partners in one terminal is feasible.

The invention now separates the transaction partner from the terminal and is arranged as illustrated in Fig. i. In this arrangement the terminals Ila' llb', llc' no longer contain any transaction partner of the traditional type. Only an operating program, not shown separately, is provided which effects the communication to the chip card 10a,. 10b, 10c and serves to provide a secure connection to various transaction partners 13a', 13c' An open network 12 handles the data transmission between the terminals la', llb', 1lc' and transaction partners 13a', 13c', which in turn interact in a con- ~ventional manner with the hosts 16a, 16c over specific networks 15a, 15c. Chip card terminals of the known type can be added to as well as continue to be operated over these networks.

Said network 12 is preferably an open network, as is represented in the text below by the Internet and the IP protocol family. By virtue of the general availability and open architecture, it is readily possible for each of the terminals 1a', llb' and 1lc' to contact each of the transaction partners 13a', 13c'. Each terminal can therefore, as will be described in more deail below, contact every transaction partner and hence can accept every chip card and can process 97P6222 5 transactions, provided even only a single suitable transaction partner can be contacted in the network. It is also sensible to provide a plurality of transaction partners at one location, as is illustrated in Fig. 1 for the transaction partner 13a', because a plurality of terminals can access them, and the one-off installation of only a single transaction partner is directly available to all terminals.

In this case the operating program in the terminal must first of all determine the type of chip card, i.e.

the service or the transaction protocol to be used, and hence a possible transaction partner. This is done by reading out from the chip card. Chip cards can also support a plurality of services; in this case the terminal would have to ask the user which service is to be used for payment, unless this can be decided implicitly. In the case of a credit card with a reloadable ."electronic purse for example, amounts of less than DM 20 could always be debited from the electronic purse *20 and high amounts from the credit card function.

:o From the desired service, a "uniform resource locator" (URL) is then formed for example. This can be .o determined by a table in the terminal or by sending a query to a transaction partner. Since it dispenses with the need for a table in the terminal, the use of a URL is advantageous because the network functions then determine the closest transaction partner for this service. A URL for an American Express Gold credit card could then be "https://de.amexco.com/credit/gold/Hamburg" where "https" indicates the protocol for data transmissign between the terminal and the transaction partner.

As can be seen from the example, it is possible to encode both the location in the computer name "de.amexco.com" and the city in the URL. As a result of 97P6222 6 the coding of the computer name, although the Internet address may be requested via the authorized name server of the headquarters in the USA, the latter can reference a computer in Germany, so that a decentrally located transaction partner is called up despite central name management. The use of a code for the transaction protocol in a computer name alone thus already offers a flexible form of connection from a terminal to a transaction partner.

A a protocol that is protected against manipulations such as intentional specific falsification or eavesdropping is used here. An example of such a protocol family is contained in the draft "The SSL Protocol Version 3.0" by A.E. Freier, Ph. Karlton and P.C. Kocher of March 1996, which could be accessed, for example, on March 10, 1997 under the

URL

f.ftp://ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/internetdrafts/draft-freier-ssl-version3-01.txt from the "Internet Engineering Task Force" (IEFT). Said protocol enables the use of a plurality of cryptographic protocols and processes to ensure mutual authenticity and protect the transmitted data against manipulation and eavesdropping.

A security module 19a in which a secret key for the establishment of the SSL connection is stored, which secret key is unique to and identifies the terminal in question, is preferably used here in the terminal lla'. As is known, with a symmetrical process said secret key is stored in a security module of every transaction partner with which the terminal is to be able to establish a connection. Asymmetrical processes are preferably used however, in which a private key is 97P6222 7 stored only in the security module of the terminal, and the key derived from that is available to processing as a so-called public key, and it is only necessary to ensure their authenticity using one of the known measures. The security module in the terminal is therefore primarily required for protecting the connections to the transaction partners, while the security modules in the transaction partners also serve to protect the chip card transactions and the concomitant conventional key management.

