Linux botnets
Collections of subverted machines, called botnets are typically associated with Windows; thousands of zombie desktops sending spam and causing other internet mayhem. Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that Linux boxes (as well as MacOS X and other UNIX boxes) are participating in botnets, but in a bit of a twist, it is mostly servers that have been subverted. Botnets are an enormous problem that Vint Cerf recently estimated may involve up to one quarter of all internet connected computers. This translates to a botnet controller's fondest wish: 150 million zombie machines to rent to the highest bidder.
Desktops are usually infected with a bot by an email-borne virus or a trojan attached to some application that the user installs, much like adware and spyware infect machines. The bot software then connects to a 'command and control' (C&C) infrastructure, that often use Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers, to get instructions on what they should do. The 'owner' of a botnet (known as a bot herder) can then instruct the bots to do whatever they, or more likely their client, want. Because the traffic generated from a botnet comes from all over the Internet, it is difficult or impossible to recognize it for what it is. This allows botnets to be used for spamming, distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, click fraud and other malicious activities in a largely untraceable way.
The desktop infection methods are not typically as useful for Linux boxes and so bot herders have turned to web application exploits as a means for collecting subverted machines. Attacking servers has the additional advantage that they are usually machines with much greater resources: faster network connectivity, more storage, faster processors, etc. The attacks are largely targeted at everyone's favorite Internet security whipping boy, PHP applications. Open source PHP applications are the main target as they are ubiquitous and typically easy to exploit as some recent research indicates. An additional benefit of targeting a higher level application is that it is a cross-platform exploit; the operating system and web server software are immaterial if the target is a PHP application.
The easiest type of vulnerability to exploit is often Remote File Inclusion (RFI) which allows an attacker to run code on a vulnerable server with the permissions of the webserver. Generally, those permissions are sufficient to allow the bot to do anything the herder might wish it to; sending email and other network traffic is not normally a privileged activity. Even a cursory glance at the Bugtraq mailing list will reveal numerous RFI vulnerabilities; they are reported regularly and each can lead to bot exploitation if not patched.
Many different types of malware can be installed on a vulnerable machine, depending on the intent of the herder. As with the exploit itself, the installed code tends to be written in a scripting language so that it is cross-platform. The malware can range from simple test tools that indicate vulnerable servers to sophisticated shells that allow the attacker to effectively login to the server and perform any allowed operation.
The most serious damage that these botnets have caused is to our inbox; bots seem to be the preferred way to deliver spam these days. Diligent anti-spam efforts tend to get spamming accounts or systems shut down within hours but there is no easy way to shut down a spam-delivering botnet. A less visible, but potentially more damaging effect is DDOS attacks on internet sites. By attacking a site and working their way up the chain of DNS servers and registrars, a botnet can silence a site the herder does not like or hold sites hostage until they pay a ransom.
Past efforts to thwart botnets have often focused on destroying the C&C servers by shutting down the affected IRC sites, but botnets are moving toward using HTTP for C&C which allows that traffic to hide amongst the sea of similar traffic; it also has the advantage of getting through most firewalls. Botnets will be a serious problem going forward, and Linux systems are not immune to participation in them. The financial incentive is large and the means of prevention are weak, at least so far. As we have learned by trying to deal with spam, money makes our adversaries much more inventive which makes long-term solutions hard to come by.
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