Arto Bendiken

ASIMOV Protocol on NEAR DevHub Live #39

Thu, 20 Feb 2025 14:20:00 +0000

ASIMOV Protocol at the NEAR Town Hall

Thu, 06 Feb 2025 08:00:00 +0000

Interview with The National

Mon, 18 Mar 2024 12:00:00 +0000

Open Letter to Marc Andreessen

Wed, 27 Dec 2023 01:00:00 +0000

Dear Mr. Andreessen,

I was saddened but unsurprised to observe that your recent Techno-Optimist Manifesto received more than its share of negative coverage in America and Europe.

Your armchair critics in the press highlighted how they’d read your 5,000-word manifesto “so [we] don’t have to”, and, smug in their luxury beliefs, lambasted your audacity in defending or—God forbid—promoting capitalism and free markets, the very foundations they owe their comfortable lives to.

You had surely hoped for a better class of critics, but as a self-made man in this twilight of Western civilization where could you have aspired to find them? It could not have been in the tech press, which now bears little resemblance to, say, Wired as we knew it back in the ‘90s.

No, these were the kind of journos who painted the night sky “dystopian” after Starlink redefined connectivity, and who maligned the test launches of Starship—the most powerful rocket ever built—as “failures”. Nearer to me, over here in Dubai, they called the Burj Khalifa—the tallest skyscraper on the planet, reaching over half a mile into the sky—“a frightening, purposeless monument”.

Here on the opposite side of the globe from you, I for one appreciated your manifesto. Taking a less US-centric point of view, however, I do believe that the great pure techno-optimist cities—or city-states, as they may be—of Earth presently number only two: Dubai and Singapore.

Certainly, participation awards might be meted out to Hong Kong, Seoul, Shenzhen, Taipei, Tokyo, and San Francisco, for starters—but they’re each encumbered or hampered in some essential way.

Be that as it may, since you indicated you’d love to see more substantive responses, I’d like to share with you a little about my own experiences in techno-optimist Dubai, one of the miracles and wonders of the modern world and what I’ve come to consider Western civilization’s last outpost.

Call it the City of Gold or the City of Dreams, it is one of those matters where perspective is worth a number of IQ points.

I posit that Dubai—indeed, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—is mankind’s first large-scale terraforming project. The climate here in this nook of the Arabian Peninsula is one of the true extremes on the planet: hot and arid almost without peer. It is not business as usual, it is not in the nature of things, and it was not preordained that one might found a great city here.

Without technology, life here in the middle of a vast desert pierced by the Tropic of Cancer would be marginal and intolerable but for tiny settlements of the hardiest souls. For over a millennium, the indigenous Bedouin tribes maintained a stable population of just 80,000 in the area that today comprises the UAE.

Until electricity arrived in the 1960s, almost nobody in Dubai had ever seen or tasted ice. Businesses closed for a long siesta from noon to 4:00 p.m. In summertime, villagers slept on the roofs of their houses, wrapped in wet cloth. The pace of life was slow, belying all still to come.

It was and is technology that makes civilization and comfort possible here; in particular air conditioning, seawater desalination, ubiquitous irrigation, cloud seeding, and nuclear power. Thus it’s little wonder that there is techno-optimism built right into the founding ethos of the city and the country.

Air conditioning (A/C) is not really optional in Dubai. Whether at home or in your car, A/C is baseline tech that makes life tolerable and pleasant for those us expats who constitutionally would not claim to be as robust as the indigenous Bedouin.

Accordingly, in Dubai today, metro stations are air-conditioned. Curbside bus shelters are air-conditioned. Pedestrian bridges over freeways are air-conditioned. Zoos, when outdoors, are intensively ventilated with fans that also spray a fine mist of water to cool visitors and animals both.

I’ve never myself experienced an electricity outage in my years in Dubai; but understandably, were electricity and A/C to ever shut off in a skyscraper or high-rise in the middle of the summer, the greenhouse effect would quickly cook the interior uninhabitable. As that’s unthinkable, they are built with backup generators to keep the electrons flowing.

Consider another fundamental of life: water. Despite the region’s extreme scarcity of fresh water, Dubai consumes 1.4 billion liters every day. Indeed the emirate is a top global consumer of fresh water, alongside the US and Canada. Up to 98.8% of Dubai’s water originates from desalinated seawater: the country’s overall desalination capacity is now a staggering 7.2 billion liters of water per day, or 83,000+ liters per second. That, then, is what it takes to make a desert inhabitable.

Dubai has sometimes been slandered as supposedly the least sustainable city on the planet, what with needing to power its skyscrapers. Such a perspective discounts the harsh natural environment the city finds itself in: just consider, if you would, that when the first Moon colony eventually will be established, it will no doubt be mankind’s least sustainable settlement. Until then, Dubai.

In fact, though, Dubai is the most sustainable city in its wider region, and sustainability initiatives are a major and routine focus for its government. I’ll also note in passing that the example of Dubai demonstrates that in case drought in California ever should seem unsolvable, that is certainly not due to a lack of applicable technology nor available capital, but must be due to other factors.

Despite being built on top of the desert, Dubai is also increasingly green. In the plainly observable, not ideological, sense. Scarcely a tree or plant in Dubai lacks its very own dedicated water supply. Once you know to look for it, you’ll notice the irrigation piping everywhere. I haven’t found the overall statistics, but there must be countless thousands of kilometers of piping in the city as a whole.

In newly-built developments where the pipes might not yet be operational, an early riser will see a remarkable sight: a team of two guys watering plants from a 10,000-gallon truck, one of them driving the truck at walking speed and the other following behind the truck hosing down each plant. Quite the job.

It may sound like science fiction, but another reason Dubai is increasingly greener and wetter is that in this country clouds and rains are now frequently artificial, based on cloud-seeding technology. Since the 1990s hundreds of cloud-seeding missions are flown annually, with the aircraft typically taking about three hours to target a handful of promising clouds.

The perception on the ground here is that this is working: winters are in fact cloudier and wetter, it occasionally rains even in the summer, and veteran desert safari guides who’ve observed the desert for decades have corroborated that the desert itself is greening by the year. So, if inspired by Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy to see terraforming in action, just visit the UAE and book your desert safari!

With a population of only 10 million inhabitants—of whom 3.6 million are in Dubai—the UAE is punching significantly above its weight class across the board. In 1950, Dubai was a small town with a population of just 20,000 souls; in the 73 years since, it has grown 180-fold. Even as recently as 2010, Dubai’s population was still only 1.8 million, meaning it doubled in the short 13 years since.

Should similar growth continue, Dubai is well on its way to flipping New York City on a lot of metrics over this coming decade. The trajectory is clear, and uncontested.

One of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world, some 90% of Dubai’s population are immigrants—including yours truly.

Despite massive—by American or European standards—continuing immigration, welcoming everyone from anywhere, the UAE notably has not suffered the kinds of problematic consequences from immigration that bedevil its Western counterparts.

Economist Milton Friedman explained decades ago where Western welfare states went wrong, but seeing this contrast in Dubai truly underlined for me that immigration, per se, is not the problem.

Rather, whatever the problem might be, the solution is prioritizing the protection of people and property through the competent and efficient administration of justice that disincentivizes bad behavior. (Just as President Bukele on his part showed the world in El Salvador earlier this year.)

The UAE is a peaceful and safe high-trust country, and Dubai itself is one of the very safest cities in the world. Many of the people I know here don’t even bother to lock their cars and/or homes.

Indeed, in the most recent Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the UAE was ranked second only to my native Finland in the Safety and Security rankings. (Singapore and Hong Kong were also ranked closely right behind the UAE. For reference, the US ranked 84th.)

Dubai is a great place for families, in particular. My wife really appreciates always feeling safe and knowing our young children will be okay even if out of sight. She also appreciates the cultural respect for families and mothers.

None of these matters can any longer be taken for granted in much of continental Europe. The wife also lauds the relative cleanliness of the city and the evident continuous great efforts that go into keeping it that way.

Despite its humble origins and its inhospitable location in a desert, Dubai today is home to the world’s tallest skyscraper and seven of the world’s ten tallest hotels, and it is also the city with the most skyscrapers per capita. And Dubai is, of course, known globally for having built the largest and most distinct man-made islands on the planet, readily visible from orbit.

Dubai hosts the world’s busiest international airport, with the world’s largest airport terminal, which makes sense given that the UAE is now the world’s fourth-most-visited country.

The city’s massive visitor infrastructure also comes in useful for events such as GITEX, the world’s largest annual tech & startup event every October, attracting more than 170,000 attendees from 170+ countries, with the exhibition space spanning 33 football fields.

Dubai and the UAE maintain such an affinity for world records that even the annual New Year’s Eve fireworks routinely get certified as Guinness World Records, and highlight the friendly competition within the country for which city can throw the most spectacular show.

Living in Dubai feels like having one foot in the future. Dubai is currently rolling out self-driving taxis as Cruise’s first non-US deployment. And some months from now, electric air taxis carrying up to six passengers will begin initial testing in the city. Competing air taxi companies are scheduled to launch the following year. The first vertiports for air taxis have been approved for construction and are set to open in 2026.

The Economist recently highlighted the UAE as the third-most-important country for artificial intelligence (AI) development, after America and China—this with a population 1/34th that of the US and 1/140th that of China.

The UAE, strategic and forward-looking as it is, has had a minister of AI since 2017, and the country’s open-source Falcon large language model offers an escape hatch to the circa 95.8% of the global population who might wish to work around the limitations of Silicon Valley-trained AIs that censor answers as per the Valley’s insular moral matrix.

Oh, I might also mention that Abu Dhabi’s cutting-edge Technology Innovation Institute (TII), who actually developed Falcon, landed as their new CEO the former CTO of Lockheed Martin, previously responsible for 72,000 staff and 4,000 programs. That is the caliber of talent now flowing into the country, and of course being headhunted in.

The UAE is the only nation with a population of less than 100 million to have attempted—and then successfully orbited—a mission to Mars, and only the fifth nation to ever have done so. It is the only spacefaring nation now drawing up plans to mine the asteroid belt.

(Speaking of mining, it is also one of the few places where crazy businessmen can propose towing icebergs from Antarctica to Dubai as a tourist attraction without getting laughed out of the room.)

As for Mars, after navigating the spacecraft half a billion kilometers in the void, the UAE’s space agency inserted the craft neatly into Martian orbit on their first attempt—and yet this agency did not even exist just six years before the launch.

The prevailing mindset here deserves a paraphrase of a former American leader: “We choose to go to [Mars] in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win, and the others, too.”

How did such a miracle in the desert come about? And why is it that a city like Dubai could only be built—really, could only be suffered to exist—in such a marginal landscape?

Westerners tend to dismiss Dubai’s success by claiming that everything’s easy when you’ve got oil, and that “they” could have done all that if only provided those resources.

Yet those who say this don’t even know that less than 1% of Dubai’s gross domestic product actually derives from oil, nor that Dubai’s share of total UAE oil reserves is a mere 4%.

By comparison, tourism accounts for more than 20% of Dubai’s GDP. Furthermore, the miracle of Dubai has yet to be replicated anywhere else in the wider oil-rich region. (It’s not the oil, dummies.)

Consider the ELI5 version of Dubai’s origin story as extracted from award-winning journalist Jim Krane’s excellent book City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream of Capitalism (2010), emphasis mine:

This is the story of a small Arab village that grew into a big city. No one thought the village would become a city. It sat on the edge of a vast desert, surrounded by a sea of sand. There was no running water, no ice, no radio, no road. The village drifted in an eddy of time. While other nations launched rockets into space, the villagers fished and napped. […]

Foreigners who ventured in liked the village and its ambitious leader, a man named Rashid. The village grew into a town. The foreigners told Rashid of the wonders of the modern world, the skyscrapers of New York and the London Underground. He listened intently.

Rashid and his townspeople were dismayed to learn that no one in the outside world had ever heard of them. Rashid decided this would change. Rashid wanted the name of his town, Dubai, on the lips of every person on earth.

When a family sat down to dinner in America, Rashid wanted them to discuss the happenings of Dubai. And when two Englishmen paused for a glass of beer, it was Dubai that he wished them to talk about. Farmers in China, bankers in Switzerland, and generals in Russia: All of them must know of Dubai. For this to happen, the town couldn’t stay small and poor. Rashid made a wish. Dubai must become the most luxurious city the world has ever known: the City of Gold.

Sheikh Rashid’s dream for Dubai was as audacious as it was improbable. Yet here we are, two generations later. The aforementioned book has the rest of the story, and what a good yarn it is!

One would surely be wise to not bet against men like this, for the laws of plausibility and probability don’t seem to operate in their usual manner around them, showing that luck is not found so much as made. That, of course, is exactly the reality-distortion field that certain Silicon Valley founders are also known for—but here writ large, determining the fates of peoples and nations.

As Sheikh Rashid’s son Sheikh Mohammed, the present Ruler of Dubai, has been known to say: “We, in the UAE, have no such word as “impossible”; it does not exist in our lexicon. Such a word is used by the lazy and the weak, who fear challenges and progress. When one doubts his potential and capabilities as well as his confidence, he will lose the compass that leads him to success and excellence, thus failing to achieve his goal.”

This echoes the famous quip usually attributed to Henry Ford: “Whether you believe you can do a thing or not, you are right.”

The miracle that is Dubai is rare in the modern world, but it is by no means singular. To mention but a few parallels, it was also the miracle of Singapore, the miracle of Hong Kong, and—a long time ago—the miracle of New York. Without question, as you know, it is replicable given the right preconditions, and one might hope the case example of Dubai sufficiently underlines that if it can be done in the middle of a desert, it could surely be done anywhere.

Milton Friedman in his classic Free to Choose (1980) broadcast highlighted Hong Kong in particular, explaining how the city grew prosperous from millions of people freely pursuing their own self-interest.

Not shown in that broadcast, in the subsequent forty plus years Hong Kong’s counterpart on the mainland, Shenzhen, also developed from a fishing village into a metropolis of 17.5 million inhabitants after being chartered as China’s first special economic zone in, you guessed it, 1980.

The same forty plus years later, it seems likely that had Prof. Friedman been writing today, he might have based many of his examples on Dubai. Be that as it may, virtually all of Prof. Friedman’s arguments are as applicable to Dubai as to Hong Kong, and in point of fact 2023 is when Dubai proceeded to flip Hong Kong on metrics such as skyscrapers per capita.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe in his study of incentives and property rights under monarchy versus democracy concluded that monarchy is generally preferable to democracy, because monarchs tend to have a lower time preference and a long-term interest in capital value. This leads to more prudent and farsighted management of resources and less exploitation of subjects.

This is in contrast to politicians in a democracy who are temporary caretakers instead of owners, and are hence incentivized to maximize short-term gains often at the expense of long-term capital value. This leads to higher taxes, more regulations, and less respect for property rights, as democratic rulers have less personal stake in the long-term health and wealth of the country.

As a fellow fan of that inimitable old curmudgeon, H.L. Mencken, who had some choice bits to say about democracy, I know you would at least humor the argument. Prof. Hoppe’s predictions can readily be observed manifested in the UAE, where the ruling families have a proprietary long-term, multi-generational interest in the future of the country. They have skin in the game, they plan up to 50 years forward from the present, and they value results over intentions.

They also don’t mistreat their populace by imposing any personal income tax, capital gains tax, or property tax. Freehold property ownership is available even to noncitizens. Respect for property rights is the basis for the virtuous spiral that drives investment into the country on both the macro and micro levels.

In terms of Machiavelli’s political cycle, Dubai and the UAE are yet but at the dawn of their golden age. Meanwhile, the hour already grows late for the US welfare-warfare state in this its oligarchic stage—as you have yourself observed and previously noted. No other social cycle model, such as Ray Dalio’s changing world order, offers any cheerier prognosis for the late-stage Pax Americana.

In your present circumstances, you are ruled by a resentful and ideologically-possessed elite who are well insulated from the consequences of their bad ideas and incompetence. At some point, trying to reform—or simply endure—American exceptionalism will surely come to feel quixotic, and the agency costs tally will grow too high.

At that time, consider going on adventure and trading in chronically-elevated cortisol for jubilantly-high testosterone punctuated by the occasional high-G jolt of pure adrenaline. If technology is a lever on the world, you still need a firm place to stand to move the world. Consider, if you would, whether your lever is optimally positioned for maximum effect. Who is John Galt, anyway?

Happy holidays to you & yours,

Arto Bendiken

Co-Founder & CTO, Haltia.AI

Interview with AI Time Journal

Fri, 01 Dec 2023 12:00:00 +0000

Meet the Team: Arto Bendiken

Thu, 23 Mar 2023 12:00:00 +0000

Humans of NEAR: Arto Bendiken

Tue, 16 Feb 2021 12:00:00 +0000

Building Arweave Smart Contracts with Clarity

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Stacks Grants Demo Day

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Cypherpunk Bitstream: Pandemic II

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Cypherpunk Bitstream: Pandemic I

Mon, 16 Mar 2020 21:00:00 +0000

Тіло веде рахунок: мозок, думка та тіло у лікуванні травми

Thu, 26 Dec 2019 16:00:00 +0000

Це резюме книги було спочатку опубліковане Тіаґо Форте, англійською мовою. Переклад на українську Юлії Олех. (This book summary originally published in English by Tiago Forte. Translation into Ukrainian by Yulia Olekh.)

Беручи цю книгу до рук уперше, я не міг уявити, навіщо мені вона.

Це книга про травму – чим вона є, звідки береться та як її лікувати. Але ж я ніколи не страждав від насильства, стихійного лиха, чи нападу… Жодної травми у мене не було…

Чи була?

Перегортаючи сторінки – спершу повільно, а тоді дедалі швидше, - я бачив цілком нову концепцію травми, не подібну на будь-що з того, з чим я стикався раніше.

Роками я був занурений в «розвиток особистості», одержимий розкриттям прихованих істин та переписуванням обмежуючих переконань. Я прочитав незліченні книжки з позитивної психології, духовного зростання та подолання когнітивних упереджень. Проте якось ніколи я не приділяв часу тому, щоби справді зрозуміти, що лежить у корені порушеної психіки.

На сторінках перед собою я побачив стільки складнощів, які відзначав у себе, своїх студентів та своїх клієнтів роками – і лише цього разу вони були зібрані за спільною ознакою побічних ефектів травми. Приміром:

складнощі з концентрацією уваги та пам’яттю;
сенсорне перевантаження та відокремлення важливого від неважливого;
складнощі з розслабленням та сном;
вивчення нового та зміна поведінки;
культивація впевненості в собі та самоконтролю;
страх та роздратування, пов’язані з ризиковими ситуаціями;
доступ до уяви та креативності у повній мірі;
сумніви в собі та перфекціонізм;
хронічні втома та виснаження;
підтримка мотивації та цілеспрямованості.

Для мене було шоком дізнатися, що розповсюдженим симптомом травми є не лише нестача уваги, а і надмірна її концентрація. Обидва ці стани можуть бути формами дисоціації – спроби втекти з моменту часу. Навіть ті з нас, кому легко бути «продуктивними», не захищені від впливу травми.

«Чи може це бути ключем до того, що мучить нас так сильно?» - думав я. Чи може це бути головною причиною стількох проблем, які не дають нам досягти найрадісніших цілей та мрій?

Нижче я склав резюме книги «Тіло веде рахунок», тому що я хочу, щоб інформація з неї розповсюдилась якнайширше. Ці відкриття критично необхідні для всіх галузей - від освіти до соціальної політики, охорони здоров’я, юриспруденції, персонального розвитку і набагато більше. Фактично, мені важко назвати сферу, на яку вони б не мали впливу.

Автором книги є доктор Бессель Ван дер Колк, і в ній підсумований його сорокарічний досвід вивчення впливу травми на розвиток мозку та емоційну регуляцію в дитинстві. Як клініцист та дослідник у Гарвардському та Бостонському університетах, він видав понад 150 академічних публікацій, а також очолював дослідження про ефективність йоги, Десенситизацію та Відновлення Рухових Функцій Ока, нейрофідбек, МДМА, театр та інші методи лікування травми.

Іншими словами, ніхто інший не може говорити про науковий та особистий вплив травми настільки кваліфіковано, у різноманітних контекстах.

Я зосереджуся на тому, що вважаю найголовнішими, незвичними та потужними точками головної думки доктора Ван дер Колка. Всі дослідження та висновки – з книги. Всі помилки чи упущення – мої власні.

Травма - універсальна

Як затверджено на самому початку книги, травма – це майже універсальна частина людського досвіду.

Ми часто думаємо, що травма стається лише в екстремальних обставинах – зґвалтування, жорстоке поводження, фізичне насильство, надзвичайна зневага, напади, домашнє насильство або стихійні лиха. Проте все це – гостра травма, яка є лише одним з видів травми.

Та навіть гостра травма – розповсюджена. Дослідження Центру Контролю Хвороб показало, що кожен п’ятий американець зазнав сексуального насильства в дитинстві; кожного четвертого бив хтось з батьків; кожен четвертий зростав поряд з родичем-алкоголіком; кожен восьмий став свідком побиття власної матері.

Це жахливі цифри, які набагато перевищили очікування навіть досвідчених лікарів. Дитячі травми – тиха епідемія, адже лише третина опитаних у знаковому дослідженні АСЕ (з якого ми беремо ці відкриття) повідомила про відсутність такого досвіду.

За оцінками Центру Контролю Хвороб, загальні витрати на наслідки дитячих та підліткових травм перевищили витрати на лікування раку та хвороб серця. А викорінення дитячого аб’юзу знизило б загальний рівень депресій більш ніж на половину; алкоголізму – на дві третини; самогубств, вживання ін’єкційних наркотиків та домашнього насильства – на три чверті.

Проте навіть для тих з нас, хто не переживав таких моментів, залишається тонше та менш помітне джерело травми: хронічне емоційне насильство або зневага. Неймовірно: дослідження Ван дер Колка показало, що таке насильство та зневага можуть бути настільки ж нищівними, як фізичний аб’юз та зґвалтування.

Він цитує працю про дитячу прихильність своєї гарвардського колеги Карлен Лайонс-Рут. Доктор Лайонс-Рут у 1980-х провела впливове дослідження, в якому стежила за дітьми від народження до 20 років. Гіпотеза полягала в тому, що ворожа чи нав'язлива поведінка матерів стане найважливішим показником психічної нестабільності у їхніх дітей в дорослому віці.

Натомість було виявлено, що найглибший та найтриваліший вплив має емоційна відстороненість матері.

Якщо той, хто піклується про вас, регулярно ігнорує ваші потреби, ви вчитеся передбачати відмову та відсторонення. Ви боретесь з цим, закриваючись від ворожості та зневаги та поводячись так, наче вони для вас неважливі. Проте, тіло веде рахунок: воно залишається у стані підвищеної тривоги, готове витримати удари, депривацію та самотність.

