CDR Salamander

To paraphrase Papa Salamander's favorite saying, "No one owes you a Navy."

As we go through today's post, I'd like everyone to keep in mind an intangible that impacts not just our Navy in the eyes of the people we serve, but our government as a whole that our Navy is part of: most of our major naval bases are located in the heart of heavily populated urban areas.

The Tidewater Area around Norfolk, VA;

And on the West Coast, San Diego;

For good and bad, what our Navy does impacts the millions of people who are our neighbors, family, and friends who live cheek-to-jowl with the fleet.

When things go wrong, they are downwind.

There is the former USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) burning two years ago and drenching the San Diego with at least two decades of trial lawyer cases.

Do you see it? See that little boat in the bottom right hand corner? That's the subject of today's post.

As one is getting used to, our friends over at gCaptain are bringing up important issues no one else is.

In this case something many assume the Navy has covered but doesn't; fireboats.

Over the past few decades, the United States Navy has increasingly abandoned the unsexy working ships it once mastered and deployed around the world. Previously, the Navy had a large fleet of salvage tugs, but now they only have two, and only two Hospital Ships, two Submarine Tenders, and two Ocean Tugs. Some ship classes have been scrapped altogether including Fireboats or, as the Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro inaccurately called them in a letter to congress, “fire boats.” 

The Unsexy-but-Important™ strike again. This isn't some fancy, surplus, radical idea that only a military might do.

“Modern fireboats are impressive and so essential to protecting ships that Long Beach purchased them even though the next city north, Los Angeles, already had a state-of-the-art fireboat, and even though the construction cost for the two boats exceeded $50 million,” we wrote in July of last year. “Long Beach is not alone. Nearly every large commercial harbor worldwide now has state-of-the-art fireboats on duty, but the world’s largest US Naval Bases doesn’t own a single one.”

Our Admiralty keeps untold thousands of admin personnel burning countless hours processing North Korean levels of medal citations and inventing a new uniform every other POM cycle ... but ... I guess everyone must have priorities.

In the official report attached to Del Toro’s letter to Congress, the Navy states. “We assess that the lack of dedicated fire boats did not have an appreciable effect on the BHR incident or loss of this ship. And, in fact, waterborne firefighting capability, readily available on Navy tug boats, was brought to bear in this incident and has been formally accepted into Navy installation emergency response plans. The Navy does not intend to request or pursue dedicated fire boats at this time.”

As you may have guessed, John Konrad is about to drop a nuke;

The 600 words are not accurate. It contains blatant lies.

“And, in fact, waterborne firefighting capability,” says the report, “Readily available on Navy tug boats, was brought to bear in this incident.”

But Navy tugboats were neither readily available nor used in the BHR fire. Nothing was “brought to bear” in the critical early stage of the fire. Two hours into the incident, civilian captains aboard commercial tugboats owned by a private company, begged to help fight the fire but instead, the Navy brought in laughably small police boats with tiny water cannons built to fight small fires on recreational boats, not 844′ warships.

Read it all and figure out that when you need 50,000, SECNAV is happy to make you think 900 is adequate.

Either you are being lied to, or people are lying to the SECNAV.

As the Bonnie Dick is cut in to tiny pieces, place your bets.

Under the prior Democratic administration, we saw seabags full of personal and institutional capital - not to mention a lot of actual capital - expended on the farcical "Great Green Fleet."

As it is with all non-value added political vanity projects (remember "Lean-In Circles"), the Navy doesn't keep them across administrations because they are just foolish and wasteful in addition to being just domestic policy objectives and personal positioning on the Navy's dime. With the Biden Administration, the Gaia cult has returned and sadly the present SECNAV feels that he needs to make another run with the same talking points supporting a neo-pagan doomsday cult that has been warning of impending doom for decades that is always right over the horizon but never arrives.

This unserious hobby is the real "existential threat." It is a distraction in time, money, focus, and institutional credibility. We have very real threats over the horizon and in our desire to pay homage to the cult, we are in the process of empowering our enemies with our foolishness.

Let's look at the maritime challenges facing our nation; an inadequate industrial base; an almost extinct merchant marine; an inability to design and build effective and affordable warships on a regular basis; Africa and Asia facing famine and instability do the the inability to get grain out of the Black Sea at market prices; a Chinese navy's steady rise to primacy in the Pacific. We could go on, yet in the summer of 2022, what is our SECNAV expending time on?

The climate crisis is a threat we know well at the U.S. Department of the Navy: It impacts our mission, our people, our platforms and our installations. As secretary of the Navy, I have three enduring priorities: strengthen our maritime dominance, empower our people and strengthen our strategic partnerships. These priorities serve a driving purpose in my comprehensive strategy “Climate Action 2030,” which I signed earlier this year.

The approach builds on the department’s history of leadership and partnership on climate and energy. It commits us to ambitious action across the entire enterprise to combat what both President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin have identified as an “existential threat.” It is against this backdrop that I will visit the South Pacific and Oceania region this week.

As we sat fat, dumb, and distracted in DC, China island hopped through the Pacific making friends and bases in what was once our backyard. Were any of their gains made through climate change histrionics - even though China is the #1 producer of what Gaia's priests call "greenhouse gasses?"

