CN108966223B - Physical layer authentication method and system based on single-bit covert protocol - Google Patents

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to a physical layer authentication method based on a single-bit concealment protocol, which is a concealment analysis method for physical layer authentication of a wireless communication system including a transmitter and a receiver. The protocol transmits the marker signal to the wireless channel, and the marker signal includes the authentication signal and the information signal. In the single-bit concealment protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is kept fixed and is an optimized value in the interval time period; the receiver receives the marker signal, Based on the single-bit concealment protocol, the marked signal is processed to obtain the probability of confidential authentication; based on the signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the received information signal, the transmission probability of authentication request and the probability of rejection of concealed authentication are obtained; and based on the probability of confidential authentication, transmission probability of authentication request, The concealment authentication rejection probability calculates the secret authentication efficiency to determine the concealment level of the physical layer authentication.

Description

Physical layer authentication method and system based on single-bit concealment protocol

technical field

The present disclosure relates to the technical field of wireless communication, and in particular, to a physical layer authentication method and system based on a single-bit concealment protocol.

Background technique

With the rapid proliferation of wireless devices, the need for transmitter authentication has grown dramatically, and physical layer authentication has two main advantages over traditional authentication techniques based on upper-layer cryptographic tools: First, physical layer authentication allows illegitimate recipients to It performs noise observation to protect the label, which is relatively safe from an information-theoretic point of view. Second, physical layer authentication enables legitimate receivers to quickly distinguish between legitimate and illegal transmission segments without completing higher-layer processing. The authentication scheme of physical layer design can usually be divided into two categories: passive form and active form.

This paper focuses on the active method, which embeds the authentication signal in the message signal at the transmitting end, and then extracts the authentication signal at the receiving section. Common existing technologies are: (1) The authentication signal is attached to the data using the time division multiplexing method, but this requires additional transmission time, and it is easy to expose the authentication signal to an illegal receiver, because the authentication signal has the same Signal same signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); (2) For OFDM systems, loop stationary signatures are generated by repeating certain message symbols on subcarriers according to the authentication signal, which wastes message throughput; (3) Frequency offset Modification according to the authentication signal, however, the rate of the authentication signal transmitted per second is relatively low; (4) For precoded duobinary signaling systems, some initial bits are modified according to the authentication signal, this scheme makes unknown received segments Recovering the message signal is challenging and violates the requirement of stealth.

Currently the most widely used authentication technology is the authentication overlay (Auth-SUP) technology, which can provide and analyze experimental results through a software-defined radio platform. Through analysis, the authentication overlay technology can overcome the shortcomings of the above four existing technologies to a certain extent, and meet the requirements of effective authentication technology.

However, effective physical layer authentication techniques usually need to consider security, robustness and concealment simultaneously. Specifically, security usually means that an illegal receiver cannot easily destroy identity authentication through various attacks (including jamming attacks, replay attacks and impersonation attacks); robustness usually means that there are transmissions in a random fading environment, authentication The scheme is resistant to channel fading and noise effects; concealment usually means that the receiving section cannot detect that the authentication signal is abnormal without knowing the authentication scheme. Although the existing technologies have proposed a general physical layer authentication framework to comprehensively evaluate security and robustness, in terms of stealth, due to its diversity and complexity, the existing technologies lack quantitative analysis of the stealth level, There is still a lot of room for improvement.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present disclosure is proposed in view of the above situation, and its purpose is to provide a single-bit stealth protocol-based physical layer authentication method and system that can better evaluate request delay and stealth performance.

To this end, a first aspect of the present disclosure provides a physical layer authentication method based on a single-bit concealment protocol, which is a physical layer authentication method of a wireless communication system including a transmitter and a receiver, and is characterized by comprising: the transmitter The terminal transmits a marker signal to the wireless channel based on a single-bit stealth protocol, the marker signal includes an authentication signal and an information signal. In the single-bit stealth protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is kept in the interval time period. is fixed and is an optimized value; the receiver receives the marker signal, processes the marker signal based on the single-bit concealment protocol, and obtains a secret authentication probability; based on the received signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the information signal Obtaining the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability; and calculating the confidential authentication efficiency based on the confidential authentication probability, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability to determine the concealment level of the physical layer authentication.

In the present disclosure, the transmitting end transmits a marker signal based on a single-bit stealth protocol, and the receiving end receives the marker signal, and obtains a confidentiality authentication efficiency (SAE) through processing based on the single-bit stealth protocol. Wherein, the single-bit concealment protocol stipulates that the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the marker signal remains fixed and is an optimized value within the interval time period. In this case, the stealth level can be better assessed based on the single-bit stealth protocol and the metric used for physical layer authentication, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE).

令P_ACR＝0，其中，R_b表示常规信号速率。由此，能够分析隐蔽物理层认证的限制的可行性。In the physical layer authentication method involved in the first aspect of the present disclosure, in the single-bit concealment protocol, the receiving end feeds back single-bit information of a signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting end, and sets

Let P _ACR = 0, where R _b represents the normal signal rate. Thereby, it is possible to analyze the feasibility of concealing the limitation of physical layer authentication.

其中，

ε_ART是认证请求传输概率的下限，γ_b表示平均信噪比，R_b表示常规信号速率。在这种情况下，能够优化单比特隐蔽性协议。In the physical layer authentication method involved in the first aspect of the present disclosure, based on P _ACR =0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of the information signal is calculated by the following formula (I):

in,

ε _ART is the lower bound of the transmission probability of the authentication request, γ _b is the average signal-to-noise ratio, and R _b is the normal signal rate. In this case, the single-bit stealth protocol can be optimized.

In the physical layer authentication method involved in the first aspect of the present disclosure, the channel assumption condition is that the channel state information of the receiving end has single-bit feedback. In this case, the stealth performance can be better evaluated based on the single-bit stealth protocol.

In the physical layer authentication method involved in the first aspect of the present disclosure, the secret authentication efficiency is calculated by the following formula (II): η=P _ART (1-P _ACR )P _SA (II), where P _ART represents The authentication request transmission probability, P _ACR represents the concealed authentication rejection probability, and _PSA represents the confidential authentication probability. Thereby, the concealment level of the physical layer authentication can be determined.

其中，

表示所述信息信号的能量分配因子，

表示所述认证信号的能量分配因子，所述标记信号分块发送，γ_b,i表示第i块标记信号在所述接收端的信道信噪比，h_b,i表示第i块标记信号的信道增益，

表示所述接收端的噪声方差。由此，能够得到隐蔽认证拒绝概率，进而判断物理层认证的隐蔽等级。本公开的第二方面提供了一种基于单比特隐蔽性协议的物理层认证设备，其特征在于，包括：处理器，其执行所述存储器存储的计算机程序以实现上述任一项所述的物理层认证方法；以及存储器。In the physical layer authentication method involved in the first aspect of the present disclosure, the signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio of the information signal is calculated by the following formula (III):

in,

represents the energy distribution factor of the information signal,

represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the marker signal is sent in blocks, γ _b,i represents the channel signal-to-noise ratio of the ith block of marker signals at the receiving end, h _b,i represents the channel of the ith block of marker signals gain,

represents the noise variance of the receiver. Thereby, the concealment authentication rejection probability can be obtained, and the concealment level of the physical layer authentication can be determined. A second aspect of the present disclosure provides a physical layer authentication device based on a single-bit stealth protocol, which is characterized by comprising: a processor that executes a computer program stored in the memory to implement the physical layer described in any of the above a layer authentication method; and a memory.