In a further development of the invention, the security module of the terminal is used as a buffer memory for keys which are received together with program modules from a transaction partner. Utilizing the keys stored in the security module, said program modules can then process a transaction with the chip card locally. If an electronic purse is being used, the amounts are also stored in the security module, as is usual for an electronic purse, and are only transmitted ooo 20 with cryptographic protection at the end of the day. In this case transmission is preferably directed to the transaction partner that transmitted the program module and the associated key(s) to the terminal over the secure network connection. To improve performance, a 25 plurality of functionally identical transaction partners may be present which, within this meaning, should then be considered to be the same transaction partners.

Some card types can process the entire transaction locally, but after the end of the transaction a transaction record has to be transmitted to a central station over a network. In this case, too, a program module can be transmitted from the transaction partner and executed in the terminal, which then sends the transaction record to its transaction partner. It may well make sense to transmit the program module together with the key over the secure connection of the network for every transaction, instead of transmitting the 97P6222 8 transaction steps individually. In particular in a datagram-oriented network such as the Internet, in which occasional delays cannot be excluded, at worst a waiting period will then fall at the beginning or end of a transaction, but not between the individual transaction steps.

The program modules are stored here in conventional mass storage, but signed and also encrypted if necessary as protection against falsification, with the corresponding key for verifying the signature also being stored in the security module. The program modules are selected on the basis of the card type or a code derived therefrom the card type. The terminal and the security module may therefore be seen as a buffer memory ('cache'). Since the security module in particular serves at least partly as a buffer memory, a virtually unlimited number of chip cards can be used with the terminal, and this number can be dynamically increased without maintenance work at the terminal, as would be required if a further security module were to be added.

The "HTTP" protocol or its secure variant "HTTPS" ee i S"allows a particularly simple method of buffering here.

In the document RFC 1945 by Bernes-Lee et al, edition of May 1996, describing HTTP/1.0, the addition "ifmodified-since" is provided in Section 10.9. A document requested in this way is only transmitted if a more recent version is present and can also be buffered to intermediate stations. It is therefore possible to pack, encrypt and sign a program module together with the required key and give it a network name identified by a URL. When the chip card is inserted, the operating program determines a URL from the card type code, adds th- date of the existing, buffered version and sends a request to the transaction partner. If the buffered 97P6222 9 version is current, only the response code "304" is transmitted, and the buffered version is used.

Otherwise the transmitted version is unpacked, stored and executed.

In another variant, even already prior to installation program modules and keys can be stored in the terminal as if they had been transmitted over a network connection and buffered. This is a way of reducing network load for previously known, frequently or chiefly used applications. An indicator in the buffer memory management can also identify these entries in such a way that displacement in the buffer memory is avoided or proscribed entirely. The respective query to the transaction partner determined by the chip card as to whether a new version is present there is not affected by this and replaces the previously stored version if .appropriate.

As described, it is preferable to transmit the eeoc program module together with one or more keys from the e 20 transaction partner into the terminal. It is however *:ooe also possible to manage and handle program modules and keys separately if, for example, the resulting .increased network load is offset by greater flexibility.

25 By virtue of the higher computer performance in a ooooo terminal, in comparison with the limitations of the chip card, which is not available in chip cards that have been issued to date and will continue to be used, it is now possible to use also public key processes for protecting data communications, in particular for the authentication and generation of session keys. Please also refer to the SSL document and the references cited there for further details of this. Certificates acFording to the X509.3 standard may be used for certifying public keys for example.

97P6222 10 The security module may be designed as a chip card or as a SIM module known from GSM mobile telephones.

Customized versions, for example on the basis of the SL 44CR80S chip from Siemens, are also possible.

Once the secure connection between the terminal and the transaction partner has been established, the operating program acts as an intermediary for the communication between the transaction partner and the chip card. In most cases, data blocks will be converted here by the operating program into the protocol of the network connection and transmitted transparently. In many cases, however, communication with a user, that is to say the owner of the chip card, will be required so that the value of the transaction is displayed to the user and the latter can then confirm the transaction.

Input and output devices such as a keyboard and a V606 display are provided on the terminal for this purpose.

