dgraywatson

The republican movement in Ireland rose during the 19thC and it all came to a head with the "Easter Uprising" in Dublin in 1916 which was eventually crushed after five days of fighting between the republicans and the British army. In the aftermath, the leaders front of a firing squad. This was actually a massive mistake by the British, firstly it made them martyrs and secondly it resulted in a new younger generation of determined republican leaders who realized that the armed conflict against the British had to be done in a more subtle way.

What followed was what we call "asymmetrical warfare. Senior officials in the army and police were targeted and assassinated predominantly with bombs and fire arms. Britain, having to cope with the aftermath of the 1914-18 world war, the failure of the black and tans, wanted to get the Irish problem solved and out of the way. The British called a truce and invited a delegation of republican leaders for talks in London to negotiate a settlement. The Irish were led by Michael Collins and Arthur Griffiths and the Republican position was clear and in many respects understandable. The desire to have a clean break and become a Republic made sense rather than just a devolved status or home rule with Britain being so close to Ireland. The republican movement feared that home rule wouldn't be sufficient enough to change the status of Ireland in the British isles and London would be tempted to interfere. The geographical position of Ireland was a crucial stumbling block because it was part of the United Kingdom and that's what complicated things. If it was in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, becoming a dominion like New Zealand would probably satisfied most in the south of Ireland. However, it was the status of northern part of Ireland where things really got complicated, the majority of the people were not only loyal to the crown but saw themselves as British. They were protestant and wanted nothing to do with a catholic Ireland in the south. There were a lot of moving parts to all of these issues, but the republican demand that all of Ireland should be a Republic was unrealistic. There would be fierce resistance to this in the north and in London and there is no way that London would walk away and abandon the protestant majority in Ulster.

The Republican movement demanded a full pint of Guinness and the British offered three-quarters of a pint of brown ale - where the six counties in the north would remain part of the UK. There is another aspect to this, the British may have decided that there is a possibility that the arrangement might be temporary and left the door open for the possibility of Ireland returning to the UK, this would be unlikely if Ireland was a Republic. Also, home rule itself might have been easier to sell to the north in the hope that both sides could negotiate some union in the future as the loyalists in the north wanted nothing to do with being a Republic. What is overlooked is that the vast majority of the protestants and loyalists lived in the northern part of Ulster and counties such as Fermanagh, Armagh were predominantly catholic. When the six counties were nominated as the boundary between the Free State and Ulster this was a concern with the Irish delegation but the British threw in a sweetener, proposing a border commission to revisit the boundary if the Irish accepted the offer of the Free State. This never came about and the UK government were never serious about giving up more territory. For the state of Northern Ireland to have any legitimacy within the UK it couldn't be any smaller than the six counties referred to as Ulster. For their part the republican negotiators, after decades of agitation and a particularly long slog over the previous 15 years, the republican movement had nothing to show for it. To double down with the war in the hope that a better deal would be offering might not have been that appealing. Therefor to turn down what London was prepared to give up was just all too tempting to pass on, going back to Dublin empty handed and returning to square one would have been a disappointment. The Irish Parliament narrowly voted in favor of home rule as a Free State rather than a Republic, with the northern part referred to as Ulster remaining in the UK. The republican opponents of this deal were led by Eamon De Valera who, with his followers walked out of the Dail' in protest. They believed that the fact that the British called a truce and were prepared to enter into talks indicated that the momentum was in their favor and the British were ready to cave in. This seems to be an overly optimistic view which Michael Collins didn't believe in, and consequently compromised from the previously hard line position of an Irish Republic which included the north. With De Valera and his supporters opposing the deal, this impasse eventually led to a civil war in the Irish Free State.