A third aspect of the present disclosure provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, and when the at least one instruction is executed by a processor, implements any one of the above physical layer authentication method.

A fourth aspect of the present disclosure provides a physical layer authentication system based on a single-bit concealment protocol, characterized by comprising: a transmitting device, the transmitting device transmits a marking signal to a wireless channel based on a single-bit concealment protocol, the The marking signal includes an authentication signal and an information signal, and in the single-bit concealment protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is kept fixed and is an optimized value in the interval time period; the receiving device includes: a processing module, which Receive the marked signal, process the marked signal based on the single-bit concealment protocol, and obtain a secret authentication probability; a calculation module, which obtains the authentication request transmission probability and a concealment authentication rejection probability; and a determination module, which calculates a confidential authentication efficiency according to the confidential authentication probability, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability to determine the concealment level of the physical layer authentication.

In the present disclosure, the transmitting device transmits a marker signal based on a single-bit stealth protocol, and the receiving device receives the marker signal, and obtains a Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) through processing based on the single-bit stealth protocol. Wherein, the single-bit concealment protocol stipulates that the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the marker signal remains fixed and is an optimized value within the interval time period. In this case, the stealth level can be better assessed based on the single-bit stealth protocol and the metric used for physical layer authentication, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE).

令P_ACR＝0，其中，R_b表示常规信号速率。由此，能够分析隐蔽物理层认证的限制的可行性。In the physical layer authentication system involved in the fourth aspect of the present disclosure, in the single-bit concealment protocol, the receiving end feeds back a signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting end, and sets

Let P _ACR = 0, where R _b represents the normal signal rate. Thereby, it is possible to analyze the feasibility of concealing the limitation of physical layer authentication.

其中，

ε_ART是认证请求传输概率的下限，γ_b表示平均信噪比，R_b表示常规信号速率。在这种情况下，能够优化单比特隐蔽性协议。In the physical layer authentication system involved in the fourth aspect of the present disclosure, based on P _ACR =0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of the information signal is calculated by the following formula (I):

in,

ε _ART is the lower bound of the transmission probability of the authentication request, γ _b is the average signal-to-noise ratio, and R _b is the normal signal rate. In this case, the single-bit stealth protocol can be optimized.

In the physical layer authentication system involved in the fourth aspect of the present disclosure, the channel assumption condition is that the channel state information of the receiving device has single-bit feedback. In this case, the stealth performance can be better evaluated based on the single-bit stealth protocol.

In the physical layer authentication system involved in the fourth aspect of the present disclosure, in the determination module, the privacy authentication efficiency is calculated by the following formula (II): η=P _ART (1-P _ACR )P _SA (II ), where _PART represents the authentication request transmission probability, P _ACR represents the concealed authentication rejection probability, and _PSA represents the secret authentication probability. Thereby, the concealment level of the physical layer authentication can be determined.

其中，

表示所述信息信号的能量分配因子，

表示所述认证信号的能量分配因子，所述标记信号分块发送，γ_b,i表示第i块标记信号在所述接收装置的信道信噪比，h_b,i表示第i块标记信号的信道增益，

表示所述接收装置的噪声方差。由此，能够得到隐蔽认证拒绝概率，进而判断物理层认证的隐蔽等级。与现有技术相比，本公开的示例具备以下有益效果：In the physical layer authentication system involved in the fourth aspect of the present disclosure, in the calculation module, the signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio of the information signal is calculated by the following formula (III):

in,

represents the energy distribution factor of the information signal,

Represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the marker signal is sent in blocks, γ _b,i represents the channel signal-to-noise ratio of the i-th marker signal at the receiving device, h _b,i represents the i-th block marker signal channel gain,

represents the noise variance of the receiving device. Thereby, the concealment authentication rejection probability can be obtained, and the concealment level of the physical layer authentication can be determined. Compared with the prior art, the examples of the present disclosure have the following beneficial effects:

In the existing technology, due to the diversity and complexity of the system, there is a lack of quantitative analysis of the concealment level. Therefore, the present disclosure designs a single-bit concealment protocol and proposes a new method for physical layer authentication. The metric—Secret Authentication Efficiency (SAE), can better evaluate the stealth performance of physical layer authentication.

Description of drawings

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of signal authentication illustrating a physical layer authentication method involved in an example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart illustrating a physical layer authentication method involved in an example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram illustrating a signal transmitted by a transmitter of a physical layer authentication method involved in an example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 4 is a schematic waveform diagram illustrating the efficiency of the receiving-end secret authentication of the physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram showing a waveform of the secret authentication efficiency of the illegal receiving end of the physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a physical layer authentication system involved in an example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating a signal processing module of a receiving apparatus of a physical layer authentication system according to an example of the present disclosure.

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a physical layer authentication device involved in an example of the present disclosure.

Detailed ways

Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, the same reference numerals are assigned to the same components, and overlapping descriptions are omitted. In addition, the drawings are only schematic diagrams, and the ratios of the dimensions of the members, the shapes of the members, and the like may be different from the actual ones.

It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", "third" and "fourth" in the description and claims of the present disclosure and the above drawings are used to distinguish different objects, rather than used to describe a specific order. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but optionally also includes unlisted steps or units, or optionally also includes For other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

In addition, the subheadings and the like mentioned in the following description of the present disclosure are not intended to limit the content or scope of the present disclosure, but only serve as a reminder for reading. Such subheadings can neither be understood to be used to divide the content of the article, nor should the content under the subheadings be limited to the scope of the subheadings.

The present disclosure provides a physical layer authentication method, device and system based on a single-bit stealth protocol. In the present disclosure, the request delay and concealment performance of physical layer authentication can be more accurately evaluated. The present disclosure will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a signal model illustrating a physical layer authentication method involved in an example of the present disclosure.

As shown in FIG. 1 , the physical layer authentication method, device and system based on the single-bit concealment protocol may be the physical layer authentication method, device and system of a wireless communication system having a transmitter and a receiver. The receiving end may include a legal receiving end and an illegal receiving end.

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 1, a transmitter is used to transmit a signal to a wireless channel. The transmitter is usually the legitimate sender. The transmitting end may also include illegal senders. The transmitter mentioned below refers to the legitimate sender. The receiver receives the signal transmitted by the transmitter. Since the receiving end can include a legal receiving end and an illegal receiving end, the signal transmitted by the transmitting end can be received by both the legal receiving end and the illegal receiving end.

In some examples, the receiver may be a test receiver. The test receiving end usually refers to the receiving end used to detect the transmitted signal of the transmitting end. For example, the test receiving end may be a test device used to detect the signal transmitted by the transmitting end under the scenario of simulating a wireless channel in daily life. Wherein, the test receiving end may include a legal receiving end and an illegal receiving end.

In some examples, there may be two or more transmitters and two or more receivers. Specifically, there may be two or more legitimate receivers, and illegal receivers may be respectively two or more.

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 1 , when an illegal receiver exists, the transmitter sends an authentication request, and the legitimate receiver feeds back a signal-to-noise ratio threshold to the transmitter.

In some examples, the above-mentioned transmitting end in the signal model of FIG. 1 may include a base station or a user equipment. A base station (eg, an access point) may refer to a device in an access network that communicates with wireless terminals over the air interface through one or more sectors. The base station may be used to convert received air frames to and from IP packets, acting as a router between the wireless terminal and the rest of the access network, which may include an Internet Protocol (IP) network. The base station may also coordinate attribute management of the air interface. For example, the base station may be a base station (BTS, Base TransceiverStation) in GSM or CDMA, a base station (NodeB) in WCDMA, or an evolved base station (NodeB or eNB or e-NodeB, evolutional Node B) in LTE ).