Одним з найбільш руйнівних наслідків цього, як дізнався Ван дер Колк, є «відсутність внутрішнього відчуття справжності» Коли ви не почуваєтесь справжнім, все інше не має значення. Неможливо захистити себе від небезпеки чи потурбуватись про власні потреби. Ви можете вдаватися до крайнощів, щоб відчути хоч щось – навіть до того, щоб різати себе лезом бритви або до бійок з незнайомцями.

Все це переходить з нами в доросле життя і не минає саме собою. Дитині, яку ігнорували чи постійно принижували, скорше за все , бракуватиме самоповаги. Дітям, яким не дозволяли захищати себе, буде важко відстоювати власну думку. І багато дорослих, які в дитинстві зазнали грубого поводження, усе життя стримуватимуть в собі палючий гнів.

Як спостерігали психологи – протягом усього часу від Фройда та Броєра, «фізична травма – або, точніше, пам’ять про травму, - виконує роль стороннього тіла, потрапляння якого має продовжувати розглядатись як агент, який все ще працює».

Іншими словами, пам’ять про травму – це наче скалка, що потрапила в розум: реакція організму на стороннє тіло стає більшою проблемою, ніж воно саме.

З точки зору неврології, дослідження графічних зображень мозку пацієнтів з травмою виявляють аномальну активність інсули. Інсула об’єднує та інтерпретує інформацію органів чуття та за потреби передає сигнали «бий або біжи» до мигдалини.

У людей з травмою ці сигнали увімкнені весь час. Вони не потребують жодного конкретного впливу – ви просто постійно перебуваєте на межі без жодної очевидної причини. У вас може виникнути відчуття приреченості, або - що щось пішло не так. Ці почуття потужні, вони виникають глибоко всередині мозку і розуміння причинно-наслідкових зв’язків не в змозі їх відімкнути.

Ван дер Колк розповідає про сильну особистість, судового адвоката, з яким він колись працював. Адвокат був активною, успішною людиною, яку заслужено поважали за досягнення. Проте сам він не міг ними насолоджуватись. Виграючи справу, він удавав задоволення, а коли програвав, то здавалося, що він сам змирився з поразкою задовго до того, як вона насправді відбулася.

Цей адвокат повністю розчинявся у розробці стратегії виграшу справи, він міг не спати ночами, заглиблюючись у деталі. «Це був наче бій», - казав він. Він почувався живим уповні, - і наче все інше не має значення. Проте, коли справа завершувалась, перемогою чи поразкою, він втрачав свою енергію та цілеспрямованість.

Ця історія ілюструє розповсюджений досвід тих, хто переживає травму: вони почуваються вповні живими лише коли занурюються у щось, що дозволяє їм втекти з теперішньої реальності. Та за це вони платять жвавістю, мотивацією, захопленням та цілеспрямованістю в інші періоди свого життя.

Травма стає фізичними симптомами

Коли люди постійно відчувають злість або страх, тривале напруження м’язів урешті-решт призводить до спазмів, болю у спині, мігрені, фіброміалгії та інших видів болю.

Інші розповсюджені стани, які часто не мають фізичної причини, - це хронічні болі в шиї, проблеми з травленням, спазми кишківника / синдром подразненого кишківника, хронічна втома та деякі форми астми. Частота виникнення астми у травмованих дітей у п'ятдесят разів вища, ніж у їхніх нетравматизованих однолітків.

Ці люди можуть звертатися до багатьох фахівців, проходити розгорнуті обстеження та отримувати призначення медикаментів. Все це може дати тимчасове полегшення, але так і не вирішує основної причини.

Ще один поширений симптом - алекситимія, при якій людина повідомляє про відчуття фізичного дискомфорту, не маючи можливості точно описати, у чому саме проблема. Це відбувається через самозаглиблення, яке заважає реагувати на звичайні потреби свого тіла спокійно та раціонально – приміром, пересуватися в кріслі, робити вправи на розтягнення м’язів, пити воду або ходити на прогулянку.

Якщо Ви не розумієте потреб свого тіла, Ви не можете піклуватися про нього. Якщо Ви не відчуваєте голоду, то не можете дати собі достатньо поживних речовин. Якщо Ви плутаєте роздратованість з голодом, Ви їсте забагато. І якщо Ви не можете відчути насичення, то продовжуватимете їсти.

Вплив травми

Загалом, вплив травми можна описати як «втрата відчуття життєрадісності, мотивації, захоплення та цілеспрямованості».

На знимках мозку 18 пацієнтів з ПТСР (Посттравматичний стресовий розлад) дослідники виявили дещо вражаюче: активність у «самовідчуваючих» ділянках мозку була майже відсутньою, у порівнянні з нетравматизованими особами. Середня префронтальна кора, передня звивина, тім’яна кора та інсула були темні.

Вони зробили висновок про те, що «у відповідь на свою травму та намагаючись впоратись з тривалим відчуттям страху, ці пацієнти навчилися вимикати ділянки мозку, які передають вісцеральні відчуття та емоції, що визначають жах та супроводжують його».

Проблема в тому, що ті самі ділянки водночас відповідають за виникнення всього спектру емоцій та відчуттів, що складають основу нашої самосвідомості. Дослідники стали свідками жахливого компромісу: у спробі відімкнути страхітливі відчуття було знищено і можливість радіти життю.

Травмовані люди часто втрачають цілеспрямованість та напрямок, тому що не можуть узгодити з самими собою свої справжні бажання, визначені найпростішими відчуттями тіла – бази для емоцій, таких як бажання та пристрасть. В окремих випадках втрата самоусвідомлення є настільки глибокою, що особа не здатна впізнати себе у дзеркалі.

Пригнічення почуттів забирає в людини величезну кількість енергії. А на змістовні цілі енергії лишається менше, і це викликає почуття знудженості та відімкнення. У той самий час гормони стресу наповнюють організм, що призводить до болю в голові та м’язах, проблем з кишківником, сексуальних розладів або агресивної поведінки з оточенням.

Ось цитата, де потужно описане те, чого бракує:

«Всі ми, особливо – діти, потребуємо такої впевненості – впевненості, що інші знають про нас, визнають нас та підтримують нас. Без цього ми не можемо розвинути відчуття сприяння, яке дасть можливість стверджувати: «Ось – те, у що я вірю, ось – те, що я відстоюю, ось – те, чому я себе присвячую» Поки ми відчуваємо себе в безпеці, маючи місце у серцях та думках люблячих людей, ми підкоримо вершини, перейдемо пустелі та проведемо ночі без сну, завершуючи проєкти. Діти та дорослі зроблять що завгодно для тих, кому довіряють і чию думку цінують».

На карті світу, що базується на травмах, аб’юзі та приниженні, травмовані люди часто шукають шляхи до забуття. Передчуваючи неприйняття, глузування та самотність, вони неохоче пробують нові варіанти, адже впевнені, що ці варіанти призведуть до невдач. Ця нестача експериментування веде їх у світ страху, ізоляції та обмежень, куди неможливо запросити новий досвід, який міг би змінити їхній базовий світогляд.

У травмованих осіб відмічають суттєвий брак уяви. Коли їх компульсивно та безперервно тягне у минуле, вони не можуть уявити собі іншого майбутнього.

Але ж уява є необхідною для якості нашого життя. Вона запалює нашу креативність, лікує нудьгу, полегшує наш біль, посилює задоволення та збагачує наші найближчі стосунки. Без неї немає надії, нема шансу передбачити краще майбутнє, нема куди йти та нема чого досягати.

Іншими розповсюдженими симптомами травми є:

Флешбеки та проєкція

Травматична подія мала початок, середину та кінець. Але ще гірші можуть бути флешбеки: ви ніколи не знаєте, коли вони трапляться та як довго триватимуть. Травмовані люди часто «проєктують» свою травму на інших людей і на повсякденні ситуації, вбачаючи ризики та небезпеку там, де їх немає.

Розділення себе та інших

Після травми світ різко ділиться - на тих, хто знає, і тих, хто не знає. Людям, які не ділилися травматичним досвідом, не можна довіряти, оскільки вони не можуть його зрозуміти. На жаль, це часто стосується подружнього партнера, дітей та близьких друзів.

Відчуття оніміння під час дитячих вечірок або на весіллі змушує людей відчувати себе чудовиськами, наче вони не є частиною людського роду. В результаті сором стає домінантною емоцією, а приховування істини - головною справою.

Роз’єднання з власним тілом

Ван дер Колк та його колеги часто відзначали суттєвий брак фізичної координації серед пацієнтів: їм було важко займатися спортом, поставити намет, керувати човном. Здавалося навіть, що їм важко підтримувати повсякденну розмову.

Врешті-решт він зрозумів це як симптоми глибокого розділення з власним тілом. Їхні організми постійно потерпають від вісцеральних тривожних сигналів, тож ці люди навчилися майстерно ігнорувати свої відчуття внутрішньої тривоги та відключати увагу до всього, того, що відбувається всередині.

Панічні атаки

Люди, які не можуть в зручний спосіб відзначити, що відбувається всередині них, стають вразливими до будь-яких сенсорних збуджень та реагують вимкненням або панікою. Віднедавна відомо, що панічні атаки запускає не початковий тригер, а чимраз більший страх перед тілесними відчуттями, які супроводжують саму панічну атаку.

Хронічно підвищені гормони стресу

Травма, яку загнали всередину, може запросто активуватися від найменшого тригера. Величезна кількість гормонів стресу заповнює систему і повернення до вихідного стану забирає набагато більше часу, ніж зазвичай. Підступні наслідки цих процесів включають проблеми з пам’яттю та увагою, дратівливість та порушення сну.

Надконтроль та надзвичайна підозрілість

Бути травмованим означає і далі організовувати своє життя так, ніби травма все ще триває. Це - замкнене коло: кожну нову зустріч і подію безперервно забруднює минуле. Вся енергія людини, яка пережила травму, використовується для придушення внутрішнього хаосу. Результат - відстороненість від життя та станів організму: фіброміалгії, хронічної втоми та аутоімунних захворювань.

Спостерігаючи за людьми з ПТСР, дослідники виявили, що при зустрічі з незнайомцями у цих людей не було активності у лобній долі мозку. Замість відчуття цікавості, в примітивній області, відомій як періакведуктальна сіра речовина, відбулися інтенсивні реакції, що генерували стрімкість, підозрілість, прикриття та іншу самозахисну поведінку. Під чиїмось поглядом ці люди просто переходили в режим виживання.

Дисоціація та уникнення

Дисоціація - це суть травми. Травматичний досвід розділений і фрагментований, тому емоції, звуки, образи, думки та фізичні відчуття окремо вриваються в сьогодення і знову викликають переживання. Навіть на найменші подразники людина реагує наче на загрозу знищення, і не розуміє, в чому річ. Поширена реакція - намагатись реорганізувати своє оточення так, щоб уникнути цих спогадів. Але постійна боротьба з невидимими небезпеками виснажує людей, залишаючи їх втомленими та пригніченими.

Актуалізація травми може бути жахливою і навіть саморуйнівною, але ще гірші наслідки з часом має брак присутності. Дітям, які заявляють про себе, принаймні приділяють час і увагу. А ті, хто просто закривається в собі, - нікого не турбують і залишаються на самоті, крок за кроком втрачаючи власне майбутнє.

Складність інтегрування травматичних спогадів

У звичайних умовах наші емоційні та раціональні системи пам'яті працюють спільно, інтегруючи нові враження в постійний потік. Натомість, під час травматичних подій багато частин мозку вимикаються: області, відповідальні за мову, створення нашого відчуття часу та простору і таламус, який інтегрує необроблені сенсорні дані.

Тепер пам'ять вже не є згуртованою та організованою в логічну розповідь, а зберігається як дезорганізовані «фрагменти» образів, звуків та хаотичних фізичних відчуттів. Таким чином між двома частинами подвійної системи пам'яті виникає стіна. Травматична пам'ять не інтегрується і не поєднується, постійно змінюючи відчуття самоусвідомлення.

Звичайна пам'ять є соціальною та адаптивною - її можна реорганізувати, стиснути для швидшого переказування або розширити до повної деталізації, залежно від потреб моменту. А роздробленість і хаос травматичної пам’яті робить її негнучкою - реконструкція застигає в часі, незмінна і завжди самотня, принизлива і відчужена.

Сенсорне перевантаження

У звичайних обставинах таламус служить фільтром або «воротарем» для надходження інформації. Це робить його центральним компонентом уваги, зосередженості та навчання, які, звісно, пошкоджує травма.

Сенсорні ворота людей з ПТСР - широко відкриті. Брак фільтра прирікає їх на постійне сенсорне перевантаження. Щоби впоратися, ці люди намагаються закритись та розвинути тунельний зір і гіперфокус. Не в змозі зробити цього самостійно, вони можуть звернутися до наркотиків чи алкоголю у бажанні відгородитися від світу. Найсумніше - те, що, закриваючись, вони позбавляють себе задоволення і радості.

Залежність від травми

Ван дер Колк відзначив поширене явище серед своїх пацієнтів, яке він називає “залежністю від травми”.

Виглядає на те, що багато травмованих людей шукають таких переживань, які для більшості з нас виглядають відразливими. А іноді навіть - самого досвіду, який травмував їх з самого початку. Вони кажуть, що без гніву, примусу чи якоїсь небезпечної діяльності відчувають якусь незрозумілу нудьгу та порожнечу.

Вісім ветеранів взяли участь в експерименті: їх попросили тримати руку в болісно холодній воді якомога довше. Одна група переглянула документальний фільм про війну “Платон” - і змогла тримати руку у воді на 30% довше, ніж контрольна група.

Повернення до спогадів про стрес воєнного часу подіяло як позбавлення від болю і тривоги. Дослідники підрахували, що полегшення болю, яке вони зазнали, еквівалентне до восьми міліграмів морфію - приблизно такої ж дози, яку людина отримала б у відділенні невідкладної допомоги при стискаючому болю в грудях.

Це могло би пояснити, чому люди з травмою парадоксально прагнуть страждань, або чому таких людей приваблюють лише ті, хто їх травмує. Адже без внутрішнього почуття захищеності вкрай важко відрізнити безпеку та небезпеку. Якщо ви живете в постійному знечуленні, потенційно небезпечні ситуації можуть повертати вам смак повноцінного життя.

Шляхи лікування

“Тіло веде рахунок” підсумовує кілька десятиліть досліджень природи травми. Спираючись на роботи Ван дер Колка та на багато інших, ця книга відкриває здобутки нового покоління дисциплін, таких як:

Нейрологія - вивчення того, як мозок підтримує психічні процеси.

Психопатологія розвитку - вивчення впливу несприятливих переживань на розвиток розуму та мозку.

Міжособистісна нейробіологія - вивчення того, як наша поведінка впливає на емоції, біологію та розумове налаштування оточення.

Ці дисципліни виявили, що травма викликає фактичні фізіологічні зміни в мозку. Сюди входить перелаштування тривожної системи мозку, збільшення активності гормону стресу та зміни в системі, яка відділяє відповідну інформацію від невідповідної.

Травма призводить до повної перебудови способу керування розумом і тілом; до занурення людей у світ їхньої свідомості, повний ризиків та загроз.

У книзі представлені три шляхи, за допомогою яких ми можемо використовувати природну нейропластику мозку, щоб скасувати наслідки травми:

Згори вниз, шляхом розмов, налагодженням або відновленням зв'язків з іншими людьми. Дозволяючи собі пізнати і зрозуміти, що відбувається всередині нас та обробляючи спогади про травму.
Застосуванням ліків, які вимикають невідповідні реакції тривоги, або використовуючи інші технології, що змінюють спосіб мозку організовувати інформацію.
Знизу догори, дозволяючи тілу відчуття, які є глибокою внутрішньою протилежністю до наслідків травми - безпорадності, люті або краху.

Згори вниз, шляхом розмов

Незважаючи на те, що психоаналіз впав у немилість в останні роки, «лікування розмовами» залишається одним із найвідоміших та найпопулярніших способів подолання травми.

Регулювання «згори вниз» передбачає посилення здатності «внутрішнього менеджера» розуму контролювати відчуття вашого тіла. Його основна презумпція полягає в тому, що детальне згадування про травматичний випадок та його обробка засобами мови допоможе розуму залишити його позаду.

Обмеження в лікуванні розмовою: травма є превербальною. Нейрологічнй дослідження показують, що дуже мало психологічних проблем є наслідком дефектів розуміння. Тому вдосконалення розуміння не допомагає. Більшість психологічних проблем виникають у глибших регіонах мозку, які зачіпають наше сприйняття та дії.

Неочікуваним відкриттям дослідження Ван дер Колка було те, що впродовж флешбеку у травмованих осіб вимкнулася ділянка у лівій лобній долі мозку, що називається ділянкою Брока. Ділянка Брока є мовленнєвим центром, і на неї таким самим чином впливає інсульт. Як і під час інсульту, повторна травма вимикає здатність людей висловити свої переживання.

Одночасно підсвітилася інша одна область мозку під назвою ділянка Бродмана. Це область в нашій зоровій корі, яка реєструє зображення, коли вони вперше потрапляють у мозок. Спалахи травми дезактивують ліву півкулю - відповідальну за слова, логіку та факти - та активують праву півкулю, яка відповідає за спогади про звук, дотик, запах та емоції, які вони викликають. Ці спогади обходять виконавчі функції мозку, змушуючи їх відчувати себе як інтуїтивну істину.

Травма за своєю природою підштовхує людей до межі розуміння. Це позбавляє нас мови, адже мова заснована на спільному досвіді чи осяжному минулому.

Ван дер Колк підсумовує: “Наші дослідження не підтвердили припущення про те, що мова може замінити дії.” Більшість осіб могли розповісти цілісну історію і відчути біль, пов'язаний з тим, що з ними трапилося. Однак, їх продовжували переслідувати нестерпні образи та фізичні відчуття.

Незалежно від того, наскільки прогресує внутрішнє і зовнішнє розуміння, раціональний мозок загалом не здатний промовляти до емоційного мозку з власної реальності. Коли є конфлікт між емоційним та раціональним мозком (приміром, коли нас розлючує хтось, кого ми любимо; лякає хтось, від кого ми залежимо чи ми пристрасно бажаємо когось недосяжного) починається справжня війна. Але ця битва багато в чому розігрується в театрі вісцерального досвіду - в кишківнику, серці, легенях - а не у світі ідей.

Когнітивна поведінкова терапія (КПТ) - більш сучасне втілення розмовного курсу, проте, має багато тих самих недоліків.

КПТ цілком успішно застосовується для ірраціональних страхів, таких як боязнь павуків, але виявилася набагато менш дієвою для лікування травм, особливо у тих, хто потерпав від насильства у дитинстві. Лише приблизно у кожного третього учасника з ПТСР (посттравматичним стресовим розладом), який пройшов до кінця курс КПТ, спостерігалося деяке покращення. У тих, хто пройшов курс КПТ, зазвичай зменшувалася кількість симптомів ПТСР, але і цілковите одужання було рідкістю. Більшість продовжувала мати значні проблеми зі здоров’ям, роботою чи психічним самопочуттям.

Пошук слів для опису того, що трапилося з вами, може частково вплинути, але не завжди скасовує флешбеки, покращує концентрацію, стимулює вас до життєво важливої залученості чи зменшує надчутливість до розчарувань та пережитих травм.

Застосування ліків

Антипсихотичні препарати спричинили значні зміни у психіатрії в останні десятиліття. Вони значною мірою зменшили кількість стаціонарних хворих у психіатричних лікарнях США, з понад 500 000 у 1955 році до менш як 100 000 у 1996 році.

Ван дер Колк характеризує фармакологічну революцію як “неймовірну” та “чудотворну”. Майже за одну ніч він став свідком того, як пацієнти, які провели більшу частину свого життя в замкненій та жахливій власній реальності, несподівано змогли повернутися до своїх сімей та суспільства. Хворі, занурені в темряву і відчай, почали реагувати на красу людських взаємин, задоволення від роботи та гри.

Та зіткнення з межами цих речовин виявилось не менш трансформуючим, ніж вони самі. Випробування препарату Прозак виявили, що він не впливає на ПТСР у ветеранів війни. Ці результати справдились для більшості подальших фармакологічних досліджень за участю ветеранів: хоча деякі з них і показали незначні покращення, користі від більшості ліків не було жодної.

Ван дер Колк дійшов висновку, що психіатричні препарати мають зворотний бік: вони можуть відвернути увагу від розв’язання основних питань. Діагнози, які ставлять людям, можуть позбавити їх контролю над їхньою подальшою долею та передати цю відповідальність лікарям та страховим компаніям

Приміром, антидепресанти. Якби вони справді були постійним, довгостроковим рішенням, депресія вже мала б стати другорядним питанням у суспільстві. Проте, на лікарнях це не позначилось. Кількість людей, що лікуються від депресії, збільшилася втричі за останні два десятиліття, і зараз кожен десятий американець приймає антидепресанти.

Існує також різка розбіжність у застосуванні антипсихотичних ліків у дітей з різним соціально-економічним статусом. Діти з малозабезпечених сімей в чотири рази частіше, ніж приватно застраховані діти, отримують антипсихотичні ліки. Ці препарати часто використовуються для того, щоб полегшити повсякденне спілкування з дітьми, які зазнали жорстокого або зневажливого поводження. Але вони також перешкоджають мотивації, грі та допитливості, які є необхідними для того, щоб вирости повноцінними, компетентними членами суспільства, здатними до співпраці. Крім того, діти, які приймають антидепресанти, ризикують захворіти на ожиріння або діабет.

На основі цих та інших досліджень Ван дер Колк робить висновок, що «… ліки не можуть «вилікувати» травму; вони можуть лише приглушити прояви порушеної психіки». Вони не дають уроків саморегуляції з тривалим ефектом і можуть допомогти контролювати почуття та поведінку, але розплатою за це стане блокування хімічних систем, які регулюють взаємодію, мотивацію, біль та задоволення.

Найбільш суперечливі ліки, так звані «антипсихотичні засоби другого покоління», такі як Ріспердал і Серокель, є лідерами продажів серед психіатричних препаратів у США. Зараз їх приймають понад пів мільйона дітей та підлітків.

Ці антипсихотичні препарати широко застосовуються для лікування дітей, які зазнали насильства та яким неправильно поставили діагноз “біполярний розлад” або “розлад регуляції настрою”. І все ж на найважчі симптоми - дисоціацію, самоушкодження, роздроблені спогади та амнезію - вони, як правило, не впливають.