No. Of course not. They are a serious nation with serious goals made by serious people with serious plan to secure them.

Us?

Additionally, the United States Naval Construction Battalions, better known as Seabees, are working with partners to adapt and build resilience throughout the region to buttress themselves against the climate crisis, helping to build renewable energy microgrids as well as shoreline and wetlands improvements. The Marine Corps, the nation’s crisis response force, trains all year to be prepared to respond to any disaster or threat anywhere around the world. 

This is all fine and well, but let us talk plainly with each other - even if Al Gore has always been right and speaks revealed truth through is chosen prophet John Kerry - will that counter the gains of China in any meaningful way?

No. No it won't. Just like the "Great Green Fleet" did nothing for the combat power of the US Navy and "Lean in Circles" did nothing to support women in the service, that isn't the goal. What is being done is using DON money, manpower, time, and reputation to provide fan service to domestic political constituencies for - in the end - civilian gain and profit.

Nothing else. 

If you care for the environment - as I do - then wouldn't you rather see this time and effort spent on ensuring when Sailors and Marines are deployed, their families have clean water, superfund sites on bases that are rapidly being cleaned up, base housing clear of mold and lead, health and child care best positioned to help those in need? Then, in those nations we help, help what they need; access to clean water, markets, waste management, and good governance. Much of that should come through the State Department, but ... well ... of course.

Nothing DON does will effect what the planet's ever changing climate does - but it can effect what the people in other nations think of us ... and what facilities we may or may not have access too when we need to sustain the fight west of Wake in the not-too-distant future.

Serious ideas and people are needed for a serious time.

So, the day after the election, what does the USCG really want its officers performance evaluated on?

Of course. Para 3 covers it.

R 041533 NOV 20

FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//CG-1//

TO ALCOAST

UNCLAS //N01000//

ALCOAST 399/20

COMDTNOTE 1000

SUBJ:  GUIDANCE FOR TARGETED MID-TERM COUNSELING FOR OFFICERS

A. Officer Accessions, Evaluations, and Promotions, COMDTINST M1000.3 (series)

B. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 041026 NOV 20/ACN 129/20

C. COMDT’s Guidance to Officer Boards and Panels

D. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 251640 JUN 20/ALCOAST 252/20

1. All reported on officers (ROOs) must receive mid-term counseling as

required by REF (A) and as updated by REF (B). This is the time to discuss

the ROO’s performance to date in the OER period, objectives to be achieved

for the remainder and the ROO’s broader career goals and best ways to achieve

those goals. In addition, rating chains must reference and reiterate the

appropriate section of the annual version of REF (C) in these discussions,

particularly for those officers who will be considered by a board or panel

in the current or next promotion year.

2. Upon promulgation, this ALCOAST applies to all OERs going forward. Mid-term

counseling already completed within the current promotion year does not need

to be redone.

3. In order to implement the Commandant’s vision of a fully inclusive Coast

Guard where all people are respected, empowered, and valued, and where every

single person can pursue and achieve personal growth and professional success,

mid-term counseling should also discuss intentional leadership topics including

diversity and inclusion (D&I). Suggested topics include influencing change,

leading inclusively and promoting inclusive behaviors as detailed in REF (D).

4. References:

   a. REF (C) can be found at: https://cg.portal.uscg.mil/units/psc/psc-opm/

OPM%20Reference%20Library/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

   b. REF (D) and other D&I information are located at:

https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/DIAP/.

5. POCs:

   a. For additional information regarding OER requirements, contact CG PSC-OPM-3

(ADPL officers) or CG PSC-RPM-1 (IDPL officers) or visit

http://cglink.uscg.mil/a74b65b8 for links to OPM-3 and RPM-1.

   b. For diversity and inclusion questions contact CGHQS-DG-lst-CG-127@uscg.mil.

6. RADM J. M. Nunan, Assistant Commandant for Human Resources, sends.

7. Internet release is authorized.

A reminder here, this is Donald Trump's USCG. He had over three and a half years to work towards an Executive Branch that does not divide its people by race, creed, color, or other equally useless description.

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UPDATE: Well, looks like the Navy is taking the opposite tac.

In place of FbF today - a rare occurrence - I offer to you the below, the best link I can find to the statement and press conference today. Worth your time and pondering.

I would ask this; watch thing not from an internal USA point of view, but from an external point of view. 

LIVE: @SECNAV & @USNavyCNO provide an update on the results of the @therealcvn71 command investigation https://t.co/s0GgPZkWYd

— Department of Defense 🇺🇸 (@DeptofDefense) June 19, 2020

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Nine months ago, in the bandwidth of this very same forum, I took the opportunity to render some unsolicited advice to the new Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Shortly thereafter, I had occasion to run into the CNO and he graciously thanked me for taking the time to do so. Just think—nine short months ago—the world was a different place. Arguments in naval circles centered around what kind of a fleet we would have, rather than its size. That argument appeared settled, and the Navy would grow.

