MXPA98001451A - Circuit integrated to proof of violation - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to an anti-violation integrated circuit apparatus which is adapted to be used with an integrated circuit carrying an active component, for example a security processor, which requires a constant energy signal in order to operate. If the power signal is interrupted, the data is erased from the volatile memory of the security processor. The memory is placed inside the integrated circuit package. An external energy signal is coupled to the memory by a conductive path which is carried out of the housing and which may be embedded in a decoder board, a micro-module substrate or a smart card body, in which the Integrated circuit. The conductive path can carry the energy signal directly to the way or it can carry the energy signal to polarize a transistor. The removal of the integrated circuit pack from the decoder board, the micro-module substrate or the smart card will open the conductive path and interrupt the power signal to the memory causing a short circuit or an open short circuit. As a result, the data stored in the memory will be lost. Therefore the device makes it harder for a pirate to violate an integrated circuit

Description

CIRCUIT INTEGRATED TO PROOF OF VIOLATIONS BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to the protection of integrated circuits (ICs) and, more particularly, to a scheme to avoid tampering thereof. The invention is particularly useful for protecting integrated circuits that are used in cable or satellite television decoders to prevent unauthorized users from receiving television broadcasts. The invention is also useful for protecting ICs used in other applications, including terminals and smart cards for electronic fund transactions, access control to facilities, electronic games and the like. Due to the increasing popularity of the paid television market, there are many financial motivations for unauthorized persons, known as "pirates", to modify the access control of the boxes of the devices (for example, the decoders) in order to obtain Obtaining the reception of television programming without paying subscription fees. Modified decoders are acquired by unscrupulous individuals through P1122 / 98MX different marketing channels and are used to receive and illegally view television signals. To produce a modified decoder, a pirate must extract some genuine decoder modification, which is usually known only by the authorized manufacturer. The decoder typically includes a security processor (e.g., crypto) that contains information, e.g., cryptographic keys that are used to demix a mixed television signal or other programming service signals (e.g., audio or data). As the security processor develops as the security processor develops access control functions it is a focal point of the pirate's tension. Consequently, the pirate will employ several techniques to try to obtain information from the security processor. A common attack technique is known as "probing". A security processor includes an integrated circuit (IC) that is manufactured as a monolithic device with a set of active and passive components, including transistors, resistors, capacitors and diodes that are interconnected within a monolithic block of the semiconductor material. The IC can be located in a housing that is installed on a decofessor board or can be part of a micromodule P1122 / 98MX that is embedded in a smart card. During the survey, ICs such as very large scale integrated circuits (VLSI) are subject to an invasive attack where the tablet (for example the integrated circuit or the "chip") is exposed by decapsulization. During descaling, the composite material that encapsulates or surrounds the tablet is removed in a systematic manner. Then, probes that measure the current and other parameters are used to submonitor the electronic signals in the active components of the chip. A pirate can perform the decapsulation stages to prepare a chip for probing. First, the chip is removed from the decoder board while the tablet is still inside the package of the integrated circuit. In general, this happens when a chip is mounted on a large board. Second, the placement of the chip within the encapsulating compound of the integrated circuit package can be determined by taking X-rays of the integrated circuit package. Third, a mechanical grinder can be used to remove as much of the encapsulating compound as possible above the top surface of the chip without damaging the chip. As a fourth step, a chemical etching or plasma etching is performed to remove the last portions of the encapsulating compound remaining on the P1122 / 98MX area of the pellet to be probed. Some chemical mordants work very well on the encapsulating compound, so that the pirate can skip the grinding stage. The decode board can be a computer board like those used in personal computers (PC). Typically, the chip requires a direct current from a battery or other power source to keep the contents of the memory volatile, such as a random access memory (RAM). In this case, the battery wires are welded to a positive pin (for example, Vbatt) and to a negative pin, for