In some examples, the user equipment may include, but is not limited to, a smartphone, a notebook computer, a personal computer (PC), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile internet device (MID), a wearable Equipment (such as smart watches, smart bracelets, smart glasses) and other electronic equipment, where the operating system of the user equipment may include but not limited to Android operating system, IOS operating system, Symbian (Symbian) operating system, BlackBerry (Blackberry) operating system, Windows Phone8 operating system, etc.

In some examples, the receiving end may include a base station. A base station (eg, an access point) may refer to a device in an access network that communicates with wireless terminals over the air interface through one or more sectors. The base station may be used to convert received air frames to and from IP packets, acting as a router between the wireless terminal and the rest of the access network, which may include an Internet Protocol (IP) network. The base station may also coordinate attribute management of the air interface. For example, the base station may be a base station (BTS, Base Transceiver Station) in GSM or CDMA, a base station (NodeB) in WCDMA, or an evolved base station (NodeB or eNB or e-NodeB, evolutional Node) in LTE B).

In other examples, the receiving end may also include user equipment or test equipment. User equipment or test equipment may include but not limited to smart phones, notebook computers, personal computers (Personal Computer, PC), personal digital assistants (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), mobile Internet devices (Mobile Internet Device, MID), wearable devices ( Such as smart watches, smart bracelets, smart glasses) and other electronic devices. Wherein, the operating system of the user equipment or test equipment may include but not limited to Android operating system, IOS operating system, Symbian (Symbian) operating system, BlackBerry (Blackberry) operating system, Windows Phone8 operating system, and the like.

FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart illustrating a physical layer authentication method involved in an example of the present disclosure. FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram illustrating a signal transmitted by a transmitter of a physical layer authentication method involved in an example of the present disclosure.

In some examples, a single-bit stealth protocol-based physical layer authentication method (sometimes referred to as "physical layer authentication method") is a physical layer authentication method for a wireless communication system having a transmitter and a receiver. The receiving end may include a legal receiving end and an illegal receiving end. In addition, in the following description, the illegal receiving end is sometimes also referred to as the listening end.

In addition, based on the signal model shown in FIG. 1, as shown in FIG. 2, the physical layer authentication method based on the single-bit stealth protocol includes that the transmitter transmits a marker signal to the wireless channel based on the single-bit stealth protocol, and the marker signal includes the authentication signal and For the information signal, in the single-bit stealth protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is kept fixed and is an optimized value in the interval time period (step S110).

In step S110, the channel assumption condition of the physical layer authentication method may be that the channel state information of the receiving end has a single bit, that is, the transmitting end knows the single-bit channel state information fed back by the receiving end. Specifically, as mentioned above, the receiving end may include a legal receiving end and an illegal receiving end. In a general communication process, the illegal receiving end does not feed back channel state information to the transmitting end, while the legitimate receiving end feeds back the channel state information to the transmitting end. That is, the transmitting end may not know any channel state information about the illegal receiving end, while the transmitting end may know the single-bit channel state information feedback of the legitimate receiving end. However, under the channel assumption condition of the above physical layer authentication method, that is, in the case where the channel state information of the illegal receiving end is unknown and the channel state information of the legitimate receiving end has single-bit feedback, the physical layer authentication method of the present disclosure can also be used to improve the performance of the system. Good for evaluating the stealth performance of physical layer authentication.

In some examples, Channel State Information (CSI) may be channel properties of the communication link. For example, the channel state information may be information such as signal scattering, environmental attenuation, distance attenuation, and the like.

In some examples, based on the signal model described above, the transmitter may transmit a marker signal to the wireless channel. That is, the transmitter can send an authentication request. As shown in FIG. 3, the marker signal may include an authentication signal and an information signal. The authentication signal can reflect the shared key knowledge between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. The information signal can reflect the information to be conveyed. The authentication signal may be superimposed on the information signal. The marker signal may be transmitted in blocks. The marker signal can be calculated by the following formula (1):

x _i =ρ _s s _i +ρ _t t _i (1)

表示消息信号的能量分配因子，

表示认证信号的能量分配因子。Wherein, x _i represents the flag signal of the ith block, _si represents the information signal of the _ith block, and ti represents the authentication signal of the ith block. in addition,

represents the energy distribution factor of the message signal,

Represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal.

为零，此时常规信号可以表示为x_i＝s_i。另外常规信号的速率可以被设置为R_b。This embodiment is not limited to this, and the transmitting end may transmit regular signals to the wireless channel. Authentication signals are not included in regular signals. That is, the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal

zero, the conventional signal can be expressed as x _i =s _i at this time. In addition the rate of the regular signal can be set to R _b .

在间隔时间段内保持固定。即发射端向无线信道发射标记信号时，标记信号中的信息信号的能量分配因子在间隔时间段内保持固定。换而言之，单比特隐蔽性协议规定了发射端以在间隔时间段内保持固定的能量分配因子

发送认证请求。其中，信息信号的能量分配因子

可以称为认证协议参数。In some examples, the protocol to which the physical layer authentication method follows may be a single-bit stealth protocol. In addition, under the above-mentioned channel assumptions, the single-bit stealth protocol is effective for the physical layer optimization stealth analysis method of the present disclosure. The single-bit concealment protocol specifies the energy distribution factor of the information signal

remain fixed during the interval period. That is, when the transmitting end transmits the marker signal to the wireless channel, the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the marker signal remains fixed in the interval period. In other words, the single-bit stealth protocol specifies the transmitter to maintain a fixed energy allocation factor during the interval

Send an authentication request. Among them, the energy distribution factor of the information signal

Can be called authentication protocol parameters.

表示能量分配因子

不是在整个通信过程中恒定不变的。在不同的时间段，能量分配因子

可以不同，在时间段内的能量分配因子可以保持固定。In some examples, a fixed energy allocation factor is maintained over the interval

represents the energy distribution factor

Not constant throughout the communication process. At different time periods, the energy distribution factor

can be different, and the energy allocation factor over the time period can remain fixed.

在间隔时间段内是优化值。也即时间段内的信息信号的能量分配因子

可以是相应时间段内的能量分配因子优化值。In other examples, the single-bit stealth protocol also specifies an energy allocation factor for the information signal

During the interval period is the optimized value. That is, the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the time period

It can be the optimized value of the energy distribution factor in the corresponding time period.

优化值在整个通信过程中是恒定的，那么不同的时间段的能量分配因子相同。也即在整个通信过程中能量分配因子

恒定且为优化值。另外，不同时间段内的能量分配因子

也可以不同。能量分配因子

优化值的获取后续进行详细描述。In this case, the energy distribution factor

The optimal value is constant in the whole communication process, then the energy distribution factor of different time periods is the same. That is, the energy distribution factor in the whole communication process

Constant and optimized value. In addition, the energy allocation factor in different time periods

Can also be different. energy distribution factor

The acquisition of the optimized value will be described in detail later.

In step S110, the transmitting end transmits the marker signal to the wireless channel based on the single-bit concealment protocol. That is, the marker signal is transmitted by the transmitting end into the wireless channel. Among them, the wireless channel has a channel gain h. Therefore, the marker signal transmitted through the wireless channel can include the channel gain h.

In some examples, the physical layer authentication method based on the single-bit stealth protocol may further include the receiving end receiving the marker signal, and performing correlation processing on the marker signal based on the single-bit stealth protocol to obtain a secret authentication probability (step S120).