Nine months later the Navy is in trouble. Two Secretaries of the Navy (one acting) have been asked to leave, and there is no Under Secretary. The secretariat has been tarred by examples of (depending on how one views them) incompetence, disloyalty, political influence, and dirty dealing. The tawdry case of a SEAL Chief Petty Officer receiving a Presidential pardon—and efforts behind the scenes to rig a “win-win” outcome--coupled with the more recent self-immolation of an Acting Secretary after making the justifiable decision to remove a Navy Captain from his command, have many asking “what is wrong with the Navy?” When one works back even further to the “Fat Leonard” scandal and the tragic collisions of 2017, the Navy appears at times to be on a public image losing streak.

Onto the scene steps a man who was until recently, the U.S. Ambassador to Norway, Kenneth Braithwaite. I have written previously about his nomination for the Navy Secretary position, urging that he be thoroughly vetted by the Senate Armed Services Committee before confirmation. If the recent confirmation hearing is any indication (he was one of three witnesses), Ambassador Braithwaite’s confirmation seems likely, given that he gave strong and intelligent answers to the questions he was asked. That none of the questions had much to do with American Seapower and conventional deterrence seems beside the point. Braithwaite handled himself well, and I expect he will be confirmed soon. And so, in order to be a full-service unsolicited advice provider, I offer the following to Ambassador Braithwaite.


Know, and Stick To, Your Area of Responsibility (AOR). As the Secretary, you have two armed services to lead, a beautiful jet at your disposal, and military sites under your purview around the globe. Wherever you go, Sailors and Marines will stand at attention for you, will spit-shine their spaces for you, and will stand quietly in ranks to listen to whatever it is you want to tell them. But the dirty little secret I urge you to internalize is this: they do not give a hoot about you. You are far too removed from their existence to be worth the trouble involved in preparing for your visit. That is not to say that you have no impact on their lives, quite the opposite. That impact, however, comes as a result of you deftly performing your duties in the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) circumscribed by the irregular polygon linking your office with the CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) offices, the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the third deck of the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and the White House. You have operational control of no one, but your authority is immense. It all flows from how you play the game in this AOR. Trips to the fleet at holidays are nice and getting out on the scene where there are important political problems to be understood and solved is also worthwhile. But most of the time, tend to your AOR.

Swallow Naval Integration Whole. Get up to speed on what the Commandant and the CNO are doing as quickly as possible and become an evangelist for it. Naval Integration is the most important conceptual thinking in the Department of the Navy since the mid-80’s, and it is going to need your weight behind it to move forward. Your background should provide insight into effective communicating, and this is something the Navy needs desperately. Never miss an opportunity to explain how important Integrated American Naval Power is. In order to do so, master the arguments.

Lead Like You Are at the End of a Second Term. You have one vitally important job between now and the next Presidential Inauguration. It is called “Program Objective Memorandum 2022 (POM 22)” and influencing it (through the lens of Naval Integration) should take up virtually all your bandwidth between now and then. What is left over should be devoted to overall leadership of the Department of the Navy COVID-19 response. If the voters return the President to office and you are retained in the second term, that will be the time to go after larger objectives. You spoke in your confirmation hearings of both leadership and cultural problems in the Navy that you will presumably tackle, and to the extent that a civilian secretary is capable of impacting these areas, considerable long-term commitment from you would be necessary. Pertaining to these two problems, I offer one final point:

Embrace Humility. Two men in the past year who underwent the same vetting process that produced you as an Ambassador and Secretary of the Navy designate, flamed out in disgrace in office. Both were intelligent, both had great plans, and both were patriotic Americans who wished to do good and well. The Department is a gigantic, unbelievably complex bureaucracy, and the two Armed Services within it are imbued with rich, historical traditions. You are to be the appointed caretaker (for the American people) of all of it, and the job demands humble prudence, unshakeable integrity, and relentless execution. When people say that there is a “leadership problem” in the Navy, ask them to explain what they mean, and more importantly, what would they do to “solve” these leadership problems. The deeper you drive this conversation, the more it turns to resource and requirements problems. You will hear from ardent advocates for reform in how we pick and how we educate leaders, but when you ask them to walk you through the logic that ties the problems they seek to solve with the means they identify to do so, the linkage begins to fray. In other words, there are no silver bullets here.


The immediate challenges facing the Department of the Navy—especially when pressurized by the impact of COVID related federal spending—are immense, and a Secretary who expertly navigates the next seven months could wind up being extraordinarily influential to the future of the Navy. I believe I speak for the community of navalists when I wish you the best in this undertaking.


Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of the FerryBridge Group where he provides consulting service to the Navy. The opinions he wields publicly are his own.

Rightfully, the month of April for navalists has been dominated by COVID-19's impact on the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), the Acting Navy Secretary, and the Navy as a whole. Time to roll up the work week with a reminder that there is a pre-existing nomination for SECNAV out there. 

To discuss the issue, we have a guest post by Bryan McGrath. Bryan, over to you.

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Late last year, the Secretary of the Navy resigned after crossing streams with the White House and the Secretary of Defense. Within hours, the President announced that he would be nominating a gentleman named Kenneth Braithwaite—then serving as the United States Ambassador to Norway—as the new Secretary of the Navy. In the meantime, Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly became Acting Secretary of the Navy. It is from this position that Modly last week fired the Commanding Officer of the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) and was then fired/asked to resign for his unfortunate remarks to the TR crew.