example Vss) on the outside of the pad before removal of the board. The chip is then removed from the board with the battery wires still attached. If the battery power is interrupted, the chip will "auto-destroy" by erasing the critical information (ie, losing it) that is stored in the memory. The pirate can identify the appropriate battery pins by taking the resistance measurements from the board traces that are connected to the battery, and then confirming the readings taken from the trace voltage with the main voltage off (for example, Vcc). The integrated circuit must be removed from the decoder board since the equipment used by the pirate P1122 / 98MX in the subsequent stages of descrambling can not be adjusted to the oversized footprint of the large decoder board. Commercial descaling stations that use chemical biting can only fit relatively small decoder boards. This effectively happens integrated circuit should be placed in a chamber to protect the operator from biting, which can be toxic. Normally, a small vacuum is created in the chamber to prevent the biting fluid and dew from escaping. These cameras are typically limited in size due to the cost and time associated with the evacuation of a larger volume chamber. Alternatively, the integrated circuit can be provided in a micromodule, which is connected to a miniature circuit composed of micro-elements such as resistors, capacitors and / or transistors. The micromodule pellet can be manufactured within a substrate matrix. A surface of the matrix of the substrate contains contacts while the tablet is joined by wires to the opposite surface. The micromodule is carried inside a cavity of a card body. Normally, a pirate extracts the micromodule from the card body and places the micromodule to access the contact area. The contact area is linked by P1122 / 98MX glue to a mounting surface and the surface of the tablet is exposed to allow removal of the epoxy adhesive that is used to secure the tablet within the card body. In this way, the task of the pirate becomes easier when the chip is consolidated within a smaller form factor of the chip itself or in a much smaller board. The present invention is directed to make it more difficult for the pirate to remove an integrated circuit from a micromodule or board or to remove a micromodule from a smart card. In the designs of the current chips, including those of specific application for integrated circuits (ASICs), a pirate in general will not have considerable obstacles in carrying out the four steps mentioned above. Removing the chip from the board with the battery wires still attached is normally considered the most delicate operation. In this way, the undamaged chip, which is protected by an inert passivation coating, can be exposed by a pirate as long as a short circuit or an open circuit of battery power is not created. In addition, damage to the attached wires can also be easily avoided. The attached wires connect chip union attenuators to package attenuators in the package P1122 / 98MX protective encapsulation, and placed on the periphery of the device. Once the chip is exposed without causing short circuit formation or power supply opening to the chip, polling starts. If the withdrawal of the chip from the board or the micromodule to which it is connected could be avoided or prevented, piracy could be more difficult or avoided. An approach to avoid polling is discussed in U.S. Patent No. 4,933,898, commonly assigned and granted on June 2, 1990 to Gilbert et al., Entitled "secure integrated chip with driver shield". Gilbert et al. expose the use of one or more conductive layers to overlap a security area of an integrated circuit. The conductive layers cover the security area protecting it from inspection and carry an energy signal to the internal circuit. The removal of one of the layers by the pirate causes the loss of energy to the components of the security area. However, this approach does not directly address the problem of removing an integrated circuit from the smart card or the decoder board. Accordingly, it would be desirable to provide an apparatus that would prevent the violation of printed circuit chips by a pirate. In particular, P1122 / 98MX would be desirable to make the task of the pirate to remove the integrated circuit from the decoder board, the micromodule substrate or the smart card without damaging the circuit, more difficult. In addition, the device must be compatible with existing chip designs and must be implemented in an economical way. It is also desirable to provide an apparatus that makes focused ion beam deposition more difficult. Ion beam deposition devices are used to inject charged molecules or atoms into a pellet and typically use a small evacuated chamber to hold the pellet. The evacuation of the chamber is difficult if the tablet is left on a micromodule board or substrate because the elimination of gases (for example the release of gases absorbed by heating) of the board or substrate. By making it more difficult and risky for a pirate to remove the pickup from the board or micromodule, the pirate's handling costs are increased since the period required to evacuate the camera is increased. The present invention provides an apparatus having the above advantages as well as additional ones.