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07 Jan 26

All encryption is end-to-end, if you’re not picky about the ends. config TCG_TPM2_HMAC bool “Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus” default n select CRYPTO_ECDH select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS help Setting this causes us to deploy a scheme which uses request and response HMACs in addition to encryption for communicating with the TPM to prevent or detect bus snooping and interposer attacks (see tpm-security.rst). Saying Y here adds some encryption overhead to all kernel to TPM transactions. Last year, I came agross a Linux kernel feature called TCG_TPM2_HMAC. It claims to detect or prevent active and passive interposer attackers. That’s one of my sleeper agent activation phrases, so I dug in.

by marc 1 month ago saved 2 times

06 Jan 26

All encryption is end-to-end, if you’re not picky about the ends. config TCG_TPM2_HMAC bool “Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus” default n select CRYPTO_ECDH select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS help Setting this causes us to deploy a scheme which uses request and response HMACs in addition to encryption for communicating with the TPM to prevent or detect bus snooping and interposer attacks (see tpm-security.rst). Saying Y here adds some encryption overhead to all kernel to TPM transactions. Last year, I came agross a Linux kernel feature called TCG_TPM2_HMAC. It claims to detect or prevent active and passive interposer attackers. That’s one of my sleeper agent activation phrases, so I dug in.

by yahourt 1 month ago saved 2 times

20 Nov 25

andlock’s goal is to make it possible for Linux applications to sandbox themselves. On Linux, many traditional access control mech- anisms are only available to the system administrator, which do not follow the principle of least privilege. As a result, sandboxing policies were created independently of an actual program execution, leading to unnecessarily broad policies. With Landlock, unprivileged processes can safely create sandboxing policies well-tailored to the expected needs of a running application. Landlock also solves the organizational aspect of keeping policy and software in sync with each other, by putting the policy definition and maintenance in the developer’s hands.

by monkeysource 3 months ago

22 Aug 25

What happened, and an investigation of the malware

by kawcco 6 months ago saved 2 times

25 Apr 25

11 Apr 25

Guide to using YubiKey for GnuPG and SSH

by mrus 10 months ago saved 3 times

15 Jan 24

This article explore Podman’s features and benefits, comparing it to Docker and describing a step-by-step migration guide

by chrisSt 2 years ago