There are reports in the defense trade press of a desire on the part of the Secretary of Defense for the Senate Armed Services Committee to put Braithwaite to the “head of the line” so to speak, in order to ensure that there is a Senate-confirmed Secretary of the Navy to guide the service through its ongoing inability to get out of its own way. And although there are a number of dark corners in the Navy worth shining light on, it occurs to me that the presence of Senate-confirmed individuals atop the Navy civilian bureaucracy has not been as causal to these troubles as the judgment of the individuals occupying those offices. Which brings me to Ambassador Braithwaite.

Clearly, Ambassador Braithwaite is an accomplished man, rising to flag rank in the Naval Reserve in the Public Affairs career field, in addition to his successful civilian life. He may indeed turn out to be a solid choice to lead hundreds of thousands of people in the Department of the Navy, civilian and military, an organization with a budget of over $200B annually.

My wariness of the pick rests on two matters, both of which are worth due consideration in a deliberate process of vetting.

The first, is that what strikes me as having been Braithwaite’s primary qualification for the job of Secretary of the Navy is his close personal relationship with the Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper. I like being surrounded by my friends as much as anyone, but I am not running the Pentagon. And one of the problems with the Navy that I have identified elsewhere is that the Navy Secretariat (and the other service secretariats, I assume) has through the years declined in influence and effectiveness, with much of its authority diffused either downward into the uniformed service staffs it oversees (Navy, Marine Corps), or upward into the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Truth be told, both trends were aided and abetted by the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose former Chairman, Senator John McCain, seemed to have no love for the Secretariats.

Crucial to American Seapower is a reinvigorated Navy Secretariat that recognizes the unique role it plays in the nation’s security and prosperity. While there has been some forward progress in identifying renewed great power competition as the defining focus of national strategy, there has been little progress made in defining strategy suitable to that focus. It is my view that such a strategy would necessarily privilege Seapower, but that is debatable. What is NOT debatable is that a Secretary of the Navy would have a fundamental role in shaping such a strategy, and that doing so would almost certainly be a point of friction within the Department of Defense. Mr. Esper has already been dismissive of the Navy’s efforts to define its future architecture and placing an old friend in charge of the Navy is not a recipe for tough debate. Bureaucratically speaking, it is just the opposite. Which brings me to my second objection to moving forward quickly on this nomination.

Let’s assume for a second that Mr. Esper greatly desires his service secretaries to be independent power bases and thoroughly effective spokespersons for the capabilities resident in their services and the contributions those capabilities make to the National Defense Strategy. For this best-case scenario to be enabled, the Secretary of the Navy would have to thoroughly understand those capabilities, how they roll up into a coherent case for American Seapower, and how the strategic benefits of American Seapower decompose into desired capabilities. And while Ambassador Braithwaite has led an accomplished life, there is simply no evidence that he ever considered these matters closely before his name was put forward. I look forward to being disabused of this notion if there is an extant record, but my research does not reveal it. Graduating from the Naval Academy and then serving as a naval aviator for one’s junior officer tours—while common to Secretary Spencer, Secretary Modly, and now Ambassador Braithwaite—simply does not predispose one to think deeply about the things that a Secretary of the Navy deals with on a daily basis.

A final note. Flag Officer biographies are sometimes difficult to read, but as I look over Ambassador Braithwaite’s, it is difficult for me to discern where in the last 36 years since graduating from the Naval Academy he served in even one full-time Pentagon job. Is this a requirement for running an armed service? Not to my knowledge. But it strikes me as worth considering given the Byzantine world of process and culture that exists there.

I urge the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to exert their influence in this situation. They should re-evaluate their complicity in the decline of the service secretariats, and they should require of this and all presidential administrations a higher level of professional knowledge and experience in Senate-confirmed positions within the services. Furthermore, the SASC should use its “advise and consent” power to foster sufficient organizational tension within the Department of Defense to encourage strategic debate. Finally, the SASC should slow down and think deeply about this nomination, and why it is so important to some that it be hurried. Ensure that Ambassador Braithwaite is his own man, and that he can articulate a theory of American Seapower that advances this nation’s security and prosperity. The uniform leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps can take the tiller while you do your work in thoroughly vetting this nomination.


Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC. He currently consults for the Navy on matters of Surface Warfare force structure and operational concepts.

Beware of the Good Idea Fairy riding in to save you on the back of a unicorn.

How many times will we have to go through this cycle? 

Have we learned anything? I hope so. 

We have a new Fleet Structure Assessment on the way that is going to try to describe how we get to 355 by 2030.

This is great ... this is welcome ... but this is worrisome as I am hearing things that are giving me an eye twitch.

I think Meghan is trying to trigger me, but here we go;

“We haven’t done a really comprehensive force structure assessment in a couple of years; 2016 was the last one. So we started on a new path for that last fall, and what we’re finding in that force structure assessment is that the number of ships we need are going to be more than 355. And when you add in some of the unmanned vessels and things like that that we’re going through experimental phases on, it’s probably going to be significantly more than [355],” he said.