In step S120, since the marker signal in step S110 is transmitted in blocks, the marker signal can be received by the receiver in blocks. Since the receivers may include legal receivers and illegal receivers, those receiving signals in the wireless communication system may include legal receivers and illegal receivers. Among them, the marked signal received by the legitimate receiver through the wireless channel can be calculated by the following formula (2):

y _b,i =h _b,i x _i +n _b,i (2)

的复高斯分布。n_b,i服从0均值方差为

的复高斯分布。Among them, h _b,i represents the channel gain of the ith block of marked signals received by the legitimate receiver. n _b,i represents the noise at the legitimate receiver. In addition, h _b,i obeys 0 mean variance as

complex Gaussian distribution. n _{b, i} obey 0 mean variance as

complex Gaussian distribution.

In some examples, since the marker signal can be received by receivers (including legal receivers and illegal receivers) in blocks, the channel signal-to-noise ratio of each block of marker signals measured by the legal receiver can be expressed by the following formula (3 ) is calculated to get:

表示合法接收端的噪声方差。另外，合法接收端测得的标记信号的平均信噪比分别可以由下式(4)计算得到：in,

represents the noise variance at the legitimate receiver. In addition, the average signal-to-noise ratio of the marked signal measured by the legitimate receiving end can be calculated by the following formula (4):

In addition, in some examples, the signal-to-noise ratio of the marker signal received by the illegal receiver through the wireless channel, the channel signal-to-noise ratio of each block of marker signals measured by the illegal receiver, and the average signal-to-noise ratio of the marker signal measured by the illegal receiver can be compared by analogy The above calculation method of the legitimate receiver.

In some examples, the receiver can perform channel estimation, that is, the legitimate receiver and the illegal receiver can perform channel estimation. Through channel estimation, the legitimate receiver and the illegal receiver can estimate the target marker signal in the received marker signal _yi transmitted through the wireless channel

下面在对信号的处理中所涉及的接收端若无特别说明均是指合法接收端。In some examples, since the legitimate receiver knows the single-bit concealment protocol and the illegal receiver does not know the single-bit concealment protocol, the legitimate receiver can further process the target marker signal based on the single-bit concealment protocol

The receivers involved in the signal processing below refer to legitimate receivers unless otherwise specified.

的初始值(即第一个时间段的能量分配因子

值)，又因为

故认证信号的能量分配因子ρ_t ²的值也可以确定。故在知道

和

的情况下，接收端可以提取出目标标记信号

中的残余信号r_i。另外，能量分配因子

可以被优化，自第二个时间段起(包含第二个时间段)单比特隐蔽性协议中设置的能量分配因子

也可以为优化的能量分配因子

值。由此，能够使单比特隐蔽性协议得到优化。In some examples, the single-bit stealth protocol sets the energy allocation factor for the information signal

The initial value of (i.e. the energy distribution factor for the first time period

value), and because

Therefore, the value of the energy distribution factor ρ _t ² of the authentication signal can also be determined. so know

and

In the case of , the receiver can extract the target marker signal

residual signal _ri in . In addition, the energy distribution factor

can be optimized, since the second time period (including the second time period) the energy distribution factor set in the single-bit stealth protocol

It is also possible to assign factors for the optimized energy

value. Thereby, the single-bit concealment protocol can be optimized.

In some examples, after acquiring the residual signal _ri , the receiving end may further determine whether the residual signal _ri includes the authentication signal t _i . The receiving end can feed back the single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ of the marker signal to the transmitting end according to the judgment result. Since the feedback of the receiving end is based on the single-bit concealment protocol, the receiving end may feed back the single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting end based on the single-bit concealment protocol. That is, in the single-bit concealment protocol, the receiving end feeds back single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting end. In addition, the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ is feasible within a certain range under the single-bit concealment protocol. The obtaining of the feasible range of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ will be described in detail later.

In addition, in some examples, the receiving end may determine whether the residual signal _{ri includes the authentication signal t i .} According to the judgment result, the receiving end can obtain the false alarm probability (PFA) and the detection rate (PD). The Probability of Secrecy Authentication (PSA) can be obtained based on the Detection Rate (PD) under the constraint of the False Alarm Probability (PFA). The secret authentication probability (PSA) can be calculated by the following formula (5):

P _SA = max{P _D,1 -P _D,2 ,0} (5)

Among them, P _D,1 represents the detection rate of the legitimate receiving end, and P _D,2 represents the detection rate of the illegal receiving end. Thus, it can be determined that the marker signal is being monitored by an unauthorized receiver through the security authentication probability (PSA).

In some examples, the physical layer authentication method may further include obtaining the authentication request transmission probability and the covert authentication rejection probability based on the signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the received information signal (step S130).

In step S130, the signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio (the terminology message-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, MINR) of the marker signal received by the specified receiver can be calculated by the following formula (6):

表示信息信号的能量分配因子。

表示认证信号的能量分配因子。由于标记信号分块发送，γ_b,i表示第i块接收端的信道信噪比。h_b,i表示接收端接收的第i块标记信号的信道增益。in,

Represents the energy distribution factor of the information signal.

Represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal. Since the marker signal is sent in blocks, γ _b,i represents the channel signal-to-noise ratio at the receiving end of the ith block. h _b,i represents the channel gain of the i-th block marked signal received by the receiver.

为零，信息信号的能量分配因子

为1。由此，

若发射端发射的信号是标记信号，则认证信号的能量分配因子

不为零，由式(6)可知，发射端发射标记信号时的信干噪比(MINR)比发射端发射常规信号时的信干噪比(MINR)小，故发射端发射标记信号时，信干噪比(MINR)满足

In some examples, if the signal transmitted by the transmitting end is a regular signal, that is, the signal transmitted by the transmitting end does not include the authentication signal, the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal

zero, the energy distribution factor of the information signal

is 1. thus,

If the signal transmitted by the transmitter is a marker signal, the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal

is not zero. From equation (6), it can be known that the signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio (MINR) when the transmitter transmits the marked signal is smaller than the signal-to-interference and noise ratio (MINR) when the transmitter transmits the conventional signal, so when the transmitter transmits the marked signal, Signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio (MINR)

In addition, the authentication request transmission probability (Probability of authentication-request transmission, PART) can be obtained according to the above-mentioned signal to interference and noise ratio (MINR). The authentication request transmission probability (PART) can be calculated by the following formula (7):

Thus, the performance of the authentication transmission request delay can be measured according to the authentication request transmission probability (PART).

结合式(7)可以得出式(8)所示的认证请求传输概率(PART)：In some examples, based on the channel assumptions in the above step S110, in order to maintain the concealment requirement, the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ is set so that the signal-to-noise ratio threshold satisfies

Combined with equation (7), the authentication request transmission probability (PART) shown in equation (8) can be obtained:

where R _b represents the normal signal rate.