Водночас, не було проведено досліджень впливу психотропних препаратів на мозок, що розвивається. Ці ліки пригнічують емоційний мозок і, таким чином, роблять дітей менш хитрими чи розлюченими, але можуть також перешкоджати оцінці тонких сигналів приємності, небезпеки чи задоволення. Вони також можуть зробити їх фізично інертними, ще більше посилюючи відчуття відчуженості. Такі ліки можуть працювати на заспокоєння, але вони блокують центри дофамінової винагороди, можуть заважати дружити з іншими дітьми та опанувати навички, відповідні до віку.

Знизу догори, крізь відчуття

Регуляція “знизу догори” передбачає повторне калібрування вегетативної нервової системи (ВНС), яка бере свій початок у стовбурі мозку. Ми можемо отримати доступ до ВНС за допомогою дихання, руху чи дотику.

Метою психомоторно-соматичної терапії, одного з методів лікування, що належить до цієї категорії, є формування нових спогадів, які житимуть пліч-о-пліч із болісними реаліями минулого. Ці нові спогади створюють сенсорні переживання почуттів, побачені, виплекані та підтримані таким чином, що вони можуть чинити протидію спогадам про біль та зраду.

Щоби змінитись, люди повинні ознайомитись з реаліями, що прямо суперечать почуттям застигання чи паніки. Їм потрібно замінити їх відчуттями, корінням яких є безпека, майстерність, захоплення та зв’язок. Підхід “знизу догори” навчає людей знов активувати мозкові структури, які були пошкоджені під час первинного переживання травми.

Перш ніж докладніше вивчити шлях «знизу вгору», нам доведеться здійснити екскурс у біологію - зокрема, щодо вирішальної ролі блукаючого нерва.

Блукаючий нерв

Система нашої соціальної залученості залежить від нервів, які мають своє походження в регуляторних центрах стовбура мозку - насамперед, блукаючого нерва.

Разом із прилеглими нервами він активує м’язи обличчя, горла, середнього вуха, голосові зв'язки або гортань. Коли цей нервовий комплекс працює належним чином, ми здатні співпереживати та синхронізуватися з іншими. Ці нерви посилають сигнали до нашого серця та легень, уповільнюючи серцебиття та збільшуючи глибину дихання. Як результат, ми відчуваємо себе спокійно і розслаблено, зосереджено або приємно збуджені.

Будь-яка загроза нашій безпеці чи соціальним зв’язкам викликає зміни в блукаючому нерві. В горлі пересихає, голос стає напруженим, серцебиття прискорюється, а дихання стає швидке та поверхневе. Ці зміни частково призначені для того, щоб закликати інших перейти на наш бік.

Але якщо ніхто не переходить, керування приймає прадавній лімбічний мозок. Симпатична нервова система мобілізує м’язи, серце та легені для боротьби або втечі. Наше мовлення пришвидшується та стає більш напружене, а наше серцебиття прискорюється.

Врешті-решт, якщо загроза триває, а виходу все ще немає, активізується кінцева система надзвичайних ситуацій: дорсально-вагусний комплекс (DVC). Ця система сягає шлунка, нирок та кишківника, глибоко під діафрагмою.

Серцебиття знижується (серце «обривається»), ми не можемо дихати, а наш кишківник припиняє працювати або спорожнюватися. Метаболізм різко знижується в усьому організмі. Це момент, коли ми відключаємось, згортаємось або застигаємо. Щойно ця система виходить на перший план, ми та інші люди втрачаємо значення. Ми навіть не можемо відзначити фізичний біль. Цей рівень іммобілізації лежить в корені більшості травм.

Лікування травми "знизу догори"

З трьох шляхів лікування травм найменш оціненим є підхід “знизу догори”, такий як соматико-психомоторна терапія, і використовують його найменше.

Його мета має три рівні:

Отримати сенсорну інформацію, яка заблокована та застигла від травми;
Допомогти пацієнтам співпрацювати з енергією, звільненою цими внутрішніми відчуттями (а не придушувати її);
Завершити самозберігаючі фізичні дії, які були перервані під час нападу, знерухомлення або застигання від жаху.

Допомога проговорюванням та розумінням разом з ліками може послабити гіперактивність тривожної системи. Але дослідження та практика показали, що фізичні переживання, протилежні до частин травми - безпорадності, люті та ступору, - можуть також трансформувати вплив минулого. Водночас, таким чином відновлюється здатність опанувати себе.

У середині 1980-х Стівен Мейєр та Мартін Селігман провели експерименти з «завченою безпорадністю» у собак. Вони багато разів завдавали болючих ударів струмом собакам, ув'язненим у замкнені клітки, викликаючи стан “невідворотного шоку”. Після відкриття кліток шоковані собаки не тікали. Вони просто лежали там зі скавулінням та випорожнювалися.

Цей відомий експеримент проливає світло на те, що відбувається з травмою у людини: відкриття шляху до свободи не означає, що люди йдуть ним. Найчастіше вони просто здаються, а не експериментують з невідомим.

Вчені встановили, що єдиний спосіб навчити травмованих собак виходити з електричних кліток, коли двері відчиняють, - це кілька разів витягувати їх із клітки, щоб вони могли фізично відчути, як вони можуть піти. Так розпочалося дослідження Ван дер Колка про шляхи застосування цих відкриттів до людей.

Він виявив, що протилежне до іммобілізації - ефективна дія. Іммобілізація тримає організм у стані неминучого шоку та завченої безпорадності. Якщо людину утримують, в пастці чи іншим способом заважають вживати ефективних дій - наприклад, у зоні війни; при автомобільній аварії, домашньому насильстві чи зґвалтуванні, - мозок продовжує виділяти хімічні речовини, що діють під тиском, а електричні ланцюжки мозку продовжують марно вистрілювати. Але якщо ці люди зможуть ефективно боротися чи тікати, загроза закінчується і організм повертається до нормального стану.

Здатність рухатись та діяти для захисту себе є критичним фактором закарбування досвіду у пам'яті як травматичного. Приміром, постраждалі від урагану Катріна, яких зняли та витягли з небезпечних місць, отримали важчу травму, ніж ті, хто залишився. Найкращий спосіб подолати вкорінений шаблон підкорення - відновити фізичну здатність до участі та захисту.

Перш ніж розпочати соматичну та психомоторну терапію, пацієнтів підтримують у формуванні почуття внутрішньої безпеки. Тілесний терапевт Пітер Левін називає це «маятником» - м'який рух до внутрішніх відчуттів і травматичних спогадів та вихід з них. Коли пацієнти будуть здатні витримати усвідомлення своїх фізичних переживань від травми, вони, ймовірно, видадуть потужні фізичні імпульси, такі як удари, відштовхування чи біг - ті, що колись були придушені, щоб вижити.

Соматична терапія створює безпечний простір для цих дій, посилюючи рухи та експериментуючи із способами їх модифікації, щоб довести незавершені дії минулого до кінця. Ця терапія може допомогти пацієнтам перенести себе в сьогодення, відчувши, що рухатись - безпечно. Відчуття від ефективних дій відновлює відчуття, що нас підтримують, а також здатність чинити активний опір та захистити себе. Це, в кінцевому підсумку, робить звільнення від травми можливим.

Головні кроки до одужання

Всі ці висновки та способи лікування вказують на низку важливих кроків, які допомагають людям вилікувати свої травми.

Повернутися у власне тіло

Ви можете повністю керувати своїм тілом, лише якщо зможете визнати реальність свого тіла у всіх його вісцеральних вимірах. У якийсь момент нам потрібно почувати себе як вдома та безпечно, з усім доступним для нас спектром відчуттів.

Це може статися через ритмічну взаємодію з іншими людьми - наприклад, у спорті, музиці, танцях чи грі. Всі ці заходи засновані на міжособистісних ритмах, вісцеральній обізнаності, голосовому та мімічному спілкуванні. Вони допомагають вивести людей зі стану “бий або тікай”, реорганізувати їхнє сприйняття небезпеки та підвищити їхню здатність будувати стосунки.

Це може відбутися шляхом розвитку соматичної обізнаності - називаючи те, що відчуваєш. Не поверхневі емоції, такі як гнів, страх чи тривога, а основні відчуття, такі як тиск, тепло, напруга, поколювання, подразнення, відчуття порожнечі тощо. Ці фізичні відчуття минущі і реагують на незначні зрушення положення тіла, зміни дихання та акценти в думках. Усвідомлення того, як ваше тіло організує ці почуття, відкриває можливість безпечного повернення у минуле, де ви можете випустити імпульси, які були колись заблоковані для виживання.

Ван дер Колк описує роботу, яка допомагала пацієнтам створити «острівці безпеки» всередині організму. Це частини тіла, позиції або рухи, які вони можуть використовувати, щоб «заземлитись», коли вони відчувають себе застиглими у жаху або люті. Ці частини тіла зазвичай лежать поза межами досяжності блукаючого нерва, який несе повідомлення про паніку до грудей, живота та горла. Вони можуть допомагати у реінтеграції травми.

Повноцінно спілкуватися та проживати досвід

У якийсь момент свого лікування жертви травми повинні навчитися поширено розповідати про свій досвід.

Нерідко їхні історії поступово перетворюються на завчені розповіді, відредаговані до найменш відразливого стану. Та шляхом розмов, письма, мистецтва, музики, танцю та інших форм самовираження вони можуть почати розповідати реальну історію. Можливо, саме тому ці види мистецтва практикують у культурах світу протягом тисячоліть, допомагаючи людям та спільнотам примиритися з тим, що з ними сталося.

Наприклад, ведення щоденника виявляє багато такого, про що ви могли й не знати. Внутрішній критик замовкає, коли слова з'являються на сторінці, у той час як перо або клавіатура, здається, вивільняють усе, що кипить всередині. За допомогою письма ми можемо з'єднати частини мозку, які зазвичай не спілкуються між собою, не переживаючи, що хто скаже.

У дослідженні Джеймса Пеннебакера та Анни Кранц, викладачів танцю та руху в Сан-Франциско, невербальне художнє вираження порівнювали з писемністю за здатністю переробляти травми. Одну групу попросили розкрити особистий травматичний досвід через виразні рухи тіла протягом принаймні десяти хвилин на день протягом трьох днів поспіль, а потім писати про це протягом ще десяти хвилин. Друга група танцювала, але не писала про свої травми, а третя група виконувала щоденно сталий комплекс вправ.

За три місяці члени всіх трьох груп повідомили, що почуваються щасливішими та здоровішими. Але лише група, в якій і виконували експресивні рухи, і писали, продемонструвала об'єктивні докази: покращення фізичного здоров'я та середніх балів.

У подальшому дослідженні Пеннебакера учасникам було запропоновано переказати свої травматичні переживання на диктофон. Вони виявили, що у тих, хто дозволив собі відчути свої емоції, відбулися значні фізіологічні зміни, як миттєві, так і довгострокові. Зниження артеріального тиску залишалося явним навіть за шість тижнів після закінчення експерименту.

Навчитися знову довіряти іншим

Один з найбільш руйнівних наслідків травми - втрата здатності довіряти іншим. Як можна дозволити собі близькі стосунки після того, як з вами повелись брутально чи жорстоко?

Все у нас, - мозок, розум, тіло, - спрямоване на співпрацю в соціальних системах. Це найпотужніша стратегія виживання. Запорука нашого виживання як виду. І саме це руйнується у більшості форм психічного страждання. З точки зору формальних симптомів, майже всі форми психічних страждань пов'язані або з проблемою створення повноцінних і задовільних стосунків, або з труднощами в регулюванні збудження (звичка розлючуватися, закритість, перезбудження або дезорганізація). Усе це заважає нашим основним механізмам соціальної підтримки.

Багато травмованих людей постійно відчувають себе відділеними від оточення. Вони часто шукають людей з подібним досвідом, які “розуміють це”. Це полегшує їхнє почуття ізольованості, але ціною часом стає заперечення власних індивідуальних відмінностей. Ізоляція себе у вузько обмеженій групі жертв сприяє погляду на інших як невідповідних у кращому випадку та небезпечних у гіршому, що призводить до подальшого відчуження. Банди, екстремістські політичні партії та релігійні культи можуть стати розрадою, але там не знайдеш розумової гнучкості, завдяки якій можна було б відкритися до життєвих можливостей.

Підтримка суспільства - це не просто перебування поряд з іншими людьми. Ключовою є взаємність: нас по-справжньому бачать і чують люди навколо, і ми відчуваємо, що маємо місце в чиємусь серці та думках. Щоби така взаємність була можливою, наша оборонна система повинна тимчасово відключитися. Близькість вимагає від нас можливості беззаперечно відчувати вразливість.

Можливість відчувати себе в безпеці з іншими людьми - це, мабуть, найважливіший аспект психічного здоров'я. Довірливі, близькі зв’язки є основою для осмисленого та задовільного життя. Оскільки травма майже завжди включає небажання бути побаченим, відображеним у дзеркалі чи врахованим, лікування потребує відновлення здатності до віддзеркалення інших та віддзеркаленості іншими, без втягування у чужі негативні емоції.

Травмовані люди одужують у контексті стосунків: з родиною, близькими людьми; зустрічей АА, ветеранських груп, релігійних громад або зустрічей з професійним терапевтом.

Відпустити сором

У глибині душі багатьох травмованих людей переслідує сором за те, що вони робили чи чого не робили під час свого досвіду. Вони зневажають себе за те, як вони почували себе переляканими, залежними, схвильованими чи розлюченими.

Це має особливий зміст, якщо кривдником був хтось близький їм у дитинстві або хтось, від кого вони залежали, що нерідко трапляється. Результатом є невизначеність щодо того, чи була особа жертвою чи пристрасним учасником. Це, у свою чергу, призводить до стирання різниці між любов'ю та терором, болем та задоволенням.

Частина одужання - це відпустити почуття провини та сорому. Пробачити себе за те, що сталося чи не сталося. Або зрозуміти, що пробачати нема чого.

Повторна інтеграція спогадів та зміна їхнього значення

Як ми вже побачили, травматичні спогади часто існують в окремій, відгородженій частині розуму. Важливим етапом лікування травми є реінтеграція цих спогадів у відчуття себе самого, де вони часто набувають нових змістів.

Ван дер Колк описує свій досвід роботи з Альбертом Пессо, колишнім танцюристом, який розробив новий вид лікування травми під назвою психомоторної терапії системи Пессо Бойдена (PBSP). Він передбачав створення “структур” або сценаріїв, де люди відтворювали сцени з минулого. За допомогою формату інтерв'ю головний учасник (його називають “головним героєм”) розставляє та розсаджує людей у кімнаті, де розігруються їхні ролі чи взаємини.

Мозок людини обробляє просторові рухи правою півкулею мозку, яка є водночас найбільш постраждалою від травми ділянкою. Створюючи ці структури та згодом маніпулюючи ними, головний герой здатний відтворювати і змінювати сцени зі свого минулого. Наприклад, коли хтось «грає» його матір чи батька, він отримує можливість висловити гнів, розчарування чи невиражену любов до них. Головні герої стали кимось на кшталт режисерів власної п’єси, залучаючи інших для забезпечення любові, підтримки та захисту, яких не вистачало у пережиті критичні моменти.

Ці інноваційні методи лікування не стирають поганих спогадів і навіть не нейтралізують їх. Вони пропонують нові варіанти - альтернативну пам’ять, де були задоволені ваші основні людські потреби, особливо - потреба в любові. Структури сприяють одній із найважливіших умов глибоких терапевтичних змін: стану, подібному до трансу, в якому багато реалій можуть жити поряд. У такому стані ви можете одночасно відчувати складні емоції вірності та ніжності, змішані з люттю і тугою.

Можливість контролювати себе

Травма позбавляє людей самоконтролю - відчуття, що ти керуєш собою. Завданням відновлення є повернення влади над своїм тілом та розумом.

Для більшості людей це включає:

Пошук способу стати спокійним та зосередженим;
Здатність підтримувати спокій у відповідь на образи, думки, звуки чи фізичні переживання, які нагадують тобі про минуле;
Пошук способу бути вповні живим у сьогоденні та спілкуватися з оточенням;
Відсутність секретів від себе самого, в тому числі – не приховувати Ваші секретні способи виживання.

Поки люди перезбуджені або закриті, вони не можуть вчитися на досвіді. Навіть якщо їм вдасться втримати контроль, вони залишаться негнучкими, впертими та депресивними. Одужання від травми передбачає відновлення функціонування керівних систем, а разом з ними і впевненості в собі та здатності до гри та творчості.

Коли наше вісцеральне з'єднання з нашими тілами відновлюється, з'являється абсолютно нова здатність тепло любити себе. Ми починаємо дбати про своє здоров’я, свій раціон, енергію та час. Ця турбота виникає спонтанно і природно, не у відповідь на “треба”. Це створює підґрунтя для розвитку наших внутрішніх навичок моніторингу себе - наскільки добре ми прислухаємось до всіх частин себе, чи переконуємося, що подбали про них, чи запобігаємо ситуаціям, коли одна частина саботує іншу. Замість того, щоби котрась частина нас домінувала в розмові, ми можемо ставитися до них усіх як до важливих елементів у складному сузір'ї думок та емоцій.

Нейрологічні дослідження піонерів галузі, таких як Майкл Ґазаніґа, у поєднанні з роботою в IFS (Internal Family Systems) дали нам модель людського розуму, що складається з декількох різних підсистем. Кожна працює напівавтономно, зі своїми потребами, вміннями та історією. Вони також мають різний рівень зрілості, збудливості, мудрості та болю.

При травмах зв'язок між цими підсистемами руйнується, і вони оголошують війну одна одній. Самовідданість бореться з грандіозністю, любов і турбота з ненавистю, оніміння і пасивність - з гнівом та агресією. Травма викрадає ці почуття з їхніх природних, цінних станів. Наприклад, у всіх нас є частина дитячої життєрадісності. Коли ми стаємо жертвою аб'юзу, саме ця частина переживає найбільший біль, а згодом застигає від болю, жаху та зради аб'юзу. Тягар робить цю частину токсичною, а інші частини консолідуються, щоб захистити себе від болю.

Таким чином, “внутрішні менеджери” переймають деякі аспекти насильника. Гіперкритичні та перфекціоністські внутрішні голоси переконуються, що ми ніколи не будемо близькі ні з ким, змушують бути невблаганно продуктивними, або кидають у лють при найменшій провокації. Вони намагаються захистити нас від почуття знищення, але в процесі цього роблять нас жалюгідними.

Наша внутрішня система, як і кожна складна система, вимагає грамотного управління. Тому частина лікування - це запевнення всіх частин, що всім їм раді та всі їх цінують - навіть ті, які є суїцидальними чи руйнівними. Це передбачає закликати внутрішнього керівника особистості до розумного розподілу наявних ресурсів та підтримки цілісного бачення, яке враховує усі частини. Цього «само-лідера» не потрібно культивувати чи тренувати. Він завжди знаходиться під поверхнею, готовий взяти на себе відповідальність, як тільки почали діяти механізми, що захищають його від руйнування.

У дев'ятимісячному дослідженні у групи осіб IFS спостерігалися помітні покращення суб'єктивного відчуття болю в суглобах, фізичних функцій, самопочуття та загального рівня болю, у порівнянні з контрольною групою. Також відбулося значне покращення стану в аспектах депресії та персональної ефективності. Протягом року суб'єктивні покращення збереглися, хоч і не були об'єктивно виміряні. А отже, покращилася здатність цих людей жити зі своїм болем.

Травматичні адаптації тривають доти, поки весь організм людини не почуває себе в безпеці і не інтегрує всі частини себе, застряглі у боротьбі з травмою чи запобіганні їй. Якщо у дитинстві ви зазнали насильства чи знехтування, то, швидше за все, всередині вас живе дитяча частина. Вона застигла в часі, все ще тримаючись за самовіддачу та відмову. Відштовхування цих почуттів може бути дуже адаптивним у короткостроковому періоді, допомагаючи зберегти свою гідність або зосередитись на таких критичних завданнях, як турбота про сім’ю чи перебудова помешкання.

Але для утримання системи під контролем потрібно величезна кількість енергії. Один коментар може зачепити кілька частин одночасно: одну, яка стає сильно розлюченою, іншу, сповнену самовідданості, і третю, яка намагається все заспокоїти за допомогою звички справлятися. Внутрішній менеджер, керуванням якого ми заручаємось у цій ситуації, може почати шкодити сам собі - створювати одержимість, шукати відволікання, нав'язувати контроль, бажання влади, придушення емоцій або взагалі заперечувати реальність. І, зрештою, виникає потреба вгамувати потужних менеджерів, яких ми створили для захисту від почуття безпорадності.

Майбутнє травми

Як показує дослідження АПФ, станом на сьогодні понад 50% дітей, яких обслуговує Head Start, мають три або більше «несприятливих переживань з дитинства». Приміром - це депресія або наркозалежність у когось з рідних, насильство, аб'юз або періоди бездомності.

Це абсолютно приголомшливе число, і воно перекреслює наше розуміння травми як чогось незвичайного - такого, що стосується лише меншості людей.

Тим часом, жорстоке поводження з дітьми та нехтування батьківськими обов'язками - це ті причини психічних захворювань, яким можна запобігти. Також це найпоширеніша причина зловживання наркотиками та алкоголем, і значною мірою ці травми сприяють головним причинам смерті, таким як діабет, серцеві захворювання, рак, інсульт та самогубства.

Наше суспільство крок за кроком рухається до усвідомлення травми, в той час як дослідження та клінічна практика, викладені в цій книзі, впроваджуються у медичних установах та культурі терапії. Але, як окремо відзначає Ван дер Колк, раніше реальність травми не визнавали, а заперечували.

Ця книга є визначним досягненням в історії усвідомлення та лікування травми. Вона містить низку наукових досліджень разом із клінічною практикою та новітніми методами лікування. Вона звертає увагу на жахливий вплив травми на людей та суспільство, пропонуючи численні практичні способи їх лікування, - у їх числі не включені до цього резюме Десенситизація та Відновлення Рухових Функцій Ока, театр та інші.

Make Your Own Neural Network with Ruby

Wed, 06 Mar 2019 19:00:00 +0000

Building a Home Security System with Elixir and Nerves

Fri, 01 Feb 2019 18:00:00 +0000

In Search of Silver Bullets for Polyglots

Fri, 20 Apr 2018 18:00:00 +0000

A Post-Libertarian Realpolitik

Sun, 08 Oct 2017 15:00:00 +0000

Interactive Robotics with Elixir and Nerves

Fri, 24 Mar 2017 18:30:00 +0000

The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones

Fri, 31 Jul 2015 00:00:00 +0000

Originally published as a book review in my Goodreads account.

Disappointing overall, and at times shallow and boring. One emerges with the assessment that the two authors are easily impressed by surface-level phenomena. They maintain that narratives taught in civics class suffice to illuminate the origins and practice of politics. They perceive a simple world, where stated intentions equal actual objectives, costs can be judged relative to ostensible objectives without minding actual effects, correlation generally implies causation, and the direction of the arrow of causality can be promptly determined. These are characteristics more of a Haidtian moral matrix than the dispassionate analysis one might have wished for in a book of this kind.