“There are certain ship classes that don’t even exist right now that we’re looking at that will be added into that mix, but the broad message is, it’s going to be a bigger fleet, it’s going to be a more distributed fleet, it’s going to be a more agile fleet. And we need to figure out what that path is and also understand our topline limitations, because no one wants a 355-plus fleet that’s hollow, that we can’t maintain. So we’re looking at balancing all those things.”

Wait ... we need to define "new" here. "New to the USN" or "new" as in PPT thick? I'm sorry, I'm not sure how we get anything in numbers by 2030 that can come from a fresh design;

Marine Corps and Navy officials at various conferences have suggested that the services are narrowing in on the Offshore Support Vessel as a model for what they want. Having several OSVs instead of one dock landing ship (LSD), for example, might be able to carry the same number of Marines but distribute them across the littorals instead of concentrating them on one hull – which defensively makes them harder to target and offensively allows them to be more agile under the Distributed Maritime Operations and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations concepts.

This has promise. There are some solid designs already out there.

If you are looking for numbers fast that have limitations, but are built here and have bite, we can look at the Ambassador MK III, I guess.

We are a a decade-and-a-half away from my call for PLAN SALAMANDER to license build an already building ship until we can get our act together for a domestically designed platform - but that is the only way to get there.

Tons of FREMM? I assume we will find out sooner more than later what magical class of ships this is going to be, but it can't be a clean sheet design. It can't be fully of "cutting edge" technology that as of the second month of 2020 is only PPT thick....can it?

No, really - it can't be. We've seen this movie before.

Like April 2012?

...where do we find ourselves with LCS. They are coming to the Fleet - in mass. More show up every few months. No mission modules. No actual proof of concept. Still slathered with technology risk and some things we do know; only 4-months deployable in an 8-11 month new normal .......... all disjointed and still not getting me closer to where I want to be - I want to be proven wrong, but so far I am only being proved right with each passing fiscal quarter. Each fiscal quarter I also see those who careers, reputations and ego are wrapped up in LCS act like the below when they have to explain away hard facts - and rely on hope.

We are a few years past the point of stopping all the damage LCS will cause in opportunity cost ... but not too late to mitigate its full impact. We won't be able to stop at 24, but not too late for 36. If we get all 55, it will be too late. We will have paid Bentley prices for a Yugo.

Heck ... Jan 2010 when we were looking at the NNFM and Reforming the Confederate Navy?

- Build DDGs at a limited rate, sufficient to keep one shipbuilder’s line open, and to keep technology current, but with the intent of reducing the Aegis force to 30 warships within 25 years. The steady state force of 30 ships costs $60B, so the SCN per year for a 30-year combat life is $2.0B.
- Introduce several affordable frigate designs of 2,500 to 3,000 tons and about 25 knots, with the goal of creating a force of 90 ships at a unit cost of $400M. Essential features are at least eight upgraded TASMs (tactical Antiship Missiles), strong close-in defense, and a modern ASW suite. The ships will emphasize sea strikes and ASW. Each must carry a helicopter or pair of UAVs.
- Design and build simple corvettes carrying about 50 land-attack missiles—upgraded TLAMs as it were. They are not fast, but 25 knots is desirable. They operate in silence, with any radiating platform being in the air or scores of miles away. Because of their simplicity and American shipbuilder design experience with stealth properties, the first design will probably be very much like the final one.

Merely for completeness we include here a component of 20 auxiliaries. The numbers and costs are unchanged from the 313-ship Navy plan.

Good googly moogly we have lost a decade spinning our wheels.

I will keep an open mind here - but there are firm constraints and restraints to get to 355 by 2030 ... with new platforms.

Besides getting tripped up at the end, I think on average of the last couple of decades, Spencer did a fine job … but … either stayed too long or was missing a skill set to roll with the zeitgeist.

I maintain that the Navy could do well to have a SECNAV with a political background. It is a very political job, and that is a skill set that is hard to pick up on the fly. Who would I nominate? Not my job – and in any event – I would prefer all the navalists on The Hill stay in their jobs for now. We will need all that expertise in place for as long as we need to get through what the 2020s will feed us.

Perhaps there are some solid folks who were term-limited out from state level positions that might work. Whoever it is – there are a lot of issues that need attention and focus.

Our friend David Larter has a great summary of just a few:

...the firing of the secretary of the Navy means another leadership implosion in an organization that has seen a near-constant stream of them.

In the past four years, scandals, disasters and shoddy performance have cut short the careers of a confirmed chief of naval operations, the Pacific Fleet commander, the head of surface forces, the former head of 5th Fleet, the former head of 7th Fleet, two high-profile task force commanders and a destroyer squadron commander.
…
And that’s on top of the nearly dozen admirals and captains who were reprimanded in the wake of 2013’s revelations about Leonard “Fat Leonard” Francis,
…
The parade of scandals and mishaps, including two collisions with commercial tankers that claimed the lives of 17 sailors, raise deep cultural questions about the service on all fronts.
…
Spencer in August ordered a complete review of the judge advocate general community, and top Navy SEAL Rear Adm. Collin Green has overseen a crackdown on SEAL behavior through a return-to-discipline approach. But some observers say the Navy needs focus more on fixing its culture.