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION According to the present invention, it is presented P1122 / 98MX an anti-violation integrated circuit device. The apparatus is adapted to be used with an integrated circuit carrying an active component, for example a security processor that requires a constant supply of power to be able to operate. If the power supply is interrupted, the data is erased from the volatile memory of the security processor. The antiviolation integrated circuit (IC) apparatus includes an integrated circuit body, which is a housing in which the integrated circuit is packaged before being installed in a decoder or smart card board. An active component, for example a security processor, is placed inside the body. In a first embodiment, a set of redundant pins that are associated with the integrated circuit body is provided for coupling a power signal that is external to the body of the integrated circuit and to the active component by an electrical path. The power signal allows the active component to work. A switch, for example a transistor, is located inside the body of the integrated circuit, and receives the energy signal through at least one of the redundant pins. The switch is adapted to interrupt the power signal to the active component when the power signal is interrupted towards P1122 / 98MX minus one of the pins. The power or energy signal may be interrupted, for example, when the body of the integrated circuit is removed from a decoder board or smart card. The switch can be adapted to provide a short circuit or an open circuit of the electrical path when the power signal is interrupted to at least one of the pins. The active component may comprise a security memory for example a RAM for storing cryptographic data, wherein an interruption of the energy signal to at least one of the pins causes the erasure of the cryptographic data. In a second embodiment, the first and second primary pins associated with the integrated circuit body are provided to couple the energy signal with the active component. A first free or spare pin is electrically coupled to one of the first and second primary pins by a first electrically conductive member, for example a trace or conductive path, and a second free pin is electrically coupled to the first free pin by a second member electrically conductive At least one of the first and second electrically conductive members extends, at least in part, away from the body of the integrated circuit. The energy signal is coupled to P1122 / 98MX active component through a series path that includes the first and second primary pins on the first and second free or spare pins. Optionally, at least the first and second electrically conductive members are embedded, at least in part, within a board, a micromodule substrate or a smart card that leads to the integrated circuit body, so that the removal of the body from the integrated circuit from the board, the micromodule substrate or the smart card interrupts the coupling of the energy signal by the series path to the active component. The active component may comprise a security memory for storing cryptographic data, wherein an interruption of the energy signal in the serial path causes the erasure of the cryptographic data. In a third embodiment, the active component comprises a plurality of segments that are placed within the body. A corresponding plurality of pins with the body of the printed circuit is provided for coupling a power or power signal to the segments by the internal electrically conductive paths that are internal, at least in part, with respect to the integrated circuit body. The energy signal allows the segments to work. The P1122 / 98MX pins receive the energy signal via an external electrically conductive path that extends, at least in part, out of the body of the integrated circuit. The coupling of the energy signal to at least one of the segments, if not all of the plurality of segments, is interrupted when the energy signal is no longer carried by the plurality of pins. Optionally, the electrically conductive external member is embedded, at least in part, into a board, a micromodule substrate or a smart card that leads to the integrated circuit body, so that removal of the integrated circuit body from the board , the micromodule substrate or the smart card interrupts the carrying of the energy signal by the plurality of pins. However, the leading member does not need to hide. For example, the integrated circuit may be carried on a two-sided board that does not have additional layers, wherein the conductive traces are placed on an upper surface of the board. In this case, some effort can be made to run the traces below the integrated circuit. The simple management of the energy in the pin or in the attenuator will cause a problem. The segments of the active component can P1122 / 98MX comprise a security memory for storing cryptographic data, wherein an interruption of the signal energy towards the plurality of pins causes the deletion of the cryptographic data.