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Bradford et al., 2008 - Google Patents

Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

Bradford et al., 2008

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Document ID
16359871696944837801
Author
Bradford P
Park S
Rothkopf M
Park H
Publication year
Publication venue
Electronic Commerce Research

External Links

Snippet

Despite attractive theoretical properties, Vickrey auctions are seldom used due to the risk of information revelation and fear of cheating. CVAs (Cryptographic Vickrey Auctions) have been proposed to protect bidders' privacy or to prevent cheating by the bid taker. This paper …
Continue reading at www.academia.edu (PDF) (other versions)

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce, e.g. shopping or e-commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/08—Auctions, matching or brokerage
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS OR METHODS, SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL, SUPERVISORY OR FORECASTING PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00—Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G06Q40/04—Exchange, e.g. stocks, commodities, derivatives or currency exchange

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