00 These are made available to the transaction partner over the secure connection, as only the transaction partner possesses the authentic value for the transaction. Alternatively, the operating program can determine this data from the communication between the ooo: chip card and the transaction partner and can display it of its own accord and transmit the confirmation to 25 the transaction partner.

o or A personal computer equipped with a chip card reading device may also serve as a terminal. The operating program of the terminal is executed on the processor of the PC and as a result additionally has access to the monitor and the keyboard. A payment process can consequently be initiated, in particular with interactive dialog, via access to the Internet and the World Wide Web for example. In this case it is particularly adyantageous that the invention is able to use the same data network, namely the Internet, that is already being used for the interactive dialog for communication between the chip card and the transaction partner. The reading device for the chip card used for payment 97P6222 11 preferably contains its own processor and a security module, preferably in the form of a further built-in chip card. The processor on the reading device handles the communication between the chip card and the transaction partner and turns to the processor of the personal computer for dialogs with the user.

Provided that the resulting achievable security level is acceptable to the personal computer user, it is also possible to dispense with a separate security module and a processor in the reading device. This is the case if the PC is not generally accessible, but is only accessible to a few known persons and there is no need to fear falsification of the operating program, as t is the case in the home of a private user. It is also possible to dispense entirely with a permanent secret key for protecting the communication with the transaction partner against manipulation by, for example, forming session keys according to the process of Diffie and Hellmann for the communication. Depending on the 20 application, it is conceivable that the authenticity of the terminal is not indispensable for the transaction partner, since the actual transactions are processed oo *with the chip card.

Instead of special terminals, for example in 25 conjunction with point-of-sale systems or personal olooo computers, a terminal according to the invention can Valso be built into a vending machine for goods or services, including information terminals. Input and .output units are then, for example, the selection buttons for an item and the output mechanism for the selected item.

It is also conceivable to issue chip cards that include, as a further application, the generation of session keys for a secure Internet connection according to the SSL protocol for example. This then dispenses with the need for either a separate processor or a 97P6222 12 security module on the chip card reading device on personal computers.

Provided no security considerations speak against it, every host 16a, 16c can also be connected (not shown in Fig. 1) to the open data network 12 and support the transaction partner function directly.

One particular advantage of the invention is that only the transaction partners need to be adapted or additional transaction partners provided; the networks 15a, 15c for transaction processing and the host applications 16a, 16c can remain unchanged and hence legacy applications can continue to run unchanged.

Since a terminal can also be equipped with a magnetic card reader or a combined reader in addition to a chip card reader, in a further development the operating program is extended in such a way that it can

S.

transmit the magnetic stripe data and any security fea-

S..

tures provided to the transaction partner. In this way, legacy processes based on magnetic cards can continue to be used. This likewise applies to chip cards without a processor that enable a memory to be read and written. The number of transaction partners in the network S•can be reduced in line with the extent to which such cards are withdrawn from service.

A security benefit is conferred in that the secret 555555 keys required for the transaction processing need no longer be stored in the terminal. In the past this has made it necessary to provide special protection for terminals installed in public places in order to discourage any attack on the security module from the outset. A successful attack on a security module which only affects communication between the terminal and the 97P6222 13 transaction partner has less serious consequences than one on a conventional security module. It is also possible for the transaction partners to run as processes on high-performance computers so that a particularly fast response is possible and a multiplicity of transaction partners can share the use of a fast security module.

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Claims (8)

