Lecture 6 Recap Nice properties of DP Composition Post - Processing Group Privacy Interpreting DP.

- Solving Seletion Problem with DP.

Definition. (Differential Privacy)

A is \mathcal{E} -differentially private if

for all neighbors \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{X}' for all subsets E of outputs $P[A(x) \in E] \leq e^{\mathcal{E}} P[A(x') \in E]$ How small can \mathcal{E} be?

Adaptive Composition (of 2 mechanisms)

Suppose
$$A_1 = \chi^n \mapsto \chi_1$$
 is $\underline{\mathcal{E}}_1 - DP$.

 $A_2 = (\chi_1 \times \chi^n) \to \chi_2$ Satisfies $\underline{\mathcal{E}}_2 - DP$

Then. $A(x) = a_1 \leftarrow A_1(x)$
 $a_2 \leftarrow A_2(a_1, x)$
Return (a_1, a_2)
is $(\underline{\mathcal{E}}_1 + \underline{\mathcal{E}}_2) - DP$.

Composition of K algorithms A_1, \ldots, A_k The choice of $A_{\hat{i}}$ depends on $A_1, \ldots, A_{\hat{i}-1}$'s outputs

The "adaptive" composition of A_1, \ldots, A_k is $\left(\sum_{i=1}^k E_i\right)$ where each A_i is $E_i - DP$.

Proof by induction.

Post - Processing Lemma

$$x \rightarrow A \rightarrow a \rightarrow b \rightarrow b$$

Lemma. If $A: x^n \mapsto Y$ is $E-DP$,

then $B(A(\cdot))$ is $E-DP$ for any $B:Y \mapsto Y'$.

Proof. Fix x , x' , any event $E \subseteq Y$.

Neighbors on B that is deterministic.

Let $B^+(E) = \{a \mid B(a) \in E\}$
 $P[B(A(x)) \in E] = P[A(x) \in B^+(E)]$
 $= e^E P[B(A(x')) \in E]$

for B to randomized, $B(a) = f(a, R)$ sources of randomized $A'(x) = (A(x), R)$ is $E-DP$ by amposition.

 $B(A(x)) = f(A(x), R)$ is $E-DP$ by proposessing deterministic.

 $A'(x) = (A(x), R)$ is $E-DP$ by proposessing deterministic.

Group Privacy

"What is revealed about k people?"

Lemma. Let
$$A: X^n \longrightarrow Y$$
 be $\underline{\varepsilon} - DP$

If X and X' differ by k records,

then for any $E \subseteq Y$
 $P[A(x) \in E] \leq e^{k\varepsilon} P[A(x) \in E]$

Proof by picture

$$\chi = \chi^{(e)} \qquad \chi^{(a)} \qquad \chi$$

Observation: Any pair of data sets X, \widetilde{X} differ by at most n records

 \Rightarrow $R[A(X) \in E] \leq e^{ne} P[A(X) \in E]$

If $\mathcal{E} << \frac{1}{n}$, two prob. are almost the same.

"No weful info is released."

Interpreting Differential Privacy.

- What should privacy mean?

Naîve hope: You cannot learn anything about me.

Alice is a smoker.

Smoking -> Lung Cancer

BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL

LONDON SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 30 1950

SMOKING AND CARCINOMA OF THE LUNG

PRELIMINARY REPORT

RICHARD DOLL, M.D., M.R.C.P.

Member of the Statistical Research Unit of the Medical Research Council

AND

A. BRADFORD HILL, Ph.D., D.Sc.

Professor of Medical Statistics, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; Honorary Director of the Statistical Research Unit of the Medical Research Council

In England and Wales the phenomenal increase in the number of deaths attributed to cancer of the lung provides one of the most striking changes in the pattern of may well have been contributory. As a corollary, it is right and proper to seek for other causes.

But we learn about this whether or not Alice's data is in the study

Differential Privacy Implication

We leam (almost) the same thing about Alice whether or not her data was used.

Formulize W/ Bayesian Stats.

prior P[X], show P[X|A(n)] ~ P[X|A(n)]

Frank McSherry blog post.

Costevior.

Variations on DP?

Additive variation? Stability property. $P[A(x) \in E] \leq P[A(x') \in E] + S$ $Still \ has : Composition, post-processing, group privacy$ $If \ S \leftarrow \frac{1}{n}, \quad P[A(x) \in E] \sim P[A(x') \in E]$ $\forall x, \tilde{x}$ then A is not useful.

"Name & Shame" Algorithm $NS_{S}(\chi_{1}, \chi_{2}, \ldots, \chi_{n})$ For each i = 1, ..., nRelease $V_i = \{ \frac{\chi_i}{\perp} \quad w.p. \delta \}$ For S in order of $\frac{1}{n}$ (e.g. $\frac{20}{n}$) NSE exposes some individuals data in the clear. Approximate DP. \forall neighbors x & x', $E \subseteq \Gamma$. $\mathbb{R}[A(x) \in E] \leq e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{R}[A(x') \in E] + S$ (2,8) - differential privacy. 8 << \(\frac{1}{n}\). for A to be meaningfully private.

Selection Problem

Heavy Hitter Set of websites {1,...,d} Example. Each user submits $\chi_i \subseteq \{1, ..., d\}$ \in they visit. Winner: website with the highest score: VjE {1..., d} $\mathcal{G}(\hat{j}; x) = |\{i \mid j \in x_i\}\}$. # users visiting v minimize. Error = max & (j;x) - & (A(x);x) & score-> Randonized Response on each Xi -> Laplace mechanism on & s. How much noise do you add? GS (g(1)..., g(d)) = d.] -> err scales w/ d.

exp mech has err scaling while)

Example 2: Pricing a digital good.

- · Selling an app; what price?
- · n people 's valuations: "How much are they willing

Revenue:
$$\frac{g(p; x) = p \cdot \# \{i : x_i > p\}}{g(p; x)} = \frac{3}{x_2 = 1}$$
Error
$$\max_{p} g(p, x) - g(A(x), x) \qquad x_3 = 1$$

$$\frac{\chi_2}{g(p, x)} = \frac{1}{x_1 + y} = \frac{1}{x_2 + y}$$

$$\frac{\chi_3}{g(p, x)} = \frac{1}{x_2 + y}$$

$$\frac{\chi_4}{g(p, x)} = \frac{1}{x_2 + y}$$
Optimal price?

Formulation: Selection Problem Y: possible outcomes $g: Y \times X^n \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}$ "score" function measures how good y is on dataset X. $% = \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left($ $\xi(y; \bullet)$ has $GS_{\xi} \leq \Delta$. Exponential Mechanism. Afm (x, g, E, 2) Output an outcome y with prob. $\propto \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2\Delta} \mathcal{F}(y;x)\right)$ proportional to When is the prob. distribution well-defined?) Finite Y: $P[A(x)=y] = \frac{1}{C_x} exp(\frac{\varepsilon}{2a} \varepsilon(y;x))$ with $G_{z} = \frac{Z}{y'} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2\delta} g(y'; \chi)\right)$ 2) Infinite & or Continuous & depends on Cx is well-defined.