Head on over and read it all. The Two Bryans, Bryan Clark and Bryan McGrath, are seeing the elephant from different sides.

Here is one thing I do know; we need a good SECNAV and we need one now.

No one full of foolish, pie in the sky theories they want to practice. No one who thinks they are smarter than the last few dozen SECNAV’s.

We need one who knows how to identify top problems, and will address them. Will know what are non-value-added accretions from previous administrations that are holding on – and scrapes them off. Will know what a bloated, self-serving bureaucracy looks like, and cuts it. Knows who gets it, and who doesn’t – and fires them.

Someone who has a thick skin, secure ego; is not interested in the post-SECNAV payoff; has a dog and has no need for new friends; … and rents, not buys, in DC.

What a way to start the week.

News broke halfway through yesterday's Midrats with Bryan McGrath that now former-SECNAV Spencer was fired.

Many of us have spent the last 12-hrs or so trying to figure out why. Well, time will reveal all. In times like this, it is time to quote a great American.


I'm going to let you hash it out in comments, but here are statements from SECDEF's spokesman, Richard Spencer, and President Trump in the order they came out.

Everyone over to the white-board and diagram these out, I'm going to get another cup of coffee.

First, spokesman for SECDEF Esper, Jonathan Hoffman:


Former SECNAV Spencer:


President Trump (tweet, of course):

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UPDATE: Well, as reported by Carl Prine;

What none of the parties knew was that minutes before the Pentagon announced Esper’s decision, Gallagher told his attorney, Timothy Parlatore, that he had decided to voluntarily relinquish his trident for the good of the SEALs, the president and the country, believing that he unwittingly had become a lightning rod for criticism and partisan division.

Back in May, in a rare set up for a smooth transition in an administration characterized by “acting” officials, gapped billets, backlogged confirmations, and general staffing disarray, Admiral Moran was confirmed by the Senate to be the next CNO once Admiral Richardson’s term ended.

And then last night, news broke that he is resigning after 38-years of service.

That is the “what” but not the “so what.” Here’s the “so what.”

What happened has laid bare a deep, structural rot in our Navy that I am not sure … no, I am sure … cannot and will not be fixed with the present civilian leadership we have. As a matter of fact, they are encouraging the rot they were – as part of the present administration’s charter – sent to repair.

Let’s dive in and review the wave tops. I’ve gone through a few drafts over the last 12-hrs after some raging over on twitter, but have waited for more information to come out this AM. The core issues remain the same, so let’s run with them.

First, ignore the conjecture. Ignore the conspiracies (though there is a non-zero chance of all too normal undermining at the 4-star level). Ignore the usual suspects who are pounding on the same little tin-drum agenda they always pound on. This is very simple.

What has happened is another scalp has been handed by those who hold power to the unaccountable Star Chamber and their unsurvivable witch hunts. We have at the highest levels, non-resilient power with clay feet where titanium moral courage is needed.

The signal it sends to our Navy is cancerous and destructive to the very foundations of our service culture – or what is left of it.

Let’s go to the facts with the following assumption; words mean things. Another assumption; SECNAV Spencer and Admiral Moran are saying exactly what happened. If not, there are larger issues. I will give them the benefit of the doubt as on whole they are both good and honorable men.

First, as reported by Sam LaGrone, SECNAV Spencer;

Adm. Bill Moran recently brought to my attention that over the past two years he maintained a professional relationship with an individual who was held accountable and counseled for failing to meet the values and standards of the Naval profession. While I admire his faithful service and commitment to the Navy, this decision on his part to maintain that relationship has caused me to call his judgment into question. Therefore, today I accepted Adm. Moran’s request to retire.

The current Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. John Richardson, will remain the CNO. I will make my recommendation for a new CNO candidate to the Acting Secretary of Defense.

I have a strong vision for the Department of the Navy — one that includes trust among Sailors, Marines, and Civilians and an urgent resolve by all to live up to the nation’s high standards for our Navy and Marine Corps. Department leadership must reflect that vision, and there must be no doubt we are wholly committed to ensuring a culture and work environment where every person is treated with dignity and respect and free from hostile behavior of any kind.

Adm. Bill Moran has served this country honorably for decades. I am grateful for the years of dedicated service by him and his family.

Now Admiral Moran:

I informed the Secretary of the Navy today that I have decided to decline my appointment as the next Chief of Naval Operations. He has expressed his support.

I made this difficult decision based on an open investigation into the nature of some of my personal email correspondence over the past couple of years and for continuing to maintain a professional relationship with a former staff officer, now retired, who had while in uniform been investigated and held accountable over allegations of inappropriate behavior.

To be clear, my decision to maintain this relationship was in no way an endorsement or tacit approval of this kind of conduct. I understand how toxic it can be to any team when inappropriate behavior goes unrecognized and unchecked. Every Sailor is entitled to serve in an environment free of harassment or intimidation.

As painful as it is to submit my request to retire, I will not be an impediment whatsoever to the important service that you and your families continue to render the nation every day.

I believe in the institution. And I believe I am doing right by it.

Serving in the United States Navy has been a high honor and privilege. For over 38 years, I have drawn so much satisfaction from that service and nothing has made me more proud than to have been a United States Sailor.