However, what unfolded in the north was that the catholic minority in Ulster became the main casualties of Ireland becoming a Republic. Now a well entrenched minority, politically isolated from the south, they were abused and humiliated in their own communities by the protestant majority. They became second and third class citizens which resulted in them being cut off from educational and employment opportunities as well as decent housing. Twenty years after the south becoming a Republic, things came to a head with the civil rights marches in Ulster. Ultimately the back lash from the RUC and the protestant majority, attacked the marchers and many catholic family's were forced out of their homes. This created civil unrest in Catholic areas and eventually the IRA reconstituted itself in the north and "the troubles" as they were known, went on for about 30 years with thousands of people being killed and injured. Although the British army was initially well received by the Catholics, eventually they were seen as another oppressive weapon by the British state alongside the mostly protestant RUC, the B-specials and the UDF. Twenty years on, it all seemed like a very unsatisfactory outcome, the only winners being the Irish Republic. Its constitution claimed the counties in the north, but they just got on with its affairs and Northern Ireland became something of a tragedy, but it didn't directly effect them. By the late 1970's and 1980's it was clear to anyone that the partitioning of the island and the south eventually becoming a Republic made the goal of a United Ireland even harder and just solidified the hatred between the loyalists and republicans in the north. Loyalists in Ulster were also very hostile and suspicious of the Irish Republic who opted out of WW2 and declared neutrality.

The "troubles" in northern was a headache for successive British governments from the late 1960's to the early 1990's. During this time London was focused on defeating the IRA, however, eventually it became apparent that even if the IRA could be defeated there would still need to be a political settlement between both communities in Northern Ireland. In international as domestic politics, the ground can shift from underneath you and to a large extent this happened with the troubles in Northern Ireland. With Margret Thatcher leaving office and the cold war finishing, this created a different global political environment for hope. With both sides in Northern Ireland punching themselves to a standstill and the enormous cost becoming an issue in British politics, this all created the environment for compromise between all sides. So in the end by the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, both sides were ready for a different course. In the end the republicans had to settle for a power sharing government in Stormont rather than a united Ireland, with no real guarantee of being part of a unified Ireland in the future. The Loyalists gave up on the RUC and the UDF and entered into power sharing with the nationalist parties. Ironically after the IRA gave up its campaign of violence, the political fortunes of Sinn' Fein took an upward curve, whereby they eventually became the largest republican party in the Northern Ireland assembly.

From the loyalist position the previously intransigent position of not talking to Sinn' Fein or ever allowing them into Stormont, was over turned by their party conferences. Perhaps seeing the tide coming in, they were persuaded that with good will being offered by the Irish Republic, the British government and the USA all at a high point, might have been the best opportunity to get the best agreement. Always being fearful of allowing a big Catholic foot in the door that would get bigger and that would work to prize Northern Ireland out of the UK and eventually join a united Ireland was always too risky. Instead they changed their position and were encouraged to go down this route, believing that it would be the best option to take to preserve Northern Irelands position in the UK. One of the main provisions is the ability to call a referendum for Northern Ireland to vote for return to a united Ireland. This is obviously a major issue as demographically Ireland is now majority Catholic. However, it's not clear that Ulster would vote to leave the union. The two parties that dominate Stormont are Sinn' Fein and the Ulster Unionists but the middle ground or moderate parties support of the status quo might be the determining factor in any referendum. After two decades of relative stability, why would the moderates vote to possibly upend this and go back to conflict "stick to the devil you know, not the one you don't" Be that as it may, the Loyalist hard liners accused the agreement as a betrayal and was designed to jettison Ulster from the UK to Ireland. Many in the provisional IRA said it was an agreement designed to keep Ulster in the UK indefinitely. These two groups were hostile to the Good Friday agreement, but for opposite reasons.

The republican movement in Ireland came to a head with the "Easter Uprising" in Dublin in 1916 which was eventually crushed after five days of fighting between the republicans and the British army. In the aftermath, the leaders ended up in front of a firing squad. This was actually a massive mistake by the British, firstly it made them martyrs and secondly it resulted in a new younger generation of determined republican leaders who realized that the armed conflict against the British had to be done in a more subtle way.