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 is a simplified diagram illustrating a first embodiment of the anti-violation integrated circuit (IC) according to the present invention. Figure 2 is a simplified diagram illustrating a second embodiment of the anti-rape integrated circuit according to the present invention. Figure 3 is a simplified diagram illustrating a third embodiment of the anti-violation integrated circuit according to the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION An anti-violation integrated circuit is presented in order to prevent the active components, for example the security processor used in a television decoder, from being violated (for example, manipulated for reconversion). In particular, any attempt to remove the integrated circuit from a PC board, smart card or other location where the integrated circuit is installed will interrupt P1122 / 98MX a power signal of the active component and will result in data loss. Figure 1 is a simplified diagram illustrating a first embodiment of the anti-violation integrated circuit according to the present invention. The integrated circuit 100 includes an active component for example a random access security (RAM) memory 130 that is part of the security processor. A central processing unit (CPU) of the security processor, not shown, can transfer the data to and from the memory 130. The RAM 130 is a volatile memory that requires a continuous power signal to preserve its content. A wire or other electrically conductive member 151 and pin 110 couple a positive terminal (e.g., Vbatt) of a voltage source 150 with RAM 130. Pin 110 and voltage source 150 are typically on the outside of the integrated circuit 100. The term "pin" used herein tends to encompass any electrically conductive terminal. Similarly, the electrically conductive members 152 and 153, and a pin 105, engage a negative terminal (e.g., Vbss) of the voltage source 150 with the RAM 130. The pins 105 and 110 are primary pins. In a nominal operation mode, the power signal is carried from the P1122 / 98MX positive terminal of battery 150, to RAM 130 by pin 110 and lines 151, and again to the negative terminal of the voltage source via lines 152 and 153 and pin 105. Of course, It will be understood that the polarity of the voltage source 150 can be reversed. According to the present invention, means are provided for interrupting the power signal to the RAM 130. In particular, one or more secondary or spare pins, 115, 120 and 125, are provided to carry the power signal to the switches 135, 140 and 145, respectively. The energy signal provided from the positive terminal of the voltage source 150 is coupled to an electrically conductive member (e.g., a line, a wire, or a trace) 160 that extends from the pin 110 to the pin 125. pins 115 and 120 are also derived to line 160. Although three spare pins are shown and any number of these can be provided, it will be appreciated that only one spare pin needs to be used to achieve the scheme of the present invention. Pin 115 provides the positive power signal to a switch 135 via line 116. Switch 135 is coupled to line 151 via line 136 and line 153 via line 137.

P1122 / 98MX switch 135 may comprise a transistor, e.g., a field effect transistor (FET), although those skilled in the art will appreciate that other types of switching or interruption devices may be employed. An FET is characterized by a gate voltage that controls the amount of source current that enters the transistor and the amount of drain current that leaves the transistor. If the gate voltage is below a threshold value, no current flows through the transistor. If the gate voltage exceeds the threshold value, the current flows through the transistor. In this way, the transistor can act as a switch that has two modes. In a first mode, the transistor has a low resistance and the current is passed easily, while in a second mode, the transistor has a very high resistance and essentially no current is passed. If switch 135 is a transistor, the power or power signal provided by line 116 can bias the transistor to a mode where no current passes between lines 136 and 137. Similarly, switch 140 can be biased by pin 120 and line 121 so that no current passes between lines 141 and 142 and switch 145 can be biased by pin 125 and line 126 so as not to pass current P1122 / 98MX between lines 146 and 147. This represents a nominal integrated circuit operation mode 100, where switches 135, 140 and 145 act as infinite resistors. In case the pirate attempts to remove the integrated circuit 100 from the decoder board or from the smart card where it is installed, the configuration of Figure 1 will present several obstacles. First, the pirate will need to make sure that the appropriate energy signal is retained on each of the pins 105, 110, 115, 120 and 125. In this way, instead of requiring only two battery connections, for example, by means of the pins 105 and 110 for supplying the required power to the memory 130, the pirate must provide one or more additional battery connections via the replacement pins 115, 120 and 125. The current carried by the pins 105, 110 is generally in the order of several microamperes, although the maximum capacity of the pins is