While I have written multiple posts for SCOTUSblog on birthright citizenship, a substantial part of my practice is litigating Second Amendment claims. In light of that experience, I was struck when listening to the Trump v. Barbara argument that the challengers’ counsel Cecillia Wang repeatedly insisted that the exceptions to birthright citizenship (such as for the children of ambassadors, tribal Indians, and invading armies) are “a closed set” – i.e., that the exceptions were set in 1868 with the adoption of the 14th Amendment and will always remain the same regardless of changed circumstances. This is a misunderstanding of originalism. As the court has explained in the Second Amendment context, the Constitution does not create “a law trapped in amber.” Rather, courts apply the original meaning of the Second Amendment to today’s circumstances, which can result in outcomes that are different from those at the Founding. A similar approach to the citizenship clause should be adopted in Trump v. Barbara.

Empirical SCOTUS is a recurring series by Adam Feldman that looks at Supreme Court data, primarily in the form of opinions and oral arguments, to provide insights into the justices’ decision making and what we can expect from the court in the future.

In Case v. Montana, which dealt with the conditions in which police officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency aid, Justice Neil Gorsuch arrived at oral argument with a specific legal theory already in hand. He pressed counsel on whether a private citizen historically could enter another person’s property to prevent serious harm. Gorsuch conveyed that law enforcement – regarding their ability to enter one’s property in an emergency situation – should have no fewer rights than a private citizen would. At the same time, he insisted that any emergency-entry is bounded – it authorizes a limited entry for law enforcement to deal with that emergency, not a general license to search the premises. When his separate concurrence appeared, it tracked those questions almost exactly: the Fourth Amendment’s emergency-aid exception for police to enter one’s home, he wrote, is grounded in the common law of necessity and the historic privilege of private citizens to enter property to avert serious physical harm.

A Second Opinion is a recurring series by Haley Proctor on the Second Amendment and constitutional litigation.

My previous column examined what it means for a gun control measure to fit within “the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” This month I want to focus on how the court has analyzed gun regulations that limit (1) who may possess a firearm, (2) what arms people may own or carry, and (3) where they may take them.

The Supreme Court on Monday morning added one new case, involving challenges to veterans’ benefit laws, to its docket for the 2026-27 term. The justices also sent the case of Stephen Bannon, a former adviser to President Donald Trump who was convicted of contempt of Congress, back to the lower court, where the Department of Justice has filed a motion to dismiss his indictment. And the court rebuffed, without comment, a challenge to an Illinois law banning guns on public transportation.

All of these actions came as part of a list of orders released from the justices’ private conference on April 2. The justices’ next conference is scheduled for Friday, April 17; orders from that conference are expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT on Monday, April 20.

Justice, Democracy, and Law is a recurring series by Edward B. Foley that focuses on election law and the relationship of law and democracy.

“Original public meaning” has become the prevailing method of constitutional interpretation at the Supreme Court. The idea, which is at the heart of originalism, will be familiar to many SCOTUSblog readers. It is that the text of the Constitution must be understood and enforced by the court today in the same way that the text was understood by members of the public at the time the text became law.