What followed was senior officials in the army and police were targeted and assassinated predominantly with bombs and fire arms. Britain, having to cope with the aftermath of the 1914-18 world war, the failure of the black and tans, wanted to get the Irish problem solved and out of the way. The British called a truce and invited a delegation of republican leaders for talks in London to negotiate a settlement. The Irish were led by Michael Collins and Arthur Griffiths and the Republican position was clear and in many respects understandable. The desire to have a clean break and become a Republic made sense rather than just a devolved status or home rule with Britain being so close to Ireland. The republican movement feared that home rule wouldn't be sufficient enough to change the status of Ireland in the British isles and London would be tempted to interfere. The geographical position of Ireland was a crucial stumbling block because it was part of the United Kingdom and that's what complicated things. If it was in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, becoming a dominion like New Zealand would probably satisfied most in the south of Ireland. However, it was the status of northern part of Ireland where things really got complicated, the majority of the people were not only loyal to the crown but saw themselves as British. They were protestant and wanted nothing to do with a catholic Ireland in the south. There were a lot of moving parts to all of these issues, but the republican demand that all of Ireland should be a Republic was unrealistic. There would be fierce resistance to this in the north and in London and there is no way that London would walk away and abandon the protestant majority in Ulster.

The Republican movement demanded a full pint of Guinness and the British offered three-quarters of a pint of brown ale - where the six counties in the north would remain part of the UK. There is another aspect to this, the British may have decided that there is a possibility that the arrangement might be temporary and left the door open for the possibility of Ireland returning to the UK, this would be unlikely if Ireland was a Republic. Also, home rule itself might have been easier to sell to the north in the hope that both sides could negotiate some union in the future as the loyalists in the north wanted nothing to do with being a Republic. What is overlooked is that the vast majority of the protestants and loyalists lived in the northern part of Ulster and counties such as Fermanagh, Armagh were predominantly catholic. When the six counties were nominated as the boundary between the Free State and Ulster this was a concern with the Irish delegation but the British threw in a sweetener, proposing a border commission to revisit the boundary if the Irish accepted the offer of the Free State. This never came about and the UK government were never serious about giving up more territory. For the state of Northern Ireland to have any legitimacy within the UK it couldn't be any smaller than the six counties referred to as Ulster. For their part the republican negotiators, after decades of agitation and a particularly long slog over the previous 15 years, the republican movement had nothing to show for it. To double down with the war in the hope that a better deal would be offering might not have been that appealing. Therefor to turn down what London was prepared to give up was just all too tempting to pass on, going back to Dublin empty handed and returning to square one would have been a disappointment. The Irish Parliament narrowly voted in favor of home rule as a Free State rather than a Republic, with the northern part referred to as Ulster remaining in the UK. The republican opponents of this deal were led by Eamon De Valera who, with his followers walked out of the Dail' in protest. They believed that the fact that the British called a truce and were prepared to enter into talks indicated that the momentum was in their favor and the British were ready to cave in. This seems to be an overly optimistic view which Michael Collins didn't believe in, and consequently compromised from the previously hard line position of an Irish Republic which included the north. With De Valera and his supporters opposing the deal, this impasse eventually led to a civil war in the Irish Free State.

In 1949 Ireland would eventually become a Republic, but Arthur Griffiths and Michael Collins would never live to see that. Griffiths died of a heart attack a year after home rule and Michael Collings would be a fatality in the civil war in the south. So in the end, they got three-quarters of a pint of Guinness, so, taking up the offer and becoming the Irish Free State was in the end the right route to take, all be it 25 years later.

However, what unfolded in the north was that the catholic minority in Ulster became the main casualties of Ireland becoming a Republic. Now a well entrenched minority, politically isolated from the south, they were abused and humiliated in their own communities by the protestant majority. They became second and third class citizens which resulted in them being cut off from educational and employment opportunities as well as decent housing. Twenty years after the south becoming a Republic, things came to a head with the civil rights marches in Ulster. Ultimately the back lash from the RUC and the protestant majority, attacked the marchers and many catholic family's were forced out of their homes. This created civil unrest in Catholic areas and eventually the IRA reconstituted itself in the north and "the troubles" as they were known, went on for about 30 years with thousands of people being killed and injured. Although the British army was initially well received by the Catholics, eventually they were seen as another oppressive weapon by the British state alongside the mostly protestant RUC, the B-specials and the UDF.