typically one thousand to ten thousand times greater. In the current state of the art, the current carried by the pins can support a memory having approximately two kilobytes of random access memory (RAM). In practice, the pirate connects a new voltage source (for example batteries) to the circuit Integrated P1122 / 98MX 100 before attempting to remove the integrated circuit from the smart card or board. However, a tremendous amount of care must be taken to make the welding of a battery to the integrated circuit before removing it from the board. The new battery is coupled by new conductors and wires that replace those supplied by the board or smart card. Once the integrated circuit is connected to the new battery, then the connections between the integrated circuit and the old battery should be broken so that the integrated circuit can be lifted off the board. The pirate faces several problems when trying to break the connections between the integrated circuit and the previous beat. In particular, when trying to use heat to break the solder connections with the previous battery, one or more of the connections with the new battery may break at the same time, resulting in the interruption of the power signal to the integrated circuit 100 and that data from volatile memory 130 be erased. Furthermore, if the electrical connections between the integrated circuit and the new battery are made with solder that is not at the proper temperature, weak connections known as cold solder joints can be formed. These unions are particularly P1122 / 98MX prone to fail when handling new connections. In fact, the operation of the integrated circuit can cause considerable voltages on the conductors of the new battery that are coupled to the integrated circuit package. Alternatively, when the integrated circuit is housed in a micro-module, voltages can be induced in the link wires that couple the new battery to the micro-module. These voltages can cause the pins or other coupling elements to literally get out of the integrated circuit package. When this happens, all the volatile content of the memory 130 is lost. Additionally, an accidental short circuit of the battery conductors in the integrated circuit can occur if it is handled carelessly by the pirate. With the present invention, this short circuit also interrupts the flow of current to the integrated circuit and causes loss in the data in the memory 130. To avoid the problems of an open circuit or a short circuit of the power signal to the integrated circuit , a pirate can choose to leave the integrated circuit on the decoder board or in the micro-module. In this case, the pirate may try to separate a portion of the board that includes the integrated circuit. Also, when the integrated circuit is on a micro-module of a smart card, the pirate can try P1122 / 98MX cut a part of the micro-module separating it from the substrate of the same and the body of the smart card. These attempts can decrease the time and costs that the pirate invests in the management of the integrated circuit but will destroy the board. The cost of destroying a complete board is usually considerable and will represent a significant deterioration for the pirate. Additionally, if the board is left intact, it will require a special handling by the pirate in a decapsulation station with mordant in number. In addition, if the board can be adjusted to a focused ion beam camera, the chamber will require a longer evacuation time for gas removal, as mentioned above. In this way, by increasing the number of pins that must be connected to the new battery to maintain the energy signal to the integrated circuit 100, the vicissitudes that the pirate has to do to perform a reengineering procedure and prevent the integrated circuit from remaining unused, they are increased. Additionally, all or part of the wire or trace 160 may be embedded (ie buried) in the board or in the smart card on which the integrated circuit 100 is to be mounted. Typically, an encoder board comprises P1122 / 98MX a multilayer structure. The line 160 can be embedded in the board so that, when the integrated circuit is removed from the board, the conductor path 160 is not divided, but the current to the chip is interrupted due to a short circuit between lines 151 and 153. example, if adequate current is not supplied to pin 125 then the power signal that is normally provided to switch 145 via line 126 will be interrupted. In this case, switch 145 will cause a current to flow between lines 146 and 147, thus putting lines 151 and 153 shorted. Similarly, if adequate current is not supplied to the pins 115 and 120, either of the switches 140 and 145, respectively, will short-circuit the energy signal to the memory 130. In this form, when arranging the replacement pins 115 , 120 and 125 and line 160 at strategic locations, for example around the periphery of the integrated circuit 100, it is possible to provide several "traps" for the pirate which will cause the interruption of the energy signal to the integrated circuit 100. The configuration shown in Figure 1 is only an example and it will be appreciated that various numbers of replacement pins and locations can be used.