The authors speak confidently about their ability to understand and predict this neatly modeled world of theirs, not particularly endeavoring to uncover their own implicit premises—brief mentions of Western liberalism aside—and rarely hedging or qualifying their rather confident assertions, many which could readily be challenged. In the gulf between reality and academia, this work is more a product of its environment than a root cause analysis that will stand the test of time.

On the bright side, in largely restricting themselves to disruptive technologies with ETAs defined with pretty firm confidence margins, we were at least spared yet another alarmist narrative of shoddily-premised and amateurishly-informed more speculative futures, which in this instance might have been titled something like “the state v. gray goo”.

Indeed, the most readable part of the book is the initial bit that discusses some of the developing technologies of mass empowerment that are set to make the first half of this century an “interesting times” to live through per that purported old Chinese curse. There is nothing new here, but it is at least a useful overview of biotech terrors to come as well as the developing arms race in autonomous weaponry, soon to be wielded by state and non-state actors both.

This is followed, alas, by the middle portion of the book, where I suspect the authors will tend to lose readers who aren’t Beltway policy wonks. These chapters are, chiefly, tedious apologia for the ostensible origins and continued existence of the state. The authors glimpse the coming sea change, but prove ultimately unable to transcend or escape the shore.

Almost pathetically obsessed with the continuation of the authority and legitimacy of the status quo in political organization today (perhaps their jobs depend on it?), the authors even go on to disregard their own contention—grounded in the myth of the social contract—that the state is only a means, not an end unto itself. Their own authority bias here leads them down a garden path of motivated reasoning that is sure to not only find itself on the wrong side of history, but soon enough swept into its dust bin.

The authors rehash elementary early modern political theory at length—beginning with the Hobbesian war of all against all—taking it all at face value as would any freshman. To say that this is a historically uninformed and philosophically unsophisticated analysis would only scratch the surface here, and the authors seem impossibly yet genuinely unaware of troves and generations of thinkers and scholars who advanced in leaps and bounds on everything they discuss here.

One might have hoped, ultimately, for a deeper nonideological and amoral (“check your morality at the door, please”) analysis premised, say, on an evolutionary and game-theoretic angle instead of this longwinded trite elaboration of the dominant political mythology du jour, consisting of little more than post-hoc rationalizations that already read akin to medieval notions of the divine right of kings. What’s a little surprising is that the authors even acknowledge these being mere justifications for the Westphalian order, prompting the question of whether this ought to not be read as an extended bit of demagoguery in the Menckenian sense of “preaching doctrines one knows to be untrue to men one knows to be idiots."

The discussion, as it moves on to the prescriptive last third of the book, is further muddled by the authors’ disregard for the precise use of language to aid in clarity of thought. Never, for instance, do they differentiate between positive liberty and negative liberty—a distinction both elementary and essential—which, unsurprisingly, helps lead them absurd conclusions such as that “mass surveillance makes us freer." Edward Snowden’s “crime” accordingly merits a whole section in a similar vein.

At root, though, unexamined and uncontested, lies the belief that, given sufficient resources, the state can, in fact, actually achieve its ostensible ends—whether those ostensible ends be the provision of security as such, or the maintenance of a Tofflerian surplus order. This is a perspective uninformed by economic law and untempered by a developed intuition about spontaneous order; both being sides of the same coin, as per Hayek’s dictum that “the curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design."

Scarcely mentioned, for instance, are the more than trillion dollars and countless lives wasted fighting a futile War on Drugs. Other authors from Bill Lind to T. X. Hammes have made the case that the inability of the state, with every conceivable home court advantage that it has, to significantly hamper let alone eradicate these 4GW adversaries—in this case, the drug cartels and their international distribution network—perfectly showcases its impotence in credibly countering more dangerous internal and external adversaries going forward.

Instead of the epistemic humility to limit themselves to the merely descriptive and predictive, the authors here choose to be prescriptive; too bad, only, that it is on such an axiomatically deficient and analytically shallow platform. As such, this amounts to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic—or make that SS Leviathan. The book best serves to underline the incompetence of the extended modern state apparatus to comprehend and cope with the rapidly multiplying and escalating challenges to its formerly unilateral hegemony. As Boyd would cackle, “you’re not even in the game!"

A case example thereof is that much of the discussion in the section on so-called “intermediate regulation” has already been obsoleted by subsequent technological developments, and that’s all in the span of less than a decade past the authority they cite as the basis for their narrative here. You’d never imagine the authors to have heard of these newer developments, even as events were in the process of overtaking and obsoleting their manuscript.

In their conclusion, the authors tacitly acknowledge that the future is ungovernable, but go on to say that they’re “not ready to give up on the state” yet. Good for them. For a deeper, more realistic, and better informed picture of the unfolding twenty-first century, pass on this and read the likes of John Robb and old curmudgeon Bill Lind instead.

The Warrior Ethos

Sat, 07 Mar 2015 00:00:00 +0000

Originally published as a book review in my Goodreads account.

As a fan of Pressfield’s historical fiction and as a student of military history, I was predisposed to like this short book of historical anecdotes and commentary on the warrior ethos; more’s the pity that it turned out to be significantly problematic.

You see, a naive reading would miss that this is ultimately an encomium to empire, deliberately and carefully selective with its facts. It can only be meant to inspire, not to inform—and indeed, a clue to this end can be found in Pressfield’s statement that he wrote this for “men and women in uniform”. He evidently does not have an unduly high regard for the critical faculties of his audience.

An illustrative example right off the bat is the pathological case of sample bias that concludes the first chapter, narrated with a straight face and nary a historiographical concern, devoid any condemnation of eugenics, and demonstrating no comprehension of established human universals:

In Sparta, every newborn boy was brought before the magistrates to be examined for physical hardiness. If a child was judged unfit, he was taken to a wild gorge on Mount Taygetos, the mountain overlooking the city, and left for the wolves. We have no reports of a mother weeping or protesting.

As another point of note, when speaking of pride and honor, and judging the warrior ethos of Americans to be superior to that of their foes, Pressfield makes an obligatory mention of “enhanced interrogation” (torture) but omits any consideration of “collateral damage” (regrettable murder), the millions of victims of many long decades of empire-building. Similar bland disregard is given to the peoples vanquished by history’s great conquerors and commanders—this is very much a hagiography of the victors.

By the chapter on “The Civilian World”, one begins to suspect the author of outright demagoguery. Coming from an author who certainly knows better, how are we to understand a nakedly false assertion such as the following:

In ancient Sparta and in the other cultures cited, a warrior culture (the army) existed within a warrior society (the community itself). No conflict existed between the two.

The helots of ancient Sparta, who under pain of death toiled to feed and clothe these brave and honorable warriors, might have taken umbrage at the statement—had they dared to look their masters in the eye. As it is, the word “helot” does not appear even once in this book that on the whole reads like an ode to the totalitarian glory that was Sparta.

Even if it be the case that wolves don’t concern themselves with the opinions of sheep—a warrior ethos for the ages if there ever was one—such strategic omissions are all the more puzzling given the author’s considerably more evenhanded treatment of these matters in his bestselling novel Gates of Fire.

I might have had a positive thing or two to say about portions of this work, but cannot be motivated to further comment given the overarching vexations and shallow pretense of history here. A true disappointment.

Nexus

Thu, 13 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000

Originally published as a book review in my Goodreads account.

I ended up reading this roller-coaster of a cyberpunk thriller in one sitting. It’s a fantastic debut and an impressive depiction of a plausible enough near future on the fast track to a technological singularity. To introduce a noob to transhumanism, I’d prescribe Nexus followed by Accelerando and Diaspora, which should be plenty to blow anyone’s mind wide open into a minor existential crisis.

Having won the Prometheus Award this previous year, it’s no surprise that the themes presented in this story will resonate particularly strongly with libertarians. With the powers that be waging a doomed-to-fail War on Science to contain disruptive technologies, with agents of the state extorting, kidnapping, torturing, and murdering people for victimless crimes, and with a general populace turning a blind eye as usual to the atrocities committed ostensibly on their behalf, there’s plenty here to keep a cynic happy. (The storyline in Influx unfolds on rather parallel themes.)

For us techies, this compelling vision of hackable wetware—hackable in both senses—presents hypotheticals and responsibilities of paramount import. As we’ve learned the hard way over the past couple of years, our current approaches to computer security are broken on such a fundamental level that in reality the Emerging Risks Directorate would hardly need to break a sweat in their pursuit of the factory backdoors to Nexus OS; rather, they’d just task the NSA with finding them a security exploit or two that would amount to the same thing. To prevent endless variations of digital dystopia facilitated by coercion technologies, we had better well and truly figure out provably secure computing in the next decade or so.

The Martian

Wed, 05 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000

Originally published as a book review in my Goodreads account.

I read this in one go. Near-future hard science fiction at its finest, this is the ultimate marooned-on-an-island story—where the island is a barren desert world twenty light-minutes past the horizon, and you’re stuck at the bottom of its gravity well with a dwindling food and oxygen supply, no means of egress, and no possible hope of rescue.

It’s a fantastic yarn, and it’s a credit to the author that the least plausible aspect of the story is its quaint and romantic premise that NASA, and the insolvent former superpower backing it, could afford to and would be able to land a manned mission on Mars—and not just one, but five of them in a row. I’ll put my chips on Elon Musk, thank you all the same.

Be that as it may, if you appreciate man’s battle for survival in the face of merciless nature and impossible odds, be sure to follow up The Martian with the bona fide account of dogged, preposterous survival recounted in Endurance: Shackleton’s Incredible Voyage by Alfred Lansing. If we can survive what Shackleton and his men did, we’ll survive Mars, too. Though it’d surely help to have Mark Watney along for the ride.

The Unlicense: The First Year in Review

Sat, 01 Jan 2011 23:00:00 +0000

It’s Public Domain Day again, and it’s now been exactly a year since I first introduced the Unlicense.org initiative: an easy-to-use template and process intended to help coders waive their copyright and dedicate all their code to the public domain with no strings attached. It seems a good time for a brief recap of the happenings on this front over the last 365 days.

A year ago, the first three hackers to adopt the Unlicense were Ben Lavender, Zachary Voase, and I. All open-source software the three of us have produced in the last year, combined totaling tens of thousands of lines of code, has been entirely copyright-free. You can “steal” it all you like, and we just won’t care. You can “forget” to attribute us, and we’ll “forget” to give a damn. We have better things to do. And as it turns out, we’re not the only ones to think that way.

The Unlicense initiative grew from numerous coffee-and-beer discussions the three of us had had throughout the rainy Spanish winter regarding how we could stop copyrighting the code we were each publishing as open source. Informed by much previous reading on the sordid history of copyright, and philosophically speaking no doubt inspired and prompted by Mike Gogulski‘s visit in the early winter, we had each arrived at the same basic dilemma: we wanted out of the copyright game, but were unsure how it could effectively be done in practice. Precedent was scarce.

Researching the matter extensively clarified what had to be done, but also made clear that few others would have been likely to expend such an effort in figuring it all out. Even if others might otherwise have been inclined to opt out of copyrighting their code, the perceived legal morass of the public domain would have incentivized just using some very permissive license instead. This was a problem that deserved a solution.

Thus was conceived the legal hack that became the Unlicense, a name I had come up with after earlier discussions with Peter Saint-Andre and Vinay Gupta about rebranding the public domain.

As I’ve previously detailed in Dissecting the Unlicense: Software Freedom in Four Clauses and a Link, the solution presented by the Unlicense was heavily inspired by the approach and the process used by one of the most successful public-domain software projects of all time, the SQLite database system. If you have a smartphone, you already have SQLite in your pocket. You also almost certainly have SQLite on your desktop or laptop. With at the very least 500 million deployments worldwide, SQLite is everywhere. Its licensing terms, or more to the point its non-licensing terms, have certainly not impeded that success; if anything, they have driven its proliferation.

Other significant inspiration and ingredients for the Unlicense were the hybrid public-domain dedication and copyright waiver approach used by Creative Commons Zero, as well as the don’t-sue-me legalese from the widely-used MIT/X11 license. A final component was understanding that open-source software has important established conventions, among them the LICENSE file, and that beyond everything else we had to also be able to satisfactorily answer pragmatic questions such as “But everyone has a license file; hence I need a license file; what do I put in it?"

When we launched the Unlicense a year ago, we were not at all certain how it would be received or if it would have any uptake whatsoever. The immediate reaction was perhaps not greatly encouraging: my initial blog post topped the Reddit “most controversial” list for a time, the downvotes eventually winning the day.

This was to be expected, as the target audience for the Unlicense really consists only of those developers who are already using permissive licensing; yet copyleft advocates still pretty much dominate open-source communities, though perceptibly in relative terms rather less overbearingly than they did a decade before. So, the Unlicense immediately served to add a new variable and more fuel to the perennial BSD/MIT vs GPL flamewars. From long conversation threads on Twitter and Identi.ca, some of the more amusing strong-copyleft reactions included assertions such as that the Unlicense “allows evil stuff” and an implication that we might be some sort of a Microsoft conspiracy. (Bill Gates, we’re all ears should you wish to fund public-domain advocacy.)

There were also positive early signs, however. Most importantly, external adoption of the Unlicense began immediately. For example, some programmers initially used the Unlicense for the code snippets that they published on their blogs, or similarly unlicensed smaller scripts and utilities that they published on GitHub and elsewhere. Within a couple of weeks, the popular open-source software blog OStatic was describing us as a “movement”. They may have jumped the gun on that one a wee bit, but now, a year later, it doesn’t seem an entirely unfitting description.

It’s difficult to give estimates of current Unlicense adoption. We initially tried to maintain a project list on Unlicense.org, but its current 50-odd listed projects represent only a small subset of the entirety of Unlicense usage out there today. We still add projects to the list upon request, but with Google Alerts notifying me of new unlicensed scripts and projects just about every single day, we’ve long since passed the point where that list could be considered canonical or up to date.

The best estimate I can give, from having semi-actively tracked the growth of adoption for the last year, is that there must at the very least now be many hundreds of projects using the Unlicense. I doubt we have yet crossed the 1,000-project mark, but I’m quite certain that in another year’s time we will have.

Already as of today, Unlicense adopters include a very diverse range of projects: software libraries, code generators, database abstraction layers and even database engines, web frameworks, HTML templates, blogging engines, low-level network utilities, 3D game engines, command-line utilities, Mac OS X applications, iPhone games, Firefox and Google Chrome extensions, jQuery plugins, Django packages, WordPress plugins, Drupal modules, Ubercart and VirtueMart payment gateways, and much more besides.

The adoption rate is also growing, as makes sense when awareness of the Unlicense diffuses ever wider, reaching ever more developers. Since we’ve done hardly any advocacy other than the rare blog post and occasional tweet, our growth factors have really only been word-of-mouth plus any implicit or explicit references in the documentation of existing unlicensed projects. It seems to have been enough.

Looking forward to 2011 and beyond, the future of the Unlicense, and the public domain more generally, looks promising. I recently had the opportunity to engage in a brief dialogue with Mike Linksvayer, the vice president of Creative Commons. It turns out that the folks at Creative Commons are already aware of the Unlicense initiative, and supportive of it. This is truly gratifying and welcome news indeed.

Mr. Linksvayer relates that though Creative Commons have previously discouraged using any of their licensing instruments for software, there has been discussion concerning the application of CC0, specifically, to cover software as well. This raises the question of how that might affect the Unlicense initiative or whether existing Unlicense adopters would be compatible with CC0 code as well; the answer is simple, due to the public domain being the superset of all more restrictive licensing arrangements.

Firstly, should CC0 come to be considered an exception to the more general Creative Commons policy regarding applicability to software, Mr. Linksvayer sees that as complementary to the Unlicense, not competitive. Further, both approaches are fully compatible and interoperable, since both are at base intended as explicit public-domain dedications and copyright waivers, not licenses per se. And it’s naturally very easy to remix code that has no strings whatsoever attached to it: there’s just nothing to get tangled up in.

If the Unlicense and CC0 both become viable options for publishing public-domain code, then the choice of which one to use becomes almost just a question of personal brand preference: those more comfortable in the mainstream might perhaps be expected to go with CC0, yet others might still prefer the explicit and strong “opt-out” subtext of the Unlicense. In any case, both will amount to the same thing: copyright-free code that anyone can use freely for any purpose without restriction.

Here’s to a great 2011 during which we’ll seek to collaborate with Creative Commons on establishing both the Unlicense and CC0 more widely, grow the public domain as well as related advocacy and education efforts, and do our part in serving as the crucial counterbalance to copyright laws that keep getting ever worse, never better. Anyone looking to join the conversation should follow @mlinksva and @bendiken on Twitter and/or Identi.ca, as well as consider subscribing to the CC-licenses/ CC-community and Unlicense mailing lists.

Licensed, License-Free, and Unlicensed Code

Sun, 19 Dec 2010 00:00:00 +0000

As discussed on the Unlicense.org mailing list, the notion of “licensing something under the Unlicense” is a not infrequent misunderstanding that calls for better explanations as to the essential difference between licensed, license-free, and unlicensed code. I will attempt to break it back down to the fundamentals and work upwards from there.

To begin, it’s useful to briefly review what copyright is and isn’t. As Peter Saint-Andre explains in his very readable essay Who’s Afraid of the Public Domain?, copyright is not a natural right. Rather, it is a government-created distribution monopoly privilege, ostensibly instituted on utilitarian grounds, and being (since 1988) automatically granted you whether you want it or not.

First off, it would be much more accurately restated as “All privileges retained”, since copyright isn’t a “right” at all. Secondly, the statement as a whole, in any form, is entirely superfluous (since 1988), as it just refers to the prevailing default state of things: hands off, except if otherwise explicitly and specifically given permission.

Meaning that if you stumble across some code with no attached licensing information, copyright laws would have you treat it as “all privileges retained”, even if its author in fact was just trying to make it available with no strings attached.

So, this then is why the Unlicense is needed: if you never asked to be a monopolist, even a small-time one, and quite simply have no interest nor desire to be one, it so happens that you actually need to explicitly tell your potential users this in the form of a copyright waiver called a public-domain dedication.

If you don’t do this, and just put your software out there without a license or dedication at all, what you’re effectively doing, according to copyright laws, is slapping the implicit and forbidding “look but don’t touch, and certainly don’t copy” license on it. The result is known as license-free software, and won’t exactly help make you or your software very popular.

By instead adopting the Unlicense for your code, what you’re doing is voluntarily and unequivocally giving up any and all monopoly privileges granted you by the state and unlicensing your code into the public domain, that is, the pool of entirely uncopyrighted and unencumbered works, available for anyone to freely use for any purpose.

Clearly what you’re not doing, then, is “licensing” your software “using the Unlicense”. That would be more than a bit nonsensical: how could your software be licensed and not licensed at the same time? It’s either one or the other: strings attached or not. The Unlicense is intended to serve as an actual license only as a fallback strategy in backward jurisdictions that otherwise have trouble recognizing the right of authors to voluntarily waive all monopoly privileges enforced in their name by the state.

Yet we’ve now seen a project or two with README files that proudly claim “Copyright (c) 2010 J. Random Hacker. All rights reserved." in one sentence and then go on to quote from the Unlicense on the very next line, “This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain." Needless to say, those two statements contradict each other in the worst way.

In fact, I think these specific examples just go to show how deeply imbedded the notion of copyright still is in Western culture, even as we’re already otherwise taking the first stumbling steps towards a post-copyright world.

It seems likely that what the authors in question really meant to convey was simply the equivalent of “Written by J. Random Hacker”. Writing that familiar “Copyright (c)…" had just become so ingrained a habit that it had practically supplanted the notion of “Written by…" in their minds – and in the minds of countless others, myself certainly included in the not-too-distant past.

Still, the mistaken notion of “licensing something under the Unlicense” also demonstrates why the Unlicense is sorely needed in the first place, and why it has already enjoyed significant uptake over the course of this year: even if (at least in certain arbitrary regions of North America) releasing something into the public domain is, in principle, as simple as stating “I hereby…", that can still present too much cognitive dissonance for people thoroughly inculcated into the modern “license-to-live” frame of reference.

Thus “but everyone has a license file; hence I need a license file; what do I put in it?" is but one of the many practical questions the Unlicense seeks to answer for public-domain software projects, in essence backporting the copyright-free future into an easy-to-use format suited to the copyright-afflicted present.

It is perhaps both inevitable and necessary that, at this still relatively early stage in the ongoing decline of copyright as an institution, contradictory or confused statements like “licensing something under the Unlicense” abound. They may even be useful as conversation starters on how unlicensing code into the public domain is fundamentally different from merely choosing yet another random permissive license.

An apt contemporary analogy for elucidating the contrast between permissive licenses and the public domain might be the “manage subscriptions” and “unsubscribe” links in some newsletters.

A permissive license is like clicking “manage subscriptions” and unchecking every option save for “demand attribution”. The Unlicense is like clicking “unsubscribe” and opting out of the copyright game altogether, ahead of the pack. The fallback strategy of treating the Unlicense as an actual license is just a workaround for broken unsubscription systems, making use of “manage subscriptions” to uncheck all possible options instead.

Perhaps in another decade or so our common discourse will have left the speed bump of licensing sufficiently far behind in the dustbin of history that the kinds of contradictions discussed here will be more readily and more widely recognized as nonsensical. The very name of initiatives like the Unlicense can help drive that change, bridging us of the last copyright generation to the bright and unlicensed post-copyright future.

A Thousand Lakes of Red Blood on White Snow

Thu, 12 Aug 2010 17:00:00 +0000

Over a bottle of Swedish vodka, a friend and I recently drifted on to the topic of Molotov cocktails. In case you don’t know, that is not a drink actually served at any cocktail parties. But depending on your audience, its story could make for a good cocktail party yarn. Here follows a brief history of the little-known subarctic origins of the Molotov cocktail in the epic Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40. It is a true tale of a people who stood up to the depredations of an evil empire, and, against all odds, prevailed. Along the way you’ll gain a pretty good idea of what exactly the Finnish word “sisu” means, despite English lacking an exact and equivalent translation.

On November 30, 1939, three months after the start of World War II and the blitzkrieg invasion of Poland, the Soviet Union invaded Finland in an all-out land, sea and air assault. In a coordinated attack almost three times larger than the Allied landing at Normandy some five years later, twenty-one Red Army divisions with over 425,000 soldiers and thousands of tanks, warplanes, and heavy artillery crossed over into Finland under the cover of massive air and artillery bombardment.

