The region wasn't down though. Only one zone was down?
From earlier in the incident history:
> Cloud SQL:
> Impact/Diagnosis: Non-HA instances backed by europe-west2-a are hard-down in europe-west2-a. HA instances that were in europe-west2-a when the incident started, are down with stuck failovers.
14-months may be pushing it -- they have a stated weight and height limit but in practice it depends if your steward cares or not. Over weight/height isn't going to break the bassinet, we had ours with the legs hanging over the edge. Some stewards though whenever there is turbulence will ask you to take your baby out so you can cover them with a seat-belt. When they are sleeping this is not ideal. On a long flight, this can happen a lot (the seat-belt light turns on, even if you barely feel a bump from turbulence afterwards). We ended up saying "ok, sure" when they come and ask, and then when they walk off we just wouldn't do anything. All in all, I found travelling with an infant pretty OK. Depending on what time your flights are, they might sleep a good 8 hours in the bassinet!
It depends on the use case, but generally speaking, yeah.
It's less secure than a dedicated device for storage of the 2FA secrets and code generation, sure, but I don't see how it's any less secure than using a service like Duo to manage and sync your secrets.
Furthermore, I'd argue it's substantially more secure than the recovery process for almost all of the services I use, most of which offer an option to reset by SMS.
Finally, keeping your 2FA secrets in your password manager is very likely not to change the attack surface for most people anyhow, as most people keep their recovery codes in their password managers as well.
Yes, if the attack vector you're trying to close is a compromised keyboard/network/terminal and not a stolen-while-unlocked device.
"Catching" one 2FA code doesn't let you compromise someone's account.
Losing (or having compromised) the hardware running your password manager while that password manager is unlocked is a totally different thing from logging into a web site once from a library computer.
> Yes, if the attack vector you're trying to close is a compromised keyboard/network/terminal and not a stolen-while-unlocked device.
however, not having the TOTP key in your password manager would also protect against malware on your machine running the password manager from gaining access to your account.
From earlier in the incident history:
> Cloud SQL:
> Impact/Diagnosis: Non-HA instances backed by europe-west2-a are hard-down in europe-west2-a. HA instances that were in europe-west2-a when the incident started, are down with stuck failovers.