其中，ε_ART是认证请求传输概率(PART)的下限，且其满足0≤ε_ART≤ε_ART1。其中，ε_ART1满足

基于上述认证请求传输概率(PART)的约束条件，可以得到接收端反馈的信噪比阈值μ的可行范围，即

In some examples, under a single-bit stealth protocol, the value of the authentication request transmission probability (PART) needs to satisfy

Among them, ε _ART is the lower limit of the authentication request transmission probability (PART), and it satisfies 0≤ε _ART ≤ε _ART1 . where ε _ART1 satisfies

Based on the above constraints on the transmission probability of authentication request (PART), the feasible range of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ fed back by the receiver can be obtained, that is,

Additionally, in some examples, an authentication concealment rejection event occurs at the receiving end when the information signal in the flag signal cannot be decoded without error at the receiving end. The probability of authentication-covertness rejection (Probability of authentication-covertness rejection, PACR) at this time can be regarded as the probability of authentication-covertness rejection under the condition of authentication request transmission probability (PART). The authentication concealment rejection probability is also called the concealment authentication rejection probability. The Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR) can be obtained from the above-mentioned Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (MINR). The probability of covert authentication rejection (PACR) can be calculated by the following formula (9):

对其进行变形可以得到，

在这种情况下，结合式(9)可以得出P_ACR＝0。由此，可以看出在标记信号中的信息信号不能实现在接收端无错误地被解码时，接收端不可能发生认证隐蔽拒绝事件。也即任何隐蔽约束都是可行的。In some examples, the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ is set such that the signal-to-noise ratio threshold satisfies

Transform it to get,

In this case, P _ACR = 0 can be obtained in combination with equation (9). From this, it can be seen that when the information signal in the marker signal cannot be decoded without error at the receiving end, the authentication concealment rejection event cannot occur at the receiving end. That is, any hidden constraints are feasible.

其中，ε_ACR是隐蔽认证拒绝概率(PACR)的上限，其满足0≤ε_ACR≤1。由此，根据隐蔽认证概率(PACR)能够量度物理层认证技术的隐蔽等级。In addition, under the single-bit concealment protocol, the Probability of Concealed Authentication Rejection (PACR) needs to satisfy

Among them, ε _ACR is the upper limit of the covert authentication rejection probability (PACR), which satisfies 0≤ε _ACR ≤1. Thus, the concealment level of the physical layer authentication technique can be measured according to the probability of concealment authentication (PACR).

其中，

In some examples, based on the above constraints of the probability of concealed authentication rejection (PACR), the feasible range of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ fed back by the receiver can be obtained, that is,

in,

Therefore, the feasible range of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ fed back by the receiver under the single-bit concealment protocol can be obtained by synthesizing the above constraints of the probability of transmission of authentication request (PART) and the constraint of probability of concealed authentication rejection (PACR).

通过下式(10)优化的能量分配因子

In addition, in some examples, under the single-bit concealment protocol, based on the above-mentioned constraint condition of P _ACR =0, in order to satisfy the

The energy distribution factor optimized by the following equation (10)

in,

In some examples, the physical layer authentication method may further include calculating the privacy authentication efficiency based on the privacy authentication probability, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealment authentication rejection probability to determine the concealment level of the physical layer authentication (step S140).

In step S140 , the privacy authentication probability (PSA), the authentication request transmission probability (PART) and the concealed authentication rejection probability (PACR) can be obtained through the above steps S120 and S130.

In some examples, the secret authentication efficiency (SAE) is calculated based on the secret authentication probability (PSA), the authentication request transmission probability (PART), and the covert authentication rejection probability (PACR).

In some examples, the prescribed secret authentication efficiency (SAE) can be calculated by the following equation (11):

η=P _ART (1-P _ACR )P _SA (11)

Among them, PART represents the authentication request transmission probability (PART), P _ACR represents the covert authentication rejection probability ( _PACR ), and _PSA represents the secret authentication probability (PSA). η represents the Secret Authentication Efficiency (SAE). In addition, the condition for the security authentication efficiency (SAE) to have a non-zero positive value is to satisfy the feasible range of the above-mentioned signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ and also to satisfy the

In some examples, the Privacy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) includes the Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) and the Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR), where the Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) may assess the request delay for physical layer authentication. The Probability of Covert Authentication Rejection (PACR) can determine the stealth level of the physical layer authentication. As a result, Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) can better assess request latency and stealth levels.

和可行性范围内的信噪比阈值μ情况下，受认证请求传输概率(PART)和隐蔽认证拒绝概率(PACR)约束的保密认证效率(SAE)获得最大值。具体而言，保密认证效率(SAE)最大值、认证请求传输概率(PART)和隐蔽认证拒绝概率(PACR)的关系由下式(12)获得：Additionally, in some examples, at the optimized energy distribution factor

Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) constrained by Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) and Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR) obtains the maximum value under the condition of SNR threshold μ within the feasible range. Specifically, the relationship between the maximum value of confidential authentication efficiency (SAE), the probability of transmission of authentication requests (PART) and the probability of concealed authentication rejection (PACR) is obtained by the following formula (12):

where ε _ACR is the upper bound of the probability of covert authentication rejection (PACR), ε _ART is the lower bound of the probability of transmission of authentication requests (PART), and R _b represents the regular signal rate.

In some examples, the transmitting end transmits the marking signal based on the single-bit stealth protocol, the receiving terminal receives the marking signal, and obtains the Security Authentication Efficiency (SAE) through processing based on the single-bit stealth protocol. Among them, the single-bit concealment protocol stipulates that the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the marker signal remains fixed in the interval time period. In this case, the stealth level can be better assessed based on the single-bit stealth protocol and the metric used for physical layer authentication, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE).

FIG. 4 is a schematic waveform diagram illustrating the efficiency of the receiving-end secret authentication of the physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the present disclosure.

In some examples, as shown in Figure 4, under the single-bit concealment protocol, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end is less than or equal to 15dB, the confidentiality authentication efficiency (SAE) is always zero, and when the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end continues to increase, The Secret Authentication Efficiency (SAE) increases rapidly and approaches 1.

恒定为0.9时，在接收端的信噪比小于等于17dB时，保密认证效率(SAE)一直为零。当接收端的信噪比继续增大时，保密认证效率(SAE)迅速增加并接近于1。信息信号的能量分配因子

恒定为0.8时，在接收端的信噪比小于等于24dB时，保密认证效率(SAE)一直为零。当接收端的信噪比继续增大时，保密认证效率(SAE)迅速增加并接近于1。According to the figure, under the non-single-bit concealment protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal

When it is constant at 0.9, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end is less than or equal to 17dB, the secret authentication efficiency (SAE) is always zero. When the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiving end continues to increase, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) increases rapidly and approaches 1. Energy distribution factor of information signal

When it is constant at 0.8, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end is less than or equal to 24dB, the security authentication efficiency (SAE) is always zero. When the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiving end continues to increase, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) increases rapidly and approaches 1.

It can be seen from the figure that the SNR requirement of the receiver under the single-bit concealment protocol is lower than that of the receiver under the non-single-bit concealment protocol. Therefore, when the SNR of the receiver is low, the single-bit concealment protocol more superior.

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram showing a waveform of the secret authentication efficiency of the illegal receiving end of the physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the present disclosure.

In some examples, as shown in Figure 5, under the single-bit concealment protocol, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the illegal receiver is less than or equal to 17dB, the security authentication efficiency (SAE) is close to 1 and does not change much. When the ratio continues to increase, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) decreases rapidly and approaches 0, and when the SNR of the subsequent illegal receiver continues to increase, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) gradually decreases to 0.