Thus began a military conflict that came to be known as the Winter War, one of the least publicized but most costly offensive campaigns in the annals of military history. Fought in the extreme cold of the Finnish forests and in the dead darkness of the subarctic winter, it pitted a mighty invader with overwhelming military superiority against a hardy defender with precious little more than the indomitable will to resist. The Winter War changed the course of World War II and was then all but forgotten, save by the people of Finland whose very history it came to delineate and define.

Territorial and political rearrangements coming up

The Soviet objective was simple enough: the total conquest and occupation of Finland, enabling Soviet dominance over the Baltic Sea and the establishment of a buffer zone around Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), from which the Finnish border at the time was only some 40 kilometers distant.

Like a donkey in heat, Josef Stalin had been eyeing Adolf Hitler’s annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia with naked envy. He wanted in on the action and in 1939 proceeded to sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler that included a secret protocol divvying up northern and eastern Europe, anticipating “territorial and political rearrangements” into respective German and Soviet spheres of influence. In plainer terms, Stalin was to have eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, and Finland, if he could take them.

After Stalin encountered no resistance in subjugating the Baltic countries, he turned his attention to Finland. He figured that Finland, too, would be a walk in the park; the Finns would either capitulate without a fight, or at least quickly and recklessly exhaust their insignificant and outdated armed forces in useless suicidal attacks on the modern Soviet tanks and machine guns, much as the Poles had done. The Red Army would roll over the country in no time at all.

Soviet Marshal Voroshilov and General Meretskov, who were to command the Soviet operation, calculated that they could knock out Finland in roughly ten to twelve days. After all, Mother Russia had some 170 million people to Finland’s puny 3.5 million, with the population of the city of Leningrad alone matching the entire population of Finland. The Red Army forces committed to the Finnish offensive – more than a million men and many thousands of tanks and warplanes – easily outnumbered the Finnish Army more than three to one in terms of manpower, thirty to one in terms of aircraft, and far more than a hundred to one in terms of tanks; and the Soviets had yet millions more soldiers in reserve. What could possibly go wrong?

The enemy outnumber us a paltry three to one; good odds for any Finn

Mobilization in Finland was nearly 100 percent, but even including all reserves the Finns could muster no more than 300,000 ill-armed men to oppose the vast and seemingly invincible horde of the invader. Even this level of mobilization was possible only as a result of assigning absolutely each and every non-combat task to the 100,000-strong women’s auxiliary.

From the start, the Finnish defense was plagued by severe equipment and munitions shortages. Many Finnish soldiers did not even have uniforms, and simply wore their regular winter clothing with ad-hoc military tags.

As for heavy weapons, the Finns had but a handful of obsolete tanks, of which only a single one was fully combat ready; further, they had very few anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft guns, and hardly much of a heavy artillery – many of their artillery pieces hailed from the previous century. The so-called Finnish Air Force was comprised of a grand total of ninety-six operational old planes that were little threat to the newer and faster Soviet fighters.

With this sorry arsenal did they mean to dare defy the wrath of a vast empire and the most powerful army in the world. The first line of defense in Finland, it was facetiously reported outside the country, was a Finn standing on skis with a rifle. The claim wasn’t entirely untrue.

But where will we find room to bury them all?

Even if they harbored few illusions regarding their chances of ultimately prevailing against the sheer overwhelming manpower and firepower of the enemy, the widespread sentiment among Finns was that, come what may, they had no choice but to take up arms for life and liberty. They knew what the alternative would entail: still in living memory had they suffered under the boot of the Russian Empire (from 1812 to 1917), and doubted not that their fate in the blood-soaked hands of the Soviet tyrant would be something incomparably worse than it had ever been under the heel of the Russian tsars.

So, never mind that they were vastly outnumbered and outgunned, they still meant to make the aggressors pay dearly for every step of their advance. If they were to be conquered, enslaved, or even exterminated, it would certainly not be as meek and willing victims. Planning for the tremendous scope of the coming casualties, they pondered with a grim optimism and not a little dark humour, “They are so many, and our country is so small, where shall we find room to bury them all?"

If we gotta burn down the house, let’s be sure to do it right

Having anticipated both the imminent invasion and a harsh winter – which indeed turned out to be the coldest in over a hundred years – Finns had spent much of the autumn of 1939 destroying bridges, roads, houses and barns that had taken a generation to build; they intended to deny the Soviets any and all shelter and respite during their advance.

One memorable report tells of an old man returning to poke through the smoldering remains of his house while the fighting is already in earshot, explaining to the soldiers overseeing the evacuation:

This farm was burned down twice before on account of the Russians; once by my grandfather, and once by my father. I don’t reckon it’ll kill me to do it either, but I’ll be damned if I could drive away without first making sure you’d done a proper job of it.

Scorched earth à la Finlande meant that the abandoned towns and villages were not left hospitable even in ruins and ashes. Mines were left in haystacks, under outhouse seats, underneath dead chickens and in abandoned sleds. The village wells were poisoned, or, if time and chemicals were lacking, at least fouled with horse manure. Floating mines were set underneath newly-frozen lakes to blast the ice from underneath advancing Soviet ranks.

Hurry up on those secret weapons, will you, we’re in dire straits here

In the first week of the Winter War, the Red Army advanced quickly on all fronts. The Finnish Army had never confronted tanks and lacked effective anti-tank weapons. The Red Army’s use of mass formations of tanks initially had an absolutely devastating effect on the Finnish defenses, which frequently seemed on the verge of total collapse. Shock and fear accompanied retreat and defeat as the Finnish troops were pushed back on all fronts.

Trying desperately to find a way to beat back Soviet tanks with the limited resources at their disposal, the Finns were forced to innovate. In short order they came up with three distinct but complementary tactics for taking out heavy Soviet armor. From the diary of Private Tauno Pukka who served in the Finnish 3rd Independent Infantry Battallion:

Our platoon leader informed us we were about to receive secret weapons that could blow up and burn any enemy tank. It did not take long until the promise was fulfilled.

Here’s a drink to your continued health, Commissar Molotov

Throughout the Winter War, the Soviet Air Force made extensive use of incendiaries and cluster bombs against Finnish troops, fortifications, and towns. When the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, claimed in propaganda broadcasts that the Soviet Union was not actually dropping bombs but merely delivering food to the starving Finns, the Finns began calling the air bombs Molotov bread baskets.

Facing mass formations of Red Army tanks, the Finnish Army borrowed and improved the design of an impromptu incendiary device that had been used for the first time in the just-concluded Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. They began attacking the advancing tanks with “Molotov cocktails” which were, with characteristic Finnish laconic wit, meant to repay Molotov’s generous gift of bread with the reciprocal gift of an alcoholic beverage – “a drink to go with the food”, as they joked.

The original Molotov cocktail was simply a glass bottle semi-filled with a mixture of sticky flammable liquid, usually based on gasoline or alcohol and thickened with soap or tar. The mouth of the bottle was stoppered with a cork and a cloth rag fixed securely around the cork. The weapon was used by soaking the rag in a flammable liquid immediately prior to use and then lighting the rag and hurling the bottle at the target. The bottle shattered on impact, spilling the flammable contents all over the target which the burning rag then ignited.

Cheap and simple to make in an emergency from a bottle of vodka and some hand soap, the Molotov cocktail proved highly effective against the Soviet tanks of the Winter War. The Soviet tank engines at the time were gasoline engines, and the hot engine at the rear of the tank caught fire quite easily. Later in the war, the Soviets attached bushes or wire mesh to protect the rear end of the tank, counting on the bottle not breaking if it couldn’t actually hit the armor. The Finns responded by tying some stones at the end of strings attached to the bottle, with the stones shattering the glass on impact. They also wrapped barbwire around the bottle, so that if the bottle at least hit the mesh protecting the ventilation, the chance of setting the engine on fire increased.

Molotov cocktails were eventually mass-produced by the Finnish state corporation Alko, bundled with attached matches to light them. Production totalled 540,000 during the Winter War, produced by a work force of 87 women and 5 men. The mass-produced design was a mixture of ethanol, tar and gasoline in a 750 ml bottle that had two long pyrotechnic storm matches attached to either side. Before use, one or both of the matches was lit; when the bottle broke on impact, the mixture ignited. The storm matches were found to be quite a bit safer to use than a burning rag on the mouth of the bottle.

The principal delivery system for these weapons was comprised of Finnish daredevils on skis. The Molotov-throwers grumbled that the weapon could only be used without immediate detection during daylight hours. As Mother Nature has seen fit to bless these latitudes with no more than up to four hours of winter daylight, that presented a somewhat limited window of opportunity for undetected approach each day.

I see your tanks and I’ll raise you a satchel charge, comrade

The second anti-tank invention was the satchel charge, a heavy-duty TNT-based explosive weapon used to sever the tracks of enemy tanks and, with larger charges, capable of destroying enemy vehicles weighing up to 30 tons. To deploy a satchel charge, the Finnish anti-tank squads had to get even closer to the tank since the bulky and heavy weapon couldn’t be thrown much further than 10-15 meters.

These tactics were risky at best. Sneaking up to an enemy tank undetected was difficult and required considerable courage and patience. To ensure a kill with a satchel charge, it had to be thrown accurately and skillfully with just enough force to land it securely on top of the tank. Another method was running all the way up to the tank and placing the charge directly on the rear deck, but this was even riskier – Finnish soldiers in some cases died from the blast of their own satchel charge when the weapon tumbled down from the tank.

A third anti-tank tactic, used in combination with either the Molotov cocktail or the satchel charge, was the riskiest of all; some might even call it borderline crazy. The idea was to run up to a tank and forcibly halt it by jamming a log into its treads; done just right, this gave an opportunity to deal with the tank and its crew at a more leisurely pace. One exceptionally burly Finnish ski trooper was decorated for immobilizing a Soviet tank with nothing but a crowbar, prying the treads off by brute force, after which another soldier came up to the tank with a satchel charge and blew it up.

Finnish tank buster forces endured a fatality rate of 70%, yet had no shortage of volunteers. It was a very dangerous business, but also very successful. Of the around 6,000 total tanks deployed by the Soviets during the course of the Winter War, the Finns managed to take out more than 2,000; of these, about half were destroyed using mines and satchel charges or burned using Molotov cocktails. The remainder are accounted for by the cunning sinking of tanks into frozen lakes or the frozen sea, as well as by artillery on the heavily-fought-over Karelian Isthmus. It’s perhaps worth mentioning in passing that the Soviets lost at least another 1,200 tanks to “technical failures”; in other words, to the elements.

Merry Christmas from the Mannerheim Line

The Soviet invasion was planned as an overwhelming onslaught everywhere along the thousand-kilometer eastern border of Finland, but the main thrust of the Soviet offensive was aimed directly northwest from Leningrad through the Karelian Isthmus, a narrow strip of strategically crucial land between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland. This was to be the Finns’ icy Thermopylae on which the outcome of the entire war hinged.

Here the Finns built a 132-kilometer-long defensive fortification line that became known as the Mannerheim Line, named after the Finnish commander-in-chief Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. The line consisted mostly of trenches, dugouts, anti-tank obstacles, barbed wire barriers and mine fields. It also had a total of 101 thinly spread out small concrete bunkers with 157 machine gun positions and eight artillery positions.

On December 6, 1939, the leading units of the Red Army reached the Mannerheim Line and tried to break through. They did not succeed. Wave after wave of the invaders broke in direct frontal assaults against the line, the attackers mowed down to the last man by well-placed Finnish automatic weapons. The true carnage had begun.

In the days that followed, untold many silent dead littered the barbed wire in front of the Finnish positions. As the bodies piled up ever higher like logs of cordwood, subsequent waves of attacks were actually able to get progressively closer to the Finnish line by taking cover behind their own dead – the temperatures were so low that after an hour a frozen corpse would stop a bullet just as well as a brick wall would.

Despite their mounting losses, the Soviet offensive was unrelenting; Stalin’s generals had promised him Finland as a gift by his upcoming 60th birthday in December, and they knew that their own continued personal well-being depended on keeping that promise. And so the mindless slaughter went on day after day, week after week, with one Soviet battalion after another wiped out. By the end of the month, over seven whole Soviet infantry divisions had obliterated themselves failing to decisively breach the Mannerheim Line. The line gave way sometimes, but always held strong in the end.

Thus the first month of the Finnish campaign ended in abject humiliation for the Red Army. Soviet propaganda back home was working overtime to explain and justify the Red Army’s insignificant progress against the Finnish defenses while covering up the mind-boggling number of steadily climbing casualties. The spin made the Mannerheim Line out to sound like a stronger, impregnable version of the French Maginot Line – a bit of a stretch considering that an equivalent span of the Maginot Line would have had some 5,800 concrete bunkers to the mere hundred that the Finns had been able to build and equip. The real strength of the Mannerheim Line lay in the men who held it.

Know your terrain, admonished Sun Tzu

Fortunately for the Finns, much as the central control of the Soviet Union’s economy had left it crippled and increasingly out of touch with reality, so was the rigid central command of the Red Army set to lead to further military disaster. Stalin’s bloody political purges in the preceding years had led to the execution of the Red Army’s best generals and most of its professional officer corps, leaving the command chain of the army in the hands of inexperienced and, more often than not, incompetent political officers.

There was no doubt that the Red Army had orders of magnitude more tanks and aircraft than the Finnish Army, and vastly more troops to boot. But what the Finns lacked in equipment and numbers they made up for in cunning strategy, bold initiative, and, crucially, an intimate knowledge of the local geography.

Geographically, the vast majority of Finland is relatively flat landscape covered in forests and swamps and pocked by tens of thousands of lakes – not ideal terrain for moving and protecting heavy weaponry, particularly in the middle of winter. This the Soviets were about to learn the hard way.

So exuberantly overconfident were the Soviets initially of a quick, relatively unimpeded victory march all the way to Helsinki that they came with parade bands, but without winter uniforms, without supplies for a protracted campaign, and without medical facilities.

The Red Army troops wore olive drab or khaki uniforms, their tanks were painted black, and they carried heavy field stoves that sent thick plumes of black smoke visible for many kilometers – none of these constituted brilliant tactics for hiding in snowy terrain. The Soviets’ semi-automatic guns frequently jammed up in the forbidding subzero temperatures, and even their howitzers behaved in unpredictable and unsafe ways.

Some commenters have wryly observed that the Russian field manual for snow combat must’ve been written in the Mediterranean, because it contained a passage on bayoneting on skis – a feat that any Finn could have readily enough told them was not a feasible prospect.

The contrast to the Finnish Army was stark, quite literally so. Nimble and decentralized, the Finnish troops wore white uniforms and camouflage to blend into the terrain, and used skis, sledges, and horses (often captured from the Soviets) to speed through the forests, taking every opportunity to outmaneuver the Red Army which was wedded to its tanks and troop formations and preferred to stick to the roads.

You can check out anytime you like, but you can never leave

In early December 1939, a Soviet division was advancing to the northwest in central Finland with the objective of taking the city of Oulu and thus effectively cutting Finland in half. If successful, this would have severed the important railway to Sweden and forced the Finns to defend themselves on two isolated fronts.

On its way to Oulu, the Soviet 163rd division captured the village of Suomussalmi, but soon found itself surrounded and suffering major casualties deep inside Finnish territory. The Soviet 44th division, an elite Ukrainian formation, was dispatched to its aid. They never made it to Suomussalmi; not that it would have made a difference if they had, as the Finnish defenders had already destroyed the 163rd before any reinforcements could have reached them.

The sordid fate of these two Soviet divisions – combined totalling some 40,000 soldiers and more than three hundred artillery pieces, a hundred tanks, and fifty armored cars – would prove an instructive lesson in the Finnish way of guerrilla warfare. The Finns would go on to apply these same tactics extensively in the other battles of the Winter War, but the Battle of Suomussalmi remains the best-studied one.

Advancing towards Suomussalmi in early January 1940, the 44th’s mechanized infantry units were completely road bound in the deep snow. Resembling a huge snake, their column stretched out for thirty kilometers on the Raate road, a long and narrow logging track with virtually no way other than forwards or backwards, surrounded as it was by deep forest and the occasional lake. Once committed to the road, the Soviet troops were effectively trapped, even if they hadn’t yet realized their peril.

Finnish ski troopers, outnumbered by the advancing enemy but much more mobile in this terrain, were able to swiftly and invisibly move up and down the entire length of the enemy column through the surrounding forest. They felled trees to block the road in front and behind the enemy division, stalling the movement of the column, and then proceeded to relentlessly chop up the Soviet column into ever-smaller segments they called mottis; a motti being a Finnish measure of stacked-up firewood.

Attacking with light machine guns, mortars, and hand grenades, the ski troopers would surge out of the forest to cut the road at that point, quickly disappearing on the other side of the road. They would be followed by Finnish combat engineers who would widen and fortify the breach, decisively cutting off one piece of the enemy column from the other. Once the Soviet division was split up into these smaller and more manageable pockets of enemy troops, the mottis could then be dealt with individually by concentrating forces on all sides against an entrapped unit. Surrounded and pinned down by Finnish snipers, the invaders froze or starved to death if they didn’t first succumb to rifle fire and wounds.

The deep cold at Suomussalmi that winter was so intense that almost any wound was fatal, and the instant a man was hit by a bullet and his circulation slowed, his body would freeze in the very posture that he was standing in when he was hit. A macabre legend of the Winter War tells of a surreal scene in still life: a Soviet patrol standing by the side of the road, the men upright and frozen stiff in the snow, a Soviet officer beside them with a loaded pistol in hand; all had had their throats neatly cut, without a single shot fired from the officer’s pistol. They never saw the freedom fighters who had snuck up on them to deliver the silent death of the puukko – a traditional Finnish hunting knife that emerged as the Finns’ close-combat weapon of choice during the Winter War.

Our lakes are full of dead Russians

The Finns would also frequently use their numerous frozen lakes as highly effective death traps, channeling the enemy onto the ice using motti tactics. When the Soviet troops attacked in company, battalion and regimental strength across the lakes, their dark uniforms made for easy pickings against the white snow. The defenders sprung the trap using machine guns to enfilade the lakes from the surrounding forest while home guard riflemen, most of whom were expert marksmen, proceeded to pick the enemy off one by one, all the while adequately concealed and protected from return fire.

The dead enemy were left to lie frozen in the snow over the lakes, a demoralizing warning to subsequent replacements crossing such a battlefield. With the spring thaw the corpses sank to the bottom to become fish food – saving everyone the trouble of a burial. As the Finnish veteran Antti Olavi Pönkänen stated: “Our lakes are full of dead Russians."

What the hell do you want our country for anyway?

For many of the encircled Soviet troops in the Finnish woods, just staying alive for one more hour or one more day was an ordeal comparable to combat. Frostbitten, desperately hungry, and crusted with their own filth – while the besieging Finns, a mere thousand meters away, might be enjoying a warm sauna bath – for them the Finnish forest was truly a snow-white hell; an existence defined by long dark hours of pain and misery, punctuated by the moans of the wounded and dying.

One captured Soviet colonel when interrogated offered some more details of his long ordeal in the Finnish woods:

Finns we couldn’t see anywhere. When we sent our sentries out to take their positions around the camp, we knew that within minutes they would be dead with a bullet hole to the forehead or the throat slashed by a dagger… it was sheer madness… I know that Stalin and Voroshilov are clever, sensible men and I can’t understand how they were led to this idiotic war. What do we need cold, dark Finland for anyway?

Hey comrade, can you spare a bullet; it’s hard work equalizing these odds

They may not have had nifty toys like mechanized infantry, but at least all the Finnish troops had rifles and bullets – even if they often had to relieve the dead Soviets of some so that there were enough to go around and carry on. Indeed throughout the war the Finns made use of captured Soviet guns, ammunition, and tanks – a classic guerrilla tactic of relying on your enemy to supply you.

Moreover, the Finnish soldiers knew how to use their rifles. One Finn in particular, Corporal Simo Häyhä, became a living legend during and after the Winter War for his exemplary service as a sniper in the Finnish Army. The Red Army respectfully and fearfully nicknamed him the White Death.

During a period of just 90 days in the Winter War, in bone-chilling temperatures ranging from -20 down to -50 degrees centigrade, dressed completely in white camouflage and operating with a very limited amount of daylight per day, Häyhä went out to “hunt Russians” each day. He just in and of himself is credited with 505 confirmed sniper kills of Soviet soldiers, 542 if unconfirmed deaths are included. The unofficial Finnish front line figure from the battlefield of Kollaa places the number of Häyhä’s sniper kills at over 800.

He did all this using but a bolt-action rifle with open sights, an almost incredible feat considering that he routinely engaged many of his targets from a distance of 400 meters or more. Besides his numerous sniper kills, Häyhä is also credited with over two hundred kills with a Suomi K31 submachine gun, bringing his confirmed kills to at least 705 – reportedly the all-time highest recorded number of confirmed kills in any major war.

As can readily be imagined, it wouldn’t have taken all that many snipers like Häyhä to even out the odds a tad into the Finns’ favor. Häyhä himself was such a menace to the invaders that the Soviets tried several ploys to get rid of him specifically, including counter-snipers and outright artillery strikes. One week before the armistice was signed, they finally succeeded.

On March 6, 1940, Häyhä was shot in the face by a Soviet sniper. The bullet tumbled upon impact and left his head explosively, in the process crushing his jaw and blowing off his entire left cheek – the fellow soldiers who later evacuated him described the grave injury succinctly as “half his head was missing”. Despite the near-lethal injury, Häyhä still somehow managed the fortitude to pick up his rifle and kill the Soviet who had shot him.

Häyhä regained consciousness the very day that peace was declared. It took him several years to recuperate, but he eventually made a full recovery and, honored as a national hero, lived to the ripe old age of 96.

“A fatalism incomprehensible to a European”

So great were the Soviet casualties in the Finnish offensive that hospitals in Leningrad filled to capacity already early on in the invasion; soon after, kilometer-long lengths of trains wound their way as far as Moscow, windows covered with curtains to hide curious passersby from the hideous sight of the frostbitten, the bleeding, the limbless and the dying.

None of this stopped the inexorable Soviet advance, however. In tune with their grisly collectivist ideology, the life of every individual Soviet soldier truly was considered expendable: there were always more warm bodies available to be thrown into the unforgiving meat grinder that the Finnish theater had become. What mattered mere individuals in the pursuit of power and glory for the state?

With company commanders threatening to shoot anyone who fell back or turned around, some Soviet regiments would link arms and march in a line to clear minefields the Finns had laid out for them; the regiments sang party war songs and advanced with the same steady, suicidal rhythm even as the mines began to explode, ripping holes in their ranks and showering the marchers with limbs and intestines. Field Marshal Mannerheim, struggling to explain the determination on both sides, described the Russian soldiers as possessing “a fatalism incomprehensible to a European."

