Preventing information leaks from ext4 filesystems

Posted Apr 28, 2021 11:43 UTC (Wed) by lsl (guest, #86508)
In reply to: Preventing information leaks from ext4 filesystems by Cyberax
Parent article: Preventing information leaks from ext4 filesystems

Does overwriting file names actually accomplish that, though? That depends on the cloud's block storage implementation.

In other words, this feature's usefulness is to the cloud operator who's in a position to assess the effect this overwriting has on the actual stored data.

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Preventing information leaks from ext4 filesystems

Posted Apr 28, 2021 11:47 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (1 responses)

> Does overwriting file names actually accomplish that, though?
It's a part of the overall puzzle.

For data block cleanup, TRIM is supposed to make the data inaccessible (except maybe through a very thorough forensic scan).

Preventing information leaks from ext4 filesystems

Posted Apr 29, 2021 11:13 UTC (Thu) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link]

> > Does overwriting file names actually accomplish that, though?

> It's a part of the overall puzzle.

Yup. What everybody seems to be missing is that ext* is saying "I've done my bit, it's not my problem any more".

Ext can't provide guarantees ELSEWHERE in the stack, but it can provide its own guarantees, which is the intent here. It's not passing the buck, it's taking responsibility for what it can. If others shirk their responsibility, it's not ext's problem.

Cheers,
Wol