恒定为0.9时，在非法接收端的信噪比小于等于15dB时，保密认证效率(SAE)接近于1且变化不大。当非法接收端的信噪比继续增大时，保密认证效率(SAE)迅速减小并接近于0，并在后续的非法接收端的信噪比继续增大时，慢慢减小至0。信息信号的能量分配因子

恒定为0.8时，非法接收端的保密认证效率(SAE)一直为0。According to the figure, under the non-single-bit concealment protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal

When it is constant at 0.9, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the illegal receiver is less than or equal to 15dB, the secret authentication efficiency (SAE) is close to 1 and does not change much. When the SNR of the illegal receiving end continues to increase, the Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) decreases rapidly and is close to 0, and gradually decreases to 0 when the SNR of the subsequent illegal receiving end continues to increase. Energy distribution factor of information signal

When it is constant at 0.8, the secret authentication efficiency (SAE) of the illegal receiver is always 0.

Considering the different requirements for legitimate receivers and illegal receivers, for example, the different requirements for Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) of legitimate receivers and illegal receivers, the physical layer authentication method based on the single-bit concealment protocol is more effective.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a physical layer authentication system involved in an example of the present disclosure. FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating a signal processing module of a receiving apparatus of a physical layer authentication system according to an example of the present disclosure.

In some examples, the single-bit stealth protocol based physical layer authentication system is a physical layer authentication system of a wireless communication system having a transmitting device and a receiving device. Wherein, the receiving device may include a legal receiving device and an illegal receiving device. In addition, the transmitting device and the transmitting end in the present disclosure may be the same concept, and the receiving device and the receiving end may be the same concept.

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 6 , the physical layer authentication system 1 based on the single-bit stealth protocol (referred to as the physical layer authentication system 1 ) may include a transmitting apparatus 10 and a receiving apparatus 20 . The receiving device 20 may include legitimate receiving devices and illegal receiving devices.

In some examples, the transmitting device 10 transmits a marker signal to the wireless channel based on a single-bit stealth protocol, the marker signal includes an authentication signal and an information signal, and in the single-bit stealth protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is within the interval time period. Remains fixed and optimized.

In some examples, the channel assumption of the physical layer authentication system 1 where the transmitting device 10 is located may be that the channel state information of the receiving end has a single bit, that is, the transmitting end knows the single-bit channel state information fed back by the receiving end. Specifically, the channel assumption condition in the above step S110 can be analogized.

In some examples, transmitting device 10 transmits a marker signal to a wireless channel. That is, the transmitting apparatus 10 can send an authentication request. Flag signals may include authentication signals and information signals. The authentication signal may reflect knowledge of the key shared between the transmitting device 10 and the legitimate receiving device. The information signal can reflect the information to be conveyed. The authentication signal may be superimposed on the information signal. The marker signal may be transmitted in blocks. The marker signal can be as shown in Equation (1). The present embodiment is not limited thereto, and the transmitting apparatus 10 may transmit regular signals to the wireless channel. Authentication signals are not included in regular signals.

在间隔时间段内保持固定。即发射端向无线信道发射标记信号时，标记信号中的信息信号的能量分配因子在间隔时间段内保持固定。换而言之，单比特隐蔽性协议规定了发射端以在间隔时间段内保持固定的能量分配因子

发送认证请求。如图6所示，实线表示发射装置10发送认证请求。其中，信息信号的能量分配因子

可以称为认证协议参数。In some examples, a single-bit stealth protocol is set up based on the channel assumptions described above. When the transmitting device 10 transmits the marker signal to the wireless channel, the protocol complied with may be a single-bit concealment protocol. The single-bit concealment protocol specifies the energy distribution factor of the information signal

remain fixed during the interval period. That is, when the transmitting end transmits the marker signal to the wireless channel, the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the marker signal remains fixed in the interval period. In other words, the single-bit stealth protocol specifies the transmitter to maintain a fixed energy allocation factor during the interval

Send an authentication request. As shown in FIG. 6 , the solid line indicates that the transmitting device 10 sends the authentication request. Among them, the energy distribution factor of the information signal

Can be called authentication protocol parameters.

表示能量分配因子

不是在整个通信过程中恒定不变的。在不同的时间段，能量分配因子

可以不同，在时间段内的能量分配因子可以保持固定。In some examples, a fixed energy allocation factor is maintained over the interval

represents the energy distribution factor

Not constant throughout the communication process. At different time periods, the energy distribution factor

can be different, and the energy allocation factor over the time period can remain fixed.

在间隔时间段内是优化值。也即时间段内的信息信号的能量分配因子

也可以是相应时间段内的能量分配因子

优化值。能量分配因子

优化值的获取类比上述物理层认证方法中的优化能量分配因子

的方法。In some examples, the single-bit stealth protocol also specifies an energy allocation factor for the information signal

During the interval period is the optimized value. That is, the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the time period

It can also be the energy distribution factor in the corresponding time period

optimized value. energy distribution factor

The acquisition of the optimized value is analogous to the optimized energy allocation factor in the above physical layer authentication method

Methods.

In some examples, transmitting device 10 transmits a marker signal to a wireless channel based on a single-bit stealth protocol. Among them, the wireless channel has a channel gain h. Therefore, the marker signal transmitted through the wireless channel can include the channel gain h.

In some examples, since the illicit receiving device has no knowledge of the single-bit stealth protocol and no shared key knowledge with the transmitting device 10, the illicit receiving device typically cannot process the received flag signal for stealth analysis . The receiving device 20 involved in the signal processing below refers to a legitimate receiving device unless otherwise specified.

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 6 , the physical layer authentication system 1 may further include a receiving apparatus 20 . The receiving means 20 may be used to receive and process the marker signal via the wireless channel. The receiving device 20 feeds back the single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting device 10 . As shown in FIG. 6 , the dotted line represents the feedback from the receiving device 20 to the transmitting device 10 .

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 7 , the receiving apparatus 20 may include a processing module 21 . The processing module 21 receives the marker signal, processes the marker signal based on the single-bit concealment protocol, and obtains a Privacy Authentication Probability (PSA).

In some examples, since the marker signal transmitted by the transmitting device 10 is transmitted in blocks, the marker signal may be received by the receiving device 20 in blocks. Since the illegal receiving device can also receive the marker signal in blocks. Therefore, the mark signal received by the processing module 21 in the receiving device 20 is shown in formula (2).

另外，处理模块21接收的每块标记信号的信噪比SNR分别可以如式(3)所示。处理模块21接收的标记信号的平均信噪比SNR分别可以如式(4)所示。In some examples, the processing module 21 in the receiving device 20 and the illegal receiving device may perform channel estimation. Through channel estimation, the processing module 21 and the illegal receiving device can estimate the target marker signal in the received marker signal _yi transmitted through the wireless channel

In addition, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of each block of marker signals received by the processing module 21 may be respectively shown in equation (3). The average signal-to-noise ratio SNR of the marker signal received by the processing module 21 may be respectively shown in equation (4).

In some examples, since the receiving device 20 knows the single-bit stealth protocol and the illegal receiving device does not know the single-bit stealth protocol, the processing module 21 of the receiving device 20 can further process the target marker signal based on the single-bit stealth protocol

的初始值(即第一个时间段的能量分配因子

值)，又因为

故认证信号的能量分配因子

的值也可以确定。故在知道

和

的情况下，接收端可以提取出目标标记信号

中的残余信号r_i。另外，能量分配因子

可以被优化，自第二个时间段起(包含第二个时间段)单比特隐蔽性协议中设置的能量分配因子

也可以为优化的能量分配因子

值。由此，能够使单比特隐蔽性协议得到优化。In some examples, the single-bit stealth protocol sets the energy allocation factor for the information signal

The initial value of (i.e. the energy distribution factor for the first time period

value), and because

Therefore, the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal

value can also be determined. so know

and

In the case of , the receiver can extract the target marker signal

residual signal _ri in . In addition, the energy distribution factor

can be optimized, since the second time period (including the second time period) the energy distribution factor set in the single-bit stealth protocol

It is also possible to assign factors to the optimized energy

value. Thereby, the single-bit concealment protocol can be optimized.