Thank you, Mr. Churchill, but we need more guns, not words

The Finnish victories made headlines around the world. During the Winter War, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill waxed poetic in a world-wide radio broadcast:

Only Finland – superb, nay, sublime – in the jaws of peril – Finland shows what free men can do. The service rendered by Finland to mankind is magnificent. They have exposed, for all the world to see, the military incapacity of the Red Army and of the Red Air Force. Many illusions about Soviet Russia have been dispelled in these few fierce weeks of fighting in the Arctic Circle. Everyone can see how Communism rots the soul of a nation; how it makes it abject and hungry in peace, and proves it base and abominable in war. We cannot tell what the fate of Finland may be, but no more mournful spectacle could be presented to what is left to civilized mankind than that this splendid Northern race should be at last worn down and reduced to servitude worse than death by the dull brutish force of overwhelming numbers. If the light of freedom which still burns so brightly in the frozen North should be finally quenched, it might well herald a return to the Dark Ages, when every vestige of human progress during two thousand years would be engulfed.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Christian Science Monitor reported on the Winter War in equally laudatory terms:

If you were to name the greatest nation in the world, would it be the richest; would it be the one whose possessions are the most wide-flung; would it be the most populous or that which boasted of the most destructive guns and the most powerful army? Perhaps it would be that nation which paid its debts, which, courageous as the Greeks at Thermopylae, fights a barbarian horde, which faces annihilation rather than compromise its liberty – whose men today die on the battlefield and whose women and babies starve and freeze behind the lines. If this is the nation you would seek, there stands Finland.

Damn you Soviets, we have not bullets enough for all of you

As January 1940 progressed, it was clear to Stalin that his army was being routed and was suffering terrible losses; he knew that the Finns had to be beaten at any cost, and quickly at that. He demoted or executed most of his commanders and placed the entire Finnish operation under the command of Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko, a trusted sycophant and also one of the few remaining truly capable Red Army generals.

Timoshenko realized that winning the Karelian Isthmus was the key to winning Finland, and concentrated his forces there. By the beginning of February, Timoshenko had called up and massed twenty-five divisions – a total of 600,000 men – arrayed against the Mannerheim Line, supported by vast numbers of tanks and artillery.

On February 1, the Soviets resumed their offensive on the Mannerheim Line, beginning a large-scale blanket bombardment to soften up the line. This heralded the beginning of the end for the stubborn Finns. Each day for the next ten days, the Soviet artillery poured down more shells on the Finnish line than the whole Finnish Army had ever had in its arsenal during the entire war.

The morning of February 11, however, was something else entirely. It was not a morning, nor a day, that anyone who happened to live through it would ever forget: the frustrated Red Army threw everything they had at the Finns. Some 300,000 artillery shells rained down on the Mannerheim Line at Summa, where the line was the weakest. It was the most massive artillery barrage the world had witnessed since the German shelling of Verdun in World War I, and it at long last succeeded in breaking the back of the Mannerheim Line.

By noon that day, the Soviet tanks had broken through and the enemy infantry had captured some of the Finnish bunker positions. All Finnish reserves were thrown into the battle, but the sheer mass of the Red Army could no longer be contained. Four days later, the Summa area was completely overwhelmed and completely destroyed.

Strangely enough, it was difficult to convince Moscow that the Mannerheim Line had in fact been overrun. Perhaps they had started to internalize their own propaganda about the impregnability of the line, but no one in the Soviet high command would initially believe that the Red Army had captured Summa. An irritated Marshal Voroshilov had to have it repeated to him three times by two trusted eyewitnesses before it sank in.

By the end of February, the Finnish defensive line had been pushed back almost all the way to the strategic city of Vyborg, the second-largest city in Finland. The Finns’ desperate resistance continued ferociously, but they were incurring heavy losses and struggling to hold on. By March 12, the situation was nothing short of catastrophic: the Red Army had advanced to the outskirts of Vyborg, and the remaining Finnish troops were almost out of ammunition and no more ammo could be found.

Like hell we’ll put those chains on ever again

While the Finns’ situation was dire, Stalin was not aware of the full extent of it. What he did know was that ongoing Red Army casualties were still high and that the situation was a source of increasing political embarrassment and ridicule for the Soviet regime. Furthermore, with the spring thaw approaching, the Soviet forces risked becoming bogged down in the Finnish forests.

At noon on March 13, 1940, the word spread along the Finnish and Soviet lines that an armistice had been signed. The war was over, having lasted 105 long days. The truce came not a moment too soon; the Finnish defenders were at the end of their rope. “We were absolutely exhausted," a veteran recounted it.

The peace terms were harsh for the Finns, ceding the entire Karelian Isthmus as well as a large swath of land north of Lake Ladoga to the Soviet Union. The area included the city of Vyborg and much of Finland’s industrialized territory. Twelve percent of Finland’s population, some 422,000 Karelians, were given the choice of becoming Soviet subjects or of being evacuated behind the new border, destitute and homeless.

As the American Mercury reported, the Finns “in one of the most impressive informal plebiscites of modern history moved voluntarily and en masse into the shrunken part of Finland. Practically none chose to remain under Soviet rule."

Despite the harsh peace terms, the Soviets did not accomplish their original objective of the total domination and occupation of Finland.

Just enough ground to bury all the dead

The Winter War is a footnote in most histories, but it was a key event in determining the subsequent course of World War II in Europe. Hitler watched with glee as the Finns humiliated the Soviets, eventually coming to believe that he could betray and crush his former ally Stalin. As for the Soviet high command, they realized very well what a military fiasco the Finnish invasion had been, even if they never publicly deigned to call it anything but a great victory.

One Russian general remarked aptly, “Well, we’ve won just enough ground to bury our dead." Timoshenko said, “The Russians have learned much in this hard war in which the Finns fought with heroism." Admiral Kuznetsov concluded, “We had received a severe lesson. We had to profit by it." Nikita Khrushchev remembered the events as follows:

Even in these most favorable conditions it was only after great difficulty and enormous losses that we were finally able to win. A victory at such a cost was actually a moral defeat… Our people never knew [in 1940] that we had suffered a moral defeat, because they were never told the truth. Quite the contrary. When the Finnish war ended our country was told, “Let the trumpets of victory sound!” But the seeds of doubt had been sown.

The official Red Army propaganda account of the Winter War indeed claimed only some 40,000 Soviet casualties. All the way up until 1988, the official version of Soviet history even maintained that the Finns were the ones who had started the war – there’s a lesson in police state history right there. Khrushchev wrote further:

All of us – and Stalin first and foremost – sensed in our victory a defeat by the Finns. It was a dangerous defeat because it encouraged our enemies’ conviction that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay… We had to draw some lessons for the immediate future from what had happened.

And draw some lessons they did. Crucially, Stalin curtailed the influence of political commissars and reinstated many army officers, returning their rank and privileges. This reorganization came just in time to prevent Hitler from taking Russia.

After Khrushchev took over as ruler of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death, he began a more realistic accounting of Soviet casualties. He concluded that a total of 1.5 million Soviet soldiers were sent to Finland and that as many as one million of them perished in the three months of the war. Some later Russian historians have challenged his figures, but whatever the exact number was, it was a spectacular and callous waste of human capital.

On their part, the Finns suffered 26,000 fatalities and 44,000 wounded in the war.

Liberty is purchased with the blood of patriots and tyrants

When hostilities with the Soviet Union resumed in the subsequent Continuation War of 1941-44, the Finns annihilated and maimed yet more hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers, ultimately forcing Stalin into yet another stalemate. The tale of that war is a worthy one, with many of its own miracles – such as how the beleaguered Finns withstood the largest artillery bombardment in the history of warfare – but it is not the tale I’m recounting today.

In any case, by the end of all the bloodshed, the Soviets had finally wearied of the cost and distraction of their supposed twelve-day-long conquest, once and for good giving up the notion of occupying Finland in favor of more indirect forms of influence. Stalin’s later 1948 toast to Finland goes to show that the only language tyrants understand and respect is that of force:

Nobody respects a country with a poor army, but everybody respects a country with a good army. I raise my toast to the Finnish Army.

Thus with a thousand lakes of warm red blood on cold white snow did the Finns purchase their escape from assimilation into the Soviet Union, ensuring that when the Iron Curtain was drawn, it ran along the eastern side of Finland rather than the western one.

During and after the wars, the Finns won international acclaim for having twice defied the might and fury of a superpower and for the terrible cost they had exacted for the Soviets’ two Pyrrhic victories. Newspaper descriptions of the Winter War popularized the Finnish word sisu in the English-speaking world for a generation; the word resists exact translation into other languages but loosely translated refers to a stoic toughness consisting of strength of will, determination, and perseverance in the face of adversity and against repeated setbacks; it means stubborn fortitude in the face of insurmountable odds; the ability to keep fighting after most people would have quit, and fighting with the will to win.

Sisu is more than mere physical courage, requiring an inner strength nourished by optimism, tempered by realism, and powered by a great deal of pig-headed obstinacy of the sort that enables a man diagnosed with an acutely fatal illness to outlive his physicians. I can’t think of a better explanation of sisu than the testimony of the events of the Winter War.

Sources: Wikipedia, WinterWar.com, Fire and Ice: The Winter War of Finland and Russia (2006), A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 by William Totter (2000), The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland, 1939-1940 by Eloise Engle & Lauri Paananen (1992), The Winter War: Russia Against Finland by Richard Condon (1972), Marskin panssarintuhoojat by Erkki Käkelä (2000), David’s Tool Kit: A Citizens’ Guide to Taking Out Big Brother’s Heavy Weapons by Ragnar Benson (1996)

Dissecting the Unlicense: Software Freedom in Four Clauses and a Link

Sat, 23 Jan 2010 16:30:00 +0000

I've previously written on the motivation that led us to formulate the Unlicense, a template for dedicating your software to the public domain. Today, I will elucidate the rationale for and the provenance of each of the four brief paragraphs (plus footer) that constitute the Unlicense.

The Unlicense combines a public domain dedication and copyright waiver patterned after those of the well-known public domain SQLite project with the no-warranty statement from the widely-used MIT/X11 license. We also provide a well-defined process instructing Unlicense adopters on how they can ensure that any third-party contributions remain likewise unencumbered by copyright.

The entire effort and nascent movement could not have come about without the inspiration and example of the SQLite project, which by any measure is surely to be counted among the most successful public domain software projects of all time. SQLite has combined technical excellence with a unique take on liberal licensing:

The source code for SQLite is in the public domain. No claim of copyright is made on any part of the core source code. [...] This means that anybody is able to legally do anything they want with the SQLite source code.

There are other SQL database engines with liberal licenses that allow the code to be broadly and freely used. But those other engines are still governed by copyright law. SQLite is different in that copyright law simply does not apply.

The source code files for other SQL database engines typically begin with a comment describing your license rights to view and copy that file. The SQLite source code contains no license since it is not governed by copyright. Instead of a license, the SQLite source code offers a blessing:

May you do good and not evil

May you find forgiveness for yourself and forgive others

May you share freely, never taking more than you give.

Over the years the SQLite project has needed to develop much of the legal infrastructure and process necessary for any large public domain project. This includes e.g. collecting copyright waivers from contributors and issuing special one-off licenses to megacorporations with legal departments unable to grok the concept of the public domain. Many a conversation on the project's mailing lists illuminate the legal hurdles they have overcome and provide hoards of valuable information to anyone considering unlicensing their code into the public domain.

We launched the Unlicense initiative so that any software developer can now draw on this time-tested knowledge base, infrastructure and process to do what SQLite's authors have done: set their code entirely free.

Now, it is certainly the case that you can perfectly well dedicate your code to the public domain without using the Unlicense, but information on how to do that can be hard to find and apply. Until now everyone who has released their software into the public domain has done so with differing wording, subject to differing legal interpretation in differing jurisdictions.

Contrasting this situation with the familiarity of simply copying a license file into your source code repository, it is perhaps no great surprise that many who would otherwise have been inclined to release their code into the public domain have instead opted for some very permissive license, avoiding the perceived legal morass of the public domain. This has constituted a barrier to both the production and adoption of public domain software.

We hope that the Unlicense can help change this for the better. Think of the Unlicense as a gateway to resurrecting the public domain in software.

§1 The Executive Summary

The first paragraph of the Unlicense reads:

This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.

In principle, wording such as this is in and of itself sufficient to dedicate a work to the public domain. In practice, given the litigious age we live in and the variations on how the public domain as a concept may be codified and interpreted in different jurisdictions, most authors will want to be somewhat more explicit. Hence the rest of the Unlicense.

This first paragraph is, hopefully, self-evident in its simplicity; but let us nonetheless briefly examine its constituents:

"Free" here means most of the definitions of the word in any English dictionary. It means "for free" as in "gratis" and "given or available without cost, payment or charge". It means "freedom" as in "not under the control or in the power of another", implying among other things "not subject to despotic government". It means "free to" as in "free to make use of". And, of course, it means "free from" as in "free from copyright" and "free of" as in "not subject to copyright".

"Unencumbered" qualifies and helps establish the aforementioned meanings by stating that your use of the software isn't burdened or weighed down by any restraints or obligations whatsoever; more on this in the next section. Some more loaded alternatives to "unencumbered" would be "unlicensed" or "uncontaminated", which also convey the notion that the software has no strings attached to it; but for the Unlicense text itself we felt it best to stick with the more neutral term.

Lastly, "the public domain" means those materials, in this case those pieces of software, that nobody claims as an intellectual monopoly and hence are not subject to copyright. These works are available for anyone to use freely for any purpose.

§2 The Freedoms

The second paragraph of the Unlicense reads:

Anyone is free to copy, modify, publish, use, compile, sell, or distribute this software, either in source code form or as a compiled binary, for any purpose, commercial or non-commercial, and by any means.

This paragraph originates from SQLite's public domain dedication, with only "the original SQLite code" changed to "this software".

This is simply a listing of some of the specific things you can do with any entirely free public domain software. It is not intended to be exhaustive, merely illustrative. You have complete freedom to do anything ("for any purpose") you want with the software. When someone dedicates their work to the public domain, they are making a public guarantee that they will not send any copyright cops after you even if they personally dislike the uses you've put their software to.

You may notice the similarity to the old saying of "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

So, yes, you are perfectly welcome to incorporate the code into proprietary software. Yes, you can relicense the code under any license you please. No, you don't need to include any original copyright statements (there are none) or a copy of the Unlicense. No, you don't need to give attribution to the original authors -- though as a matter of common courtesy you probably should be doing so!

The legal significance of this Unlicense clause is that even if it so happened that in some backward jurisdiction there were any questions about the interpretation of a public domain dedication like the Unlicense, the authors have here very explicitly granted permission to do just about anything with the software. So, while the Unlicense is not intended to be, legally speaking, an actual copyright license, but rather merely an explicit form of public domain dedication, the fallback strategy for any public domain-unfriendly jurisdictions is to in fact treat it as if it were an extremely permissive license.

We would like to eventually improve this paragraph somewhat, to make it read a bit better and to explicitly mention a few more of the things you are allowed to do. Ultimately, it ought to also be somewhat more, well, poetic.

§3 The Legalese

The third paragraph of the Unlicense reads:

In jurisdictions that recognize copyright laws, the author or authors of this software dedicate any and all copyright interest in the software to the public domain. We make this dedication for the benefit of the public at large and to the detriment of our heirs and successors. We intend this dedication to be an overt act of relinquishment in perpetuity of all present and future rights to this software under copyright law.

This legally significant paragraph is a statement of intent that has its origins in SQLite's public domain dedication, which in turn is based on the Creative Commons public domain certification with the wording changed (improved, I should say) from the third person to the first person.

This paragraph is important because it establishes intent. Regardless of how the public domain as a concept is codified in the laws of a particular country, this paragraph makes it very clear that the authors have explicitly disavowed any and all monopoly privileges granted them by copyright law -- in the full knowledge that this could, in theory, be financially detrimental to them.

Since the fitness of this paragraph has been established in the SQLite project, we incorporated it as-is but for two trivial changes:

We changed "this code" to "this software" to ensure we're covering not just the code per se but everything that constitutes the software, typically the entirety of the source and binary distributions. There is better room for appropriate interpretation in "this software" than in "this code".

We also very purposefully added the introductory "in jurisdictions that recognize copyright laws" text. Beyond the immediate practical goal of helping you unlicense your software into the public domain, a secondary goal of the Unlicense is to help disseminate the idea that we perhaps really shouldn't be taking for granted the existence of copyright licensing and copyright laws in the first place.

If you actually take some time to read about the history of copyright, you will discover that most everything you thought you knew about copyright is mistaken. Despite popular myth, copyright did not, in fact, come about as some noble effort to protect the rights of authors, but rather has its ignoble origin in the privatization of censorship in 16th century England. Its further developments have been by and for the distributors, as is evident even today with the major media companies seeking, and obtaining, what amount to perpetual extensions to their copyright terms.

All this notwithstanding, however, everyone twentysomething and younger knows that we are already well on our way to a post-copyright world. Since we wanted the Unlicense's wording to stand the test of time, we did not bake in the current implicit assumption that copyright is "just the way things are". Rather, we baked in the hope for a future where increasingly fewer jurisdictions cling to their obsolete copyright laws at a clear disadvantage to those freer corners of the world that have already let go of the concept.

§4 The Don't-Sue-Me

The fourth paragraph of the Unlicense reads:

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

This no-warranty clause comes almost verbatim from the MIT/X11 license, with the "the authors or copyright holders" changed to read merely "the authors". After all, the whole point of the Unlicense is that there no longer are any copyright holders for the software, only authors.

Now, it must surely be evident to every reasonable human being that this no-warranty paragraph is, inherently, a redundantly idiotic bunch of all-caps legalese in defense of the perfectly obvious point that "yeah, dumbass, I'll pay you the $0 in damages that the software cost you."

An alternative wording I'm fond of is "assume nothing works, and you may be pleasantly surprised; and when it breaks, you get to keep both pieces."

Redundant and idiotic as it may be, we knew we had to include a no-warranty clause of some kind. An often cited, though unwarranted, concern about releasing your software into the public domain is that this could leave you open to damage claims from litigious imbeciles who somehow managed to microwave their cat and burn down the house with the help of your code, whereas using a permissive license with lots of capital letters would magically prevent this.

So, whether to alleviate a perceived problem or a real one, we felt we did need to very explicitly disclaim any implied warranties as part of the Unlicense public domain dedication. We evaluated the all-caps clauses in various permissive licenses, including the BSD and ISC licenses. They all read somewhat differently but hit the same points. In the end we preferred the MIT/X11 license's wording as well as its (relative) brevity, so that's what we incorporated.

We have preserved the all-caps nature of the paragraph only for the sake of your reading pleasure, namely so that your eyes can gently and quickly glaze over it and continue on their way.

§5 The Link

The footer of the Unlicense reads:

For more information, please refer to https://unlicense.org/

This final line of the Unlicense simply contains an optional link to the Unlicense.org website. This is the only "viral" part of the Unlicense, and, naturally, you're perfectly welcome to leave it out from your copy of the Unlicense if you should so choose.

We expect that most adopters of the Unlicense will want to retain the link, however. If you care enough to swim against the mainstream in choosing to unlicense your code into the public domain, you will likely care enough to consider the Unlicense an idea worth spreading. But the choice is up to you.

This concludes my overview of the ingredients that went into the initial version of the Unlicense. If you believe you can improve on any of this, please join the Unlicense mailing list and let us know how.

Kudos to Ben Lavender and Mike Gogulski for their valuable input on this article.

Set Your Code Free

Fri, 01 Jan 2010 20:00:00 +0000

Today is Public Domain Day, in honor of which I’m hereby relicensing (or more properly, unlicensing) all of my software into the public domain.

As the public domain is these days unfortunately somewhat an obscure concept to many people, and disclaiming copyright interest in open-source software seems at present a relatively rare phenomenon (though there exist some notable examples), I will elaborate some on the rationale and implications. As is often the case, there are two kinds of reasons for doing this: the practical and the moral. Let’s start with some practical reasons.

If you are an open-source developer like me, licensing is likely a growing headache for you. Yes, it’s all “open source”, but which flavor? Let me ask you: how often have you passed up on utilizing a great software library just because its open source license was not compatible with your own preferred flavor? How many precious hours of your life have you spent deliberating how to license your software or worrying about licensing compatibility with other software? How many wheels have you rewritten because of licensing concerns?

As you know, there are basically three camps in the FLOSS movement: viral copyleft licensing (so-called “Free Software”), permissive licensing (“open source”), and the public domain. It’s fairly evident that this last camp has been somewhat underrepresented in the last decade and more (and there are reasons for that), with most of the action having taken place in the former two camps. But that could change in an eyeblink.

Now, if you are like me, you’ve never cared much for the concept of copyleft to begin with, and have tended to by default prefer more permissive and liberal licenses such as MIT, BSD, ISC or the Apache License. That already puts you very near the public domain in practical terms. Basically, the key difference between these permissive licenses and the public domain is that in the latter you stop holding a gun to your users’ heads regarding attribution. More on this later.

So, if you’ve preferred permissive licenses, you probably have often uttered a silent sigh when you’ve come across a nice new piece of GPL/LGPL software whose author has inadvertently doomed it to relative obscurity with his licensing choice. For while you might have extended the software and contributed to the project, your interest level dropped as soon as you saw the licensing terms. It turned out to be the equivalent of contaminated code, and assuming that you are not the only one to feel that way, an unintended consequence of the author’s licensing choice has been to curtail the pool of early adopters and contributors.

Having had that experience often enough, I’ve so far made sure to stick with the MIT license for all my software (excepting special cases with external constraints, such as with my Drupal modules). The nice thing about the MIT license and its peers are that they don’t impede cross-pollination: MIT-licensed code can be directly used without legal problems in other software licensed under an equally-permissive license (e.g. the revised BSD license), and vice versa, because these licenses don’t attempt to prohibit relicensing.

Contrast this with the GPL/LGPL, which are one-way streets, or put another way, they are an entry without an exit. To paraphrase a classic song, your code can be checked out anytime you like, but it can never leave. It’s easy to see that if you want your code to be used as widely as possible, copyleft is perhaps not the way to go. But then, that’s sort of the whole point of copyleft, of course: you can look at my code, but if you touch it in a way I don’t approve of, I’ll crucify you with law and impunity.

This leads us into some of the moral, and immoral, aspects of claiming a state-created and state-enforced distribution monopoly on a piece of software. If you failed Ethics 101 (sociopaths, raise your hand) or are not one to philosophize, you can safely quit reading here.

What copyrighting your code really comes down to is this: when you include a license statement in your software project, you are effectively making a threat to the users of your software. You are saying that if they don’t behave according to whatever arbitrary criteria you’ve set out in your license statement, you will send some men with guns after them. I don’t know about you, but I think that’s a pretty shitty thing to do.