I thank President Trump and Secretary Spencer for the opportunity they gave me, and I deeply regret any inconvenience my decision causes them.

So, the core issue here goes back to Chris Servello. If you don’t know the background of the “Naughty Santa” kerfuffle, I’ll let you google it. No CM, not even NJP, just another IG Star Chamber exercise of professional destruction.

This is now the go-nogo point for CNO? Really?

What did Moran do? He worked with a subordinate on and off for over a decade. They had a mentor/mentoree relationship as our Navy has encouraged people to do for decades. As with all long term mentoring relationships, you get to be at least close acquaintances, if not friends. That is how normal humans work.

Mentoring relationships can only properly function if there is a high degree of trust and a feeling of two-way loyalty. Again, this is how normal, healthy relationships work. Part of being a mentor is being there to provide advice and counsel through the good times and the bad. To work through rough patches and plan for a successful path through milestones and obstacles that life will always put in your personal and professional life.

You also need steadfastness. Steadfastness should come naturally to normal, healthy relationships, but it can be difficult for some as life brings enough challenges on its own – to bring the problems of those you mentor just adds to the load you are carrying. It takes men and women of character, and dare I say virtue, to be steadfast with those they mentor when they run in to tough times.

On the other side, there is a not well hidden sickness in our Navy that may be worse than in the general population due to how close you can get to people in the pressure cooker 24/7/365 that is the military; abandonment.

You will never find out faster the character of those you call acquaintances and friends than when you find yourself in any kind of scandal. At the first gust of crisis, the thin, hollow, and poorly anchored are the first to disappear. As the gale increases, more and more break away until sometimes you are alone. Being alone as the world around you swirls out of control is a nightmarish place. If you are the cause of the chaos, it is easy to fall in to self-pity at best, life-threatening depression at worse.

If when you are at your lowest, there are those who are standing there ready to help you recover, then you are a blessed person. They will be the supports that help you and those who count on you to recover and move on. They are the ones that have demonstrated character and are an example of the best personal loyalty has to offer.
By standing with you to help, they do not necessarily ignore or condone what you may have done – what they do is recognize your humanity and the fact that, like them, you are an imperfect being in a fallen world.

They know no one is perfect and life is short. What matters most is what we do for those who need us – especially those who feel they can rely on us in times of trouble.

To abandon those who you led to think could rely on you is a deeply unethical, immoral, and sociopathic act. It goes beyond seeing people as just objects to be used, it places “you” at the center of the universe and your personal comfort and ambition at the center of all you do.

Is that what we want to reward as a Navy? Is that what we want to promote in our leaders? If so, then if the present justifications stand, that is exactly what we are doing.

All Moran did here was to keep in touch with a mentoree who had a very human moment of weakness around the wrong people at the wrong time. That empathy and, yes, loyalty, is what we want in our leaders. If not, we will quickly distill nothing but a leadership that is a carnival of grotesques thoroughly populated with sociopaths, high-functioning autists, and the slippery, calculating types whose drive to power will be littered with destroyed careers, cratering retention, and an abundance of leaks when advantageous to themselves or the agendas they approve of.

For officers of character like Moran, what does it signal? I think Moran tells us; leave. This is an organization that does not desire men and women of character who see their Sailors as people, not objects; who see people has imperfect being of value, not useful block in building temples to their own ambition; who see service to nation as a driver, not using the nation to serve their rapacious egos and feed deep insecurities.

At this moment in time, what has our Navy lost? We have lost one of the most anticipated leaders rising to CNO I have seen in my adult life.

Moran was the right man at the right time for CNO. Full stop.

As we go in to the Terrible 20s where budgetary knowledge will by key in getting the most of every dime after two lost decades of acquisition malpractice, the Flag Officer who knows the budget process better than any is gone. A 38-years investment in leadership development, gone. A good man who cares about Sailors and the long term health of our Navy, gone.

Worse, a message to our fleet is clear and bright; we want sociopaths. Mentoring is only transactional.

We have punished virtue and will reap a bitter harvest.

Lastly, I have to say the advice I took myself and told anyone who would listen after Tailhook holds true.
1. Never live on base.
2. There is no such thing as a Navy social event, they are work events.
3. Never have more than 1-drink per hour at a Navy social event. Better yet, only have one drink, none if you can.
4. Show up on time and leave early.
5. When deployed, be exceptionally careful who is on your liberty crew. The smaller the better, and if possible, if you are a male do not include a female who has a DOD ID. If you have a female on your liberty crew, see #2-4 above and perform a filtering iteration of this bullet. Spin off a single sex sub-group NLT 2100 or two drinks, whichever comes first.

As for mentoring? Do the right thing, and if things go sideways - let others publish and be damned.

Who knows, perhaps you will work for someone who is willing to look the harpy commissariat in the face and tell them to pack sand. Perhaps when it is your time in the barrel, you will have the support by your superiors that you would give to your subordinates. It is a gamble, but one at the end of the day you can look yourself in the mirror and be content with.

I am willing to make this bet; Admiral Moran will have no problem looking himself in the mirror in the AM. He did the right thing. Chris should not feel bad, he’s gone through enough and this isn’t on him in the slightest.