In some examples, after the processing module 21 obtains the residual signal _ri , it can further determine whether the residual signal _ri includes the authentication signal _ti . The receiving device 20 may feed back the threshold μ of the signal-to-noise ratio of the marker signal to the transmitting device 10 according to the judgment result. That is, the receiving apparatus 20 may feed back the single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting apparatus 10 based on the single-bit concealment protocol. That is, in the single-bit concealment protocol, the receiving apparatus feeds back single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitting apparatus. The feasible range of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ can be analogous to the acquisition of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ in the above-mentioned physical layer authentication method.

In addition, in some examples, the receiving apparatus 20 may determine whether the authentication signal t _i is included in the residual signal _ri . According to the judgment result, the receiving device 20 can obtain the false alarm probability (PFA) and the detection rate (PD). The Privacy Authentication Probability (PSA) can be obtained based on the Detection Rate (PD). The secret authentication probability (PSA) can be shown as formula (5).

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 7 , the receiving apparatus 20 may include a computing module 22 . The calculation module 22 obtains the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability based on the signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the received information signal.

为零，信息信号的能量分配因子

为1。由此，

若发射装置10发射的信号是标记信号，则认证信号的能量分配因子

不为零，由式(6)可知，发射端发射标记信号时的信干噪比(MINR)比发射端发射常规信号时的信干噪比(MINR)小，故发射端发射标记信号时，信干噪比(MINR)满足

In some examples, the prescribed signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio (MINR) of the marker signal received by the receiving device 20 may be as shown in equation (6). If the signal transmitted by the transmitting device 10 is a conventional signal, that is, the signal transmitted by the transmitting device 10 does not include an authentication signal, the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal

zero, the energy distribution factor of the information signal

is 1. thus,

If the signal transmitted by the transmitting device 10 is a marker signal, the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal

is not zero. From equation (6), it can be known that the signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio (MINR) when the transmitter transmits the marked signal is smaller than the signal-to-interference and noise ratio (MINR) when the transmitter transmits the conventional signal, so when the transmitter transmits the marked signal, Signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio (MINR)

结合式(7)可以得出式(8)所示的认证请求传输概率(PART)。In addition, the authentication request transmission probability (PART) can be obtained according to the above-mentioned signal to interference and noise ratio (MINR). The authentication request transmission probability (PART) can be shown in equation (7). Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) can measure the performance of authentication transmission request delay. In some examples, since the physical layer authentication system 1 is based on the above-mentioned channel assumptions, in order to maintain the concealment requirement, the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ is set so that the signal-to-noise ratio threshold satisfies

Combined with equation (7), the authentication request transmission probability (PART) shown in equation (8) can be obtained.

其中，ε_ART是认证请求传输概率(PART)的下限，且其满足0≤ε_ART≤ε_ART1。其中，ε_ART1满足

In some examples, under a single-bit stealth protocol, the value of the authentication request transmission probability (PART) needs to satisfy

Among them, ε _ART is the lower limit of the authentication request transmission probability (PART), and it satisfies 0≤ε _ART ≤ε _ART1 . where ε _ART1 satisfies

Additionally, in some examples, when the information signal in the flag signal cannot be decoded without error by the receiving device 20, the receiving device 20 may experience an authentication concealment rejection event. The Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR) can be obtained from the above-mentioned Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (MINR). The probability of covert authentication rejection (PACR) can be shown in equation (9).

对其进行变形可以得到，

在这种情况下，结合式(9)可以得出P_ACR＝0。由此，可以看出在标记信号中的信息信号不能实现在接收端无错误地被解码时，接收端不可能发生发生认证隐蔽拒绝事件。也即任何隐蔽约束都是可行的。In some examples, the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ is set such that the signal-to-noise ratio threshold satisfies

Transform it to get,

In this case, P _ACR = 0 can be obtained in combination with equation (9). From this, it can be seen that when the information signal in the marker signal cannot be decoded without error at the receiving end, the authentication concealment rejection event cannot occur at the receiving end. That is, any hidden constraints are feasible.

其中，ε_ACR是隐蔽认证拒绝概率(PACR)的上限，其满足ε_ACR≤1。由此，根据隐蔽认证概率(PACR)能够量度物理层认证技术的隐蔽等级。In addition, under the single-bit concealment protocol, the Probability of Concealed Authentication Rejection (PACR) needs to satisfy

where ε _ACR is an upper bound on the probability of covert authentication rejection (PACR), which satisfies ε _ACR ≤1. Thus, the concealment level of the physical layer authentication technique can be measured according to the probability of concealment authentication (PACR).

通过式(10)得到优化的能量分配因子

Additionally, in some examples, under single-bit stealth protocols, based on P _ACR = 0 and

The optimized energy distribution factor is obtained by formula (10)

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 7 , the receiving apparatus 20 may include a determination module 23 . The determination module 23 calculates the secret authentication efficiency according to the secret authentication probability, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability, so as to determine the request delay and concealment level of the physical layer authentication.

Additionally, in some examples, the Probability of Secrecy Authentication (PSA), Probability of Transmission of Authentication Requests (PART), and Probability of Covert Authentication Rejection (PACR) may be obtained by the processing module 21 and the computing module 22 .

In some examples, the Privacy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) is calculated based on the Privacy Authentication Probability (PSA), the Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART), and the Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR). Prescribed Secret Authentication Efficiency (SAE) can be expressed as Equation (11).

In some examples, the Privacy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) includes the Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) and the Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR), where the Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) may assess the request delay for physical layer authentication. The Probability of Covert Authentication Rejection (PACR) can determine the stealth level of the physical layer authentication. As a result, Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) can better assess request latency and stealth levels.

和可行性范围内的信噪比阈值μ情况下，受认证请求传输概率(PART)和隐蔽认证拒绝概率(PACR)约束的保密认证效率(SAE)获得最大值。具体而言，保密认证效率(SAE)最大值、认证请求传输概率(PART)和隐蔽认证拒绝概率(PACR)的关系由式(12)获得。Additionally, in some examples, at the optimized energy distribution factor

Secrecy Authentication Efficiency (SAE) constrained by Authentication Request Transmission Probability (PART) and Covert Authentication Rejection Probability (PACR) obtains the maximum value under the condition of SNR threshold μ within the feasible range. Specifically, the relationship between the maximum value of confidential authentication efficiency (SAE), the probability of transmission of authentication requests (PART) and the probability of concealed authentication rejection (PACR) is obtained by Equation (12).

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a physical layer authentication device involved in an example of the present disclosure. In some examples, both the transmitter and the receiver include an authentication device 30 as shown in FIG. 8 .

In some examples, as shown in FIG. 8 , the authentication device 30 includes a processor 31 and a memory 32 . The processor 31 and the memory 32 are respectively connected to the communication bus. In some examples, memory 32 may be high-speed RAM memory or non-volatile memory. Those skilled in the art can understand that the structure of the authentication device 30 shown in FIG. 8 does not constitute a limitation of the present disclosure, and it can be either a bus-shaped structure, a star-shaped structure, or a More or fewer components, or a combination of certain components, or a different arrangement of components.