Applying the coercive machinery of the state in this way always boils down to the threat of physical violence for non-compliance. When applied, it usually fiddles out into merely financial catastrophe because the victim (that’d be the so-called “infringer”, by the way) doesn’t put up a fight and does show up in the courtroom to hear the verdict that he is bankrupt.

The threat of violence is always in the background, though, and what you’ve done, if you should ever actually press suit for copyright infringement, is given men with guns a pretext for tearing apart a life, or lives, in case your victim doesn’t decide to play ball. (The inconvenient fact that you actually don’t possess any right to delegate the initiation of force in this way is a longer topic best suited for a political philosophy class.)

Now, I don’t know about you, but the least effective way to secure my cooperation is to threaten me. That virtually guarantees that I’ll do the opposite of what you want (even at personal cost to myself), or at the very least that I will choose not to associate with you in the future.

When I say that copyleft code is contaminated, I very much mean that. It is code with significant legal strings attached, and when using it you had better be very aware of those strings. Again, of course, that’s the point of the FSF’s strategy, so in case you agree with their missive you will see this as a benefit. I personally don’t, because I have no interest whatsoever in wreaking havoc on people who want to use my code or (heaven forbid) profit from it. I have better things to do.

It is a strange thing, indeed, to think, as copyleft advocates do, that it’s worth outrage and legal action if somebody incorporates some code of yours into their closed-source proprietary software. In all but the most special of cases, your “abusers” have not actually harmed you in any way. In fact, what they have done is paid you a compliment, whether they choose to openly acknowledge it or not.

Further, if the code they’ve incorporated is substantial, they have an economic incentive to cooperate with you by contributing patches and enhancements instead of attempting to maintain their own private fork of your software. Hell, they may even hire you. Whether they do so or not, you have not lost anything, and you may have gained something. This is known as a positive-sum outcome.

It is a stranger thing, even, to believe that slapping a licensing statement on your software will in some way prevent such wonderful “abuse” in the first place. That is simply a form of magical thinking. Those who would benefit from your software without reciprocity will do so in any case, with or without your implied copyright-sanctioned threats; and regarding my software I say, they’re welcome to knock themselves out. It’s no loss to me.

Not only copyleft advocates but anybody affixing a licensing statement to open-source software is guilty of either magical thinking or of having an intention to follow up on the implied threat. The only thing your license will prevent, or at least curtail, is the adoption of your software. Let us briefly consider a couple of contemporary examples of whether you can successfully attempt to legislate people’s private behavior, or merely drive it underground with the force of guns.

When you smoked that joint last night on New Year’s Eve, did you care about the fact that it is, supposedly, illegal? You knew perfectly well that there exists some bunch of legalese in some legal code you’ve never seen that claims, if you can believe it, to give certain men with guns the “legitimate” authority to prevent you from ingesting certain natural compounds, and to physically restrain and do violence to you in pursuance of that end.

Of course, being the reasonable person that you presumably are, you knew all that to be a bunch of nonsense and saw right through that claim of legitimacy. Those paragraphs of legal garbage no more bound you last night than do, well, the dead fingers of the dead lawyers who wrote them. Thus, last night you only took the sensible precaution of avoiding those particular men with guns who irrationally worship those dead fingers, just as you exercised caution about walking home through a bad neighborhood and opted for a cab instead. Smart of you.

To consider an example perhaps closer to home for those in my captive audience who are merely suffering from a vulgar hangover today: if you are anything like most twentysomethings or younger, you will be quite familiar with torrenting the latest television series, movies and music. You know perfectly well that a bunch of lawyers and politicians claim that what you are doing is “wrong” and that they would dearly love to “punish” you for it every chance they get, and you don’t believe a word they say. In fact, pirating entertainment is now so mainstream that only 3% of Canadians and (closer to home, for me) 1% of Spaniards still believe that it is criminal behavior, so you’re in good company.

Not that this will stop the copyright cops, always on the lookout for imaginary abuses of imaginary property, from “confiscating evidence” (otherwise known as home invasion plus property theft) and hauling your sorry behind to a courtroom (otherwise known as abduction) if they come knocking. So be safe.

The practical point being that, if you are twentysomething or younger, you already know that copyright is dead. It’s a joke, really. The genie is out of the bottle, and refuses to go back in, but all these middlemen are running around in a panic trying to forcibly stuff it back in. Like the Prohibition or the so-called War on Drugs, it’s one of those things where the writing is clearly on the wall, and it’s just a matter of time. The world got along fine before copyright, and will continue to do so (all the better, in fact) long after the concept has been given up for the farce that it is. So, why not give it a kick in the behind to speed things along?

The moral point being that if you’re pirating copyrighted material or clicking through idiotic EULAs without reading them, why on earth are you still slapping a copyright notice on software you yourself write and release? Do you know what that makes you? It makes you a hypocrite. Nobody wants to be a hypocrite. I’ve given up being a hypocrite (about this, anyway) today. What about you?

I’ve collected some resources at Unlicense.org that will help you unlicense your code into the public domain. Be good.

Unlicense

Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000

https://unlicense.org

The Unlicense is a template for disclaiming copyright monopoly interest in software you’ve written; in other words, it is a template for dedicating your software to the public domain. It combines a copyright waiver patterned after the very successful public domain SQLite project with the no-warranty statement from the widely-used MIT/X11 license.

Inflation and the Fall of the Roman Empire

Tue, 11 Aug 2009 23:00:00 +0000

This is a transcript of Prof. Joseph Peden's 50-minute lecture "Inflation and the Fall of the Roman Empire" given at the Seminar on Money and Government in Houston, Texas on October 27, 1984. The original audio recording is available courtesy of the Mises Institute. I have commissioned this transcript in the hope that you may find it as interesting and educational as I did. Kudos to Joshua Griffith for bringing this talk to my attention.

Two centuries ago, in 1776, there were two books published in England, both of which are read avidly today. One of them was Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations and the other was Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon's multi-volume work is the tale of a state that survived for twelve centuries in the west and for another thousand years in the east, at Constantinople.

Yet Gibbon in looking at this phenomenon commented that the wonder was not that the Roman Empire had fallen, but rather that it had lasted so long. And scholars since Gibbon have devoted great deal of energy to examining that problem: how was it that the Roman Empire lasted so long, and did it decline or was it simply transformed into something else? That something else being the European civilization, of which we are the heirs.

I've been asked to speak on the theme of Roman history, particularly the problem of inflation and its impact. My analysis is based on the premise that monetary policy cannot be studied, or understood, in isolation from the overall policies of the state. Monetary, fiscal, military, political and economic issues are all very much intertwined. And the reason they are all so intertwined is, in part, due to the fact that the state, any state, normally seeks to monopolize the supply of money within its own territory.

Monetary policy therefore always serves, even if it serves badly, the perceived needs of the rulers of the state. If it also happens to enhance the prosperity and progress of the masses of the people, that is a secondary benefit; but its first aim is to serve the needs of the rulers, not the ruled. And this point is central, I believe, to an understanding of the course of monetary policy in the late Roman Empire.

We may begin by looking at simply the mentality of the rulers of the Roman Empire, beginning at the end of the 2nd century [A.D.] and looking through to the end of the 3rd century. This period of the 3rd century Roman historians refer to as the Crisis of the Third Century. And the reason is that the problems of the Roman society in that period were so profound, so enormous, that Roman society emerged from the 3rd century very, very different in almost all ways from what it had been in the first and second centuries, a period the historians speak of as the Augustan Principate.

To look at the mentality of the Roman emperors, we can look just at the advice that the Emperor Septimius Severus gave to his two sons, Caracalla and Geta. This was supposed to be his final words to his heirs. He said, "live in harmony; enrich the troops; ignore everyone else." Now, there is a monetary policy to be marveled at!

Caracalla did not adhere to the first part of that; in fact, one of his first acts was to murder his brother. But as for enriching the troops, he took that so seriously to heart that his mother remonstrated with him and urged him to be more moderate and to restrain his increasing military expenditures and his very burdensome new taxes. He responded by saying there was no longer any revenue, just or unjust, to be found. But not to worry, "for as long as we have this," he insisted, pointing to his sword, "we shall not run short of money."

His sense of priorities was made more explicit when he remarked, "nobody should have any money but I, so that I may bestow it upon the soldiers." And he was as good as his word: he raised the pay of the soldiers fifty percent, and to achieve this he doubled the inheritance taxes paid by Roman citizens. When this was not sufficient to meet his needs, he admitted almost every inhabitant of the empire to Roman citizenship. What had formerly been a privilege now became simply a means of expanding the tax base.

He then went further by proceeding to debase the coinage. The basic coinage of the Roman Empire to this time — we're speaking now about 211 [A.D.] — was the silver denarius introduced by Augustus at the end of the 1st century before Christ. Augustus had issued a silver coin, a denarius, that was about 95% silver, and that coin continued for the better part of two centuries as the basic medium of exchange in the empire.

By the time of Trajan in 117, it was only about eighty-five percent silver, down from Augustus' ninety-five percent. By the age of Marcus Aurelius, in 180, it was down to about seventy-five percent silver. In Septimius' time it had dropped to sixty percent, and Caracalla evened it off at fifty-fifty. Caracalla was assassinated in 217 and there then followed an age that historians refer to as the Age of the Barrack Emperors, because throughout the 3rd century all the emperors were soldiers and all of them came to their power by military coups of one sort or another. There were about 26 legitimate emperors in this century and only one of them died a natural death; the rest were either assassinated or died in battle, which will give you some idea of the change since this was totally unprecedented in Roman history — with two exceptions: Nero, a suicide, and Caligula, assassinated earlier.

Caracalla had also debased the gold coinage. Under Augustus this circulated at 45 coins to a pound of gold. Caracalla made it 50 to a pound of gold. Within 20 years after him it was circulating at 72 to the pound of gold, reduced to 60 at the end of the century by Diocletian, only to be raised again to 72 by Constantine. So even the gold coinage was in fact inflated, debased.

But the real crisis came after Caracalla, between 258 and 275. In a period of intense civil war and foreign invasions, the emperors simply abandoned, for all practical purposes, a silver coinage. By 268 there was only five tenths percent silver in the denarius. And prices in this period rose in most parts of the empire by nearly a thousand percent. The only people who were getting paid in gold were the barbarian troops hired by the emperors. The barbarians were so barbarous that they would only accept gold in payment for their services.

The situation did not change until the accession of Diocletian in the year 284. Shortly after his accession he raised the weight of the gold coinage, the aureus, to 60 to the pound - this was from a low of 72. But ten years later, he finally abandoned the silvered coinage, which by this time was simply a bronze coin dipped in silver rather quickly. He abandoned that completely and tried to issue a new silver coin which was struck at 96 coins to the pound of silver, called the argenteus. This argenteus was fixed as equal to fifty of the old denarii, the old coinage. It was designed to respond to the need for higher-tariffed coins in the marketplace, to reflect the inflation. He also issued a new bronze coin tariffed at ten denarii, called the nummus. But less than a decade later, that silver coin had gone from being tariffed at 50 of the old to now equaling 100 of the old, and the bronze coinage from 10 denarii to 20; in other words, a hundred percent inflation. In other words, despite his efforts Diocletian had not been able to stop the inflation.

The next emperor who interfered with the coinage in a meaningful way was to be Constantine, the first Christian emperor of Rome. Constantine in the year 312, which is also the year he issued the Edict of Toleration for Christianity, issued a new gold piece which he called by a new name, the solidus — solid gold. This was struck at 72 to the pound, so it was in fact debased over Diocletian's. These were very large issues and historians have puzzled over where he got all the gold; but I think the puzzle is not so much of a real puzzle once you begin to look at the legislation that took place.

First of all, he issued two new taxes: one was taxed on the estates of the senators, and this was rather new because senators generally were free of most taxes on their land. He also issued a tax on the capital of merchants; not their earnings, but their capital. This was to be levied every five years and it was to be paid in gold. He also required that the rents from the imperial estates, which were rented out to tenants, were to be paid only in gold. He took on the bullion reserves of his former partner Licinius who had extracted, by force, bullion from the treasuries of the cities of the Eastern Empire. In other words, any city that had any gold bullion or silver bullion left in its treasury, this was simply requisitioned by Licinius and this passed on now into the hands of Constantine who had gotten rid of Licinius in a civil war.

We're also told that he stripped the pagan temples of their treasuries. This he did rather late in his reign, still somewhat afraid apparently in the early days of angering the gods of Rome. As his Christianity became more fixed, he felt greater ease at robbing the temples. Now, Constantine's reform in one sense began the reversal of the process: the gold coinage was sufficiently large that it began to take hold and to circulate more freely. The silver coinage failed and, what was worse, at no time in this period did the central government try to control the token coinage. And the result of that was [that] token coinage was being minted not only by the imperial mints, but also by the mints of cities. In other words, if a city couldn't pay its costs, pay its salaries to its employees, it simply struck up some token coinage and issued that.

By the late 3rd century we also begin to have massive appearance of what numismatists call counterfeits. I would say it would be called credit money today. People need small change, and they simply go and manufacture it — all of which of course means that the amount of token coinage in circulation is uncontrolled and increasingly massive. Now, one of the things that had happened in the course of this 3rd century inflation was that the government found that when it paid its troops in token coinage, or even in these debased silver coins, prices immediately rose. Every time the silver value of the denarius dropped, prices naturally rose; and the result of this was [that] the government, in order to try to protect its civil servants and its soldiers from the effects of inflation, began to demand payment of taxes in kind and services rather than in coin. They wound up, in effect, in repudiating their own issues, not accepting them for tax collection purposes.

With Constantine's reform, this situation changed somewhat and, slowly but surely, the government began to move away from collecting taxes in kind and from paying salaries in kind, and began to substitute paying salaries in gold and collecting taxes in gold. Over the long run, this meant that the gold standard was strengthened and gold remained the real money of the Roman Empire. However, the inflation did not end for the masses of the people. In other words, gold was a hedge against inflation for those who had it, and these were principally the troops and the civil servants. The taxpayers had to buy these gold coins in order to pay their taxes and so, if they were wealthy enough, they could afford to buy these gold coins which were increasingly expensive in terms of token money. If they were poorer they simply couldn't pay the taxes and this meant they lost their lands in one form or another or became delinquents; and we hear constant references to people abandoning their land, disappearing.

As a matter of fact in the 3rd century this was a constant problem in Rome: all sorts of people were trying to escape the increased taxes that the military needed. The army itself [had grown] from the time of Augustus, when they had about a quarter of a million troops, [to where] by the the time of Diocletian they had somewhat over 600,000. So the army itself had doubled in size in the course of this inflationary spiral, and obviously that contributed greatly to the inflation.

In addition, the administration of the state had grown enormously. Under Augustus essentially you had the imperial administration at Rome and the governors of different provinces, the secondary level of administration, and then the primary governmental units in the Roman Empire in this time were the cities, the municipalities. By the time of Diocletian this pattern had been broken apart. You had not one emperor but you had, under Diocletian, four emperors. Which meant four imperial courts, four Praetorian Guards, four palaces, four staffs, etc.

Under them were four Praetorian prefectures, regional administrative units with their staffs and their budgets. Under these four prefectures, they were then divided into 12 dioceses, each diocese having its administrative staff and so on. Under the diocesan rulers, the vicars of the diocese, we have the provinces. In Augustus' time there were approximately 20 provinces. Three hundred years later, with no substantial increase in territory, there were over a hundred provinces. They had simply began to divide and subdivide provinces for purposes of maintaining internal military control of these regions. In other words, the cost of policing the Roman state became increasingly enormous.

All these costs, then, are some of the reasons why the inflation took place; I'll get to others in a moment. To give you some idea of the situation after Constantine's reform of the gold, let me just briefly give you the figures for what it cost in terms of the silver coinage, or token coinage now, the denarius, for a pound of gold. In Diocletian's time, in the year 301, he fixed the price at 50,000 denarii for one pound of gold. Ten years later it had risen to 120,000. In 324, in other words 23 years after it was 50,000, it was now 300,000; and in 337, the year of Constantine's death, a pound of gold brought 20,000,000 denarii. And by the way, just as we are all familiar with the German currency of the [1920s] with the bigger stamp on it, the Roman coinage also has stamps and over-stamps on the metal, indicating multiples of value.

At one point one of the Roman emperors had a marvelous idea: instead of issuing a single coin he devised a method to handle the inflation. He took brass slugs and put them in a leather pouch and called it a follis; and people began passing these pouches back and forth as value. I guess it was the Roman equivalent to those baskets of paper we see in the pictures of Germany in the [1920s]. Interestingly enough, within ten years or so after that began, the word follis — which had meant this bag of coins — had now drifted to mean one of those slugs. One of those slugs was now the follis; so they couldn't even keep the bags stable, they too were inflated.

Now one interesting thing with all this inflation, I think it should be a great comfort to us: historians of prices in the Roman Empire have come to the conclusion that despite all of this inflation — or perhaps we should say, because of all this inflation — the price of gold, in terms of its purchasing power, remained stable from the first through the fourth century. In other words, gold remained, in terms of its purchasing power, a stable value whereas all this coinage just became increasingly worthless.

What were the causes of this inflation? First of all, war; the soldiers' pay rose from 225 denarii during the time of Augustus to 300 denarii in the time of Domitian, about a hundred years later. A century after Domitian, in the time of Septimius, it had gone from 300 to 500 denarii; and in the time of Caracalla, about 10 years later, it had gone to 750 denarii. In other words, the cost of the army was also rising in the terms of the coinage; so, as the coinage became more worthless, the cost of the army had to be increased. The advance in the soldier's pay in the rest of the 3rd century and into the 4th century is not known, we don't have figures. And one reason is that the soldiers were increasingly paid in terms of requisitions of supplies and goods in kind. They were literally given food, clothing, shelter and other commodities in lieu of pay - and this applied also to the civil service.

When one Roman emperor refused to pay a donative on his accession — this was a bonus given to the soldiers on the accession of the emperor — he was simply murdered by his troops. The Romans had had this kind of problem even in the days of the Republic: if the soldiers don't get paid they rather resent it. What we find is that the donatives had been given on the accession of a new emperor from the time of Augustus on; then they began to be given in the 3rd century every five years. By the time of Diocletian, donatives were given every year, so that the soldiers' donatives had in fact become part of their basic salary.

The size of the army, I think I indicated already, had increased. Doubled from the time of Augustus to Diocletian, and the size of the civil service I indicated also. Now, all these events strained the fiscal resources of the state beyond its ability to sustain itself, and the debasement and the taxation were both used to keep the ship of state going; frequently by debasing, then by taxation, and then often simply by accusing people of treason and confiscating their estates.

One of the Christian fathers, Saint Gregory Nazianzus, commented that war is the mother of taxes and I think that's a wonderful thing to keep in mind: war is the mother of taxes. And it's also, of course, the mother of inflation.

Now, what were the consequences of inflation? One of the odd things about inflation is, in the Roman Empire, that while the Roman state survived — the Roman state was not destroyed by inflation — what was destroyed by inflation was the freedom of the Roman people, and particularly the first victim was their economic freedom. Rome had basically a laissez-faire concept of state/economy relations. Except in emergencies, which were usually related to war, the Roman government generally followed a policy of free trade and minimal restriction on the economic activities of its population. But now under the pressure of this need to pay the troops and under the pressure of inflation, the liberty of the people began to be seriously eroded - and very rapidly.

We could start with the class known as the decurions. This was your prosperous, small and middle landowning class who were the dominate elements of the cities of the Roman Empire. They were the class from which were chosen the municipal counsels, the municipal magistrates and officials. Traditionally, they had viewed service in the governments of their towns as an honor and they had responded to this by donating, not merely their time, but their wealth to the betterment of the urban environment: building stadiums and bathhouses and repairing the streets and providing for pure water. These were considered benefactions, it was a kind of philanthropic element and their reward was, of course, public recognition and esteem.

This class, in the mid-3rd century, was assigned a task of collecting the taxes in the municipality that were being assessed by the central government. The central government could no longer collect its taxes effectively, so they made the decurion class collectively responsible for getting revenues and passing them on to the imperial government. The decurions, of course, had as much difficulty as anyone else in doing this, and the returns were, again, frequently inadequate so the government solved that problem by simply passing a law that any taxes that decurions could not collect from others, they would have to pay out of their own pocket. That's known as the incentive method for the tax collect. [laughter]

As you can well imagine, as the crises became greater and the economy was disrupted by civil conflicts and invasions and the effects of inflation, the decurions, strangely enough, no longer wanted to be decurions; and they began to abandon their lands, abandon their cities, and escape to wherever they could find refuge in other larger cities or other provinces. But they were not to be allowed to do that with impunity, and the law was then passed that any decurion discovered somewhere else was to be arrested, bound like a slave and carted back to his hometown where he was restored to his dignity as a decurion. [laughter]

This third century is also the period of the persecution of the church, and we find that at least some of the emperors must have had a sense of humor because when they passed a regulation that if a Christian was arrested and found guilty of capital punishment, namely believing in Christ, he was to not be executed but offered the option of becoming a decurion. [laughter]

Now, the merchants and the artisans were traditionally organized into guilds and chambers of commerce and that sort of thing. They now, too, came under government pressure because the government could not obtain enough material for the war machine through regular channels — people after all don't want all that token coinage — and so they were now compelled to make deliveries of goods. So that if you had a factory making garments, you now had to deliver so many garments to the government requisitions. If you had ships, you had to carry government goods in your ships. In other words, what we have here is a kind of nationalization of private enterprises, and this nationalization means that the people who risk their money and their talent are compelled to now serve the state whether they like it or not.

When people tried to get out of this they were then, by law, compelled to remain in the occupation that they were in. In other words, you couldn't change your job or your business. This was not sufficient because, after all, death is always a relief from taxes; and so the occupations were now made hereditary. When you died, your son had to take up your business, your trade, your profession. If your father was a shoemaker, you had to be a shoemaker. These started by being restricted to the defense-oriented industries but, of course, gradually it was realized that everything is defense-oriented and the system just developed.

The peasantry, known as the coloni, these were leaseholders on both imperial and private estates. They, too, formerly a free class were now under the same kinds of pressures that all smallholders were in this situation, and they began to drift away trying to find better opportunities, better leases, better occupations; and so under Diocletian the coloni were now bound to the soil. Anyone who had a lease on a particular piece of land could not give that lease up. More than that, they had to stay on the land and work it. In effect, this is the beginning of what in the Middle Ages is called serfdom, but it actually has its origins here in the late Roman society.

We know for example from studies of Palestine, particularly in the Rabbinical writings, that in the course of the 3rd and early 4th century the structure of landholding in Palestine changed very dramatically. Palestine in the 2nd century was largely composed of small peasant landholders with very small acreage, perhaps an average of two and a half acres. By the 4th century those small holders had virtually disappeared and been replaced by vast estates controlled by a few large landowners. The peasants working the estates were the same people, but they had in the meantime lost their land to the larger landowners.

