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Holcomb, 2017 - Google Patents

Nanoscale CMOS Memory-Based Security Primitive Design

Holcomb, 2017

Document ID
9314668897678110647
Author
Holcomb D
Publication year
Publication venue
Security Opportunities in Nano Devices and Emerging Technologies

External Links

Snippet

This chapter considers security primitives based on memory cells. As memories continue to scale near the end of the complementary-metal-oxide-semiconductor roadmap, they become increasingly sensitive to process variations and noise. A second benefit of memory …
Continue reading at www.taylorfrancis.com (other versions)

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11C—STATIC STORES
    • G11C11/00—Digital stores characterised by the use of particular electric or magnetic storage elements; Storage elements therefor
    • G11C11/21—Digital stores characterised by the use of particular electric or magnetic storage elements; Storage elements therefor using electric elements
    • G11C11/34—Digital stores characterised by the use of particular electric or magnetic storage elements; Storage elements therefor using electric elements using semiconductor devices
    • G11C11/40—Digital stores characterised by the use of particular electric or magnetic storage elements; Storage elements therefor using electric elements using semiconductor devices using transistors
    • G11C11/401—Digital stores characterised by the use of particular electric or magnetic storage elements; Storage elements therefor using electric elements using semiconductor devices using transistors forming cells needing refreshing or charge regeneration, i.e. dynamic cells
    • G11C11/406—Management or control of the refreshing or charge-regeneration cycles
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11C—STATIC STORES
    • G11C29/00—Checking stores for correct operation; Subsequent repair; Testing stores during standby or offline operation
    • G11C29/04—Detection or location of defective memory elements, e.g. cell constructio details, timing of test signals
    • G11C29/08—Functional testing, e.g. testing during refresh, power-on self testing [POST] or distributed testing
    • G11C29/12—Built-in arrangements for testing, e.g. built-in self testing [BIST] or interconnection details
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11C—STATIC STORES
    • G11C29/00—Checking stores for correct operation; Subsequent repair; Testing stores during standby or offline operation
    • G11C29/04—Detection or location of defective memory elements, e.g. cell constructio details, timing of test signals
    • G11C29/50—Marginal testing, e.g. race, voltage or current testing
    • G11C29/50016—Marginal testing, e.g. race, voltage or current testing of retention
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRICAL DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRICAL DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
    • G06F7/58—Random or pseudo-random number generators
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRICAL DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures

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