14- The claims defining the invention are as follows: 1. A process for processing transactions secured by a chip card, which can be connected to a terminal connected to a data network, said process comprising the steps of: determining a code for a transaction process according to which the transaction is to be executed, wherein said code is determined by an operating program contained in said terminal after the chip card has been connected to the terminal; determining the network address of a transaction partner from the code of the transaction process; establishing a connection to the transaction partner protected by cryptographic processes utilising the operating program; and processing the transaction, wherein said operating program acts as an intermediary between the chip card and the transaction partner. 15 2. The process as claimed in claim 1, wherein input and output units connected to the terminal, in particular for confirming the transaction, can be used for the transaction partner through the data connection between the terminal and the transaction partner. S3. The process as claimed in claim 1 or 2, wherein the transaction partner uses of. 20 secure keys of at least one directly connected security module both for protecting the connection to the terminal and for protecting the transactions with the chip card. 4. The process as claimed in claim 3, wherein the terminal uses secure keys of a :,:":directly connected security module for protecting the connection to the transaction 25 partner. The process as claimed in claim 4, wherein an application of the chip card and a key stored securely on the chip card are used to protect the connection between the terminal and the transaction partner, by means of which key a session key for the further processing of the transaction is determined or a public key is verified. 6. The process as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein a TCP/IP protocol is used for connecting the terminal and the transaction partner. R:\LIBPP\O I 697.doc 7. The process as claimed in claim 6, wherein the SSL protocol is used for protecting the TCP/IP connection. 8. The process as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the determination of the network address of a transaction partner suitable for the transaction process is established by means of a query sent to a transaction partner assigned to the terminal. 9. The process as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the determination of the network address of a transaction partner suitable for the transaction process is established by using the code of the transaction process as part of a symbolic network address, said network address being resolved by the server and being utilized for determining network addresses that belong to the network. :0O00. The process as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the operating program of the terminal requests the user to input a secret character string, checks said user against a reference value, in particular utilizing cryptographic processes, and transmits only the result of the check to the transaction partner over the secure connection. U 11. The process as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein a program module is transmitted from the transaction partner to the terminal via said connection and is executed by said terminal. 12. The process as claimed in any one of claims 4 to 9, wherein by means of the 25 connection a key is transmitted from the transaction partner into the security module, and serves for the secure processing of at least part of a transaction with the chip card. 13. The process as claimed in claim 11 or 12, wherein the program modules or keys transmitted by the transaction partners are stored in the terminal in the manner of a buffer memory and are used instead of a renewed transmission. 14. The process as claimed in claim 13, wherein prior to use of a buffered program module or key, a query to the transaction partner is used to check that it is up to date, and if necessary a current version is transmitted and used in future. R:\LIBPP\01697.doc -16- The process as claimed in claim 14, wherein the HTTP or HTTPS protocol is used for requests with up-to-date status checks.

16. An arrangement for processing transactions secured by a chip card, which can be connected to a terminal connected to a data network, said arrangement comprising: a first device for determining a code for the transaction process to be used by means of the connection of the chip card to the terminal; a means for address mapping from the code, a transaction partner that can be contacted over the data network; a connection device for establishing a connection to the transaction partner, at least one second device contained in the terminal and the transaction partner, with which the connection between the terminal and the transaction oo.. partner can be protected against manipulations; and 15 -a third device contained in the transaction partner for enabling transactions OS e *Vgo:with the chip card to be processed securely using the terminal as an intermediary.

17. The arrangement as claimed in claim 16, wherein the terminal contains input and output devices which can be used by the transaction partner over the network during the 20 processing of the transaction.

18. The arrangement as claimed in claim 16 or 17, wherein the transaction partner contains at least one device for the secure storage of cryptographic keys both for protecting the connection to the operating program of the terminal and for protecting the transaction with the chip card.

19. The arrangement as claimed in claim 18, wherein the terminal includes a fourth device for the secure storage of keys for protecting the connection to the transaction partner. The arrangement as claimed in claim 19, wherein the chip card includes a fifth device with which a session key for protecting the connection between the terminal and the transaction partner can be generated in the terminal. R:\LIBPP\01697.doc -17-

21. A process for processing transactions secured by a chip card, said process comprising the steps of: determining a code for a transaction process according to which the transaction is to be executed; determining the network address of a transaction partner from the code of the transaction process; establishing a connection to the transaction partner protected by cryptographic processes; and processing the transaction.

22. A process according to claim 21, when dependent upon any one of claims 1 to

23. A process for processing transactions secured by a chip card, substantially as 15 herein described with reference to Fig. 1. DATED this Fifth Day of January 2001 Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme AG Patent Attorneys for the Applicant SPRUSON FERGUSON 0S 0000 S C S C S S S C OS. S R:\LIBPP\01697.doc