In other words, landholding became a massive kind of agribusiness. In [the] course of this the population of Palestine, still principally Jewish, also changed in that the ownership of land passed from Jews to Gentiles; and the reason for that undoubtedly was that the only people with large amounts of cash who could buy out these smallholders who were in distress were, of course, the government officials. And we hear of them being called potentates, powerful ones. In effect there is a shift in the distribution of wealth in Palestine; and obviously, from other evidence, similar things were happening in other places.

With regard to taxes, they naturally increased across the board, but Diocletian decided that it was a very inefficient system that he had inherited; every province more or less had its own system of taxation going back to pre-Roman times, actually. And so he, with his military mind, demanded standardization. And what he did was to have all wealth, which was of course landed wealth, assessed in units of productivity. In other words, every person who had land was either singly, if he was a large landowner, fit into a particular unit, a tax unit called iugum, and those who were smaller landowners were collectively put into a iugum. This meant that the emperor for the first time had the basis of a national budget, something the Romans never had until Diocletian, and therefore he knew at any given time how many taxable units of wealth there were in any province, and he could simply levy an assessment and expect to get a fixed amount of money.

Unfortunately, this took no account of the fact that in agriculture productivity varies considerably from season to season, and that if an army has passed through your district it may take years to recover. The result is, we hear of massive petitions from whole regions asking the emperor to forgive them their taxes, to remit five years of past dues and so on and so forth; or to reduce the number of units of productivity to reflect the loss of population or the loss of materials. As a matter of fact, when people began to say "it used to be I had five people paying this unit of taxation, but two them have fled and it's only half the land in production," the response of the government was to say, "that doesn't matter, you still have to pay for the land that is now out of production." So, I mean, there's no relationship between taxes and actual productivity.

How did people protect themselves from this? Well, first of all, mortgages virtually ceased; long-term mortgages virtually ceased to be given. Long-term loans of any kind disappeared. No one will lend unless they are guaranteed payment in gold or silver bullion. In fact the government itself, under Diocletian and Constantine, refused to accept gold coins in payment of taxes, but insisted instead on gold bullion. So that the coins that you bought in the marketplace had to then be melted down and presented in the form of bullion; and the reason was [that] the government was never sure how adulterated its own gold coinage really was so they insisted on bullion.

Pledges and securities for crops and for loans were always in either gold, silver or indeed in crops themselves. In Egypt we have a document in which the banks have been refusing to accept coins with the divine image of the emperor; in other words, state issues. The government's reaction to that, of course, was to force the banks to accept the coinage. This led to wholesale corruption in Roman society as the black market became a normal part, as people refused to pass, to exchange, coinage at the officially fixed tariffs but instead coinage was passed on a market principle.

There were, obviously, flight from the land, massive evasion of taxes, people left their jobs, they left their homes, they left their social status. Now, Diocletian's final contribution to this continuing disaster was to issue his famous Edict on Prices [of] 301, a very famous instance of a massive effort by the government to control inflation by price controls. You have to realize that there is a little problem: the Roman Empire was a vast region running from Britain in the west to Iraq, Mesopotamia in the east; from the Rhine and the Danube to the Sahara. It included areas of very sophisticated and very primitive economies, and the result of that was the cost of living varied considerably from province to province. Egypt seems to have had the lowest cost of living, Palestine had a cost of living twice that of Egypt, and [Rome in Italy] had a cost of living twice that of Palestine.

Diocletian ignored that; he just issued a single standard price for the entire empire. The result was that in Egypt the effects of the Edict probably didn't exist because the price, the maximum price fixed in the Edict, was very rarely reached in Egypt. But it was the people in Rome, of course, [who] had the maximum price lower than the market price. The result of that, of course, was riots in the street, disappearance of goods; the penalty for violating the law was death, a very common penalty in Rome for almost anything; and the mentality of Diocletian comes out, and the cause of [the] maximum price edict comes out in the preface to the law. I'll just quote briefly some of it; when you hear these first words I'd like you to pay attention because you may have a different interpretation of them than Diocletian meant. He says, "if the excesses perpetrated by persons of unlimited and frenzied avarice could be checked," he doesn't mean himself [laughter], "if the general welfare could endure without harm this riotous license, if these uncontrolled madmen, the unscrupulous, the immoderate, the avaricious, could be persuaded to desist from plundering the wealth of all, then all would be well." Now who are these people? They are the merchants; they are the avaricious greedy types who cause inflation as we all know.

Then he speaks about himself and his three partners. "[We, the protectors of the] human race," sounds familiar doesn't it [laughter], "we are agreed that decisive legislation is necessary, so that the long-hoped-for solutions, which mankind itself could not provide..." You know, it's the same stuff [laughter], we can't do anything ourselves, we need the legislator. "By the remedies provided by our foresight [laughter], these things may be remedied for the general betterment of all." In fact, as you read through the rest of the thing it becomes clear that the reason the Edict on Prices [was] issued was that the soldiers were the principal victims of the inflation, and that Diocletian was afraid he was losing control of his army. And so the people who are to be protected are the soldiers and the other servants of the state.

Now Diocletian's monetary reforms were tentative steps in the right direction; except for the Edict on Prices which, by the way, simply didn't work and was gradually dropped. But his steps were not radical enough; his inability to create a sufficient supply of gold and silver coinage, combined with his continued reliance on payments in kind for taxes and salaries, and the continued issuance of fiat bronze coinage in endless amounts, failed to make a significant dent in the problem.

Constantine's reforms were also partial, but of sufficient vigor and radical character to make a difference. Through his willingness to extract by compulsion the gold reserves of the taxpayers, forcing them to disgorge their bullion, he placed an ever-increasing supply of gold in the hands of the government officials. This was increasingly used to pay military bonuses, salaries for bureaucrats, and even payments for certain public works. Increasingly, then, a two-tier monetary system emerged in which the government, the soldiers and the bureaucrats enjoyed the benefits of a gold standard while the non-governmental portion of the economy continued to struggle with a rapidly-inflating fiat currency.

The new gold solidus — circulated widely by its possessors, the government-salaried employees — sold at various market rates to customers who desperately needed it to pay their taxes. Thus the state had found a way to protect itself and its servants from the unwholesome effects of its own earlier inflationary cycle, while slowly withdrawing itself from the cumbersome and wasteful system of accepting taxes and paying salaries in kind. Meanwhile, the masses suffered from [a] massive injection of fiat money which they had to accept in payment for government requisitions of such gold or silver or other commodities which the government demanded.

Now, we may wish to find some lessons in this tale of [the] monetary policies of the late Roman Empire. The first lesson, I think, must be that if war is the health of the state, as Randolph Bourne said, it is poison to a stable and sound money. The Roman monetary crisis therefore was closely connected with the Roman military problem. Another lesson is that the problems become solvable when a ruler decides that something can be done and must be done. Diocletian and Constantine clearly were willing to act to protect their own ruling-class interest, the military and the civil service. Monetary reforms were necessary to win the support of the troops and the bureaucrats that composed the only real constituency of the Roman state, and the two-tier system was designed to this end. It brought about a stable monetary standard for the ruling group who did not hesitate to secure it at the expense of the mass of the population.

The Roman state survived. The liberty of the Roman people did not. When freedom became possible in the west in the 5th century, with the barbarian invasions, people took advantage of the possibility of change. The tax burden remained burdensome even after the gold standard was re-established. The peasantry had become totally alienated from the Roman state because it was no longer free. The business community likewise was no longer free, and the middle class of the urban cities was no longer free.

The economy of the west was perhaps more fatally weakened than that of the east, and when we read in the writings of the early 5th century Christian priest Salvian of Marseille his account of why the Roman state was collapsing in the west — he was writing from France, Gaul — Salvian says that the Roman state is collapsing because it deserved collapse; because it had denied the first premise of good government which was justice to the people. And by justice he meant a just system of taxation. Salvian tells us, and I don't think he's exaggerating, that one of the reasons why the Roman state collapsed in the 5th century was that the Roman people, the mass of the population, had but one wish after being captured by the barbarians: that they would never again fall under the rule of the Roman bureaucracy. In other words, the Roman state was the enemy, the barbarians were the liberators. And this undoubtedly was due to the inflation of the 3rd century. While the state had solved the monetary problem for its own constituents, it had failed to solve that monetary problem for the masses and continued to use an oppressive system of taxation in order to fill the coffers of the ruling bureaucrats and military. Thank you. [applause]

The Road to Enlightenment Is Littered with Irritating, Superfluous Parentheses

Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:30:00 +0000

Originally published at http://bendiken.net/2007/01/01/the-road-to-lisp and the ALU Wiki.

I, Arto Bendiken, do solemnly offer these my responses to The Road to Lisp Survey:

When did you first try Lisp seriously, and which Lisp family member was it?

I read Peter Seibel’s Practical Common Lisp and Paul Graham’s On Lisp sometime in mid-2005 or thereabouts. Both proved to be useful introductions to Common Lisp and gave me an initial appreciation of the unique characteristics of Lisp-derived programming languages.

After being sufficiently enlightened by those two books, I moved onward to Scheme. This came about primarily as a result of struggling my way through the Wizard Book and watching the 6.001 video lectures, as well as perusing various online tutorials and papers. I’ve been programming in Scheme ever since, with the occasional foray into Common Lisp.

Where did your road originate?

I first started programming at the tender age of 11, with the unholy combination of BASIC and C. (Yes, I’ve since worked hard to overcome the brain damage that caused, thank you very much for asking.)

Having always been fascinated by the concept of artificial intelligence, I gophered all the AI programs I could find as soon as the Internet hit the scene (which was just a couple of years later, in my case). To my dismay, these programs were pretty much all written in an obscure, half-forgotten language called LISP (the name was still usually uppercased back then, as I recall).

At that point in time, this was immensely frustrating. I wanted to write my ELIZA clone and my first neural net in C, dammit, and I was pretty sure that example programs written in all uppercase text and containing lots and lots of irritating, obviously superfluous parentheses wouldn’t help me learn how to do so. Oh, the impatience of youth.

I proceeded to ignore Lisp for the next decade, wondering aimlessly through the vast wasteland of mainstream programming technologies.

What led you to try Lisp?

It took half a dozen other programming languages, and seven years of full-time software development, before I came full circle. The key ingredients were Graham’s writings, Seibel’s book, and familiarity with Ruby. But not to get ahead of myself; the story resumes at the turn of the millennium.

At that time, I was employed as a J2EE developer at a largish company, working on various horribly overengineered, enterprisey systems. It was bad enough, at times, that I had almost come to regret my choice of a career. Writing software was apparently a joyless and dull activity, with little room for individual creativity. Half the time was wasted fighting the bloated toolchain, and the other half was lost to red tape, useless meetings or just the constant interruptions in the cubicles we developers worked in. Thank goodness for overtime. (But of course, it all paid very well; selling your soul tends to.)

In my copious free time, I worked on a 3D physics engine and did some Linux kernel hacking in C and assembler; just enough to keep the old passion for programming alive. Then one day, though I didn’t know it at the time, I happened to take a first small step in the right direction at a crucial crossroads: I needed to write a specialized web crawler and had read somewhere that Google was using a programming language called Python, so out of pure curiosity I decided to try and implement my crawler in Python.

After embarking on this project, it didn’t take me long to understand how much vastly more productive Python coding was compared to Java’s endless boilerplate drudgery. Python truly sold me on the benefits of dynamically-typed languages and rapid prototyping. I began to see that many of the sacred GoF design patterns were not, in actuality, grand universal truths of software engineering, but simply collateral damage caused by incidental limitations in the abstractive power and object model of certain manifestly-typed programming languages.

Fast forward a couple more years. I had, naturally, ditched Java (and the old job as a code monkey) for good, and was hacking away with Python, mostly happily. However, I had another date with destiny coming up: a superficially similar scripting language called Ruby was on the rise, and to find out what all the fuss was about, I went ahead and learned that, too.

The similarity between Python and Ruby turned out to be skin-deep. After grokking the initially strange new idioms in Ruby, I recognized that it was a yet more powerful language than Python — the abstraction gap wasn’t anything as wide as it had been from Java to Python, but it was definitely there. The Ruby community also offered a (for me) more attractive philosophy than Python’s “our way or the highway”, so I promptly chose the highway — good riddance, Python.

By this time I had already stumbled across Graham’s eloquent writings regarding the Blub Paradox and the power continuum of programming languages, and I’d also read his book Hackers and Painters. From my own first-hand experience, I was thoroughly comfortable with the (at times surprisingly controversial) notion that programming languages indeed do vary in expressive power.

It was also fast becoming obvious to me that I was something of a power junkie: though I liked Ruby just fine, the grass is always greener on the other side, and soon enough I was curious to find out if there really was something yet more powerful out there. Researching the matter extensively brought me, of course, squarely back to dear Old Faithful, per Graham’s very words. Oh, the horror.

It took some serious mental juggling to overcome the deeply-rooted trauma of my unfortunate first encounter with the language, and to understand that despite the widespread meme that Lisp was dead, it wasn’t really any deader than usual that in fact, being not an invention but a discovery, Lisp is essentially unkillable and is destined to rise time and again to the murmured incantations of Greenspun’s Tenth in the pallid, ghostly glow of a display monitor in a dark room, forever and ever.

More seriously, from my experience with Python and Ruby I had already learned not to judge a book by its cover. After all, I had overcome the weird significant whitespace to hack in Python, as well as Ruby’s equally weird block syntax to think in closures. I could give a shot at tackling lots of irritating, possibly superfluous parentheses, right? (Besides, I like horror stories, so I knew Lisp would haunt me if I didn’t.)

Ruby proved to be the perfect penultimate stepping stone, priming me for Lisp: not only did the language familiarize me with symbols, closures and the basics of metaprogramming, but many eminent Ruby hackers were also erstwhile Lispers. Ruby’s Lisp heritage often came up in discussions, and was mostly presented in a favorable light. As Matz, Ruby’s creator, explained: “Some may say Ruby is a bad rip-off of Lisp or Smalltalk, and I admit that. But it is nicer to ordinary people.”

With uncanny timing, Seibel’s Practical Common Lisp was published online at just the right moment to provide instant gratification for my curiosity. I finished the book in a couple of days, followed it up with a good dose of On Lisp, and as they say, that’s all she wrote. I had been lost, and now I was found again.

What other languages have you been using most?

For systems programming, I still use C — but only as a glorified, somewhat portable assembly language. While I think it fulfills this limited role adequately, I have lately been looking into replacing it with a static subset of Lisp (perhaps something like Pre-Scheme).

My daily work, though, mostly involves web development, where my tools of the trade are Ruby and PHP. I use Ruby because it’s an enjoyable and thorougly dynamic language, essentially Smalltalk for the mainstream. It’s nowhere near as “pure” as Smalltalk, but still manages to swing some pretty powerful metaprogramming facilities (as demonstrated by the Rails web framework).

I use PHP simply because it is ubiquitous and, despite the language’s obvious failings, there’re some very useful web applications written in PHP. It’s a dynamic language (which makes it tolerable), but not a particularly good one; if I had to describe PHP in one adjective, it would be “impoverished”. That only applies to its abstractive capabilities, though, and not to the wealth of available libraries and software, or to the massive commercial and open-source ecosystem thriving around the language. Still, as Java could be described as the present-day COBOL, so PHP is essentially BASIC or Pascal for the web; if used in isolation, it will surely cripple the mind.

Other languages I use on a semi-regular basis are Python and JavaScript.

Something I’ve noticed in the past year is that Lisp idioms have begun permeating through to my code in other programming languages. This has really thrown a spotlight on the specific limitations of the various languages I use, because so few of them can keep up (Ruby and JavaScript perhaps being the only real contestants, on a good day).

Most recently, I’ve been dabbling in Haskell and Erlang to improve my comprehension of best-of-breed functional programming and distributed computing techniques, respectively; moreover, I’m keeping close tabs on Factor and other modern Forth-derivatives, and of course, I can’t help but admire what the Smalltalkers have built with Squeak. (I suppose once you’ve reached the Source, being a polyglot becomes second nature.)

How far have you gotten in your study of Lisp?

Right now, I know just enough to realize how much I have yet to learn. Lisp and the lambda calculus served as an eye-opening introduction to the more theoretical aspects of computation and information theory, and have forced me to accept that despite over a decade of practical experience, I didn’t really have a clue what programming was fundamentally all about. I may still not have a crystal-clear grasp of the Big Picture, but at least I’m on the right path.

I’ve become fairly experienced in Scheme, but am yet somewhat less so in Common Lisp. Despite the early BASIC-induced brain damage, I did manage to successfully rewire my neural pathways to handle all the central new concepts, from higher-order functions and functional programming to closures, multiple dispatch in CLOS, continuations, and, of course, macros and syntactic abstraction. I’ve learned first-hand what Dijkstra meant when he claimed that Lisp has assisted programmers in thinking previously impossible thoughts.

Currently, I’m busy implementing several small-scale, experimental metacircular interpreters and am pushing further into mastering the wealth of compilation techniques developed over the past four decades. I’m on my second reading of Christian Quiennec’s Lisp in Small Pieces, and am looking forward to soon tackling Peter Norvig’s Paradigms of Artificial Intelligence Programming, Gregor Kiczales’s The Art of the Metaobject Protocol, and Chris Okasaki’s Purely Functional Data Structures.

I’ve also been reading a lot of the relevant academic literature published since the 1970s; for instance, the Lambda Papers and the myriad works of Henry Baker have been particularly inspiring. I continue to be struck by the harsh reality of the often-asserted, but seldom-accepted, truth that most of the great work in software was indeed done very early on, with virtually no further fundamental progress having been made during the past couple of decades.

It’s understandable how this state of affairs leads some old-timers to cynically grumble how those who ignore history are doomed to only reinvent it. However, it also implies that there may surely still be a whole untapped frontier before our very noses, with only a comparatively few people seriously attempting to explore it. In Alan Kay’s words: “The real romance is out ahead and yet to come. The computer revolution hasn’t started yet.”

If so, then opportunity truly abounds for an ambitious new generation of programmers, unafraid of paradigm shifts and looking to stake their claim — if they can first find their way to the frontier along the very long, windy road littered with the roadblocks of commonly accepted wisdom and conventional industry practices.

What do you think of Lisp so far?

Realizing the equivalence between code and data, and understanding how Lisp’s uniform syntax and macros conspire to bridge the two in practice, was an epiphany something akin to encountering E=mc² for the first time.

I fully understand how many Lispers feel something like prophets who have ventured to the Other Side, catching a brief glimpse of a higher realm and the transcendent fabric of reality. It’s no wonder at all that the meme regarding the “smug Lisp weenies” persists, and not infrequently hits home, too. How could it be otherwise?

I’m thrilled at how Lisp allows me to solve problems in the most direct conceivable representation, meaning that I spend more time thinking about the solution than actually typing it in on the keyboard. I like that any new control structure or language extension I can imagine, I can also implement; I’m restricted only by my own abilities, not by some arbitrary constraints imposed by the programming language.

I’m cautiously optimistic about the longevity of sufficiently well-written, abstract Lisp code (that is, code that doesn’t explicitly rely on incidental present facilities such as IPv4). Writing in some other language, I certainly wouldn’t expect (or want) my code to survive a couple of decades unchanged; whereas with Lisp it seems that might be a real possibility, since you can work at a higher abstraction level, almost directly in touch with the actual problem domain.

In terms of expressive power, Lisp lacks any true competition due to its unique ability to assimilate any new programming paradigm when one crops up. (Indeed, “embrace and extend” would be fitting words to describe the manner in which Common Lisp assimilated object-oriented programming in the 1980s, given that CLOS goes far and beyond the OOP facilities found in most object-oriented mainstream programming languages.)

What’s more, as has occasionally been remarked, other programming languages may not be able to catch up to Lisp without actually becoming Lisp — which would have to be the ultimate expression of Greenspun’s Tenth: the alien creature bursting out from within the rib cage to take over the host.

In view of all the above, I definitely buy Graham’s argument that Lisp is a competitive advantage, a supremely malleable medium for exploring the gap between what is currently possible and what is ultimately possible. (Which is the very reason, of course, why Lisp became the lingua franca for that hardest of problems: artificial intelligence.)

I think this also ties into the perceived smugness of Lispers: the lots of irritating, supposedly superfluous parentheses serve to actually hide the secret weapon in plain sight. It’s right there, up for grabs, but so very few ever approach it with the right mindset needed to grok it. So, if you are one of those very few, how could you not be a little smug about having been smart enough to self-select into that elite?

This attitude has a serious flaw, though: a superiority complex of this magnitude inevitably induces complacency. Giddy with the omnipotent abstract power afforded to us by Lisp in its platonic form, it’s all too easy to ignore the very real problems with the presently-existing, concrete dialects of Lisp.

So, while I’m sufficiently convinced that Lisp is the most powerful programming language and paradigm yet invented (or discovered, if you will), I find neither of the major dialects, Common Lisp or Scheme, particularly satisfactory in their present form; Common Lisp is just plain anachronistic, and Scheme is too minimalistic to be all that useful in itself.

Birch’s corollary to Greenspun’s Tenth rings dangerously true: “Even an ad-hoc, informally-specified, bug-ridden, slow implementation of half of Common Lisp is better than most other languages.”

Given that any useful new concept introduced in some lesser language can be copied into Lisp at will, what incentive is there to truly push the envelope in Lisp itself? Apparently not much, if recent history is an indication. The Lisp machines seem to have been the apex of Lisp, a brilliant achievement still unequalled (except by the Smalltalkers, as always). These wonderous machines have been followed by two decades of standstill, or even retrograde, progress.

Richard P. Gabriel wrote in his famous essay Lisp: Good News, Bad News, How to Win Big: “On the other hand, there should be a strong effort towards the next generation of Lisp. The worst thing we can do is to stand still as a community, and that is what is happening.” The thing is that Gabriel wrote that in 1991, for crying out loud.

Not only is Common Lisp anachronistic, it seems stagnant, a victim of its own very success. This is why personally I’ve focused on Scheme instead of Common Lisp: I don’t want to get trapped into accepting that Common Lisp is already so damned good that it doesn’t need to change or to be reinvented from time to time. I don’t want to get comfortable with Common Lisp, and then, gradually, complacent. I want to keep asking: is this all there is?

The Scheme community is a much more chaotic, fragmented space, but at least the lights are still on. I think Scheme, with its minimalistic, elegant core, provides a decent basis on top of which something new, something truly great, might again be built without having to throw out the baby with the bath water.

After all, isn’t perhaps the single most significant quality of Lisp its ability to, without all that much effort, bootstrap a whole new disparate language implementation on top of an existing one, taking full advantage of all the compilation facilities and built-in libraries of the existing implementation?

Lisp is literally the perfect language for reinventing itself, and I think it’s about time it did so.