There are a lot of people who should be haunted by shame, and if they are not, then those who know them need to be aware of the type of person they are working with and act accordingly.

What a waste. What a huge loss for our Navy. What a huge loss for our nation.

Pray for peace, as I don’t see this type of institutional character having what is needed for war.

A few days before Christmas, SECNAV Spencer visited Marines and Sailors at TFSW in Afghanistan.

When you see it ... nuff said ... . 


Hat tip SP.

With apologies to The Bard;

Friends, Navalists, members of the Front Porch, give me your attention. I have come here to bury the 350 Ship Navy, not to plan for it. The evil that men do is remembered after the POM, but the good is often buried with the sequestor. It might as well be the same with NDAA. The noble SECNAV told you that a substantially larger Navy was ambitious. If that’s true, it’s a serious fault, and our Navy has paid seriously for it. With the permission of SECNAV and the others — for SECNAV is an honorable man; they are all honorable men — I have come here to speak at the 350 Ship Navy's funeral. She was my friend, she was faithful and just to me. But SECNAV says she was ambitious, and SECNAV is an honorable man. She brought many captives home to the E-ring whose HASC testimony brought wealth to the city.

There will be no reconditioned OHP's. 

There will be no license-built EuroFrigate.

If we are lucky we will get better focus on proper manning, training and equipping our Navy. Maybe all our DDG will get some OTH ASUW capability. That is about it. I have not totally given up hope that we may restructure the malformation of our Surface force, but that is looking to be losing headway as well. The revolution seems to have culminated at the first whiff of grapeshot at the first barricade.

The Swamp around the Potomac Flotilla has won.

Sometimes it is best to just be silent in mourning. After reading the latest from SECNAV Spencer, sadly I think this may one of those times.

Before we get there, we must Salamander a wee bit. 

Really, this should not be unexpected. One would have thought that if we had a realistic chance at growing to 350 ships or more, that once his mandatory SAPR training was complete, our new SECNAV and he band of merry men and women would be visiting every port and shire to get the word out so our politicians could feel the swelling support ... but no. You have not seen it. I have not seen it. Reports from the field from the last month or so have been sprinkled with meh leavened with some pumpkin spice feh.

As I am sure that the primary players have already seen a draft of the soon to be revealed strategy, you can assume that no one who would expect to retain credibility and self-respect would get too far over their skis - or better yet - regardless of their personal feelings, would start to set expectations around them in alignment with what will soon be behind door #3.

That is why, I believe, when you read from the link above, you get an extra helping from the output of the "Random SECNAV Speech Generator."

Rest assured, the Department of the Navy is dedicated to restoring readiness and increasing the capacity and capability of the fleet to meet the nation’s security needs. We are beginning to witness improvements in these three areas, and we expect to see the rate of improvement increase in the near future. We are committed to doing so in a way that works hand-in-hand with our partners in Congress and industry so we may deliver superior national defense at a value to the American taxpayers.
...
This administration is dedicated to rebuilding American military might and ensuring stability and certainty as we address global security demands. The future is challenging but bright as we lean forward to engage with our legislative and industry partners to guarantee that the Navy and Marine Corps team remains the world’s most ready and lethal forward-deployed fighting force.
...
The money we do have must be invested as efficiently as possible, which means we must attain greater budgetary certainty in order to fund our strategy. Having a clear line of sight to the necessary resources for growth will allow our partners in industry to invest for the future, which will in turn lower overall costs.
...
All of us in the national security enterprise ― the Pentagon, Congress and industry ― share the goal of supporting our current and future sailors and Marines so that they can be successful at conducting their missions.

There is one pull quote that I find of utility;

We will do this by streamlining our acquisition process and working with our congressional partners to secure steady funding commitments, which will encourage innovation, better manage risk and drive efficiencies.

Yes, yes, yes ... we all know that our acquisition process needs to go in to drydock to get all the accretions accumulated over the last few decades scrapped off, the hull reconditioned and painted ... but ...

When is it starting?
Who is doing it?
When will it be completed?

It is almost 2018 people.

If that is all we can do, then fine. That is actually an extremely valuable long term thing to do. Have it done properly and perhaps at some point we can design, commission, and deploy new warships that can actually fight a war. 

You know our track record this century; something besides the DDG-1000 white elephant we are trying to do anything with, or LCS that almost a decade after commissioning Hull-1, still is of no use in any front line wartime contingency. 

As we finish picking the last of the lint out of our belly button, the Chinese are in serial production of their Type-55 don't-call-it-a-destroyer-it-is-larger-than-a-TICO, the Russians have corvettes with more combat capabilities in all warfare areas than our larger, more expensive LCS. Nations with less than 2% of our population (DNK & NOR) are producing more modern and effective warships under 8,000 tons than we are.

So, if we can't get more money - then let's do the hard work of getting an acquisition process that supports the military, as opposed to having a military that supports the acquisition process.

Give the job to McGrath and Eaglen. They'll have it done ready for signature by the mid point of Q4FY18.

Oh, and about the critique of growing cynicism;

"Cynicism is the smoke that rises from the ashes of burned out dreams."

I'll take the Llama.