P1122 / 98MX for line 160. For example, the line may extend substantially around the circumference of the integrated circuit 100. Alternatively, the polarity of the voltage source 150 may be reversed and more than one voltage supply may be used. Additionally, several interruption schemes may be used. For example, switch 135 may be positioned to provide an open circuit (instead of a short circuit) on any of lines 151 and 153 when the power signal on line 116 is interrupted. Figure 2 is a simplified diagram illustrating a second embodiment of the anti-rape integrated circuit according to the present invention. Therefore, a signal from the voltage source 150 is coupled to the memory 130 by a number of pins and lines that are placed in series. In particular, the positive terminal of the voltage source is coupled to a pin 205, while a negative terminal of the voltage source is coupled to a pin 245. The pin 205 is coupled to the memory 130 via the line 207, the pin 210, line 212, pin 215, line 217, pin 200, line 222, pin 225 and line 227. Pin 245 is coupled to memory 130 via line 242, pin 240, line 237, pin 235 and line 230. The interruption of the current to one of the pins will interrupt the P1122 / 98MX power supply to memory 130 and will cause data loss in it. In addition, a pirate can easily cause a short circuit by coupling one of the positively polarized pins or positively polarized lines with one of the pins or negatively polarized lines. For example, if the pin 225 is electrically coupled to the pin 235, a short circuit may occur through the integrated circuit 100. As a result, the energy signal that is brought to the memory 130 by the lines 227 and 230 will be interrupted, causing thus the loss of the data stored in the memory. Optionally, the lines or traces 212, 222 and 237 may be embedded, at least in part, within a smart card or decoder board on which the integrated circuit 100 is carried. This may make it more difficult to detect the presence of the traces It will be understood that the series mode of Figure 2 is only an example and many other modifications can be made. Furthermore, it is possible to combine the configurations of FIGS. 1 and 2, for example, by routing the line 160 with additional pins in a series path extending, in part, within the integrated circuit 100. FIG. simplified diagram that P1122 / 98MX illustrates a third embodiment of the anti-rape integrated circuit according to the present invention. Here, the integrated circuit 100 includes a segmented memory 360, with segments 362, 364, 366 and 368. Each segment receives an energy signal from the voltage source 150. In this way, the voltage source 150 is common to each memory segment. In particular, a common line 310 extending between the pin 320 and the pin 345 couples the positive terminal of the voltage source 150 to the segment 362 via the pin 330 and the line 331, to the segment 366 via the pin 335 and the line 336, to segment 368 by pin 345 and line 346, and to segment 364 by pin 320 and line 321. Similarly, a common line 305 extending between pin 315 and pin 350 couples to the negative terminal of voltage source 150 with segment 362, through pin 325 and line 326, to segment 366, via pin 340 and line 341, to segment 368, through pin 350 and line 351, to segment 364 and through the pin 315 and the line 316. Optionally, the lines 305 and 310 may be partially embedded or fully embedded in a decoder board or smart card in which the integrated circuit 100 is carried to further complicate the detection of Your presence. With the configuration of Figure 3, you can P1122 / 98MX observing that removal of the integrated circuit 100 from the decoder board or smart card will interrupt the current provided by any of the lines 305 and 310, thus interrupting the power signal that is provided by the memory segments 362, 364, 366 and 368. Additionally, energy signals to memory segments will also be interrupted if a pirate short-circuits the electrical coupling of lines 305 and 310. The embodiment of Figure 3 can be modified in several ways. It is possible to combine the combinations of Figures 2 and 3, for example, by routing the two lines 305 and 310, or any of them, in a series path that extends, in part, within the integrated circuit 100. Alternatively, the embodiment of Figure 1 can also be incorporated by the coupling of a switch to provide a short circuit or an open circuit that interrupts the energy signal to the memory segments. Accordingly, it can be seen that there are many possible configurations of the antiviolation integrated circuit of the present invention, which prevent an unauthorized person from removing the integrated circuit from the decoder board, from the smart card or from another location where this circuit is mounted.

P1122 / 98MX integrated. The electrically conductive lines are placed so that the break or opening of one of the lines interrupts the energy signal that is provided to an active component of the activated circuit, thus causing the loss of the data stored in a volatile memory. In addition, the interruption may be caused by an open circuit or a short circuit caused by the interruption of a bias signal in a switch, for example a transistor. The task of the pirate to manipulate the engineering of the integrated circuit becomes much more difficult, laborious and expensive. Although the invention has been described in connection with several specific embodiments, those skilled in the art will appreciate that various adaptations and modifications may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention set forth in the appended claims.

P1122 / 98MX

Claims (16)

1. NOVELTY OF THE INVENTION Having described the present invention, it is considered as a novelty and, therefore, the content of the following CLAIMS is claimed as property; An antiviolation integrated circuit apparatus comprising: an integrated circuit body; an active component placed inside the body; a set of pins associated with the body of the integrated circuit, which are adapted to couple with the active component a signal that comes from the power source that is external to the body of the integrated circuit, by an electrical path to allow the active component to operate; a switch placed inside the body of the integrated circuit; the switch is adapted to receive the energy signal through at least one of the pins; the switch is adapted to interrupt the energy signal to the active component when the energy signal to at least one of the pins is interrupted.
