Another kind of cookie
It has become increasingly difficult to use the web without some kind of Flash player, but a little-known "feature" of Flash is causing some privacy concerns. In some ways, Local Shared Objects (LSOs aka Flash cookies) are similar to browser cookies, but there are a number of significant differences as well. In addition, because the dominant Flash player is closed-source, one must depend on Adobe's ability to faithfully implement the security model. In all, Flash cookies are something that web users should be cognizant of.
At its core, an LSO is a chunk of data that is stored on a user's disk based on the domain that the Flash program was downloaded from. Only Flash programs from that domain should have access to the data and, unlike browser cookies, much more data can be stored. By default, 100K bytes can be used per domain, which is a sizable increase from the 4K available for browser cookies. The amount of storage for a Flash cookie can be increased with the assent of the user, or decreased via the management interface.
Another major difference from the now-familiar browser cookies is that the interface for managing them is less-than-obvious. From a given Flash application, there is a "Settings" menu that allows control of the LSOs from that site. To see the sites that have stored Flash cookies or to have more global control over them, one must visit Adobe's site. There are also third-party applications and browser add-ons that will allow more control. A user can also resort to the ultimate control—removing them from the filesystem (~/.macromedia/Flash_Player/#SharedObjects).
There are many benign things that a Flash application might do with a bit of local storage—caching data, storing preferences, etc.—but they can also be used to track users in much the same way that browser cookies are used. Because Flash cookies are less well-known, and harder to manage, though, they may be more effective because they are removed or restricted less often.
Another important thing to note is that there is no requirement that there be a visible Flash application on the web site. A site could embed a Flash application with no visible elements simply to store a cookie. Unless the user has a browser add-on like NoScript, they will get no indication that anything has happened.
Assuming that there aren't any holes in Adobe's implementation of the Flash security model, Flash cookies aren't much different—or more dangerous—than browser cookies. But that assumption is a bit worrisome. For Firefox or other free software browsers, the code can be inspected to verify correct behavior. Either Flash or Firefox could have some flaw that allowed cross-site cookie access (which would be a rather nasty information disclosure vulnerability), but for Flash, we can only take Adobe's word.
Privacy advocates have been successful in getting the idea of deleting browser cookies into the consciousness of concerned users, but Flash cookies seem to have flown below the radar. A recent blog posting that was widely reported has helped to raise the profile of Flash cookies so that users will, hopefully, know that they exist. Those with a desire to strictly control their privacy will be better able to do so. With luck, it may also lead Adobe to provide an easier and more visible interface to manage them as well.
| Index entries for this article | |
|---|---|
| Security | Browser cookies |
| Security | Privacy |