The "troubles" in northern was a headache for successive British governments from the late 1960's to the early 1990's. During this time London was focused on defeating the IRA, however, eventually it became apparent that even if the IRA could be defeated there would still need to be a political settlement between both communities in Northern Ireland. In international as domestic politics, the ground can shift from underneath you and to a large extent this happened with the troubles in Northern Ireland. With Margret Thatcher leaving office and the cold war finishing, this created a different global political environment for hope. With both sides in Northern Ireland punching themselves to a standstill and the enormous cost becoming an issue in British politics, this all created the environment for compromise between all sides. So in the end by the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, both sides were ready for a different course. In the end the republicans had to settle for a power sharing government in Stormont rather than a united Ireland. The Loyalists gave up on the RUC and the UDF and entered into a power sharing agreement with the Sinn' Fein to govern from Stormont. The real compromise from the Sinn' Fein/IRA was settling for power sharing with no real guarantee of being part of a unified Ireland. . Ironically after the IRA gave up its campaign of violence, the political fortunes of Sinn' Fein took an upward curve, whereby the became the largest republican party in the Northern Ireland assembly.

From the loyalist position the previously intransigent position of not talking to Sinn' Fein or ever allowing them into Stormont, was over turned by their party conferences. Perhaps seeing the tide coming in, they were persuaded that with good will being offered by the Irish Republic, the British government and the USA all at a high point, might have been the best opportunity to get the best agreement. Always being fearful of allowing a big Catholic foot in the door that would get bigger and that would work to prize Northern Ireland out of the UK and eventually join a united Ireland was always too risky. Instead they changed their position and were encouraged to go down this route, believing that it would be the best option to take to preserve Northern Irelands position in the UK. One of the main provisions is the ability to call a referendum for Northern Ireland to vote for return to a united Ireland. This is obviously a major issue as demographically Ireland is now majority Catholic. However, it's not clear that Ulster would vote to leave the union. The two parties that dominate Stormont are Sinn' Fein and the Ulster Unionists but the middle ground or moderate parties support of the status quo might be the determining factor in any referendum. After two decades of relative stability, why would the moderates vote to possibly upend this and go back to conflict "stick to the devil you know, not the one you don't" Be that as it may, the Loyalist hard liners accused the agreement as a betrayal and was designed to jettison Ulster from the UK to Ireland. Many in the provisional IRA said it was an agreement designed to keep Ulster in the UK indefinitely. These two groups were hostile to the Good Friday agreement, but for opposite reason's.

During the 1960's and 1970's there was paranoia in the USA regarding nuclear power. Nuclear power first came to prominence was the plutonium and uranium bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. In Hiroshima the bomb killed 40,000 people instantaneously and another 30,000 days weeks and months after the attacks, the city was destroyed and radiation was an issue for decades to come. So it's hardly surprising that the green movement would be hostile to nuclear power as a source of energy whose misuse could lead to devastating consequences. An explosion, or a meltdown of the nuclear reactor could lead to a radioactive leak that would be devastating to the surrounding environment.

The China Syndrome taps in to this paranoia, and on viewing this today, you'd have to wonder why the Nuclear industry didn't sue the studio who made this film as a gross ,misrepresentation of the nuclear industry. The reason they didn't was because only a few days after the film was released there was an accident at the nuclear power plant on Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. The result was a ruptured steam pipe and a small amount of radiation was released into the air. To this day it was the worst accident at a nuclear power plant, although it has to be said that nobody died and any radiation that got into the air was no threat to life . Nevertheless, it was a massive publicity boost for the film and only reinforced the anti nuclear campaigns many countries. The naysayers over nuclear power have always argued that there only has to be one major disaster, and eventually it will happen, but or the time being nuclear power has an impressive safety record. The USA has 50 nuclear power plants, France 18, UK 5, Switzerland 3 and Germany zero.

So it's all a mixed bag, some countries going all in, others like Germany and the UK with huge populations with very little nuclear power. Many people think that the anti-nuclear lobby was spearheaded by Green Peace or lobbyists like the Sera Club, in fact it was heavily financed and supported by the fossil fuel industry who saw nuclear power as a threat to their monopoly. The film itself is a thriller, with an impressive cast with the likes of veteran actor Jack Lemon, the smart looking and articulate Jane Fonda and a young Michael Douglas all supported by an assortment of character actors.