2. 2. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein: P1122 / 98MX the switch is adapted to short circuit the electrical path when the energy signal to the pins is interrupted. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein: the switch is adapted to open the electrical path when the power signal at least one of the pins is interrupted. The apparatus according to one of the preceding claims, wherein: the switch comprises a receiver that is biased by the energy signal. The apparatus according to one of the preceding claims, wherein: the active component comprises a security memory for storing cryptographic data; and an interruption of the energy signal to at least one of the pins causes the cryptographic data to be erased. 6. An anti-rape integrated circuit apparatus comprising: an integrated circuit body; an active component placed inside the body; first and second primary pins associated with the body of the integrated circuit for coupling a signal P1122 / 98MX of energy that is external to the integrated circuit body, to the active component, to allow it to work; a first replacement pin that is electrically coupled to the first and second primary pins by a first electrically conductive member; a second spare pin that is electrically coupled to the first replacement pin by a second electrically conductive member; at least one of the first and second electrically conductive members extend, at least in part, away from the body of the integrated circuit; the energy signal is coupled to the active component by a series path that includes the first and second primary pins and the first and second spare pins. The apparatus according to claim 6, wherein: at least one of the first and second electrically conductive members are embedded, at least in part within a board leading to the integrated circuit body, so that removal of the body of the integrated circuit from the board interrupts the coupling of the energy signal by the series path to the active component. P1122 / 98MX 8. The apparatus according to claim 6, wherein: at least one of the first and second electrically conductive members is embedded, at least in part within a body of a smart card leading to the integrated circuit body, so that the withdrawal of the integrated circuit body from the body of the smart card interrupts the coupling of the energy signal by the series path to the active component. The apparatus according to claim 6, wherein: at least one of the first and second electrically conductive members is embedded, at least in part within a micro-module substrate that leads to the integrated circuit body, so that the removal of the integrated circuit body from the micro-module substrate interrupts the coupling of the energy signal by the series path to the active component. The apparatus according to one of claims 6 to 9, wherein: the active component comprises a security memory for storing cryptographic data; and an interruption of the energy signal in the P1122 / 98MX serial path causes the cryptographic data to be erased. 11. An anti-rape integrated circuit apparatus comprising: an integrated circuit body; an active component comprising a plurality of segments positioned within the body; a corresponding plurality associated with the body of the integrated circuit, which are adapted to couple an energy signal that is external to the circuit body integrated with the segments, by respective internal electrically conductive paths, which are internal, at least in part, to the body of the integrated circuit, to allow the segments to work; the pin is adapted to receive the energy signal by an external electrically conductive path, which extends, at least in part, outwardly from the body of the integrated circuit; wherein: the coupling of the energy signal to at least one segment of the plurality of segments is interrupted when the energy signal is no longer carried by at least one of the pins of the plurality of pins. 12. The apparatus according to claim 11, wherein: P112-2 / 98MX the coupling of the energy signal towards each of the plurality of segments is interrupted when the energy signal is no longer carried by each of the pins forming the plurality. The apparatus according to claim 11 or 12, wherein: the external electrically conductive member is embedded, at least in part, within a board leading to the integrated circuit body, so that the removal of the integrated circuit body to From the board it interrupts that the signal can be carried on the plurality of pins. The apparatus according to claim 11 or 12, wherein: the electrically conductive external member is embedded, at least in part, within a smart card body leading to the integrated circuit body, so that when it is removed from the the body of the smart card, the action of carrying an energy signal in the plurality of pins is interrupted. The apparatus according to claim 11 or 12, wherein: at least one of the first and second electrically conductive members is embedded, at least in part, within a micro-module substrate that leads to the P1122 / 98MX integrated circuit body, so that the withdrawal of this from the substrate of the micro-module interrupts the coupling of the energy signal by the series path, to the active component. The apparatus according to one of claims 11 to 15, wherein: the segments of the active component comprise a security memory for storing cryptographic data; and an interruption of the energy signal to the plurality of pins causes the cryptographic data to be erased. P1122 / 98MX