The processor 31 is the control center of the authentication device 30 . In some examples, it can be a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU). The processor 31 uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire authentication device 30, and by running or executing the software programs stored in the memory 32 and/or or modules, and call program code stored in memory 32 for performing the following operations:

In the case of single-bit feedback in the channel state information of the receiver, the transmitter transmits a marker signal to the wireless channel based on the single-bit stealth protocol. The marker signal includes an authentication signal and an information signal. In the single-bit stealth protocol, let the information signal The energy allocation factor remains fixed and optimized for the interval period (performed by the authentication device 30 at the transmitting end).

The receiving end receives the marked signal, processes the marked signal based on the single-bit concealment protocol, and obtains the secret authentication probability; based on the signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the received information signal, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability are obtained; and based on the secret authentication probability , the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability to calculate the secret authentication efficiency to determine the concealment level of the physical layer authentication (executed by the authentication device 30 at the receiving end).

令P_ACR＝0，其中，R_b表示常规信号速率。In some examples, the processor 31 of the authentication device 30 also performs the following operations: in the single-bit concealment protocol, feedback the single-bit information of the signal-to-noise ratio threshold μ to the transmitter, set

Let P _ACR = 0, where R _b represents the normal signal rate.

其中，

ε_ART是认证请求传输概率的下限，γ_b表示平均信噪比，R_b表示常规信号速率。In some examples, the processor 31 of the authentication device 30 also performs the following operations: based on P _ACR =0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of the information signal is calculated by the following formula (10):

in,

ε _ART is the lower bound of the transmission probability of the authentication request, γ _b is the average signal-to-noise ratio, and R _b is the normal signal rate.

In some examples, the processor 31 of the authentication device 30 also performs the following operations: The secret authentication efficiency is calculated by the following formula (11): η=P _ART (1-P _ACR )P _SA (11), where _PART represents Authentication request transmission probability, P _ACR represents the probability of concealed authentication rejection, and _PSA represents the probability of confidential authentication.

其中，

表示信息信号的能量分配因子，

表示认证信号的能量分配因子，标记信号分块发送，γ_b,i表示第i块标记信号在接收端的信道信噪比，h_b,i表示第i块标记信号的信道增益，

表示接收端的噪声方差。In some examples, the processor 31 of the authentication device 30 also performs the following operations: the signal-to-interference-to-noise ratio of the information signal is calculated by the following formula (6):

in,

represents the energy distribution factor of the information signal,

Represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the marker signal is sent in blocks, γ _b,i represents the channel signal-to-noise ratio of the ith block of marker signals at the receiving end, h _b,i represents the channel gain of the ith block of marker signals,

represents the noise variance at the receiver.

In some examples, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus may be implemented in other ways. For example, the device examples described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or may be Integration into another system, or some features can be ignored, or not implemented. On the other hand, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, and may be in electrical or other forms.

Units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment.

In addition, in some examples, each functional unit may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically alone, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware, or may be implemented in the form of software functional units.

In some examples, the integrated unit, if implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may be stored in a computer-readable memory. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the present disclosure essentially or the parts that contribute to the prior art or all or part of the technical solutions can be embodied in the form of software products, and the computer software products are stored in a memory, Several instructions are included to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present disclosure. The aforementioned memory includes: U disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), mobile hard disk, magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.

In some examples, a computer-readable storage medium is disclosed, and those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the steps in the various physical layer authentication methods in the above examples can be implemented by instructing relevant hardware through programs (instructions). Completion, the program (instruction) can be stored in a computer-readable memory (storage medium), and the memory can include: a flash disk, a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), a random access device (Random Access Memory, RAM) , disk or CD, etc.

Although the present disclosure has been specifically described above with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, it should be understood that the above description does not limit the present disclosure in any form. Those skilled in the art can make modifications and changes of the present disclosure as required without departing from the essential spirit and scope of the present disclosure, and these modifications and changes all fall within the scope of the present disclosure.

Claims (2)

1. a physical layer authentication method based on single-bit concealment protocol, is the concealment analysis method of the physical layer authentication of the wireless communication system comprising transmitting end and receiving end, it is characterized in that, include: The transmitting end transmits a marker signal to the wireless channel based on a single-bit stealth protocol, and the marker signal includes an authentication signal and an information signal. In the single-bit stealth protocol, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is set at the interval time. The segment remains fixed and is an optimized value; The receiving end receives the marked signal, and based on the single-bit concealment protocol, processes the marked signal to obtain a secret authentication probability; obtaining an authentication request transmission probability and a covert authentication rejection probability based on the received signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the flag signal; and The secret authentication efficiency is calculated based on the secret authentication probability, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability to determine the concealment level of the physical layer authentication, Wherein, the secret authentication efficiency satisfies: η=P _ART (1-P _ACR )P _SA , where n represents the secret authentication efficiency, _PART represents the authentication request transmission probability, and satisfies

P _ACR represents the covert authentication rejection probability, and satisfies

P _SA represents the secret authentication probability, and satisfies P _SA =max{P _D,1 -P _D,2 ,0}, μ represents the signal-to-noise ratio threshold, and the signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the marker signal satisfies:

in,

represents the energy distribution factor of the information signal,

represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the marker signal is sent in blocks, γ _b,i represents the channel signal-to-noise ratio of the ith block of marker signals at the receiving end, h _b,i represents the channel of the ith block of marker signals gain,

represents the noise variance of the receiving end, R _b represents the normal signal rate, P _D,1 represents the detection rate of the legitimate receiving end, and P _D,2 represents the detection rate of the illegal receiving end. In the single-bit concealment protocol, set

Let P _ACR =0, based on P _ACR =0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of the information signal satisfies:

in,

ε _ART is the lower bound of the transmission probability of the authentication request, and γ _b represents the average signal-to-noise ratio. 2. a physical layer authentication system based on single-bit concealment protocol, is characterized in that, include: A transmitting device, the transmitting device transmits a marker signal to a wireless channel based on a single-bit stealth protocol, the marker signal includes an authentication signal and an information signal, and in the single-bit stealth protocol, let the energy distribution factor of the information signal It remains fixed and optimized for the interval period; A receiving device, comprising: a processing module, which receives the marking signal, processes the marking signal based on the single-bit concealment protocol, and obtains a secret authentication probability; a computing module, which is based on the received marking signal The signal-to-interference-noise ratio obtains the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability; and a determination module, which calculates the confidential authentication efficiency according to the confidential authentication probability, the authentication request transmission probability and the concealed authentication rejection probability to determine the physical Layer authentication concealment level, Wherein, the secret authentication efficiency satisfies: η=P _ART (1-P _ACR )P _SA , where n represents the secret authentication efficiency, _PART represents the authentication request transmission probability, and satisfies

P _ACR represents the covert authentication rejection probability, and satisfies

P _SA represents the secret authentication probability, and satisfies P _SA =max{P _D,1 -P _D,2 ,0}, μ represents the signal-to-noise ratio threshold, and the signal-to-interference-noise ratio of the marker signal satisfies:

in,

represents the energy distribution factor of the information signal,

Represents the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the marker signal is sent in blocks, γ _b,i represents the channel signal-to-noise ratio of the i-th marker signal at the receiving device, h _b,i represents the i-th block marker signal channel gain,

represents the noise variance of the receiving device, R _b represents the normal signal rate, P _D,1 represents the detection rate of the legitimate receiving device, and P _D,2 represents the detection rate of the illegal receiving device. In the single-bit concealment protocol, set up

Let P _ACR =0, based on P _ACR =0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of the information signal satisfies:

in,

ε _ART is the lower bound of the transmission probability of the authentication request, and γ _b represents the average signal-to-noise ratio.

Images